Every source we rely on
No lawyer has reviewed this site. Attribution is what we offer instead: every claim traces to a named source, with the supporting text quoted so you can check us without taking our word for anything.
A script re-fetches each of these from its source and confirms the quoted words are still there. It catches both a quote we transcribed wrongly and a source that has since been amended.
147 authorities in use.
17 U.S.C. §105
legislation · United States (Federal) · used by 0 claims
“Copyright protection under this title is not available for any work of the United States Government—the United States Government is not precluded from receiving and holding copyrights transferred to it by assignment, bequest, or otherwise.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
Alasaad v. Wolf, 988 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2021)
caselaw · United States (1st Circuit) · used by 0 claims
“We also join the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits in holding that basic border searches of electronic devices are routine searches that may be performed without reasonable suspicion.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
Alasaad v. Wolf, 988 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2021)
caselaw · United States (1st Circuit) · used by 0 claims
“We join the Eleventh Circuit in holding that advanced searches of electronic devices at the border do not require a warrant or probable cause.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
Amnesty International, "A Digital Prison: Surveillance and the suppression of civil society in Serbia", 16 Dec 2024
report · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States · used by 0 claims
“This analysis confirmed a second case of an individual whose device was unlocked with Cellebrite UFED and infected with the NoviSpy while in possession of Serbian authorities.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
Android Open Source Project, "Encryption overview" (source.android.com), as fetched 2026-09-08
vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Android) · used by 0 claims
“Encryption is the process of encoding all user data on an Android device using symmetric encryption keys.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
Android Open Source Project, "File-based encryption" (source.android.com), as fetched 2026-09-08
vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Android) · used by 3 claims
“Credential Encrypted (CE) storage, which is the default storage location and only available after the user has unlocked the device.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
Android Open Source Project, "File-based encryption" (source.android.com), as fetched 2026-09-08
vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Android) · used by 1 claim
“Device Encrypted (DE) storage, which is a storage location available both during Direct Boot mode and after the user has unlocked the device.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
Android Open Source Project, "File-based encryption" (source.android.com), as fetched 2026-09-08
vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Android) · used by 1 claim
“All devices launching with Android 10 and higher are required to use file-based encryption.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
Anibowei v. Blanche, No. 26-208 (U.S., petition pending, docketed 19 Aug 2026)
caselaw · United States (Supreme Court) · used by 0 claims
“George Anibowei, Petitioner v. Todd Blanche, Attorney General, et al. Docketed: August 19, 2026—Petition for a writ of certiorari filed. (Response due September 18, 2026)”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
Apple Platform Security Guide — "Data Protection classes", published 19 Dec 2024, Apple
vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Apple iOS) · used by 4 claims
“Shortly after the user locks a device (10 seconds, if the Require Password setting is Immediately), the decrypted class key is discarded, rendering all data in this class inaccessible until the user enters the passcode again or unlocks (logs in to) the device using Optic ID , Face ID , or Touch ID .”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
Apple Platform Security Guide — "Data Protection classes", published 19 Dec 2024, Apple
vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Apple iOS) · used by 2 claims
“This is the default class for all third-party app data not otherwise assigned to a Data Protection class.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
Apple Platform Security Guide — "Passcodes and passwords", published 19 Dec 2024, Apple
vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Apple iOS) · used by 1 claim
“On iPad, iPhone, Mac, and Apple Vision Pro , to further discourage brute-force passcode attacks, there are escalating time delays after the entry of an invalid passcode, password, or PIN (depending on the device and the state the device is in), as shown in the table below.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
Apple Platform Security Guide — "Passcodes and passwords", published 19 Dec 2024, Apple
vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Apple iOS) · used by 1 claim
“In fact, it would take more than five and one-half years to try all combinations of a six-character alphanumeric passcode with lowercase letters and numbers.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
Apple, "About Lockdown Mode" (support.apple.com/en-gb/105120), as fetched 2026-09-08
vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Apple iOS) · used by 1 claim
“Device connections: to connect your iPhone or iPad to an accessory or another computer, the device needs to be unlocked.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
Apple, "iCloud data security overview" (support.apple.com/en-gb/102651), as fetched 2026-09-08
vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Apple iOS) · used by 2 claims
“With Advanced Data Protection, the number of data categories that use end-to-end encryption rises to 25 and includes your iCloud Backup, Photos, Notes and more.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
Apple, "iCloud data security overview" (support.apple.com/en-gb/102651), as fetched 2026-09-08
vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Apple iOS) · used by 3 claims
“Apple doesn't have the encryption keys for these categories, and we can't help you recover this data if you lose access to your account.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
Apple, "Legal Process Guidelines — Government & Law Enforcement within the United States", published October 2025, Apple
vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Apple iOS) · used by 2 claims
“For all devices running iOS 8.0 and later versions, Apple is unable to perform an iOS device data extraction as the data typically sought by law enforcement is encrypted, and Apple does not possess the encryption key.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
Apple, "Legal Process Guidelines — Government & Law Enforcement within the United States", published October 2025, Apple
vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Apple iOS) · used by 1 claim
“iCloud content, as it exists in the customer's account, may be provided in response to a search warrant issued upon a showing of probable cause, or customer consent.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
AppleInsider, "Cellebrite can't crack iPhones running iOS 17.4 or later", William Gallagher, 18 Jul 2024
news · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Cellebrite) · used by 1 claim
“Significant sections of the model/iOS matrix are listed as either "Coming Soon," or "in Research."”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296 (2018)
caselaw · United States (Supreme Court) · used by 1 claim
“It is sufficient for our purposes today to hold that accessing seven days of CSLI constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296 (2018)
caselaw · United States (Supreme Court) · used by 0 claims
“Our decision today is a narrow one. We do not express a view on matters not before us: real-time CSLI or—tower dumps—(a download of information on all the devices that connected to a particular cell site during a particular interval).”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
CBP Directive No. 3340-049B §§3.3–3.4 (eff. 1 Jan 2026)
policy · United States (CBP) · used by 0 claims
“Basic Search: Any border search of an electronic device that does not qualify as an advanced search as described in section 3.4, in which an officer conducts a review or analysis of information residing in electronic or digital form on the device.—Advanced Search: An advanced search is any search in which an officer connects equipment, wired or wireless, to copy and/or analyze the contents of an electronic device.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
CBP Directive No. 3340-049B §§5.6.1, 5.6.4 (eff. 1 Jan 2026)
policy · United States (CBP) · used by 0 claims
“CBP may retain copies of information from an electronic device when, based on a review of the information encountered or on other facts and circumstances, they determine there is probable cause to believe the information contains digital contraband or evidence of a violation of law that CBP is authorized to enforce or administer—Following the completion of the border search, CBP will retain no copies of the information beyond twenty-one (21) calendar days following the conclusion of the border search unless retention is permissible or required consistent with sections 5.6.1, 5.6.2, or 5.6.3.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
CBP Directive No. 3340-049B §5.1.3 (eff. 1 Jan 2026)
policy · United States (CBP) · used by 0 claims
“An officer may conduct a basic search of an electronic device with or without suspicion, subject to the requirements and limitations provided herein and applicable law.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
CBP Directive No. 3340-049B §5.1.4 (eff. 1 Jan 2026)
policy · United States (CBP) · used by 0 claims
“An officer may perform an advanced search of an electronic device only in instances in which there is reasonable suspicion of activity in violation of the laws enforced or administered by CBP or, in the absence of individualized reasonable suspicion when there is a national security concern. All advanced searches require supervisory approval at the Grade 14 level or higher”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
CBP Directive No. 3340-049B §5.3.1 (eff. 1 Jan 2026)
policy · United States (CBP) · used by 2 claims
“Travelers are obligated to present electronic devices and the information contained therein in a condition that allows inspection of the device and its contents.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
CBP Directive No. 3340-049B §5.3.2 (eff. 1 Jan 2026)
policy · United States (CBP) · used by 1 claim
“Passcodes or other means of access obtained during a border inspection will only be utilized to facilitate the inspection of devices and information subject to border search. Passcodes or other means of access may not be utilized to access information that is only stored remotely.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
CBP Directive No. 3340-049B §5.3.3 (eff. 1 Jan 2026)
policy · United States (CBP) · used by 2 claims
“If an officer is unable to complete an inspection of an electronic device because it is protected by a passcode or encryption, the officer may, in accordance with section 5.4 below, detain the device pending a determination as to its admissibility, exclusion, or other disposition.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
CBP, "Border Searches of Electronic Devices at Ports of Entry" — FY2023 Report to Congress (26 Nov 2024)
report · United States (DHS) · used by 0 claims
“Travelers are not referred to secondary inspection for the purpose of accessing digital content.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
CBP, "Border Searches of Electronic Devices at Ports of Entry" — FY2023 Report to Congress (26 Nov 2024)
report · United States (DHS) · used by 0 claims
“In FY 2023, CBP conducted such searches for less than 0.01 percent of arriving travelers at a POE.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
CBP, Border Search of Electronic Devices — statistics page (FY2025 figures)
report · United States (CBP) · used by 0 claims
“In FY 2025, out of the over 419 million travelers CBP processed at ports of entry, CBP only searched the electronic devices of 55,318 international travelers.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
Cellebrite, "Cellebrite Inseyets, powered by UFED" product page (cellebrite.com), as fetched 2026-09-08
vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Cellebrite) · used by 2 claims
“Access devices previously unreachable and extract the Full File System, including encrypted and containerized data.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
Cellebrite, "Cellebrite Statement about Amnesty International Report" (cellebrite.com/en/blog/), 16 Dec 2024
vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Cellebrite) · used by 0 claims
“Since 2020, Cellebrite has voluntarily ceased selling to customers in more than 60 countries, including certain countries specifically cited in the Amnesty International report.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
Cellebrite, "Ethics & Integrity" page (cellebrite.com/en/about/ethics-integrity/), as fetched 2026-09-08
vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Cellebrite) · used by 0 claims
“Cellebrite licenses its technology to government agencies, law enforcement, and enterprises for their use to lawfully access, review, analyze, and manage legally obtained data to bring resolution to investigations and create a safer world.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
Crime and Policing Act 2026, s.173(1) — NOT YET IN FORCE
legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · used by 0 claims
“Where an electronic device has been lawfully seized, a senior officer may authorise an enforcement officer to extract information accessible by means of one or more online accounts which were accessed by means of the device before it was seized.”
Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08
Crime and Policing Act 2026, s.173(2)(b) — NOT YET IN FORCE
legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · used by 0 claims
“A senior officer may give an authorisation under subsection (1) only if satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that— it is not reasonably practicable to obtain that information by other means.”
Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08
Crime and Policing Act 2026, s.174(4) — NOT YET IN FORCE
legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · used by 0 claims
“Any information which has been extracted under an authorisation under section 173 may be retained for so long as is necessary in all the circumstances”
Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08
Crime and Policing Act 2026, s.177(1)(a) — NOT YET IN FORCE
legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · used by 0 claims
“The Secretary of State must prepare a code of practice about— the exercise of the power to give an authorisation under section 173”
Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08
Crime and Policing Act 2026, s.178 — Terrorism Act 2000 Sch.7 para 11B(2) (inserted) — NOT YET IN FORCE
legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · used by 0 claims
“In Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 (port and border controls), after paragraph 11A insert— This paragraph applies where an electronic device is detained under paragraph 11 after having been— searched or found on a search under paragraph 8, or— examined under paragraph 9.— A relevant senior officer may authorise a constable to extract information accessible by means of one or more online accounts which were accessed by means of the device before the search or examination began.”
Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-09
Crime and Policing Act 2026, s.255(1) (default commencement — ss.173-180 not separately listed)
legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · used by 0 claims
“Subject as follows, this Act comes into force on such day as the Secretary of State may by regulations appoint.”
Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3E(1) — when a search warrant can be issued (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026)
legislation · Australia (Commonwealth) · used by 0 claims
“An issuing officer may issue a warrant to search premises if the officer is satisfied, by information on oath or affirmation, that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that there is, or there will be within the next 72 hours, any evidential material at the premises.”
Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3L(1) — operating electronic equipment at warrant premises (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026)
legislation · Australia (Commonwealth) · used by 0 claims
“The executing officer of a warrant in relation to premises, or a constable assisting, may operate electronic equipment at the warrant premises to access data (including data not held at the premises) if he or she suspects on reasonable grounds that the data constitutes evidential material or suggests the existence of a digital asset that may be seized under the warrant.”
Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3L(1A)(a) — copying accessed data to a device (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026)
legislation · Australia (Commonwealth) · used by 0 claims
“If the executing officer or constable assisting suspects on reasonable grounds that any data accessed by operating the electronic equipment constitutes evidential material or suggests the existence of a digital asset that may be seized under the warrant, he or she may:—copy any or all of the data accessed by operating the electronic equipment to a disk, tape or other associated device brought to the premises”
Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3LA(1) — order power (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026)
legislation · Australia (Commonwealth) · used by 1 claim
“A constable may apply to a magistrate for an order requiring a specified person to provide any information or assistance that is reasonable and necessary to allow a constable to do one or more of the following:—access data held in, or accessible from, a computer or data storage device”
Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-09
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3LA(2)(a) — matter the magistrate must be satisfied of (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026)
legislation · Australia (Commonwealth) · used by 0 claims
“The magistrate may grant the order if the magistrate is satisfied that:—there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that evidential material is held in, or is accessible from, the computer or data storage device”
Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3LA(5) — penalty tier one (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026)
legislation · Australia (Commonwealth) · used by 1 claim
“A person commits an offence if:— the person is subject to an order under this section; and— the person is capable of complying with a requirement in the order; and— the person omits to do an act; and— the omission contravenes the requirement.—Penalty: Imprisonment for 5 years or 300 penalty units, or both.”
Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3LA(6) — penalty tier two (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026)
legislation · Australia (Commonwealth) · used by 1 claim
“A person commits an offence if:—Penalty: Imprisonment for 10 years or 600 penalty units, or both.”
Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08
Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), s.465AA(1) — application, authorised version
legislation · Australia (Victoria) · used by 0 claims
“This section applies if a magistrate has issued a warrant under section 465 in relation to warrant premises.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), s.465AA(10) — penalty, authorised version
legislation · Australia (Victoria) · used by 1 claim
“A person who commits an offence against subsection (9) is liable to level 6 imprisonment (5 years maximum).”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), s.465AA(2) — order on application of a senior sergeant or above, authorised version
legislation · Australia (Victoria) · used by 2 claims
“The Magistrates' Court may, on the application of a police officer of or above the rank of senior sergeant, make an order requiring a specified person to provide any information or assistance that is reasonable and necessary to allow a police officer to do one or more of the things specified in subsection (3).”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), s.465AA(9) — offence, authorised version
legislation · Australia (Victoria) · used by 2 claims
“A person commits an offence if—the person fails to comply with the order without reasonable excuse.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
Criminal Code (Qld), s.205A(1) — contravening a device information order, offence and penalty (current as at 1 July 2026)
legislation · Australia (Queensland) · used by 2 claims
“A person who, without reasonable excuse, contravenes—an order made under the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000, section 154(1) or (2), 154A(2) or 178A(1)—commits a crime.—Maximum penalty—5 years imprisonment.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-09
Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2016, s.34(4)(a)
legislation · Scotland · used by 1 claim
“The person is under no obligation to answer any question, other than to give the following information— the person's name”
Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08
Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2016, s.47(3)(b)
legislation · Scotland · used by 0 claims
“Powers of the type described in subsection (2) include the power to— seize any item in the person's possession”
Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08
Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.50(1)
legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · used by 0 claims
“a person who is lawfully on any premises finds anything on those premises that he has reasonable grounds for believing may be or may contain something for which he is authorised to search on those premises,— that person's powers of seizure shall include power under this section to seize so much of what he has found as it is necessary to remove from the premises to enable that to be determined.”
Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08
Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.59(2)
legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · used by 0 claims
“Any person with a relevant interest in the seized property may apply to the appropriate judicial authority, on one or more of the grounds mentioned in subsection (3), for the return of the whole or a part of the seized property.”
Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08
Customs Act 1901 (Cth), s.186(1) — general power to examine goods (Compilation No. 192, 5 Sep 2026)
legislation · Australia (Commonwealth) · used by 0 claims
“Any officer may, subject to subsections (2) and (3), examine any goods subject to customs control, and the expense of the examination including the cost of removal to the place of examination shall be borne by the owner.”
Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08
Customs Act 1901 (Cth), s.186A(1) — power to copy documents and data (Compilation No. 192, 5 Sep 2026)
legislation · Australia (Commonwealth) · used by 0 claims
“a document is examined under section 186 or 186AA; and—the officer of Customs may make a copy of, or take an extract from, the document, or arrange for another officer of Customs or other person having the necessary experience, to make such a copy or take such an extract.”
Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08
Data Protection Act 2018, s.35(1)
legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · used by 0 claims
“The first data protection principle is that the processing of personal data for any of the law enforcement purposes must be lawful and fair.”
Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08
Data Protection Act 2018, s.35(8)(a)
legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · used by 0 claims
“In this Part , “ sensitive processing ” means— the processing of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs or trade union membership”
Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08
Data Protection Act 2018, s.37
legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · used by 0 claims
“The third data protection principle is that personal data processed for any of the law enforcement purposes must be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purpose for which it is processed.”
Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08
Data Protection Act 2018, s.39(1)
legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · used by 0 claims
“The fifth data protection principle is that personal data processed for any of the law enforcement purposes must be kept for no longer than is necessary for the purpose for which it is processed.”
Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08
Equipment Interference Code of Practice (June 2025), example following para 3.32
policy · England & Wales · used by 0 claims
“A law enforcement officer interferes with equipment to obtain information stored in electronic form on that equipment (as relevant evidence in a criminal investigation) under their powers of seizure arising from the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. The officer's conduct is authorised by the 1984 Act and no equipment interference warrant is therefore required.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
Equipment Interference Code of Practice (June 2025), para 3.31
policy · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · used by 0 claims
“a law enforcement officer must obtain a targeted equipment interference warrant under the Act to authorise equipment interference, unless either the conduct is authorised under another law enforcement power”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
Extraction of Information from Electronic Devices: Code of Practice (Oct 2022), para 138
policy · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · used by 0 claims
“Information which is extracted and deemed not relevant must be deleted unless there is a lawful basis to retain it.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
Extraction of Information from Electronic Devices: Code of Practice (Oct 2022), para 71
policy · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · used by 0 claims
“An authorised person must only exercise the Section 37 power for the purposes of preventing, detecting, investigating, or prosecuting crime if they reasonably believe that information on the device is relevant to a reasonable line of enquiry”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
Extraction of Information from Electronic Devices: Code of Practice (Oct 2022), para 82
policy · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · used by 0 claims
“the authorised person will have to be satisfied that the information sought is required to achieve the relevant purpose, e.g., preventing crime, and that the purpose cannot be achieved by other less intrusive means.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e)(2)(A)
legislation · United States (Federal) · used by 0 claims
“the warrant must identify the person or property to be searched, identify any person or property to be seized, and designate the magistrate judge to whom it must be returned.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e)(2)(B)
legislation · United States (Federal) · used by 0 claims
“A warrant under Rule 41(e)(2)(A) may authorize the seizure of electronic storage media or the seizure or copying of electronically stored information. Unless otherwise specified, the warrant authorizes a later review of the media or information consistent with the warrant.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g)
legislation · United States (Federal) · used by 0 claims
“A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure of property or by the deprivation of property may move for the property's return. The motion must be filed in the district where the property was seized.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
GrapheneOS, "Features" (grapheneos.org/features), as fetched 2026-09-08
vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (GrapheneOS) · used by 1 claim
“The timer is set to 18 hours by default, but can be set to values between 10 minutes and 72 hours, or turned off.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
GrapheneOS, "Features" (grapheneos.org/features), as fetched 2026-09-08
vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (GrapheneOS) · used by 1 claim
“GrapheneOS provides users with the ability to set a duress PIN/Password that will irreversibly wipe the device (along with any installed eSIMs) once entered anywhere where the device credentials are requested (on the lockscreen, along with any such prompt in the OS).”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
GrapheneOS, "Features" (grapheneos.org/features), as fetched 2026-09-08
vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (GrapheneOS) · used by 1 claim
“The default is Charging-only when locked , which significantly reduces attack surface when the device is locked.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
GrapheneOS, "Features" (grapheneos.org/features), as fetched 2026-09-08
vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (GrapheneOS) · used by 1 claim
“This feature allows users to make use of diceware passwords if they don't want to depend on the security of the secure element which provides very aggressive throttling and offers a high level of security even for a random 6 digit PIN.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
ICO, Mobile phone data extraction by police forces in England and Wales (June 2020)
report · England & Wales · used by 1 claim
“police data extraction practices vary across the country, with excessive amounts of personal data often being extracted, stored, and made available to others, without an appropriate basis in existing data protection law.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
ICO, Mobile phone data extraction by police forces in England and Wales (June 2020), Recommendation 1
report · England & Wales · used by 0 claims
“The Government should strengthen the current legislative framework by producing a statutory code or other equivalent measure to ensure the law is sufficiently clear and foreseeable.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW), Part 5 Division 4A — insertion historical note
legislation · Australia (New South Wales) · used by 0 claims
“pt 5, div 4A: Ins 2022 No 47, Sch 1[5].”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW), s.76AM(1) — effect of a digital evidence access order
legislation · Australia (New South Wales) · used by 2 claims
“The executing officer for a digital evidence access order may direct the specified person to—give the officer any information or assistance reasonable and necessary to enable the officer to access data held in or accessible from a computer specified in, or within the scope of, the order”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW), s.76AO(1) — failure to comply, offence and maximum penalty
legislation · Australia (New South Wales) · used by 2 claims
“A specified person for a digital evidence access order must not, without reasonable excuse—fail to comply with a direction given, in accordance with the order, by the executing officer for the order—Maximum penalty—100 penalty units or imprisonment for 5 years, or both.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-09
Magnet Forensics blog, "Understanding the security impacts of iOS 18's inactivity reboot", 13 Nov 2024
news · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Apple iOS) · used by 1 claim
“This means that once a device has entered a locked state and has not been unlocked within 72 hours, it will reboot.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
Magnet Forensics, Magnet Graykey product page (magnetforensics.com), as fetched 2026-09-08
vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Magnet Forensics) · used by 1 claim
“Get started with Graykey's same-day access to the latest iOS and Android devices”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
Osservatorio Nessuno, "A deep dive into Cellebrite Android support, as of February 2025", 16 Mar 2025
news · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (GrapheneOS) · used by 1 claim
“While it seems that for the standard Google ROM there are working exploits available to perform the FFS extraction in AFU state, on the contrary GrapheneOS additional hardening and protections are effective, and have been so since 2022.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
PACE Code B (2023), para 7.14
pace-code · England & Wales · used by 0 claims
“anything seized in accordance with the above provisions may be retained only for as long as is necessary”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
PACE Code B (2023), para 7.6
pace-code · England & Wales · used by 0 claims
“If an officer considers information stored in any electronic form and accessible from the premises could be used in evidence, they may require the information to be produced in a form:— which can be taken away and in which it is visible and legible, or— from which it can readily be produced in a visible and legible form.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-09
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.120(1) (extent)
legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · used by 0 claims
“Subject to the following provisions of this section, this Act extends to England and Wales only.”
Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.16(3)
legislation · England & Wales · used by 0 claims
“Entry and search under a warrant must be within three months from the date of its issue.”
Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.19(3)
legislation · England & Wales · used by 0 claims
“The constable may seize anything which is on the premises if he has reasonable grounds for believing— that it is evidence in relation to an offence which he is investigating or any other offence”
Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.19(4)
legislation · England & Wales · used by 0 claims
“The constable may require any information which is stored in any electronic form and is accessible from the premises to be produced in a form in which it can be taken away and in which it is visible and legible or from which it can readily be produced in a visible and legible form”
Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.20(1)
legislation · England & Wales · used by 0 claims
“shall be construed as including a power to require any information stored in any electronic form contained in a computer and accessible from the premises to be produced in a form in which it can be taken away and in which it is visible and legible”
Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.21(1)
legislation · England & Wales · used by 0 claims
“A constable who seizes anything in the exercise of a power conferred by any enactment, including an enactment contained in an Act passed after this Act, shall, if so requested by a person showing himself— to be the occupier of premises on which it was seized; or— to have had custody or control of it immediately before the seizure, provide that person with a record of what he seized.”
Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.22(1)
legislation · England & Wales · used by 0 claims
“anything which has been seized by a constable or taken away by a constable following a requirement made by virtue of section 19 or 20 above may be retained so long as is necessary in all the circumstances.”
Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.32(2)(a)(ii)
legislation · England & Wales · used by 0 claims
“a constable shall also have power in any such case— to search the arrested person for anything— which might be evidence relating to an offence”
Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.54(3)-(4)(b)
legislation · England & Wales · used by 0 claims
“a custody officer may seize and retain any such thing or cause any such thing to be seized and retained.— has reasonable grounds for believing that they may be evidence relating to an offence”
Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.8(1)
legislation · England & Wales · used by 0 claims
“a justice of the peace is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing— that an indictable offence has been committed”
Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08
Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld), s.154(1)(c)(i) — order about device access information (current as at 1 July 2026)
legislation · Australia (Queensland) · used by 1 claim
“a specified person to do any of the following in relation to a digital device at the place—use access information for the device to gain access to device information from the device”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld), s.154(2) — order extending to a device after removal (current as at 1 July 2026)
legislation · Australia (Queensland) · used by 1 claim
“If the issuer is a magistrate or a judge, the issuer may also, in the search warrant, order that a specified person is required to do a thing mentioned in subsection — (1)(b) or (c) in relation to a digital device”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld), s.154A(2) — post-seizure order (current as at 1 July 2026)
legislation · Australia (Queensland) · used by 1 claim
“On the application of a police officer, a magistrate or a judge may make an order requiring a specified person to do a thing mentioned in section 154(1)(b) or (c).”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
Police Scotland, "Cyber kiosks" — legal basis
guidance · Scotland · used by 0 claims
“We will only examine a digital device where there is a legal basis and where it is necessary, justified and proportionate to the incident or crime under investigation.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
Police Scotland, "Cyber kiosks" — no persistent storage
guidance · Scotland · used by 0 claims
“all information is securely deleted from the cyber kiosk at the end of each examination”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.37(1)(a)
legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · used by 0 claims
“An authorised person may extract information stored on an electronic device from that device if— a user of the device has voluntarily provided the device to an authorised person, and— that user has agreed to the extraction of information from the device by an authorised person.”
Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.37(13) (interpretation: "electronic device")
legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · used by 0 claims
“means any device on which information is capable of being stored electronically and includes any component of such a device”
Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.37(5)(c)
legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · used by 0 claims
“An authorised person may exercise the power in subsection (1) only if— in any case, the authorised person is satisfied that exercise of the power is necessary and proportionate to achieve the purpose within subsection (2) for which the person proposes to exercise the power.”
Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.39(3)(d)
legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · used by 2 claims
“An authorised person must have given P notice in writing— stating that P may refuse to provide the device or agree to the extraction of information from it”
Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.40(3)
legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · used by 0 claims
“Condition B is that— a user of the electronic device is a child or an adult without capacity, and— an authorised person reasonably believes that the user's life is at risk or there is a risk of serious harm to the user.”
Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-09
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.42(1)
legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · used by 0 claims
“The Secretary of State must prepare a code of practice containing guidance about the exercise of the powers in sections 37(1) and 41(1).”
Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08
Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003, reg. 6(1) — as substituted from 5 February 2026 by the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025, s.112(2)
legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · used by 0 claims
“Subject to Schedule A1, a person must not store information, or gain access to information stored, in the terminal equipment of a subscriber or user.”
Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-09
Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003, Sch. A1 para. 2(1) (consent) — in force from 5 February 2026
legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · used by 0 claims
“Regulation 6(1) does not prevent a person storing information, or gaining access to information stored, in the terminal equipment of a subscriber or user if the subscriber or user— is provided with clear and comprehensive information about the purpose of the storage or access, and— gives consent to the storage or access.”
Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-09
Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003, Sch. A1 para. 5(1) (collecting information for statistical purposes) — in force from 5 February 2026
legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · used by 0 claims
“the person provides an information society service,— the sole purpose of the storage or access is to enable the person— to collect information for statistical purposes about how the service is used with a view to making improvements to the service— any information that the storage or access enables the person to collect is not shared with any other person except for the purpose of enabling that other person to assist with making improvements to the service or website— the subscriber or user is given a simple means of objecting, free of charge, to the storage or access and does not object.”
Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-09
Privacy International, "Digital stop and search: how the UK police can secretly download everything from your mobile phone", 27 Mar 2018
report · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States · used by 2 claims
“MSAB's XRY Physical allows access to "system and deleted data and can use extra functionality to help overcome security and encryption challenges”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, s.49(1)(a)
legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · used by 1 claim
“This section applies where any protected information— has come into the possession of any person by means of the exercise of a statutory power to seize, detain, inspect, search or otherwise to interfere with documents or other property”
Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, s.49(2)(c)-(d)
legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · used by 0 claims
“that the imposition of such a requirement is proportionate to what is sought to be achieved by its imposition, and— that it is not reasonably practicable for the person with the appropriate permission to obtain possession of the protected information in an intelligible form without the giving of a notice under this section”
Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, s.53(1)
legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · used by 2 claims
“A person to whom a section 49 notice has been given is guilty of an offence if he knowingly fails, in accordance with the notice, to make the disclosure required by virtue of the giving of the notice.”
Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, s.53(5A)
legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · used by 1 claim
“the appropriate maximum term' means— in a national security case or a child indecency case , five years; and— in any other case, two years”
Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014)
caselaw · United States (Supreme Court) · used by 1 claim
“Our answer to the question of what police must do before searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest is accordingly simple—get a warrant.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014)
caselaw · United States (Supreme Court) · used by 0 claims
“Cell phones differ in both a quantitative and a qualitative sense from other objects that might be kept on an arrestee's person.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014)
caselaw · United States (Supreme Court) · used by 0 claims
“other case-specific exceptions may still justify a warrantless search of a particular phone—the exigencies of the situation—make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment—The critical point is that, unlike the search incident to arrest exception, the exigent circumstances exception requires a court to examine whether an emergency justified a warrantless search in each particular case.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014)
caselaw · United States (Supreme Court) · used by 0 claims
“With all they contain and all they may reveal, they hold for many Americans—the privacies of life”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
RIPA Part III Code of Practice, para 3.38
policy · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · used by 0 claims
“The person giving appropriate permission and, where different, the person with that permission must believe that the imposition of a disclosure requirement by a notice is necessary.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
Schedule 7 (Terrorism Act 2000) Code of Practice (Oct 2025), para 55
policy · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · used by 1 claim
“Information requested by an examining officer under paragraph 5(a) may include passwords to electronic devices.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
Schedule 7 (Terrorism Act 2000) Code of Practice (Oct 2025), para 61
policy · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · used by 3 claims
“The person must provide access to any electronic device to allow for a search to be undertaken, including where access to a device requires the person to unlock a device through application of their thumb or finger, or any other form of access control”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
Schedule 7 (Terrorism Act 2000) Code of Practice (Oct 2025), para 68
policy · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · used by 0 claims
“An examining officer who is a constable may copy anything obtained under paragraph 5, searched or found on a search under paragraph 8, or anything examined under paragraph 9 and this includes making copies of electronic data.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee, Additional Estimates, ABF answer AE22-050 (14 Feb 2022) — consequence of refusal
policy · Australia (Australian Border Force) · used by 2 claims
“If an individual refuses to comply with a request or provide a password for an examination of their electronic device, and an ABF officer considers there to be a risk to the border, the ABF officer is authorised to seize that device for further examination prior to being returned.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee, Additional Estimates, ABF answer AE22-050 (14 Feb 2022) — data not altered or deleted
policy · Australia (Australian Border Force) · used by 0 claims
“The ABF does not alter or delete any data as a result of an examination of a device under the Customs or Migration acts.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee, Additional Estimates, ABF answer AE22-050 (14 Feb 2022) — no legal compulsion
policy · Australia (Australian Border Force) · used by 2 claims
“There is no legal compulsion for a traveller to provide a password/passcode or provide assistance to an electronic device at the border.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee, Additional Estimates, ABF answer AE22-050 (14 Feb 2022) — retention policy
policy · Australia (Australian Border Force) · used by 0 claims
“Current ABF policy is to retain electronic devices held for examination for no longer than 14 days, unless it is reasonable that the examination will take longer or content is located on the device that renders the device subject to seizure.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee, Additional Estimates, ABF answer AE22-050 (14 Feb 2022) — sharing copied data
policy · Australia (Australian Border Force) · used by 0 claims
“Copied data can only be shared depending on the type of information and the specific legislation that applies to that type of information, such as Part 6 of the Australian Border Force Act, Privacy Act or Migration Act.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
SQLite, "PRAGMA secure_delete" (sqlite.org/pragma.html), as fetched 2026-09-08
vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (SQLite) · used by 1 claim
“When secure_delete is on, SQLite overwrites deleted content with zeros.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
SQLite, "Write-Ahead Logging" (sqlite.org/wal.html), as fetched 2026-09-08
vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (SQLite) · used by 1 claim
“The original content is preserved in the database file and the changes are appended into a separate WAL file.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth), s.27KAA — sunsetting of the data disruption warrant Division (Compilation No. 62, 27 Aug 2026)
legislation · Australia (Commonwealth) · used by 0 claims
“27KAA Sunsetting This Division is repealed at the end of 4 September 2029.”
Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08
Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth), s.6(1) — definition of "data disruption warrant" (Compilation No. 62, 27 Aug 2026)
legislation · Australia (Commonwealth) · used by 0 claims
“data disruption warrant means a warrant issued under section 27KC or subsection 35B(2) or (3).”
Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08
Surveillance Legislation Amendment (Identify and Disrupt) Act 2021 (Cth), s.2 commencement table, item 1 (as made)
legislation · Australia (Commonwealth) · used by 0 claims
“Sections 1 to 3 and anything in this Act not elsewhere covered by this table The day this Act receives the Royal Assent. 3 September 2021”
Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08
Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 11(2)(a)
legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · used by 0 claims
“An examining officer may detain the thing— for the purpose of examination, for a period not exceeding seven days beginning with the day on which the detention commences”
Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08
Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 18(1)(a)
legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · used by 3 claims
“A person commits an offence if he— wilfully fails to comply with a duty imposed under or by virtue of this Schedule”
Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08
Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 18(2)(a)
legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · used by 2 claims
“A person guilty of an offence under this paragraph shall be liable on summary conviction to— imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months”
Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08
Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 2(1)
legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · used by 0 claims
“An examining officer may question a person to whom this paragraph applies for the purpose of determining whether he appears to be a person falling within section 40(1)(b).”
Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08
Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 2(4)
legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · used by 0 claims
“An examining officer may exercise his powers under this paragraph whether or not he has grounds for suspecting that a person falls within section 40(1)(b).”
Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08
Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 5(a)
legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · used by 3 claims
“A person who is questioned under paragraph 2 or 3 must— give the examining officer any information in his possession which the officer requests”
Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08
Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 8(1)(a)
legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · used by 0 claims
“An examining officer who questions a person under paragraph 2 may, for the purpose of determining whether he falls within section 40(1)(b)— search the person”
Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08
U.S. Constitution, Fifth Amendment
legislation · United States (Federal) · used by 1 claim
“nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
U.S. Constitution, Fourth Amendment
legislation · United States (Federal) · used by 0 claims
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
UK General Data Protection Regulation, Article 6(1)(a)
legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · used by 0 claims
“Processing shall be lawful only if and to the extent that at least one of the following applies:— the data subject has given consent to the processing of his or her personal data for one or more specific purposes;”
Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-09
United States v. Belmonte Cardozo, No. 25-4239 (4th Cir. July 13, 2026)
caselaw · United States (4th Circuit) · used by 0 claims
“Under our precedent, forensic searches of cell phones are nonroutine—we join all our sister circuits that have addressed this issue in holding that manual searches of cell phones at the border are routine and thus do not require individualized suspicion.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
United States v. Brown, No. 23-3074 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 24, 2025)
caselaw · United States (D.C. Circuit) · used by 1 claim
“we hold that, in compelling Schwartz to unlock his cellphone, law enforcement violated the Fifth Amendment”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
United States v. Payne, 99 F.4th 1145 (9th Cir. 2024)
caselaw · United States (9th Circuit) · used by 0 claims
“the compelled use of a biometric to unlock an electronic device was not testimonial because it required no cognitive exertion, placing it in the same category as a blood draw or a fingerprint taken at booking—merely provided the CHP with access to a source of potential information”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
United States v. Payne, 99 F.4th 1145 (9th Cir. 2024)
caselaw · United States (9th Circuit) · used by 1 claim
“Our opinion should not be read to extend to all instances where a biometric is used to unlock an electronic device.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
Upturn, "Mass Extraction", October 2020
report · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States · used by 1 claim
“Based on 110 public records requests to state and local law enforcement agencies across the country, our research documents more than 2,000 agencies that have purchased these tools, in all 50 states and the District of Columbia.”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08
Utah H.B. 57 (2019), enacting Utah Code §77-23c-102(1)(a)
legislation · United States (Utah) · used by 0 claims
“a law enforcement agency may not obtain, without a search—warrant issued by a court upon probable cause—the location information, stored data, or transmitted data of an electronic device”
Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08