Duress wipes, auto-reboot and the law: what a wipe can cost once a phone is sought

This page describes; it does not advise. It sets out what vendors say their features do, in the vendors’ own words, and what statutes, prosecution guidance and court documents say, set out in the words of each source; the full quotation is under each item. Nothing on this page is advice to use any feature. Nothing on this page is advice to wipe, lock, restart or withhold a phone at any time. It is not legal advice.

None of the statutes or the Crown Prosecution Service guidance quoted here mentions a phone, a duress PIN or a wipe by name, and this page does not say how any court would apply them. A United States indictment quoted below does mention a phone; it is an allegation and is set out separately. This page is not a list of every offence in any jurisdiction; that is a limit of this page, not a statement that no other offence applies.

Apart from the lines that open “Across the United Kingdom”, this page makes no statement about Northern Ireland. For the border-specific position, see Preparing a phone before a border crossing.

GrapheneOS’s Features page says it “provides users with the ability to set a duress PIN/Password that will irreversibly wipe the device (along with any installed eSIMs) once entered anywhere where the device credentials are requested (on the lockscreen, along with any such prompt in the OS).” The same page says “The wipe does not require a reboot and cannot be interrupted”, that “Duress PIN will also wipe the device when entered as the two-factor fingerprint unlock PIN but not currently when entered as the SIM PIN” and, in a separate sentence, “if the duress PIN/Password is the same as the actual unlock method, the actual unlock method always takes precedence, and therefore no wipe will occur.”

On auto-reboot, GrapheneOS’s Features page says it “provides an auto-reboot feature which reboots locked devices after a set period of time to put data at rest.” It says “A countdown timer is started each time the device is locked, and the device will reboot if a successful unlock doesn’t occur before the timer reaches zero.” and “Unlocking any profile cancels the timer, not just the Owner profile.” It also says “The timer is set to 18 hours by default, but can be set to values between 10 minutes and 72 hours, or turned off.” and “This feature doesn’t apply when the device is in ‘Before First Unlock’ state, meaning that it will not lead to the device continuously rebooting, as data is already at rest.” See Lock state, Lockdown Mode and GrapheneOS: what each changes for what that page quotes from the same Features page.

Apple’s Platform Security Guide describes a different setting, one that is tied to incorrect passcode attempts. It says “If the Erase Data option is turned on for iPad, iPhone, or Apple Vision Pro…after 10 consecutive incorrect attempts to enter the passcode, all content and settings are removed from storage.” It adds “Consecutive attempts of the same incorrect passcode don’t count toward the limit”, and that the setting is also available as an administrative policy through a device management service that supports this feature and through Microsoft Exchange ActiveSync, and “can be set to a lower threshold”.

Google’s Android Help page “Protect your personal data against theft” says “These features aren’t supported on Android Go devices, tablets, and wearables. Support may also vary based on your smartphone device model.” and, later on the page, “If Failed Authentication Lock is on, your device will automatically lock when authentication attempts fail repeatedly.” That last sentence describes a lock. Google’s Advanced Protection help page lists, among the protections offered by Advanced Protection, Inactivity Reboot: “Automatically reboot your phone if it remains locked for 72 hours. The process of rebooting will make user data unreadable until a fresh unlock takes place.”

In England and Wales, the Crown Prosecution Service’s guidance “Public Justice Offences” says the offence of perverting the course of justice is committed when an accused “does an act or series of acts; which has or have a tendency to pervert; and which is or are intended to pervert; the course of public justice.” It says “The course of justice must be in existence at the time of the act(s).” and that “The course of justice starts when: an event has occurred, from which it can reasonably be expected that an investigation will follow; or investigations which could/might bring proceedings have actually started; or proceedings have started or are about to start.”

In England and Wales, the same guidance lists “false alibis and interference with evidence or exhibits” and “concealing or destroying evidence or providing a false alibi” among its “examples of what may amount to a charge of perverting the course of justice”. In England and Wales, on maximum sentences, the guidance says that perverting the course of justice, preventing lawful burial, obstructing a coroner, escape from lawful custody and breaching prison “have a maximum sentence of life imprisonment and which are triable only on indictment”, and that “The offences carrying a maximum life sentence are all common law offences.” The guidance goes on, in the same passage, to address prosecuting a statutory offence in preference to these common law offences; that part is not quoted on this page. This is a prosecutor’s guidance, not a statute, and the excerpts quoted here do not mention a phone.

In England and Wales, section 89(2) of the Police Act 1996 provides that “Any person who resists or wilfully obstructs a constable in the execution of his duty, or a person assisting a constable in the execution of his duty, shall be guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one month or to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale, or to both.”

Across the United Kingdom, section 49(1)(a) of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) lists cases in which the section applies; the case at paragraph (a), which is the case quoted on this page, is where any protected information has come into the possession of any person by means of the exercise of a statutory power to seize, detain, inspect, search or otherwise to interfere with documents or other property, or is likely to do so. Across the United Kingdom, section 49(2) sets out the conditions under which a person with the appropriate permission under Schedule 2 may, by notice, impose a disclosure requirement; those conditions are set out in full in the “What they can do” item below. Across the United Kingdom, section 53(1) provides that a person to whom a section 49 notice has been given is guilty of an offence if he knowingly fails, in accordance with the notice, to make the disclosure required by virtue of the giving of the notice. Across the United Kingdom, section 53(2) to (4) of that Act provides that in proceedings against any person for an offence under that section, if it is shown that that person was in possession of a key to any protected information at any time before the time of the giving of the section 49 notice, that person shall be taken for the purposes of those proceedings to have continued to be in possession of that key at all subsequent times, unless it is shown that the key was not in his possession after the giving of the notice and before the time by which he was required to disclose it; that a person shall be taken to have shown that he was not in possession of a key to protected information at a particular time if sufficient evidence of that fact is adduced to raise an issue with respect to it and the contrary is not proved beyond a reasonable doubt; and that it shall be a defence for that person to show that it was not reasonably practicable for him to make the disclosure required by virtue of the giving of the section 49 notice before the time by which he was required, in accordance with that notice, to make it, but that he did make that disclosure as soon after that time as it was reasonably practicable for him to do so. Across the United Kingdom, section 53(5) and (5A) set out the penalties, which are listed in the items below. See The RIPA s.49 notice: when failing to disclose is an offence.

Across the United Kingdom, paragraph 18(1) of Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 provides that a person commits an offence if he wilfully fails to comply with a duty imposed under or by virtue of the Schedule, wilfully contravenes a prohibition imposed under or by virtue of the Schedule, or wilfully obstructs, or seeks to frustrate, a search or examination under or by virtue of the Schedule. Across the United Kingdom, paragraph 18(2) sets the penalty on summary conviction at imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months, a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale, or both. See Schedule 7 at ports.

In Scotland, section 90 of the Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012 provides that it is an offence for a person to resist, obstruct or hinder a person acting in a capacity mentioned in subsection (3), or a person assisting that person while acting in such capacity. In Scotland, subsection (3) lists the capacity of a constable among the capacities. In Scotland, the penalty provision quoted says that a person who is guilty of an offence under subsection (1) or (2) is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 12 months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to both; subsection (1) is not quoted on this page.

Across the United Kingdom, section 53(1) of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 provides that a person to whom a section 49 notice has been given is guilty of an offence if he knowingly fails, in accordance with the notice, to make the disclosure required by virtue of the giving of the notice. Across the United Kingdom, section 53(2) to (4) of that Act provides that in proceedings against any person for an offence under that section, if it is shown that that person was in possession of a key to any protected information at any time before the time of the giving of the section 49 notice, that person shall be taken for the purposes of those proceedings to have continued to be in possession of that key at all subsequent times, unless it is shown that the key was not in his possession after the giving of the notice and before the time by which he was required to disclose it; that a person shall be taken to have shown that he was not in possession of a key to protected information at a particular time if sufficient evidence of that fact is adduced to raise an issue with respect to it and the contrary is not proved beyond a reasonable doubt; and that it shall be a defence for that person to show that it was not reasonably practicable for him to make the disclosure required by virtue of the giving of the section 49 notice before the time by which he was required, in accordance with that notice, to make it, but that he did make that disclosure as soon after that time as it was reasonably practicable for him to do so.

Across the United Kingdom, paragraph 18(1) of Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 provides that a person commits an offence if he wilfully fails to comply with a duty imposed under or by virtue of the Schedule, wilfully contravenes a prohibition imposed under or by virtue of the Schedule, or wilfully obstructs, or seeks to frustrate, a search or examination under or by virtue of the Schedule. The penalties for these provisions are quoted in the England and Wales section above and in the items below. See Schedule 7 at ports.

Scots common-law offences about destroying evidence are not quoted on this page because no official text was found to quote; that is a gap in this page, not a statement that no such offence exists.

In Victoria, section 254 of the Crimes Act 1958 provides that a person who (a) knows that a document or other thing of any kind is, or is reasonably likely to be, required in evidence in a legal proceeding; and (b) either destroys or conceals it or renders it illegible, undecipherable or incapable of identification, or expressly, tacitly or impliedly authorises or permits another person to destroy or conceal it or render it illegible, undecipherable or incapable of identification and that other person does so; and (c) acts as described in paragraph (b) with the intention of preventing it from being used in evidence in a legal proceeding, is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to level 6 imprisonment (5 years maximum) or a level 6 fine or both. In Victoria, subsection (2) provides that the section applies with respect to a legal proceeding, whether the proceeding is one that is in progress or is to be, or may be, commenced in the future. The full section is at the link.

In Queensland, section 129 of the Criminal Code provides that a person who, knowing something is or may be needed in evidence in a judicial proceeding, damages it with intent to stop it being used in evidence commits a misdemeanour, with a maximum penalty of 7 years imprisonment.

In New South Wales, section 317 of the Crimes Act 1900 provides that a person who, with intent to mislead any judicial tribunal in any judicial proceeding, suppresses, conceals, destroys, alters or falsifies anything knowing that it is or may be required as evidence in any judicial proceeding is liable to imprisonment for 10 years.

Under Commonwealth law in Australia, section 39(1) of the Crimes Act 1914 provides that a person commits an offence if the person knows that a book, document or thing of any kind is, or may be, required in evidence in a judicial proceeding; and destroys the book, document or thing, or renders it illegible, undecipherable or incapable of identification; and does so with the intention of preventing it from being used in evidence; and the judicial proceeding is a federal judicial proceeding. The penalty stated is imprisonment for 5 years.

Under Commonwealth law in Australia, section 3LA(1) of the Crimes Act 1914 provides that a constable may apply to a magistrate for an order requiring a specified person to provide any information or assistance that is reasonable and necessary to allow a constable to do one or more of the following, including to access data held in, or accessible from, a computer or data storage device in the circumstances listed in the “What they can do” item below. Under Commonwealth law in Australia, section 3LA(5) provides that a person commits an offence if the person is subject to an order under that section, is capable of complying with a requirement in the order, omits to do an act, and the omission contravenes the requirement. Under Commonwealth law in Australia, section 3LA(6) provides that a person commits an offence if the person is subject to an order under that section, is capable of complying with a requirement in the order, omits to do an act, the omission contravenes the requirement, and the offence to which the relevant warrant relates is a serious offence or a serious terrorism offence. The penalty stated in section 3LA(5) is imprisonment for 5 years or 300 penalty units, or both; the penalty stated in section 3LA(6) is imprisonment for 10 years or 600 penalty units, or both.

The Australian Border Force’s written answer AE22-050 to a Senate committee (the document is headed 14 February 2022) said that if an individual refuses to comply with a request or provide a password for an examination of their electronic device, and an ABF officer considers there to be a risk to the border, the ABF officer is authorised to seize that device for further examination prior to being returned. See Border: ABF for the rest of that answer.

The words “legal proceeding”, “judicial proceeding” and “federal judicial proceeding” are used in the Australian provisions quoted above, as are “serious offence”, “serious terrorism offence” and “relevant warrant” in section 3LA(6); this page quotes no definition of them. The other Australian states and territories are not covered on this page. Other offences in the Australian jurisdictions named above are not quoted on this page either; that is a limit of this page, not a statement that none applies.

Under United States federal law, 18 U.S.C. §2232(a) provides that whoever, “before, during, or after any search for or seizure of property by any person authorized to make such search or seizure”, knowingly destroys, damages, wastes, disposes of, transfers, or otherwise takes any action, or knowingly attempts to destroy, damage, waste, dispose of, transfer, or otherwise take any action, “for the purpose of preventing or impairing the Government’s lawful authority to take such property into its custody or control or to continue holding such property under its lawful custody and control”, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both. The words quoted are about a search for or seizure of property.

Under United States federal law, 18 U.S.C. §1519 provides that whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper administration of any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States or any case filed under title 11, or in relation to or contemplation of any such matter or case, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.

Under United States federal law, 18 U.S.C. §1512(c)(1) provides that whoever corruptly alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document, or other object, or attempts to do so, with the intent to impair the object’s integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. The words “official proceeding” are used in the quoted provision; this page quotes no definition of that term.

CBP’s directive states that travelers are obligated to present electronic devices and the information contained therein in a condition that allows inspection of the device and its contents. See CBP and your phone at the U.S. border for the rest of that directive.

This section gives the indictment in, and docket entries for, United States v. Tunick, No. 1:25-cr-00499 (N.D. Ga.); the next section gives reports about it. The indictment (Doc. 1, filed 13 November 2025) alleges that, on or about January 24, 2025, in the Northern District of Georgia, the defendant, Samuel Tunick, “before and during the search for and seizure of property by Customs and Border Patrol Tactical Terrorism Response Team…did knowingly destroy, damage, waste, dispose of, and otherwise take any action to delete the digital contents of a Google Pixel cellular phone, for the purpose of preventing and impairing the Government’s lawful authority to take said property into its custody and control”, and it cites Section 2232(a) of Title 18. The paragraph quoted here cites that section and no other provision. That is an allegation, not a finding. The indictment paragraph quoted here does not mention GrapheneOS, a duress password or a wipe. CourtListener’s copy of the docket records a plea of not guilty entered as to Count 1.

CourtListener’s copy of the docket, as fetched on 14 October 2026, records at entry 8 (3 December 2025): “INITIAL APPEARANCE and ARRAIGNMENT held as to Samuel Tunick. A PLEA of NOT GUILTY was entered as to Count 1.”

CourtListener’s copy of the docket records at entry 21 (17 March 2026): “MOTION to Suppress Evidence and Statements by Samuel Tunick.” It records at entry 31 (20 July 2026): “The Court held an evidentiary hearing regarding Defendant’s 21 motion to suppress evidence and statements.” Entry 31 continues beyond the sentence quoted here.

CourtListener’s copy of the docket records at entry 38 (18 September 2026) an order granting a motion for continuance of the post-hearing briefing schedule, and that “Defendant’s opening brief shall be due October 19, 2026, the Government’s response shall be due November 9, 2026, and Defendant’s reply shall be due November 23, 2026.”

As of CourtListener’s copy of the docket as fetched on 14 October 2026, this page quotes no ruling on that motion. That is a statement about what this page quotes, not about the court.

The paragraphs below give reports about United States v. Tunick; each supports only that the outlet reported it.

On 24 July 2026, TechCrunch reported that “The U.S. Justice Department is prosecuting an American for allegedly providing U.S. border authorities with a passcode that wiped the contents of his phone, according to an indictment and media reports.” It also reported “Prosecutors later charged Tunick under a federal statute that makes it unlawful to knowingly destroy or damage property to prevent authorities from seizing it. Tunick has pleaded not guilty.”

On 27 July 2026, MediaNama reported that “The U.S. Department of Justice is prosecuting Samuel Tunick of Atlanta for allegedly providing border officers with a passcode that erased his phone’s data during a search.” It also reported that “Legal and security experts say this is the first known U.S. case involving the alleged use of a ‘duress’ password”.

On 9 August 2026, Fox News reported that “Tunick pleaded not guilty. The charge remains an allegation, and the court has not decided whether the government’s seizure was lawful.” It also reported “Installing GrapheneOS or setting up a duress passcode is not the crime alleged in this case.” That is the outlet’s description of what is alleged; this page makes no statement on whether any setting is lawful.

On 30 July 2026, Decrypt reported that GrapheneOS had said its smartphone operating system is “completely legal” and constitutionally protected, and that the project tweeted on July 27, “We have no obligation to weaken any of the security protections it provides,” adding that laws requiring it to do so “would be unconstitutional.” Decrypt reported that “The statement came in a thread about the prosecution, after a user asked whether the project was refusing to cooperate with Homeland Security. GrapheneOS said it could not.” and wrote “Once key material is wiped, ‘there’s nothing we can do to assist with it,’ it wrote”. This page does not assess those statements.

The outlets’ descriptions of a passcode, a duress password or GrapheneOS are what the outlets reported; the indictment paragraph quoted in the previous section does not mention them.

The first reports below concern France and Catalonia (Spain). Those places are outside the jurisdictions this site covers, and the items are reports.

On 21 November 2025, Privacy Guides reported that the GrapheneOS project “has announced on X that they are ceasing all operations in France”; that “While the operating system will still be available to French users, all website and discussion servers are being relocated to countries and providers outside France’s jurisdiction”; that, according to GrapheneOS, “law enforcement in France has repeatedly made media statements with ‘inaccurate and unsubstantiated claims’ about GrapheneOS”; and that “This decision was publicly initiated after negative press coverage from two articles published by Le Parisien”.

On 3 July 2025, Notebookcheck reported that “Cops in Catalonia, Spain, reportedly stay alert when they spot someone using a Google Pixel phone.” It also reported “Per the authorities in the region, Google’s smartphones are apparently go-to devices for organized crime groups, especially with GrapheneOS installed.”

On 30 October 2025, Android Authority reported of GrapheneOS that it is “also the same software that’s occasionally drawn attention from police agencies who associate it with criminal use, even though its biggest audience is privacy-minded users who simply want more control over their devices.”

The sources cited on this page include no equivalent report for England and Wales, Scotland or Australia. That is a statement about the sources used for this page, not about whether any such report exists.

GrapheneOS’s Features page says, of its auto-reboot, “The timer is set to 18 hours by default, but can be set to values between 10 minutes and 72 hours, or turned off.” Of its USB-C port and pogo pins setting, the Features page says “The default is Charging-only when locked, which significantly reduces attack surface when the device is locked.” These are the vendor’s statements; this page gives no steps for any of them.

On ending a secondary user profile session, GrapheneOS’s FAQ says that ending such a session “fully purges the encryption keys and puts the profiles back at rest” and that “This can’t be done for the owner profile without rebooting due to it encrypting the sensitive system-wide operating system data.” This is the vendor’s statement; this page gives no steps for it.