Border prep

What the law says here

• At a UK port, airport or the border area, an examining officer can question you under Schedule 7 whether or not they have any grounds for suspecting you individually.

  Source: Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 2(4) (legislation.gov.uk, checked 2026-09-08)

• You must give the examining officer any information in your possession that they request.

  Source: Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 5(a) (legislation.gov.uk, checked 2026-09-08)

• That duty explicitly extends to passwords for your electronic devices.

  Source: Schedule 7 (Terrorism Act 2000) Code of Practice (Oct 2025), para 55 (assets.publishing.service.gov.uk, checked 2026-09-08)

• You must also provide access to the device itself if asked — including unlocking it with a passcode, thumbprint or any other access control.

  Source: Schedule 7 (Terrorism Act 2000) Code of Practice (Oct 2025), para 61 (assets.publishing.service.gov.uk, checked 2026-09-08)

• Wilfully failing to comply with any of these duties is a criminal offence.

  Source: Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 18(1)(a) (legislation.gov.uk, checked 2026-09-08)

• The maximum penalty on summary conviction is three months’ imprisonment.

  Source: Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 18(2)(a) (legislation.gov.uk, checked 2026-09-08)

Device steps, before you travel

None of this is advice to refuse a lawful demand — each line describes a device state in a vendor’s own words. See preparing a phone before a border crossing for the fuller version.

• Turning off biometric unlock leaves the passcode as the only way in: Apple’s own documentation lists entering the passcode, or unlocking with Face ID, Touch ID or Optic ID, as the alternatives once the most-protected data class has locked.

  Source: Apple Platform Security Guide — "Data Protection classes", published 19 Dec 2024, Apple (support.apple.com, checked 2026-09-08)

• Powering the device off returns its default app-data storage to a locked, credential-encrypted state that stays inaccessible until the device is unlocked again.

  Source: Android Open Source Project, "File-based encryption" (source.android.com), as fetched 2026-09-08 (source.android.com, checked 2026-09-08)

• If Advanced Data Protection is turned on, Apple itself does not hold the encryption keys for those iCloud categories and cannot recover that data even if asked.

  Source: Apple, "iCloud data security overview" (support.apple.com/en-gb/102651), as fetched 2026-09-08 (support.apple.com, checked 2026-09-08)

What to expect after

• A device can be detained for examination for up to seven days from when the detention begins.

  Source: Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 11(2)(a) (legislation.gov.uk, checked 2026-09-08)

• An examining officer who is a constable can copy anything obtained, searched or found under these powers, including making copies of electronic data.

  Source: Schedule 7 (Terrorism Act 2000) Code of Practice (Oct 2025), para 68 (assets.publishing.service.gov.uk, checked 2026-09-08)

What the law says here

• Any officer may examine goods subject to customs control at the Australian border — including your phone — and the cost of that examination is borne by you as the owner.

  Source: Customs Act 1901 (Cth), s.186(1) — general power to examine goods (Compilation No. 192, 5 Sep 2026) (legislation.gov.au, checked 2026-09-08)

• If a document is examined this way, an officer may also make a copy of it or take an extract, or arrange for another Customs officer or a suitably experienced person to do so.

  Source: Customs Act 1901 (Cth), s.186A(1) — power to copy documents and data (Compilation No. 192, 5 Sep 2026) (legislation.gov.au, checked 2026-09-08)

• There is no legal compulsion to provide a password or passcode, or to provide assistance accessing an electronic device, at the Australian border — that is the ABF’s own stated position.

  Source: Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee, Additional Estimates, ABF answer AE22-050 (14 Feb 2022) — no legal compulsion (aph.gov.au, checked 2026-09-08)

• If you refuse and an officer considers there is a risk to the border, the officer is authorised to seize the device for further examination before it is returned.

  Source: Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee, Additional Estimates, ABF answer AE22-050 (14 Feb 2022) — consequence of refusal (aph.gov.au, checked 2026-09-08)

Device steps, before you travel

None of this is advice to refuse a lawful demand — each line describes a device state in a vendor’s own words. See preparing a phone before a border crossing for the fuller version.

• Turning off biometric unlock leaves the passcode as the only way in: Apple’s own documentation lists entering the passcode, or unlocking with Face ID, Touch ID or Optic ID, as the alternatives once the most-protected data class has locked.

  Source: Apple Platform Security Guide — "Data Protection classes", published 19 Dec 2024, Apple (support.apple.com, checked 2026-09-08)

• Powering the device off returns its default app-data storage to a locked, credential-encrypted state that stays inaccessible until the device is unlocked again.

  Source: Android Open Source Project, "File-based encryption" (source.android.com), as fetched 2026-09-08 (source.android.com, checked 2026-09-08)

• If Advanced Data Protection is turned on, Apple itself does not hold the encryption keys for those iCloud categories and cannot recover that data even if asked.

  Source: Apple, "iCloud data security overview" (support.apple.com/en-gb/102651), as fetched 2026-09-08 (support.apple.com, checked 2026-09-08)

What to expect after

• Current ABF policy is to hold a seized device for examination no longer than 14 days, unless the examination reasonably needs longer or something is found that makes the device itself liable to seizure.

  Source: Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee, Additional Estimates, ABF answer AE22-050 (14 Feb 2022) — retention policy (aph.gov.au, checked 2026-09-08)

• The ABF says it does not alter or delete any data on your device as a result of examining it under the Customs Act or the Migration Act.

  Source: Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee, Additional Estimates, ABF answer AE22-050 (14 Feb 2022) — data not altered or deleted (aph.gov.au, checked 2026-09-08)

• Any data copied can only be shared depending on the type of information and the specific legislation that applies to it, such as Part 6 of the Australian Border Force Act, the Privacy Act or the Migration Act.

  Source: Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee, Additional Estimates, ABF answer AE22-050 (14 Feb 2022) — sharing copied data (aph.gov.au, checked 2026-09-08)

What the law says here

• CBP’s own directive states plainly that travelers are obligated to present their electronic devices, and the information on them, in a condition that allows inspection.

  Source: CBP Directive No. 3340-049B §5.3.1 (eff. 1 Jan 2026) (cbp.gov, checked 2026-09-08)

• A basic search — an officer looking through what is already on the device — may be conducted with or without any suspicion at all.

  Source: CBP Directive No. 3340-049B §5.1.3 (eff. 1 Jan 2026) (cbp.gov, checked 2026-09-08)

• An advanced search — connecting equipment to copy or analyze the device’s contents — needs reasonable suspicion of a law CBP enforces, or a national-security concern, plus supervisory approval at the Grade 14 level or higher.

  Source: CBP Directive No. 3340-049B §5.1.4 (eff. 1 Jan 2026) (cbp.gov, checked 2026-09-08)

• A passcode obtained during a border inspection may only be used to inspect the device itself — the directive says it may not be used to reach information that exists only in the cloud or on a remote server.

  Source: CBP Directive No. 3340-049B §5.3.2 (eff. 1 Jan 2026) (cbp.gov, checked 2026-09-08)

Device steps, before you travel

None of this is advice to refuse a lawful demand — each line describes a device state in a vendor’s own words. See preparing a phone before a border crossing for the fuller version.

• Turning off biometric unlock leaves the passcode as the only way in: Apple’s own documentation lists entering the passcode, or unlocking with Face ID, Touch ID or Optic ID, as the alternatives once the most-protected data class has locked.

  Source: Apple Platform Security Guide — "Data Protection classes", published 19 Dec 2024, Apple (support.apple.com, checked 2026-09-08)

• Powering the device off returns its default app-data storage to a locked, credential-encrypted state that stays inaccessible until the device is unlocked again.

  Source: Android Open Source Project, "File-based encryption" (source.android.com), as fetched 2026-09-08 (source.android.com, checked 2026-09-08)

• If Advanced Data Protection is turned on, Apple itself does not hold the encryption keys for those iCloud categories and cannot recover that data even if asked.

  Source: Apple, "iCloud data security overview" (support.apple.com/en-gb/102651), as fetched 2026-09-08 (support.apple.com, checked 2026-09-08)

What to expect after

• If officers cannot complete an inspection because the device is locked or encrypted, the directive lets them detain the device pending a determination as to its admissibility, exclusion, or other disposition.

  Source: CBP Directive No. 3340-049B §5.3.3 (eff. 1 Jan 2026) (cbp.gov, checked 2026-09-08)

• Outside that, CBP’s default cap is no retained copies beyond twenty-one calendar days after the border search ends, unless one of the directive’s own retention grounds applies.

  Source: CBP Directive No. 3340-049B §§5.6.1, 5.6.4 (eff. 1 Jan 2026) (cbp.gov, checked 2026-09-08)