# Phone Seized

> Deleted is not gone. Locked is not safe.

Full-text export for LLMs, generated from the same content the pages render. Canonical:
https://phoneseized.com/llms-full.txt · Index: https://phoneseized.com/llms.txt

This is legal information, not legal advice, and it is quote-anchored, not reviewed by a lawyer.
Every claim on this site is attributed to a named source with the supporting text quoted
verbatim — see /methodology and /sources.

Content as of: 2026-10-14

## Can they take my phone?
URL: https://phoneseized.com/compare/take-it
Jurisdictions: England & Wales, Scotland, Australia, United States
Last reviewed: 2026-10-04

### The short answer, country by country
In England & Wales, under s.19 of PACE a constable who is lawfully on any premises may seize anything which is on the premises if he has reasonable grounds for believing that it is evidence in relation to an offence which he is investigating or any other offence, and that it is necessary to seize it in order to prevent the evidence being concealed, lost, altered or destroyed. Separately, s.32 gives a constable, after an arrest at a place other than a police station, power to search the arrested person for anything which might be evidence relating to an offence, and s.32(9) says a constable carrying out that search may seize and retain anything he finds, other than an item subject to legal privilege, if he has reasonable grounds for believing that it is evidence of an offence or has been obtained in consequence of the commission of an offence. In Scotland, s.47(1) of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2016 says that nothing in Part 1 affects any rule of law by virtue of which a constable may exercise a power of the type described in subsection (2) — a power exercised in relation to a person by reason of the person’s having been arrested and charged with an offence by a constable — and s.47(3) says powers of that type include the power to seize any item in the person’s possession. PACE, subject to the other provisions of its s.120, extends to England and Wales only. In Australia, under s.3F(1)(c)–(e) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) (https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1), a warrant that is in force in relation to premises authorises the executing officer or a constable assisting to search the premises for the kinds of evidential material specified in the warrant, and to seize things of that kind found at the premises. The same provision also authorises the executing officer or a constable assisting to seize other things found at the premises in the course of the search — on the conditions it states: that they believe on reasonable grounds the things to be evidential material in relation to an offence to which the warrant relates, evidential material in relation to another offence that is an indictable offence, or evidential material (within the meaning of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002) or tainted property (within the meaning of that Act), and that they believe on reasonable grounds that seizure of the things is necessary to prevent their concealment, loss or destruction or their use in committing an offence; or that they believe on reasonable grounds the things to be seizable items. Separately, s.3K(2) (https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1) says a thing found at warrant premises, or a thing found during a search under a warrant that is in force in relation to a person, may be moved to another place for examination or processing in order to determine whether the thing may be seized under a warrant, or the thing suggests the existence of a digital asset that may be seized under a warrant, on the conditions that subsection states. Under s.3K(3A) (https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1), the thing may be moved for examination or processing for no longer than 30 days if it is a computer or data storage device, and otherwise 14 days; under s.3K(3B)–(3D) (https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1) an executing officer may apply to an issuing officer for one or more extensions if the executing officer believes on reasonable grounds that the thing cannot be examined or processed within that time, and a single extension cannot exceed 14 days for a computer or data storage device, and otherwise 7 days. In the United States, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(e)(2)(B) says a warrant under Rule 41(e)(2)(A) may authorize the seizure of electronic storage media or the seizure or copying of electronically stored information, and that unless otherwise specified the warrant authorizes a later review of the media or information consistent with the warrant. For searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest, the Supreme Court’s answer in Riley v. California was “accordingly simple—get a warrant.”

### Where the jurisdictions differ
The sourced powers have different triggers, so they are not like-for-like. In England & Wales the sourced triggers are a constable lawfully on premises (s.19) and an arrest (s.32: a power to search the person and, under s.32(9), to seize and retain what the search finds, other than an item subject to legal privilege, if the constable has reasonable grounds for believing it is evidence of an offence or was obtained in consequence of the commission of an offence). In Scotland the sourced provision, s.47, is about powers exercised in relation to a person by reason of the person’s having been arrested and charged with an offence by a constable. In Australia the sourced trigger is a warrant that is in force in relation to premises (s.3F(1)); the same provision also covers seizing other things found at the premises in the course of the search, on the conditions it states. In the United States the sourced power is exercised under a warrant. What officers may then do with the phone — search it, keep it, hand it back — is a separate question, covered on the comparison pages linked below.

### Read further
See what happens to a seized phone in England & Wales (https://phoneseized.com/uk/seizure-pace), seizure and cyber kiosks in Scotland (https://phoneseized.com/scotland/seizure-and-cyber-kiosks), the Commonwealth warrant and computer-access powers in Australia (https://phoneseized.com/australia/assistance-orders-3la), moving a thing for examination, and getting seized things back, under the Commonwealth Crimes Act (https://phoneseized.com/australia/moved-for-examination-and-return), the U.S. warrant position (https://phoneseized.com/usa/riley-warrant), and what a full extraction actually contains (https://phoneseized.com/on-your-phone/what-a-full-extraction-contains). For England & Wales in more depth, see warrants and premises (https://phoneseized.com/uk/warrants-and-premises), property in police custody (s.54) (https://phoneseized.com/uk/custody-property-s54) and seize and sift (CJPA 2001 ss.50–51) (https://phoneseized.com/uk/seize-and-sift-cjpa-50-51). For what happens after a phone is seized, see Do they need a warrant? (https://phoneseized.com/compare/warrant) and Can I get it back, or get the data deleted? (https://phoneseized.com/compare/get-it-back-or-deleted)

## Must I give them the passcode?
URL: https://phoneseized.com/compare/must-i-give-the-code
Jurisdictions: England & Wales, Scotland, Australia, United States
Last reviewed: 2026-10-06

### The short answer, country by country
In England & Wales and Scotland, a person to whom a section 49 notice under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 has been given is guilty of an offence under s.53(1) if they knowingly fail, in accordance with the notice, to make the disclosure required by virtue of the giving of the notice. A notice imposing a disclosure requirement in respect of protected information must be given in writing or, if not in writing, in a manner that produces a record of its having been given (s.49(4)). Schedule 2 to the Act says that, subject to the other provisions of that Schedule, a person has the appropriate permission in relation to any protected information if, and only if, written permission for the giving of section 49 notices in relation to that information has been granted — in England and Wales, by a Circuit judge; in Scotland, by a sheriff. Paragraph 4 of that Schedule (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/schedule/2) applies to protected information falling within section 49(1)(a), (b) or (c) which is not information in the case of which paragraph 2 or 3 applies; paragraph 4(2) says that, subject to paragraph 6, where the statutory power was exercised, or is likely to be exercised, by the police, the police have the appropriate permission in relation to the protected information, without any grant of permission under paragraph 1. Paragraph 2 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/schedule/2) of that Schedule, which paragraph 4 refers to, applies in the case of protected information falling within section 49(1)(a), (b) or (c) where the statutory power in question is one exercised, or to be exercised, in accordance with a warrant issued by the Secretary of State or a person holding judicial office, an authorisation under Part III of the Police Act 1997, or a targeted equipment interference warrant issued under section 106 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016; and, subject to sub-paragraphs (3) to (5) and paragraph 6(1), a person has the appropriate permission in relation to that protected information (without any grant of permission under paragraph 1) if the warrant or, as the case may be, the authorisation contained the relevant authority’s permission for the giving of section 49 notices in relation to protected information to be obtained under the warrant or authorisation, or, since the issue of the warrant or authorisation, written permission has been granted by the relevant authority for the giving of such notices in relation to protected information obtained under the warrant or authorisation. Paragraph 2(9) says that protected information that comes into a person’s possession by means of the exercise of any statutory power which is exercisable without a warrant, but is so exercisable in the course of, or in connection with, the exercise of another statutory power for which a warrant is required, shall not be taken, by reason only of the warrant required for the exercise of that other statutory power, to be information in the case of which paragraph 2 applies. Paragraph 3 is not quoted here. Paragraph 6(2) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/schedule/2) of that Schedule says that, subject to sub-paragraph (3), a constable does not by virtue of paragraph 1, 4 or 5 have the appropriate permission in relation to any protected information unless he is of or above the rank of superintendent, or permission to give a section 49 notice in relation to that information has been granted by a person holding the rank of superintendent, or any higher rank. In Australia, under s.3LA(1) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) a constable may apply to a magistrate for an order requiring a specified person to provide any information or assistance that is reasonable and necessary to allow a constable to do one or more of a listed set of things, which include accessing data held in, or accessible from, a computer or data storage device, provided the computer or storage device is on warrant premises, was found in the course of an ordinary search or a frisk search authorised by a warrant under s.3E, has been moved under s.3K(2) and is at a place for examination or processing, or has been seized under that Division. Under s.3LA(5), a person commits an offence if they are subject to such an order, are capable of complying with a requirement in it, and omit to do an act that contravenes the requirement; the stated penalty is imprisonment for 5 years or 300 penalty units, or both. Under s.3LA(6) (https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1), a person commits an offence if they are subject to such an order, are capable of complying with a requirement in it, and omit to do an act, and the omission contravenes the requirement, and the offence to which the relevant warrant relates is a serious offence or a serious terrorism offence; the penalty stated is imprisonment for 10 years or 600 penalty units, or both. The Australian state order regimes carry offences too. In New South Wales (https://phoneseized.com/australia/nsw-digital-evidence-access-orders), a specified person for a digital evidence access order must not, without reasonable excuse, fail to comply with a direction given, in accordance with the order, by the executing officer. In New South Wales, s.76AO(2) (https://legislation.nsw.gov.au/view/whole/html/inforce/current/act-2002-103) says that, without limiting subsection (1), it is not a reasonable excuse for a specified person for a digital evidence access order to fail to comply with the order or a requirement made in accordance with the order on the ground that complying with the order or the requirement would tend to incriminate the person or otherwise expose the person to a penalty. In Queensland (https://phoneseized.com/australia/qld-device-information-orders), s.205A(1) of the Criminal Code (https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/view/pdf/inforce/current/act-1899-009) says that a person who, without reasonable excuse, contravenes an order made under the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000, section 154(1) or (2), 154A(2) or 178A(1), or an order made under the Crime and Corruption Act 2001, section 88A(1) or (2) or 88B(2), commits a crime, and s.205A(2) (https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/view/pdf/inforce/current/act-1899-009) says that it is not a reasonable excuse to contravene an order made under those provisions on the basis that complying with the order might tend to incriminate the person or expose the person to a penalty. In Victoria (https://phoneseized.com/australia/vic-assistance-orders-465aa), under s.465AA(9) (https://content.legislation.vic.gov.au/sites/default/files/2026-10/58-6231aa323-authorised.pdf) of the Crimes Act 1958, a person commits an offence if the person has relevant knowledge of the computer or data storage device or a computer network of which it forms or formed a part, or of measures applied to protect data held in, or accessible from, it; the person is informed by a police officer of the order and its terms and that it is an indictable offence punishable by imprisonment to fail to comply with the order; and the person fails to comply with the order without reasonable excuse. In Victoria, s.465AA(6) (https://content.legislation.vic.gov.au/sites/default/files/2026-10/58-6231aa323-authorised.pdf) of the Crimes Act 1958 says a person is not excused from complying with an order on the ground that complying with it may result in information being provided that might incriminate the person. The Australian Border Force’s written answer AE22-050 to a question taken on notice at the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs’ Additional Budget Estimates hearing of 14 February 2022 is about devices at the border, not about these orders. In it the ABF said (https://www.aph.gov.au/api/qon/downloadattachment?attachmentId=bd0902f9-1209-49d9-9c86-b6858c22020d) there was no legal compulsion for a traveller to provide a password/passcode or provide assistance to an electronic device at the border, and said (https://www.aph.gov.au/api/qon/downloadattachment?attachmentId=bd0902f9-1209-49d9-9c86-b6858c22020d) that if an individual refused to comply with a request or provide a password for an examination of their electronic device, and an ABF officer considered there to be a risk to the border, the ABF officer was authorised to seize that device for further examination prior to being returned. That is the Australian Border Force’s statement to the committee, not a provision of law quoted here; see At the border? (https://phoneseized.com/compare/at-the-border) In the United States, the matrix cell is marked unsettled. The state supreme court decisions quoted in its notes each concern a particular act — verbally providing a passcode, disclosing passcodes or a computer password, entering a passcode, unlocking a phone, or producing a phone unlocked — and each rests on the ground that court decided: the Fifth Amendment, the state’s own law, or both. A state court’s decision is a decision of that state’s court; the state passcode rulings page (https://phoneseized.com/usa/state-passcode-rulings) sets out each one with its quoted text. United States v. Payne (Ninth Circuit) and United States v. Brown (D.C. Circuit), quoted on the related pages, are about unlocking a phone with a thumb; federal appeals decisions on decrypting hard drives and other seized devices are on the state passcode rulings page. See Can they use my face or fingerprint? (https://phoneseized.com/compare/face-or-finger) and the US passcode-versus-biometrics page (https://phoneseized.com/usa/passcode-vs-biometrics).

### Where the jurisdictions differ
The England & Wales, Scotland and Australian cells each attach an offence to a formal instrument: a s.49 notice (s.53(1)), a s.3LA order (s.3LA(5)), or a state order. The United States cell is different in kind: it rests on court decisions, not on a statute creating an offence, and the decisions quoted in its notes do not all come out the same way. That is not a statement that refusing a court’s order carries no penalty: the state passcode rulings page (https://phoneseized.com/usa/state-passcode-rulings) quotes decisions that arose from a finding of contempt. The device-state strip shown with the matrix is vendor documentation, not law. The Android Open Source Project’s file-based encryption documentation (https://source.android.com/docs/security/features/encryption/file-based) says testers can verify that CE storage is locked before the device has been unlocked for the first time since boot, and Apple’s Platform Security Guide (https://support.apple.com/guide/security/data-protection-classes-secb010e978a/web) says the Protected Until First User Authentication class behaves in the same way as Complete Protection, except that the decrypted class key isn’t removed from memory when the device is locked or the user logged out, and that it is the default class for all third-party app data not otherwise assigned to a Data Protection class. The strip does not show the guide’s separate Complete Protection entry; that entry (https://support.apple.com/guide/security/data-protection-classes-secb010e978a/web) says that, for data in the Complete Protection class, shortly after the user locks a device the decrypted class key is discarded, rendering all data in this class inaccessible until the user enters the passcode again or unlocks the device using Optic ID, Face ID, or Touch ID.

### Read further
For the difference between being asked for a passcode and being served a s.49 notice, see rightsandlimits.com’s guide to phone passwords (https://rightsandlimits.com/devices/phone-passwords). See also At the border? (https://phoneseized.com/compare/at-the-border), the RIPA s.49 notice, in full (https://phoneseized.com/uk/ripa-notice), computer access orders under s.3LA (https://phoneseized.com/australia/assistance-orders-3la), the two US thumb-unlock decisions (https://phoneseized.com/usa/passcode-vs-biometrics), and passcode strength and why it matters (https://phoneseized.com/protect/passcode-and-updates).

## Can they use my face or fingerprint?
URL: https://phoneseized.com/compare/face-or-finger
Jurisdictions: England & Wales, Scotland, Australia, United States
Last reviewed: 2026-10-04

### The short answer, country by country
In England & Wales and Scotland, under Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 a person commits an offence if they wilfully fail to comply with a duty imposed under or by virtue of that Schedule, wilfully contravene a prohibition imposed under or by virtue of that Schedule, or wilfully obstruct, or seek to frustrate, a search or examination under or by virtue of that Schedule. The Schedule 7 Code of Practice (October 2025), at para 61, says the person must provide access to any electronic device to allow for a search to be undertaken, including where access to a device requires the person to unlock a device through application of their thumb or finger, or any other form of access control. For England and Wales and for Scotland, the provisions quoted on this page are Schedule 7 ones; no other power to compel biometric unlocking is quoted here for those jurisdictions. In the United States, the two federal appeals decisions sourced here are both about a compelled thumb unlock. In United States v. Payne (2024) the Ninth Circuit held that the compelled use of Payne’s thumb to unlock his phone (which he had already identified for the officers) required no cognitive exertion, that the use of his thumb was not a testimonial act and that the Fifth Amendment did not apply; the court added that its opinion should not be read to extend to all instances where a biometric is used to unlock an electronic device. In United States v. Brown (D.C. Circuit, 17 January 2025) the court held that, in compelling Schwartz to unlock his cellphone, law enforcement violated the Fifth Amendment; the record shows an FBI agent ordered Schwartz to open the phone and he complied by placing his thumb on it. In Payne, by contrast, the opinion says Officer Coddington forcibly grabbed Payne’s thumb and used it to unlock the phone. A footnote in Payne (https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2024/04/17/22-50262.pdf) says that whether the officer forcibly used Payne’s thumb to unlock the phone or Payne “reluctantly unlocked the cell phone using his thumb print” was disputed before the district court, and that for the purposes of the appeal the government accepted the defendant’s version of the facts, “that defendant’s thumbprint was compelled.” A footnote in Brown says: “This holding is consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Payne.” It explains: “In that case, instead of instructing the defendant to open his phone, as the FBI instructed Schwartz to do, the police ‘forcibly grabbed Payne’s thumb and used it to unlock the phone.’” It quotes Payne’s statement that “the outcome on the testimonial prong may have been different” had the officer “required Payne to independently select the finger that he placed on the phone,” and adds: “That is this case.” Payne says it mentions such possibilities “not to opine on the right result.” The Ninth Circuit also said in Payne that district courts applying Doe and Hubbell have arrived at different conclusions on the biometric unlock question. In Australia, the cell is New South Wales law, not Commonwealth law; the matrix has no Commonwealth cell for this row. In New South Wales (https://phoneseized.com/australia/nsw-digital-evidence-access-orders), s.76AM(1) (https://legislation.nsw.gov.au/view/whole/html/inforce/current/act-2002-103) of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 says the executing officer for a digital evidence access order may direct the specified person to give the officer any information or assistance reasonable and necessary to enable the officer to access data held in or accessible from a computer specified in, or within the scope of, the order; s.76AM(2) says that, without limiting subsection (1), the executing officer may require the specified person to provide reasonable and necessary assistance in accessing data on a computer that is secured by biometric means, including, for example, fingerprints or retina scans. Section 76AM(2B) says that the executing officer must not direct a specified person who is less than 18 years of age unless reasonable steps are taken to have a suitable person present to represent the interests of the specified person while the specified person is directed. Section 76AM(3) says that, to avoid doubt, information provided by a specified person under subsection (1) to access data held in or accessible from a computer may be used only for that purpose and no other purpose, and that the section is subject to any other provision of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 or another Act that provides for how a police officer may take particulars that are necessary to identify a person. Separately, s.76AO(1) (https://legislation.nsw.gov.au/view/whole/html/inforce/current/act-2002-103) says that a specified person for a digital evidence access order must not, without reasonable excuse, fail to comply with a direction given, in accordance with the order, by the executing officer for the order, and s.76AO(2) (https://legislation.nsw.gov.au/view/whole/html/inforce/current/act-2002-103) says that, without limiting subsection (1), it is not a reasonable excuse for a specified person for a digital evidence access order to fail to comply with the order or a requirement made in accordance with the order on the ground that complying with the order or the requirement would tend to incriminate the person or otherwise expose the person to a penalty. Section 76AO(1) speaks of a “direction”; s.76AM(1) says the executing officer “may direct” the specified person, and s.76AM(2) speaks of what the executing officer “may require”. The general s.3LA order is covered on Must I give them the passcode? (https://phoneseized.com/compare/must-i-give-the-code) The device-state strip shown with the matrix is vendor documentation, not law. Apple’s Platform Security Guide (https://support.apple.com/guide/security/face-id-touch-id-passcodes-and-passwords-sec9479035f1/web) says a passcode or password is also required if the device is in any of the states it lists; among them, that the device has just been turned on or restarted (this does not apply to Apple Vision Pro if the “Nearby iPhone Enables Optic ID” feature is turned on), that the user hasn’t unlocked their device for more than 48 hours, and, separately, that there were five unsuccessful biometric authentication match attempts (though for usability, the device might offer entering a passcode or password instead of using biometrics after a smaller number of failures).

### Where the jurisdictions differ
The England & Wales and Scotland cells rest on Schedule 7 and its Code of Practice, and para 61 is about a Schedule 7 search. The United States cell rests on two decisions about a thumb unlock, and the Ninth Circuit said its own opinion should not be read to extend to all instances where a biometric is used to unlock a device. The cell is marked “unsettled” because the Ninth Circuit itself said that district courts applying Doe and Hubbell have arrived at different conclusions on the biometric unlock question. The Australian cell is New South Wales law only: s.76AM(1) and (2) are about what the executing officer may direct or require, and the offence in s.76AO(1) is stated in its own words in the cell’s notes; the matrix has no Commonwealth cell for this row.

### Read further
See Schedule 7 and your phone at a UK port (https://phoneseized.com/uk/ports-schedule-7), the two US thumb-unlock decisions (https://phoneseized.com/usa/passcode-vs-biometrics), what a full extraction actually contains (https://phoneseized.com/on-your-phone/what-a-full-extraction-contains), and preparing a phone before a border crossing (https://phoneseized.com/protect/before-a-border), including turning off biometric unlock.

## Do they need a warrant?
URL: https://phoneseized.com/compare/warrant
Jurisdictions: England & Wales, Scotland, Australia, United States
Last reviewed: 2026-10-04

### The short answer, country by country
In England & Wales, under s.8(1) of PACE, if on a constable’s application a justice of the peace is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that an indictable offence has been committed, that there is material on premises mentioned in subsection (1A) which is likely to be of substantial value to the investigation of the offence, that the material is likely to be relevant evidence, that it does not consist of or include items subject to legal privilege, excluded material or special procedure material, and that any of the conditions specified in subsection (3) applies, he may issue a warrant authorising a constable to enter and search the premises. Section 113(3)(b) of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 says that, in s.8(1) of the 1984 Act, in paragraph (e), at the end, the words “in relation to each set of premises specified in the application” are added; the revised text of s.8 of PACE (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/8) on legislation.gov.uk prints them at the end of the subsection (s.113 of the 2005 Act (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2005/15/section/113)). Under s.16(3), entry and search under a warrant must be within three months from the date of its issue. PACE Code B, para 7.6, says that if an officer considers information stored in any electronic form and accessible from the premises could be used in evidence, they may require the information to be produced in a form which can be taken away and in which it is visible and legible, or from which it can readily be produced in a visible and legible form. In Australia, under s.3E(1) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), an issuing officer may issue a warrant to search premises if the officer is satisfied, by information on oath or affirmation, that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that there is, or there will be within the next 72 hours, any evidential material at the premises. In the United States, in Riley v. California the Supreme Court’s answer to the question of what police must do before searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest was “accordingly simple—get a warrant.” In the same opinion the Court said that other case-specific exceptions may still justify a warrantless search of a particular phone, and that the exigent circumstances exception requires a court to examine whether an emergency justified a warrantless search in each particular case. The matrix has no Scotland cell for this row: no Scottish warrant provision is quoted on this page. For the Scottish seizure power quoted on another comparison page, see Can they take my phone? (https://phoneseized.com/compare/take-it)

### Where the jurisdictions differ
The cells are not like-for-like. The England & Wales and Australian cells quote the conditions for a warrant to search premises. The United States cell quotes the Supreme Court on searching a phone that has already been seized incident to an arrest, and adds that case-specific exceptions may still justify a warrantless search of a particular phone. None of the cells here says whether a further warrant is needed to search a phone’s contents in England & Wales or Australia once it has been seized.

### Read further
See what happens to a seized phone in England & Wales (https://phoneseized.com/uk/seizure-pace), the Commonwealth warrant and computer-access powers in Australia (https://phoneseized.com/australia/assistance-orders-3la), and Riley v. California in full (https://phoneseized.com/usa/riley-warrant). See also Can they take my phone? (https://phoneseized.com/compare/take-it) and What can they actually get? (https://phoneseized.com/compare/what-they-can-extract)

## What can they actually get?
URL: https://phoneseized.com/compare/what-they-can-extract
Jurisdictions: England & Wales, Scotland, Australia, United States
Last reviewed: 2026-10-04

### The short answer, country by country
In England & Wales, the Information Commissioner’s Office’s June 2020 report on mobile phone data extraction by police forces said that police data extraction practices vary across the country, with excessive amounts of personal data often being extracted, stored, and made available to others, without an appropriate basis in existing data protection law. In Scotland, Police Scotland’s cyber kiosks page says it will only examine a digital device where there is a legal basis and where it is necessary, justified and proportionate to the incident or crime under investigation. In Australia, s.186A(1) of the Customs Act 1901 (Cth) says that if a document is examined under section 186 or 186AA and, as a result of that examination, an officer of Customs is satisfied that the document or part of the document may contain information relevant to an importation or exportation, or a proposed importation or exportation, of prohibited goods, the commission or attempted commission of any other offence against that Act or of any offence against a prescribed Act, the performance of functions under section 17 of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 or section 6 of the Intelligence Services Act 2001, or security (within the meaning of section 4 of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979), the officer of Customs may make a copy of, or take an extract from, the document, or arrange for another officer of Customs or other person having the necessary experience to make such a copy or take such an extract. In the United States, Upturn’s October 2020 report “Mass Extraction” says that law enforcement agencies use mobile device forensic tools, a powerful technology that allows police to extract a full copy of data from a cellphone, and that, based on 110 public records requests to state and local law enforcement agencies across the country, its research documents more than 2,000 agencies that have purchased these tools, in all 50 states and the District of Columbia.

### What the phone makers’ documentation says, by device state
The lines below are what Apple’s and Android’s own documentation says for each device state. They describe what the vendors document, not what any particular extraction tool can or cannot reach: Off / Before First Unlock: the Android Open Source Project’s file-based encryption documentation says that on an FBE-enabled device each user has two storage locations available to apps, one of which is Device Encrypted (DE) storage, which is a storage location available both during Direct Boot mode and after the user has unlocked the device. After First Unlock: the Android Open Source Project’s file-based encryption documentation describes Credential Encrypted (CE) storage as the default storage location, and says it is only available after the user has unlocked the device. Unlocked: Apple’s “About Lockdown Mode” page says that when Lockdown Mode is enabled some apps and features function differently, including “Device connections: to connect your iPhone or iPad to an accessory or another computer, the device needs to be unlocked.” Cloud: Apple’s iCloud data security overview says that if you enable Advanced Data Protection and then lose access to your account, Apple will not have the encryption keys to help you recover it.

### Read further
See what a full extraction actually contains (https://phoneseized.com/on-your-phone/what-a-full-extraction-contains), what lives in the cloud and with your carrier (https://phoneseized.com/on-your-phone/cloud-and-carrier), and lock state, Lockdown Mode and GrapheneOS (https://phoneseized.com/protect/bfu-lockdown-grapheneos). Deep pages: England & Wales (https://phoneseized.com/uk/extraction-after-seizure), Scotland (https://phoneseized.com/scotland/seizure-and-cyber-kiosks), Australia (https://phoneseized.com/australia/border-abf).

## How long can they keep it — or the data?
URL: https://phoneseized.com/compare/how-long-kept
Jurisdictions: England & Wales, Scotland, Australia, United States
Last reviewed: 2026-10-04

### The short answer, country by country
In England & Wales, under s.22(1) of PACE, subject to subsection (4), anything which has been seized by a constable, or taken away by a constable following a requirement made by virtue of section 19 or 20, may be retained so long as is necessary in all the circumstances. Under s.22(4) of PACE, nothing may be retained for either of the purposes mentioned in subsection (2)(a) if a photograph or copy would be sufficient for that purpose. Separately, under the Data Protection Act 2018, personal data processed for any of the law enforcement purposes must be kept for no longer than is necessary for the purpose for which it is processed. In Scotland, Police Scotland’s cyber kiosks page says that all information is securely deleted from the cyber kiosk at the end of each examination — that sentence is about the cyber kiosk and does not mention the seized device or any copies. In Australia, the Australian Border Force’s written answer AE22-050 to a question taken on notice at the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs’ Additional Budget Estimates hearing of 14 February 2022 said that current ABF policy was to retain electronic devices held for examination for no longer than 14 days, unless it was reasonable that the examination would take longer or content was located on the device that rendered the device subject to seizure. In the same answer the ABF said (https://www.aph.gov.au/api/qon/downloadattachment?attachmentId=bd0902f9-1209-49d9-9c86-b6858c22020d) that it has powers under the Customs Act 1901 (Customs Act), the Migration Act 1958 (Migration Act) and the Maritime Powers Act 2013 (Maritime Powers Act) to examine and copy electronic devices which includes mobile phones, computers and removable storage devices such as USB drives, and that “None of the aforementioned legislation provide a time limit for the retention of goods subject to examination.” Separately from the ABF’s policy, under a Commonwealth search warrant (Crimes Act 1914), s.3K(3A) (https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1) says a thing may be moved to another place for examination or processing for no longer than whichever of the following is applicable: if the thing is a computer or data storage device, 30 days; otherwise, 14 days. That period is stated for a thing moved under s.3K(2); the provision quoted does not state a period for a thing seized. Under s.3K(3B)–(3D) (https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1), an executing officer may apply to an issuing officer for one or more extensions of that time if the executing officer believes on reasonable grounds that the thing cannot be examined or processed within the time applicable under subsection (3A) or that time as previously extended, and a single extension cannot exceed whichever of the following is applicable: if the thing is a computer or data storage device, 14 days; otherwise, 7 days. That is a warrant provision, not Australian Border Force policy. In the United States, CBP Directive 3340-049B says that, following the completion of the border search, CBP will retain no copies of the information from an electronic device beyond twenty-one (21) calendar days following the conclusion of the border search unless retention is permissible or required consistent with sections 5.6.1, 5.6.2, or 5.6.3. Section 5.6.1 (https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/2026-01/cbp_directive_3340-049b_jan_2026_508.pdf) says that CBP may retain copies of information from an electronic device when, based on a review of the information encountered or on other facts and circumstances, they determine there is probable cause to believe the information contains digital contraband or evidence of a violation of law that CBP is authorized to enforce or administer, subject to the requirements and limitations provided in the directive and applicable law. Section 5.6.2 says that, without probable cause, CBP may retain only information from the border search of an electronic device relating to immigration, customs, and other enforcement matters if such retention is consistent with the applicable system of records notice and subject to the requirements and limitations provided in the directive and applicable law. The same directive (https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/2026-01/cbp_directive_3340-049b_jan_2026_508.pdf) says it is an internal policy statement of CBP and does not create or confer any rights, privileges, or benefits on any person or party.

### Where the jurisdictions differ
The England & Wales cell is a necessity test, subject to s.22(4) — “so long as is necessary in all the circumstances” — and the provision quoted states no period of days. The Australian and United States cells each state a day limit, and each comes from a border-examination policy: the Australian Border Force’s answer to the Senate committee and CBP’s directive on border searches. The Australian cell’s notes also quote the Border Force’s statement that none of the legislation it mentions provides a time limit for the retention of goods subject to examination, and, separately, the Commonwealth search-warrant limits in s.3K(3A) on moving a thing for examination or processing, which s.3K(3B)–(3D) allow to be extended. The matrix has no cell giving a stated time limit for the seized device in Scotland or for a domestic seizure in the United States.

### Read further
See how long police can keep your phone data (https://phoneseized.com/uk/retention-and-deletion) in England & Wales, the Scotland retention position (https://phoneseized.com/scotland/retention), Australian Border Force policy (https://phoneseized.com/australia/border-abf), moving a thing for examination under a Commonwealth warrant (https://phoneseized.com/australia/moved-for-examination-and-return), and getting a seized phone back in the US (https://phoneseized.com/usa/return-and-retention-rule-41). See also Can I get it back, or get the data deleted? (https://phoneseized.com/compare/get-it-back-or-deleted) and At the border? (https://phoneseized.com/compare/at-the-border)

## Can I get it back, or get the data deleted?
URL: https://phoneseized.com/compare/get-it-back-or-deleted
Jurisdictions: England & Wales, Scotland, Australia, United States
Last reviewed: 2026-10-04

### The short answer, country by country
In England & Wales, the Code of Practice on extraction of information from electronic devices says it only applies as regards the powers in Chapter 3 of Part 2 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 (‘the Act’), and that information which is extracted and deemed not relevant must be deleted unless there is a lawful basis to retain it. The same Code says it “only applies as regards the powers in Chapter 3 of Part 2 of the Act” (the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022) and that “If another power is being used as the basis for extracting information from an electronic device, the guidance/code for that power will apply.” Getting seized property back is a separate route: under s.59(2) of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, any person with a relevant interest in the seized property may apply to the appropriate judicial authority, on one or more of the grounds mentioned in s.59(3), for the return of the whole or a part of the seized property. The matrix shows the same Code in its Scotland column: the Code of Practice on extraction of information from electronic devices says it only applies as regards the powers in Chapter 3 of Part 2 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 (‘the Act’), and that information which is extracted and deemed not relevant must be deleted unless there is a lawful basis to retain it. In the United States, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g) says that a person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure of property or by the deprivation of property may move for the property’s return, and that the motion must be filed in the district where the property was seized. In Australia, under s.3ZQX(1) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) (https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1), if the Commissioner is satisfied that a thing seized under Division 2 or 4 is not required (or is no longer required) for a purpose mentioned in section 3ZQU or for other judicial or administrative review proceedings, the Commissioner must take reasonable steps to return the thing to the person from whom it was seized or to the owner if that person is not entitled to possess it. That is a duty on the Commissioner, and the quoted text states no period. Section 3(1) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) says (https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1) that in that Act, unless the contrary intention appears, “Commissioner means the Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police.” Under s.3ZQX(2) the Commissioner does not have to take those steps if the thing may be retained because of an order under subsection 3ZQZB(3), or any other order under that subsection has been made in relation to the thing; or the Commissioner has applied for such an order and the application has not been determined; or the thing may otherwise be retained, destroyed or disposed of under a law, or an order of a court or tribunal, of the Commonwealth or of a State or a Territory; or the thing is forfeited or forfeitable to the Commonwealth or is the subject of a dispute as to ownership. Under s.3ZQZB(1) (https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1), a magistrate may, on application by the Commissioner, make an order under subsection (2) or (3) in relation to a thing seized or a document produced under that Part. Under s.3ZQZB(3) and (4) (https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1), the magistrate may make any of the orders in subsection (4) if satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that, if a thing seized or document produced under that Part is returned to the owner of the thing or document, to the person from whom the thing was seized, or to the person who produced the document, it is likely to be used by that person or another person in the commission of a terrorist act, a terrorism offence or a serious offence; the orders are that the thing or document may be retained for the period specified in the order, that it is forfeited to the Commonwealth, for a thing that is not a document that the thing be sold and the proceeds given to the owner or sold in some other way, or that the thing or document is to be destroyed or otherwise disposed of. Under s.3ZQZB(5) (https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1), the magistrate must order that a thing or document be returned to the person from whom the thing was seized (or, for a document, the person who produced it), or to the owner if that person is not entitled to possess it, if the magistrate is not satisfied as mentioned in subsection (2) or (3). Under s.3ZQZB(6) and (7) (https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1), before making an application the Commissioner must take reasonable steps to discover who has an interest in the thing or document and, if it is practicable to do so, notify each person who the Commissioner believes to have such an interest of the proposed application; the magistrate must allow a person who has an interest in the thing or document to appear and be heard in determining the application. Separately, the Australian Border Force’s written answer AE22-050 to a question taken on notice at the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs’ Additional Budget Estimates hearing of 14 February 2022 said that the ABF did not alter or delete any data as a result of an examination of a device under the Customs or Migration acts — a statement about what the ABF does, not a right for a traveller to have data deleted.

### Where the jurisdictions differ
The England & Wales and Scotland cells quote a Code of Practice that says it only applies as regards the powers in Chapter 3 of Part 2 of the Act, and that information extracted and deemed not relevant must be deleted unless there is a lawful basis to retain it. The United States cell is a different kind of remedy: Rule 41(g) speaks of the property’s return, not of deleting data. The Australian cell is a duty on the Commissioner to take reasonable steps to return a thing seized under Division 2 or 4 if the Commissioner is satisfied that it is not required (or is no longer required) for a purpose mentioned in section 3ZQU or for other judicial or administrative review proceedings, with the cases in s.3ZQX(2) in which the Commissioner does not have to. The quoted text speaks of returning the thing, not of deleting data.

### Read further
See the s.59 return route in full (https://phoneseized.com/uk/seizure-pace), the deletion duty in full (https://phoneseized.com/uk/retention-and-deletion), the Scotland retention position (https://phoneseized.com/scotland/retention), getting seized things back under the Commonwealth Crimes Act (https://phoneseized.com/australia/moved-for-examination-and-return), and getting a seized phone back in the US (https://phoneseized.com/usa/return-and-retention-rule-41). See also How long can they keep it? (https://phoneseized.com/compare/how-long-kept)

### Limits on them
- Anyone with a relevant interest in seized property may apply to the appropriate judicial authority, on one or more of the grounds mentioned in subsection (3), for its return.
  This is a route to get seized property back through the court — separate from the Code of Practice rule on deleting extracted data found not relevant, covered above.
  Source: Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.59(2) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/59

## At the border?
URL: https://phoneseized.com/compare/at-the-border
Jurisdictions: England & Wales, Scotland, Australia, United States
Last reviewed: 2026-10-04

### The short answer, country by country
In England & Wales and Scotland, under Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 a person commits an offence if they wilfully fail to comply with a duty imposed under or by virtue of that Schedule, wilfully contravene a prohibition imposed under or by virtue of that Schedule, or wilfully obstruct, or seek to frustrate, a search or examination under or by virtue of that Schedule. Under Schedule 7, a person who is questioned under paragraph 2 or 3 must give the examining officer any information in his possession which the officer requests, and the Schedule 7 Code of Practice (October 2025), at para 55, says that information requested under paragraph 5(a) “may include passwords to electronic devices.” The same paragraph says an examining officer may not, however, compel a person to disclose or confirm the identity of a source of journalistic information or disclose information subject to legal privilege. That is a rule for the examining officer. As quoted, it does not give the person a right to refuse any Schedule 7 duty. Once in force, s.178 of the Crime and Policing Act 2026 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2026/20/section/178) will insert into Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 (port and border controls) a paragraph that will apply where an electronic device is detained under paragraph 11 after having been searched or found on a search under paragraph 8, or examined under paragraph 9; under it a relevant senior officer will be able to authorise a constable to extract information accessible by means of one or more online accounts which were accessed by means of the device before the search or examination began; the power will be exercisable only to extract information which was accessible by means of the online accounts at the time the search or examination began, and the powers under the paragraph will be exercisable only for so long as the electronic device continues to be detained under paragraph 11. In Australia, the Australian Border Force’s written answer AE22-050 to a question taken on notice at the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs’ Additional Budget Estimates hearing of 14 February 2022 said there was no legal compulsion for a traveller to provide a password/passcode or provide assistance to an electronic device at the border. In the same answer the ABF said that if an individual refused to comply with a request or provide a password for an examination of their electronic device, and an ABF officer considered there to be a risk to the border, the officer was authorised to seize that device for further examination prior to being returned. In the United States, CBP Directive 3340-049B says that travelers are obligated to present electronic devices and the information contained therein in a condition that allows inspection of the device and its contents. The same directive says that if an officer is unable to complete an inspection of an electronic device because it is protected by a passcode or encryption, the officer may, in accordance with section 5.4 of the directive, detain the device pending a determination as to its admissibility, exclusion, or other disposition. The directive also says (https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/2026-01/cbp_directive_3340-049b_jan_2026_508.pdf) that passcodes or other means of access obtained during a border inspection will only be utilized to facilitate the inspection of devices and information subject to border search, and that passcodes or other means of access may not be utilized to access information that is only stored remotely.

### Where the jurisdictions differ
The sources differ in kind, so the cells are not like-for-like. The England & Wales and Scotland cells quote an offence provision in an Act, with a Code of Practice on what the duty can cover. The Australian cell is the Australian Border Force’s own statement to a Senate committee, not a provision of law. The United States cell is an agency directive: CBP’s own statement of what travelers are obligated to do, and what an officer may do with a device it cannot inspect. It is CBP’s policy, not legislation or a court ruling.

### Read further
See Schedule 7 and your phone in full (https://phoneseized.com/uk/ports-schedule-7), Border Force and your phone in Australia (https://phoneseized.com/australia/border-abf), and CBP and your phone at the US border (https://phoneseized.com/usa/border-cbp). See also Must I give them the passcode? (https://phoneseized.com/compare/must-i-give-the-code) for how the domestic and border positions differ within each country, and, for UK encounter rights specifically, rightsandlimits.com’s guide to Schedule 7 (https://rightsandlimits.com/borders/schedule-7).

## Can police take my phone, and what happens to it?
URL: https://phoneseized.com/uk/seizure-pace
Jurisdictions: England & Wales
Last reviewed: 2026-10-04

### Can they just take it?
In the circumstances PACE sets out, officers have the powers below. Under s.32, in a case where the person has been arrested at a place other than a police station, a constable has power to search the arrested person for anything “which might be evidence relating to an offence”, but may not do so unless he has reasonable grounds for believing that the person may have concealed on him anything for which that search is permitted. Section 32(9) adds that a constable searching a person in the exercise of the power conferred by subsection (2)(a) “may seize and retain anything he finds, other than an item subject to legal privilege”, if he has reasonable grounds for believing that it is evidence of an offence or has been obtained in consequence of the commission of an offence. Under s.19(3), a constable who is lawfully on premises may seize anything on the premises if he has reasonable grounds for believing it is evidence in relation to an offence he is investigating “or any other offence”, and that it is necessary to seize it in order to prevent the evidence being concealed, lost, altered or destroyed. Section 19(3) is worded as a power to seize “anything which is on the premises” where both of those conditions are met.

### Getting it in a form they can read
Section 19(4) says the constable may require any information which is stored in any electronic form and is accessible from the premises to be produced in a form in which it can be taken away and in which it is visible and legible, or from which it can readily be produced in a visible and legible form, if he has reasonable grounds for believing that it is evidence in relation to an offence which he is investigating or any other offence, or that it has been obtained in consequence of the commission of an offence; and that it is necessary to do so in order to prevent it being concealed, lost, tampered with or destroyed. PACE Code B (para 7.6) says that if an officer considers information stored in any electronic form and accessible from the premises could be used in evidence, they may require the information to be produced in a form which can be taken away and in which it is visible and legible, or from which it can readily be produced in a visible and legible form. Section 19(4) speaks of requiring information “to be produced in a form in which it can be taken away and in which it is visible and legible”; its words, as quoted, say nothing about a password or about an offence for refusing. Under s.53(1) of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/section/53), a person to whom a section 49 notice has been given is guilty of an offence if he knowingly fails, in accordance with the notice, to make the disclosure required by virtue of the giving of the notice. Section 49 notices are covered on the RIPA notice page (https://phoneseized.com/uk/ripa-notice).

### How long can they keep it?
PACE s.22(1) says that, subject to subsection (4), anything seized by a constable, or taken away by a constable following a requirement made by virtue of section 19 or 20, “may be retained so long as is necessary in all the circumstances”. The quoted provision states a necessity test and no period of days. Section 22(2)(a) says that, without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), anything seized for the purposes of a criminal investigation may be retained, except as provided by subsection (4), for use as evidence at a trial for an offence, or for forensic examination or for investigation in connection with an offence. Section 22(4) says nothing may be retained for either of the purposes mentioned in subsection (2)(a) if a photograph or copy would be sufficient for that purpose. Code B para 7.14 states a similar test for officers: “anything seized in accordance with the above provisions may be retained only for as long as is necessary”.

### Seize first, sift later
Section 50(1) of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 says that, where each of the following is met, that person’s powers of seizure “shall include power under this section to seize so much of what he has found as it is necessary to remove from the premises to enable that to be determined”: a person who is lawfully on any premises finds anything on those premises that he has reasonable grounds for believing may be or may contain something for which he is authorised to search on those premises; a power of seizure to which the section applies, or the power conferred by subsection (2), would entitle him, if he found it, to seize whatever it is that he has grounds for believing that thing to be or to contain; and, in all the circumstances, it is not reasonably practicable for it to be determined, on those premises, whether what he has found is something that he is entitled to seize, or the extent to which what he has found contains something that he is entitled to seize.

### Getting it back
Section 59(2) of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 says that any person with a relevant interest in the seized property may apply to the appropriate judicial authority, on one or more of the grounds mentioned in subsection (3), for the return of the whole or a part of the seized property. The quoted words do not say which seizure powers they cover. PACE s.21(1) says that a constable who seizes anything in the exercise of a power conferred by any enactment shall, if so requested by a person showing himself to be the occupier of premises on which it was seized, or to have had custody or control of it immediately before the seizure, provide that person with a record of what he seized.

### Related pages
Related pages on this site: Warrants and premises searches (https://phoneseized.com/uk/warrants-and-premises), Property taken in custody: PACE s.54 (https://phoneseized.com/uk/custody-property-s54) and Seize and sift (https://phoneseized.com/uk/seize-and-sift-cjpa-50-51).

### What they can do
- Where a person has been arrested at a place other than a police station, a constable has power to search the arrested person for anything which might be evidence relating to an offence, but may not do so unless he has reasonable grounds for believing that the person may have concealed on him anything for which that search is permitted; and a constable searching a person in the exercise of the power conferred by subsection (2)(a) may seize and retain anything he finds, other than an item subject to legal privilege, if he has reasonable grounds for believing that it is evidence of an offence or has been obtained in consequence of the commission of an offence.
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.32(1), (2)(a)(ii), (5) and (9) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/32
- A constable who is lawfully on any premises may seize anything which is on the premises if he has reasonable grounds for believing that it is evidence in relation to an offence which he is investigating or any other offence, and that it is necessary to seize it in order to prevent the evidence being concealed, lost, altered or destroyed.
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.19(3) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/19
- Under s.19(4), the constable may require any information which is stored in any electronic form and is accessible from the premises to be produced in a form in which it can be taken away and in which it is visible and legible, or from which it can readily be produced in a visible and legible form, if he has reasonable grounds for believing that it is evidence in relation to an offence which he is investigating or any other offence, or that it has been obtained in consequence of the commission of an offence; and that it is necessary to do so in order to prevent it being concealed, lost, tampered with or destroyed.
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.19(4) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/19
- Section 20(1) provides that every power of seizure conferred by an enactment to which s.20 applies on a constable who has entered premises in the exercise of a power conferred by an enactment shall be construed as including a power to require any information stored in any electronic form contained in a computer and accessible from the premises to be produced in a form in which it can be taken away and in which it is visible and legible or from which it can readily be produced in a visible and legible form. Section 20(2) says it applies to any enactment in an Act passed before the 1984 Act, to sections 8 and 18, to paragraph 13 of Schedule 1, and to any enactment in an Act passed after it.
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.20(1) and (2) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/20
- PACE Code B para 7.6: if an officer considers information stored in any electronic form and accessible from the premises could be used in evidence, they may require the information to be produced in a form which can be taken away and in which it is visible and legible, or from which it can readily be produced in a visible and legible form.
  Source: PACE Code B (2023), para 7.6 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/65804a3a83ba380013e1b769/PACE+Code+B+2023.pdf
- Under s.50(1) of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, where each of the following is met, that person's powers of seizure include power under that section to seize so much of what he has found as it is necessary to remove from the premises to enable that to be determined: a person who is lawfully on any premises finds anything on those premises that he has reasonable grounds for believing may be or may contain something for which he is authorised to search on those premises; a power of seizure to which the section applies, or the power conferred by subsection (2), would entitle him, if he found it, to seize whatever it is that he has grounds for believing that thing to be or to contain; and, in all the circumstances, it is not reasonably practicable for it to be determined, on those premises, whether what he has found is something that he is entitled to seize, or the extent to which what he has found contains something that he is entitled to seize.
  Source: Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.50(1) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/50
- Section 22(2)(a) says that, without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), anything seized for the purposes of a criminal investigation may be retained, except as provided by subsection (4), for use as evidence at a trial for an offence, or for forensic examination or for investigation in connection with an offence.
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.22(2)(a) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/22

### Limits on them
- Subject to subsection (4), anything seized by a constable, or taken away by a constable following a section 19 or 20 requirement, may be retained so long as is necessary in all the circumstances — the quoted provision states a necessity test and no period of days.
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.22(1) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/22
- Under s.22(4), nothing may be retained for either of the purposes mentioned in subsection (2)(a) if a photograph or copy would be sufficient for that purpose.
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.22(4) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/22
- PACE Code B para 7.14 says anything seized in accordance with the above provisions may be retained only for as long as is necessary.
  Source: PACE Code B (2023), para 7.14 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/65804a3a83ba380013e1b769/PACE+Code+B+2023.pdf
- Any person with a relevant interest in the seized property may apply to the appropriate judicial authority, on one or more of the grounds mentioned in subsection (3), for the return of the whole or a part of the seized property.
  Source: Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.59(2) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/59
- A constable who seizes anything in the exercise of a power conferred by any enactment shall, if so requested by a person showing himself to be the occupier of premises on which it was seized, or to have had custody or control of it immediately before the seizure, provide that person with a record of what he seized.
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.21(1) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/21

## What happens when police examine a seized phone
URL: https://phoneseized.com/uk/extraction-after-seizure
Jurisdictions: England & Wales
Last reviewed: 2026-10-02

### What this page covers
This page covers the legal side: what the authorities this site has sourced say about obtaining information from a phone the police have already seized. For what a full extraction contains, device by device, see what a full extraction contains (https://phoneseized.com/on-your-phone/what-a-full-extraction-contains).

### No equipment interference warrant where PACE seizure powers are used
The Equipment Interference Code of Practice gives an example. A law enforcement officer interferes with equipment to obtain information stored in electronic form on that equipment, as relevant evidence in a criminal investigation, under their powers of seizure arising from the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. The Code says: “The officer’s conduct is authorised by the 1984 Act and no equipment interference warrant is therefore required.” That example is about an equipment interference warrant. This site has not sourced a statement about what other authorisation, if any, applies to examining the data on a seized phone.

### What the extraction Code says about its own scope
Section 42(1) of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 says the Secretary of State must prepare a code of practice containing guidance about the exercise of the powers in sections 37(1) and 41(1). The Code itself says it “only applies as regards the powers in Chapter 3 of Part 2 of the Act” and that “If another power is being used as the basis for extracting information from an electronic device, the guidance/code for that power will apply.” The voluntary pathway under section 37(1) is covered separately (https://phoneseized.com/uk/victims-witnesses-pcsc).

### What the regulator found
The Information Commissioner’s Office looked at how forces across England and Wales were using extraction and found that “police data extraction practices vary across the country, with excessive amounts of personal data often being extracted, stored, and made available to others, without an appropriate basis in existing data protection law.” Read the ICO’s 2020 report (https://ico.org.uk/media2/migrated/2617838/ico-report-on-mpe-in-england-and-wales-v1_1.pdf). Its Recommendation 1 says: “The Government should strengthen the current legislative framework by producing a statutory code or other equivalent measure to ensure the law is sufficiently clear and foreseeable.” That is a recommendation rather than a rule, so it is not listed as a duty item below.

### What they can do
- The Equipment Interference Code gives this example: a law enforcement officer interferes with equipment to obtain information stored in electronic form on that equipment (as relevant evidence in a criminal investigation) under their powers of seizure arising from the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, and the officer's conduct is authorised by the 1984 Act and no equipment interference warrant is therefore required.
  Source: Equipment Interference Code of Practice (June 2025), example following para 3.32 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6841a1b4280ec7236902c0a4/Equipment_Interference_Code_of_Practice_-_June_2025.pdf

### What the sources say
- Section 42(1) of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 says the Secretary of State must prepare a code of practice containing guidance about the exercise of the powers in sections 37(1) and 41(1).
  Source: Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.42(1) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/42
- The extraction Code says it only applies as regards the powers in Chapter 3 of Part 2 of the Act, and that if another power is being used as the basis for extracting information from an electronic device, the guidance/code for that power will apply.
  Source: Extraction of Information from Electronic Devices: Code of Practice (Oct 2022), para 4 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/634810a38fa8f53463dcb957/E02802691_Electronic_Devices_Code_of_Practice_WEB.pdf

## The RIPA s.49 notice: when failing to disclose is an offence
URL: https://phoneseized.com/uk/ripa-notice
Jurisdictions: England & Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland
Last reviewed: 2026-10-06

### The notice that turns silence into an offence
Under s.49(1)(a) of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, section 49 applies where any protected information has come into the possession of any person by means of the exercise of a statutory power to seize, detain, inspect, search or otherwise to interfere with documents or other property, or is likely to do so. Section 53(1) says that a person to whom a section 49 notice has been given is guilty of an offence if he knowingly fails, in accordance with the notice, to make the disclosure required by virtue of the giving of the notice.

### The notice has conditions attached
Under s.49(2), if a person with the appropriate permission under Schedule 2 believes, on reasonable grounds, that a key to the protected information is in the possession of any person, that a disclosure requirement is necessary on grounds falling within subsection (3) or for the purpose of securing the effective exercise or proper performance by any public authority of any statutory power or statutory duty, that imposing it is proportionate to what is sought to be achieved, and that it is not reasonably practicable for the person with the appropriate permission to obtain possession of the protected information in an intelligible form without the giving of a notice under that section, that person may by notice to the person he believes to have possession of the key impose a disclosure requirement in respect of the protected information. The RIPA Part III Code of Practice (para 3.38) says the person giving appropriate permission and, where different, the person with that permission must believe that the imposition of a disclosure requirement by a notice is necessary.

### Who has the appropriate permission
Schedule 2 to the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/schedule/2) says that, subject to the other provisions of that Schedule, a person has the appropriate permission in relation to any protected information “if, and only if, written permission for the giving of section 49 notices in relation to that information has been granted” — in England and Wales, by a Circuit judge; in Scotland, by a sheriff; or in Northern Ireland, by a county court judge. Paragraph 4 of that Schedule applies to protected information falling within section 49(1)(a), (b) or (c) which is not information in the case of which paragraph 2 or 3 applies; paragraph 4(2) says that, subject to paragraph 6, where the statutory power was exercised, or is likely to be exercised, by the police, the police have the appropriate permission in relation to the protected information, without any grant of permission under paragraph 1. Paragraph 2 of that Schedule (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/schedule/2) applies in the case of protected information falling within section 49(1)(a), (b) or (c) where the statutory power in question is one exercised, or to be exercised, in accordance with a warrant issued by the Secretary of State or a person holding judicial office, an authorisation under Part III of the Police Act 1997, or a targeted equipment interference warrant issued under section 106 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. Paragraph 2(2) says that, subject to sub-paragraphs (3) to (5) and paragraph 6(1), a person has the appropriate permission in relation to that protected information (without any grant of permission under paragraph 1) if the warrant or authorisation contained the relevant authority’s permission for the giving of section 49 notices in relation to protected information to be obtained under the warrant or authorisation, or if, since the issue of the warrant or authorisation, written permission has been granted by the relevant authority for the giving of such notices in relation to protected information obtained under the warrant or authorisation. Paragraph 2(9) says that protected information that comes into a person’s possession by means of the exercise of any statutory power which is exercisable without a warrant, but is so exercisable in the course of, or in connection with, the exercise of another statutory power for which a warrant is required, shall not be taken, by reason only of the warrant required for the exercise of that other statutory power, to be information in the case of which paragraph 2 applies. Paragraph 6(2) of that Schedule says that, subject to sub-paragraph (3), a constable does not by virtue of paragraph 1, 4 or 5 have the appropriate permission in relation to any protected information unless he is of or above the rank of superintendent, or permission to give a section 49 notice in relation to that information has been granted by a person holding the rank of superintendent, or any higher rank.

### The penalty
Section 53(5) says a person guilty of an offence under that section is liable, on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding “the appropriate maximum term” or to a fine, or to both; and, on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to both. Section 53(5A) defines “the appropriate maximum term” as five years in a national security case or a child indecency case, and two years in any other case.

### A section 49 notice and an informal request
The s.53(1) offence quoted above is worded as an offence by “a person to whom a section 49 notice has been given”. This page does not cover an officer simply asking for a PIN during a search or an interview; that is covered in more depth, including how to tell a request from a notice, on rightsandlimits.com’s phone passwords page (https://rightsandlimits.com/devices/phone-passwords).

### You must
- Make the disclosure required by a section 49 notice given to you, in accordance with the notice — knowingly failing to do so is an offence under s.53(1).
  Section 53(1): a person to whom a section 49 notice has been given is guilty of an offence if he knowingly fails, in accordance with the notice, to make the disclosure required by virtue of the giving of the notice.
  Source: Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, s.53(1) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/section/53
- A person guilty of an offence under s.53 of RIPA is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding "the appropriate maximum term" or to a fine, or to both, where s.53(5A) defines "the appropriate maximum term" as five years in a national security case or a child indecency case and two years in any other case; on summary conviction the person is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to both.
  Source: Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, s.53(5) and (5A) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/section/53

### What they can do
- Under s.49(2), if a person with the appropriate permission under Schedule 2 believes, on reasonable grounds, that a key to the protected information is in the possession of any person, that a disclosure requirement is necessary on grounds falling within subsection (3) or for the purpose of securing the effective exercise or proper performance by any public authority of any statutory power or statutory duty, that imposing it is proportionate to what is sought to be achieved, and that it is not reasonably practicable for the person with the appropriate permission to obtain possession of the protected information in an intelligible form without the giving of a notice under that section, that person may by notice to the person he believes to have possession of the key impose a disclosure requirement in respect of the protected information.
  Source: Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, s.49(2) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/section/49

### Limits on them
- The RIPA Part III Code (para 3.38) says the person giving appropriate permission and, where different, the person with that permission must believe that the imposition of a disclosure requirement by a notice is necessary.
  Source: RIPA Part III Code of Practice, para 3.38 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5ba378d540f0b605084c94cf/RIPA_Part_III_Code_of_Practice.pdf
- Paragraph 6(2) of Schedule 2 to the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 says that, subject to sub-paragraph (3), a constable does not by virtue of paragraph 1, 4 or 5 have the appropriate permission in relation to any protected information unless he is of or above the rank of superintendent, or permission to give a section 49 notice in relation to that information has been granted by a person holding the rank of superintendent, or any higher rank.
  Source: Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, Sch.2 para 6(2) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/schedule/2

### What the sources say
- Schedule 2 to the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 says that, subject to the other provisions of that Schedule, a person has the appropriate permission in relation to any protected information if, and only if, written permission for the giving of section 49 notices in relation to that information has been granted — in England and Wales, by a Circuit judge; in Scotland, by a sheriff; or in Northern Ireland, by a county court judge.
  Source: Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, Sch.2 para 1(1) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/schedule/2
- Paragraph 4 of that Schedule applies to protected information falling within section 49(1)(a), (b) or (c) which is not information in the case of which paragraph 2 or 3 applies; paragraph 4(2) says that, subject to paragraph 6, where the statutory power was exercised, or is likely to be exercised, by the police, the police have the appropriate permission in relation to the protected information, without any grant of permission under paragraph 1.
  Source: Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, Sch.2 para 4(1)(a) and (2) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/schedule/2
- Paragraph 2 of that Schedule applies in the case of protected information falling within section 49(1)(a), (b) or (c) where the statutory power in question is one exercised, or to be exercised, in accordance with a warrant issued by the Secretary of State or a person holding judicial office, an authorisation under Part III of the Police Act 1997, or a targeted equipment interference warrant issued under section 106 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016; paragraph 2(2) says that, subject to sub-paragraphs (3) to (5) and paragraph 6(1), a person has the appropriate permission in relation to that protected information (without any grant of permission under paragraph 1) if the warrant or authorisation contained the relevant authority’s permission for the giving of section 49 notices in relation to protected information to be obtained under the warrant or authorisation, or if, since the issue of the warrant or authorisation, written permission has been granted by the relevant authority for the giving of such notices in relation to protected information obtained under the warrant or authorisation. Paragraph 2(9) says that protected information that comes into a person’s possession by means of the exercise of any statutory power which is exercisable without a warrant, but is so exercisable in the course of, or in connection with, the exercise of another statutory power for which a warrant is required, shall not be taken, by reason only of the warrant required for the exercise of that other statutory power, to be information in the case of which paragraph 2 applies.
  Source: Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, Sch.2 para 2(1), (2) and (9) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/schedule/2
- The s.53(1) offence is worded as an offence committed by a person to whom a section 49 notice has been given.
  Source: Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, s.53(1) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/section/53
- Section 49(1)(a) says that section 49 applies where any protected information has come into the possession of any person by means of the exercise of a statutory power to seize, detain, inspect, search or otherwise to interfere with documents or other property, or is likely to do so.
  Source: Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, s.49(1)(a) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/section/49

## Stopped at a port or airport: Schedule 7 and your phone
URL: https://phoneseized.com/uk/ports-schedule-7
Jurisdictions: England & Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland
Last reviewed: 2026-10-06

### A different power, a different rulebook
Paragraph 2 of Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 applies to a person if he is at a port or in the border area and the examining officer believes that the person’s presence at the port or in the area is connected with his entering or leaving Great Britain or Northern Ireland or his travelling by air within Great Britain or within Northern Ireland. Paragraph 2(3) says it also applies to a person on a ship or aircraft which has arrived at any place in Great Britain or Northern Ireland (whether from within or outside Great Britain or Northern Ireland). Paragraph 2(1) says an examining officer may question a person to whom the paragraph applies for the purpose of determining whether he appears to be a person falling within section 40(1)(b). Paragraph 2(4) says an examining officer may exercise his powers under that paragraph “whether or not he has grounds for suspecting that a person falls within section 40(1)(b)”. Paragraph 4 of Schedule 7 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/schedule/7/paragraph/4) says a place in Northern Ireland is within the border area for the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3 if it is no more than one mile from the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. It also says that, if a train goes from the Republic of Ireland to Northern Ireland, the first place in Northern Ireland at which it stops for the purpose of allowing passengers to leave is within the border area for the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3.

### A legal duty to give information
Paragraph 5(a) says a person who is questioned under paragraph 2 or 3 must give the examining officer any information in his possession which the officer requests. The Schedule 7 Code of Practice says that information requested under paragraph 5(a) “may include passwords to electronic devices”; the same paragraph says an examining officer may not, however, compel a person to disclose or confirm the identity of a source of journalistic information or disclose information subject to legal privilege. That is a rule for the examining officer. As quoted, it does not give the person a right to refuse any Schedule 7 duty. The Code also says that “The person must provide access to any electronic device to allow for a search to be undertaken, including where access to a device requires the person to unlock a device through application of their thumb or finger, or any other form of access control”. Paragraph 18(1) says a person commits an offence if he wilfully fails to comply with a duty imposed under or by virtue of the Schedule, wilfully contravenes a prohibition imposed under or by virtue of that Schedule, or wilfully obstructs, or seeks to frustrate, a search or examination under or by virtue of that Schedule; paragraph 18(2) says a person guilty of an offence under that paragraph is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months, a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale, or both.

### Searching, copying and detaining
Paragraph 8(1)(a) says an examining officer who questions a person under paragraph 2 may, for the purpose of determining whether he falls within section 40(1)(b), search the person. The Schedule 7 Code says an examining officer who is a constable may copy anything obtained under paragraph 5, searched or found on a search under paragraph 8, or anything examined under paragraph 9, and that this includes making copies of electronic data. Paragraph 11 applies to anything which is given to an examining officer in accordance with paragraph 5(d), is searched or found on a search under paragraph 8, or is examined under paragraph 9. Under paragraph 11(2) an examining officer may detain the thing for the purpose of examination, for a period not exceeding seven days beginning with the day on which the detention commences; while he believes that it may be needed for use as evidence in criminal proceedings; or while he believes that it may be needed in connection with a decision by the Secretary of State whether to make a deportation order under the Immigration Act 1971.

### Where to go for the rest of it
This page covers the seizure and device side of a Schedule 7 stop. For the full picture — how long an examination itself can last, what happens if you are detained rather than just examined, and what protections still apply — see rightsandlimits.com’s Schedule 7 page (https://rightsandlimits.com/borders/schedule-7). Related situations are covered on the page on a work phone at a UK port (https://phoneseized.com/scenarios/work-phone-at-a-uk-port) and, for England and Wales, the page on journalistic and source material (https://phoneseized.com/scenarios/journalist-source-material).

### You must
- If you are questioned under paragraph 2 or 3 of Schedule 7, give the examining officer any information in your possession which the officer requests.
  Source: Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 5(a) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/schedule/7
- The Schedule 7 Code says the person must provide access to any electronic device to allow for a search to be undertaken, including where access to a device requires the person to unlock a device through application of their thumb or finger, or any other form of access control.
  Source: Schedule 7 (Terrorism Act 2000) Code of Practice (Oct 2025), para 61 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68e7b52b187483de54d766d2/Schedule+7+Code+of+Practice.pdf
- A person commits an offence if he wilfully fails to comply with a duty imposed under or by virtue of Schedule 7, wilfully contravenes a prohibition imposed under or by virtue of that Schedule, or wilfully obstructs, or seeks to frustrate, a search or examination under or by virtue of that Schedule.
  Source: Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 18(1) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/schedule/7/paragraph/18
- A person guilty of an offence under paragraph 18 is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months, a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale, or both.
  Source: Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 18(2) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/schedule/7/paragraph/18

### What they can do
- Paragraph 2 of Schedule 7 applies to a person if he is at a port or in the border area and the examining officer believes that the person’s presence at the port or in the area is connected with his entering or leaving Great Britain or Northern Ireland or his travelling by air within Great Britain or within Northern Ireland. Paragraph 2(3) says it also applies to a person on a ship or aircraft which has arrived at any place in Great Britain or Northern Ireland (whether from within or outside Great Britain or Northern Ireland). Under paragraph 2(4), an examining officer may exercise his powers under that paragraph whether or not he has grounds for suspecting that a person falls within section 40(1)(b).
  Source: Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 2(2), (3) and (4) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/schedule/7
- An examining officer may question a person to whom paragraph 2 applies for the purpose of determining whether he appears to be a person falling within section 40(1)(b).
  Source: Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 2(1) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/schedule/7
- The Schedule 7 Code says information requested by an examining officer under paragraph 5(a) may include passwords to electronic devices; the same paragraph says an examining officer may not, however, compel a person to disclose or confirm the identity of a source of journalistic information or disclose information subject to legal privilege.
  The second part is a rule for the examining officer. As quoted, it does not give the person a right to refuse any Schedule 7 duty.
  Source: Schedule 7 (Terrorism Act 2000) Code of Practice (Oct 2025), para 55 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68e7b52b187483de54d766d2/Schedule+7+Code+of+Practice.pdf
- An examining officer who questions a person under paragraph 2 may, for the purpose of determining whether he falls within section 40(1)(b), search the person.
  Source: Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 8(1)(a) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/schedule/7/paragraph/8
- The Schedule 7 Code says an examining officer who is a constable may copy anything obtained under paragraph 5, searched or found on a search under paragraph 8, or anything examined under paragraph 9, and that this includes making copies of electronic data.
  Source: Schedule 7 (Terrorism Act 2000) Code of Practice (Oct 2025), para 68 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68e7b52b187483de54d766d2/Schedule+7+Code+of+Practice.pdf
- Paragraph 11 of Schedule 7 applies to anything which is given to an examining officer in accordance with paragraph 5(d), is searched or found on a search under paragraph 8, or is examined under paragraph 9; an examining officer may detain the thing for the purpose of examination, for a period not exceeding seven days beginning with the day on which the detention commences; while he believes that it may be needed for use as evidence in criminal proceedings; or while he believes that it may be needed in connection with a decision by the Secretary of State whether to make a deportation order under the Immigration Act 1971.
  Source: Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 11(1) and (2) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/schedule/7/paragraph/11

### What the sources say
- Schedule 7 says “port” includes an airport and a hoverport.
  Source: Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 1(2) (interpretation: "port") — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/schedule/7
- Paragraph 4 of Schedule 7 says a place in Northern Ireland is within the border area for the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3 if it is no more than one mile from the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland; and that, if a train goes from the Republic of Ireland to Northern Ireland, the first place in Northern Ireland at which it stops for the purpose of allowing passengers to leave is within the border area for the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3.
  Source: Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 4(1) and (2) (the border area) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/schedule/7/paragraph/4

## Phone extraction under the PCSC Act 2022: ss.37, 39 and 40
URL: https://phoneseized.com/uk/victims-witnesses-pcsc
Jurisdictions: England & Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland
Last reviewed: 2026-10-04

### Devices handed over voluntarily, and section 40
Section 37(1) of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 says an authorised person may extract information stored on an electronic device from that device if a user of the device has voluntarily provided it to an authorised person, and that user has agreed to the extraction of information from the device by an authorised person. Section 37(13) says “electronic device” means any device on which information is capable of being stored electronically and includes any component of such a device, so the definition is not limited to phones.

### The written notice must say you may refuse
Section 39(1) says a person (‘P’) is treated for the purposes of section 37 or 38 as having voluntarily provided an electronic device to an authorised person and agreed to the extraction of information from it only if the requirements of section 39 have been met. Under s.39(3)(d), an authorised person must have given P notice in writing stating that P may refuse to provide the device or agree to the extraction of information from it. Under s.39(3)(e), the notice in writing that an authorised person must have given to P must state that the investigation or enquiry for the purposes of which the information is sought will not be brought to an end merely because P refuses to provide the device or agree to the extraction of information from it.

### The conditions attached to using it at all
Section 37(5) says an authorised person may exercise the power only if satisfied that exercise of the power is necessary and proportionate to achieve the purpose for which they propose to exercise it. The Code says an authorised person “must only exercise the Section 37 power for the purposes of preventing, detecting, investigating, or prosecuting crime if they reasonably believe that information on the device is relevant to a reasonable line of enquiry”, and that the authorised person “will have to be satisfied that the information sought is required to achieve the relevant purpose, e.g., preventing crime, and that the purpose cannot be achieved by other less intrusive means”.

### Extraction without agreement: section 40
Section 40(1) says that, if any of conditions A to C is met, an authorised person may exercise the power in section 37(1) to extract information stored on an electronic device from that device even though the device has not been voluntarily provided to an authorised person by a user of the device, or no user of the device has agreed to the extraction of information from the device by an authorised person. Section 40(2) says Condition A is that a person who was a user of the electronic device has died, and the person was a user of the device immediately before their death. Section 40(3) says Condition B is that a user of the electronic device is a child or an adult without capacity, and an authorised person reasonably believes that the user’s life is at risk or there is a risk of serious harm to the user. Section 40(4) says Condition C is that a person who was a user of the electronic device is missing, the person was a user of the device immediately before they went missing, and an authorised person reasonably believes that the person’s life is at risk or there is a risk of serious harm to the person. Section 40(5) says the exercise of the power in subsection (1) of section 37 by virtue of this section is subject to that section. See also rightsandlimits.com’s page on victim phone extraction (https://rightsandlimits.com/devices/victim-phone-extraction). Related situations are covered on the page on a complainant who is asked for a phone (https://phoneseized.com/scenarios/complainant-asked-for-phone) and the page on the phone of someone who has died (https://phoneseized.com/scenarios/phone-of-someone-who-has-died).

### What happens to what isn't relevant
The Code says it “only applies as regards the powers in Chapter 3 of Part 2 of the Act” and that “If another power is being used as the basis for extracting information from an electronic device, the guidance/code for that power will apply.” It also says: “Information which is extracted and deemed not relevant must be deleted unless there is a lawful basis to retain it.”

### You may refuse
- Under s.39(1) of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, a person (‘P’) is treated for the purposes of section 37 or 38 as having voluntarily provided an electronic device to an authorised person and agreed to the extraction of information from it only if the requirements of section 39 have been met. Under s.39(3)(d), an authorised person must have given P notice in writing stating that P may refuse to provide the device or agree to the extraction of information from it.
  Section 39(3)(d): an authorised person must have given P notice in writing stating that P may refuse to provide the device or agree to the extraction of information from it.
  Source: Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.39(1) and (3) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/39

### What they can do
- An authorised person may extract information stored on an electronic device from that device if a user of the device has voluntarily provided the device to an authorised person, and that user has agreed to the extraction of information from the device by an authorised person.
  Source: Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.37(1) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/37
- Under s.40(1), if any of conditions A to C is met, an authorised person may exercise the power in section 37(1) to extract information stored on an electronic device from that device even though the device has not been voluntarily provided to an authorised person by a user of the device, or no user of the device has agreed to the extraction of information from the device by an authorised person. Section 40(2) says Condition A is that a person who was a user of the electronic device has died, and the person was a user of the device immediately before their death. Section 40(3) says Condition B is that a user of the electronic device is a child or an adult without capacity, and an authorised person reasonably believes that the user’s life is at risk or there is a risk of serious harm to the user. Section 40(4) says Condition C is that a person who was a user of the electronic device is missing, the person was a user of the device immediately before they went missing, and an authorised person reasonably believes that the person’s life is at risk or there is a risk of serious harm to the person. Section 40(5) says the exercise of the power in subsection (1) of section 37 by virtue of this section is subject to that section.
  Source: Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.40(1) to (5) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/40

### Limits on them
- Under s.39(3)(e) of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, the notice in writing that an authorised person must have given to a person (‘P’) before P is treated for the purposes of section 37 or 38 as having voluntarily provided an electronic device and agreed to the extraction of information from it must state that the investigation or enquiry for the purposes of which the information is sought will not be brought to an end merely because P refuses to provide the device or agree to the extraction of information from it.
  Source: Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.39(1) and (3) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/39
- An authorised person may exercise the power in subsection (1) only if satisfied that exercise of the power is necessary and proportionate to achieve the purpose within subsection (2) for which they propose to exercise it.
  Source: Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.37(5)(c) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/37
- The extraction Code says an authorised person must only exercise the Section 37 power for the purposes of preventing, detecting, investigating, or prosecuting crime if they reasonably believe that information on the device is relevant to a reasonable line of enquiry.
  Source: Extraction of Information from Electronic Devices: Code of Practice (Oct 2022), para 71 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/634810a38fa8f53463dcb957/E02802691_Electronic_Devices_Code_of_Practice_WEB.pdf
- The extraction Code says the authorised person will have to be satisfied that the information sought is required to achieve the relevant purpose, e.g., preventing crime, and that the purpose cannot be achieved by other less intrusive means.
  Source: Extraction of Information from Electronic Devices: Code of Practice (Oct 2022), para 82 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/634810a38fa8f53463dcb957/E02802691_Electronic_Devices_Code_of_Practice_WEB.pdf
- The Code of Practice on extraction of information from electronic devices says it only applies as regards the powers in Chapter 3 of Part 2 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 (‘the Act’), and that information which is extracted and deemed not relevant must be deleted unless there is a lawful basis to retain it.
  Source: Extraction of Information from Electronic Devices: Code of Practice (Oct 2022), paras 1, 4 and 138 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/634810a38fa8f53463dcb957/E02802691_Electronic_Devices_Code_of_Practice_WEB.pdf

### What the sources say
- Section 37(13) provides that 'electronic device' means any device on which information is capable of being stored electronically and includes any component of such a device.
  Source: Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.37(13) (interpretation: "electronic device") — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/37

## How long police can keep your phone data
URL: https://phoneseized.com/uk/retention-and-deletion
Jurisdictions: England & Wales
Last reviewed: 2026-10-04

### The general data protection duty
Part 3 of the Data Protection Act 2018 sets data protection principles for the processing of personal data for any of the law enforcement purposes. The first principle (s.35(1)) is that processing must be lawful and fair. The third (s.37) is that personal data must be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purpose for which it is processed. The fifth (s.39(1)) is that it must be kept for no longer than is necessary for the purpose for which it is processed. That is a necessity test; the quoted provision states no period of days. Limb (a) of the definition of “sensitive processing” in s.35(8), which applies in Part 3, is the processing of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs or trade union membership.

### PACE's retention provision
PACE s.22(1) says that, subject to subsection (4), anything seized by a constable, or taken away by a constable following a requirement made by virtue of section 19 or 20, “may be retained so long as is necessary in all the circumstances”. Section 22(2)(a) says that, without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), anything seized for the purposes of a criminal investigation may be retained, except as provided by subsection (4), for use as evidence at a trial for an offence, or for forensic examination or for investigation in connection with an offence. Section 22(4) says nothing may be retained for either of the purposes mentioned in subsection (2)(a) if a photograph or copy would be sufficient for that purpose. PACE Code B para 7.14 says “anything seized in accordance with the above provisions may be retained only for as long as is necessary”. The quoted PACE provisions state a necessity test and no period of days, weeks or months.

### What the extraction Code says about deletion, and its scope
Para 138 of the extraction Code says: “Information which is extracted and deemed not relevant must be deleted unless there is a lawful basis to retain it.” As quoted, para 138 states no deadline for that deletion. The same Code says it “only applies as regards the powers in Chapter 3 of Part 2 of the Act” and that “If another power is being used as the basis for extracting information from an electronic device, the guidance/code for that power will apply.” Section 37(1) of the 2022 Act is a power to extract information from a device a user has voluntarily provided and agreed to the extraction from (see victims and witnesses (https://phoneseized.com/uk/victims-witnesses-pcsc)). This site has not sourced a deletion rule specific to a phone seized under PACE; the PACE and data protection provisions above are the ones it has sourced for that situation.

### The regulator's own verdict
The Information Commissioner’s Office found that “police data extraction practices vary across the country, with excessive amounts of personal data often being extracted, stored, and made available to others, without an appropriate basis in existing data protection law.” Its Recommendation 1 says: “The Government should strengthen the current legislative framework by producing a statutory code or other equivalent measure to ensure the law is sufficiently clear and foreseeable.”

### Related pages
Related pages on this site: Property taken in custody: PACE s.54 (https://phoneseized.com/uk/custody-property-s54) and Seize and sift (https://phoneseized.com/uk/seize-and-sift-cjpa-50-51).

### What they can do
- Section 22(2)(a) says that, without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), anything seized for the purposes of a criminal investigation may be retained, except as provided by subsection (4), for use as evidence at a trial for an offence, or for forensic examination or for investigation in connection with an offence.
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.22(2)(a) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/22

### Limits on them
- The first data protection principle is that the processing of personal data for any of the law enforcement purposes must be lawful and fair.
  Source: Data Protection Act 2018, s.35(1) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2018/12/section/35
- The third data protection principle is that personal data processed for any of the law enforcement purposes must be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purpose for which it is processed.
  Source: Data Protection Act 2018, s.37 — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2018/12/section/37
- The fifth data protection principle is that personal data processed for any of the law enforcement purposes must be kept for no longer than is necessary for the purpose for which it is processed.
  Source: Data Protection Act 2018, s.39(1) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2018/12/section/39
- Subject to subsection (4), anything seized by a constable, or taken away by a constable following a section 19 or 20 requirement, may be retained so long as is necessary in all the circumstances — the quoted provision states a necessity test and no period of days.
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.22(1) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/22
- Under s.22(4), nothing may be retained for either of the purposes mentioned in subsection (2)(a) if a photograph or copy would be sufficient for that purpose.
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.22(4) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/22
- PACE Code B para 7.14 says anything seized in accordance with the above provisions may be retained only for as long as is necessary.
  Source: PACE Code B (2023), para 7.14 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/65804a3a83ba380013e1b769/PACE+Code+B+2023.pdf
- The Code of Practice on extraction of information from electronic devices says it only applies as regards the powers in Chapter 3 of Part 2 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 (‘the Act’), and that information which is extracted and deemed not relevant must be deleted unless there is a lawful basis to retain it.
  Source: Extraction of Information from Electronic Devices: Code of Practice (Oct 2022), paras 1, 4 and 138 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/634810a38fa8f53463dcb957/E02802691_Electronic_Devices_Code_of_Practice_WEB.pdf

### What the sources say
- In Part 3 of the Data Protection Act 2018, limb (a) of the definition of "sensitive processing" in s.35(8) is the processing of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs or trade union membership.
  Source: Data Protection Act 2018, s.35(8)(a) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2018/12/section/35
- The ICO report says police data extraction practices vary across the country, with excessive amounts of personal data often being extracted, stored, and made available to others, without an appropriate basis in existing data protection law.
  Source: ICO, Mobile phone data extraction by police forces in England and Wales (June 2020) — https://ico.org.uk/media2/migrated/2617838/ico-report-on-mpe-in-england-and-wales-v1_1.pdf
- The ICO recommended that the Government strengthen the current legislative framework by producing a statutory code or other equivalent measure to ensure the law is sufficiently clear and foreseeable.
  Source: ICO, Mobile phone data extraction by police forces in England and Wales (June 2020), Recommendation 1 — https://ico.org.uk/media2/migrated/2617838/ico-report-on-mpe-in-england-and-wales-v1_1.pdf

## Crime & Policing Act 2026: account extraction, not in force
URL: https://phoneseized.com/uk/online-accounts-2026-act
Jurisdictions: England & Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland
Last reviewed: 2026-10-06

### Not yet the law — but coming
Once in force, section 173 of the Crime and Policing Act 2026 (Part 11) will allow a senior officer to authorise an enforcement officer to extract information accessible by means of online accounts accessed by means of a lawfully seized device before it was seized. Section 255(1) provides that, “Subject as follows”, the Act comes into force “on such day as the Secretary of State may by regulations appoint”. Regulation 2(1)(t) of S.I. 2026/689 (the Crime and Policing Act 2026 (Commencement No.1 and Saving Provision) Regulations 2026) says that, subject to paragraph (2), sections 176(7) and 177 come into force on 29th June 2026; it describes them as concerning confidential information and a code of practice. legislation.gov.uk still marked section 173, and sections 174, 175 and 178 to 180, as prospective when checked on 2026-10-01, so the power to authorise an extraction is not yet in force.

### What the new power will allow
Once in force, where an electronic device has been lawfully seized, a senior officer will be able to authorise an enforcement officer to extract information accessible by means of one or more online accounts which were accessed by means of the device before it was seized. Once in force, s.173(2) will allow a senior officer to give an authorisation under subsection (1) only if satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the information mentioned in subsection (1) includes information that is relevant to a reasonable line of enquiry which is being, or is to be pursued, by an enforcement officer for one or more relevant purposes, and that it is not reasonably practicable to obtain that information by other means.

### A retention provision, and PACE s.22(1)
Once in force, s.174(4) will provide that any information which has been extracted under an authorisation under section 173 “may be retained for so long as is necessary in all the circumstances”, but that this is subject to section 176. PACE s.22(1) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/22), which is subject to its own subsection (4), reads “may be retained so long as is necessary in all the circumstances”. Section 120(1) of PACE (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/120) says that, subject to the following provisions of that section, the 1984 Act extends to England and Wales only.

### A ports and borders version, and a code of practice
Once in force, s.178 will insert a paragraph into Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 (port and border controls) that will apply where an electronic device is detained under paragraph 11 after having been searched or found on a search under paragraph 8, or examined under paragraph 9: a relevant senior officer will be able to authorise a constable to extract information accessible by means of one or more online accounts which were accessed by means of the device before the search or examination began; the power will be exercisable only to extract information which was accessible by means of the online accounts at the time the search or examination began, and the powers under the paragraph will be exercisable only for so long as the electronic device continues to be detained under paragraph 11. Section 177(1)(a), in force since 29 June 2026 (S.I. 2026/689, reg. 2(1)(t)), says the Secretary of State must prepare a code of practice about the exercise of the power to give an authorisation under section 173; section 173 itself is not yet in force.

### What they can do
- Once in force, where an electronic device has been lawfully seized, a senior officer will be able to authorise an enforcement officer to extract information accessible by means of one or more online accounts which were accessed by means of the device before it was seized.
  Source: Crime and Policing Act 2026, s.173(1) — NOT YET IN FORCE — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2026/20/section/173
- Once in force, s.178 will insert into Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 (port and border controls) a paragraph that will apply where an electronic device is detained under paragraph 11 after having been searched or found on a search under paragraph 8, or examined under paragraph 9; under it a relevant senior officer will be able to authorise a constable to extract information accessible by means of one or more online accounts which were accessed by means of the device before the search or examination began; the power will be exercisable only to extract information which was accessible by means of the online accounts at the time the search or examination began, and the powers under the paragraph will be exercisable only for so long as the electronic device continues to be detained under paragraph 11.
  Source: Crime and Policing Act 2026, s.178 — Terrorism Act 2000 Sch.7 para 11B(1)-(3) and (6) (inserted) — NOT YET IN FORCE — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2026/20/section/178

### Limits on them
- Once in force, s.173(2) will allow a senior officer to give an authorisation under subsection (1) only if satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the information mentioned in subsection (1) includes information that is relevant to a reasonable line of enquiry which is being, or is to be pursued, by an enforcement officer for one or more relevant purposes, and that it is not reasonably practicable to obtain that information by other means.
  Source: Crime and Policing Act 2026, s.173(2) — NOT YET IN FORCE — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2026/20/section/173
- Once in force, s.174(4) will provide that any information which has been extracted under an authorisation under section 173 may be retained for so long as is necessary in all the circumstances, but that this is subject to section 176.
  Source: Crime and Policing Act 2026, s.174(4) — NOT YET IN FORCE — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2026/20/section/174

### What the sources say
- Section 177(1)(a) says the Secretary of State must prepare a code of practice about the exercise of the power to give an authorisation under section 173.
  Source: Crime and Policing Act 2026, s.177(1)(a) — in force from 29 June 2026 (S.I. 2026/689, reg. 2(1)(t)) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2026/20/section/177
- Regulation 2(1)(t) of S.I. 2026/689 says that, subject to paragraph (2), sections 176(7) and 177 of the Crime and Policing Act 2026 come into force on 29th June 2026.
  Source: The Crime and Policing Act 2026 (Commencement No.1 and Saving Provision) Regulations 2026 (S.I. 2026/689), reg. 2(1)(t) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2026/689
- Section 255(1) says that, subject as follows, this Act comes into force on such day as the Secretary of State may by regulations appoint.
  Source: Crime and Policing Act 2026, s.255(1) (default commencement) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2026/20/section/255

## PACE s.8 search warrants and s.18 searches after arrest
URL: https://phoneseized.com/uk/warrants-and-premises
Jurisdictions: England & Wales
Last reviewed: 2026-10-04

### When can a justice of the peace issue a warrant to search a home?
Section 8(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) says that, if on an application made by a constable a justice of the peace is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that an indictable offence has been committed; that there is material on premises mentioned in subsection (1A) which is likely to be of substantial value (whether by itself or together with other material) to the investigation of the offence; that the material is likely to be relevant evidence; that it does not consist of or include items subject to legal privilege, excluded material or special procedure material; and that any of the conditions specified in subsection (3) applies, he may issue a warrant authorising a constable to enter and search the premises in relation to each set of premises specified in the application. Read the full text at legislation.gov.uk (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/8). The revised text of s.8(1) on legislation.gov.uk prints the words “in relation to each set of premises specified in the application” at the end of the subsection (s.8(1) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/8)). Section 113(3)(b) of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 says that, in s.8(1) of the 1984 Act, in paragraph (e), at the end, those words are added (s.113 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2005/15/section/113)). Section 8(1A) says the premises referred to in subsection (1)(b) are one or more sets of premises specified in the application (in which case the application is for a “specific premises warrant”), or any premises occupied or controlled by a person specified in the application, including such sets of premises as are so specified (in which case the application is for an “all premises warrant”). If the application is for an all premises warrant, s.8(1B) says the justice of the peace must also be satisfied that because of the particulars of the offence referred to in paragraph (a) of subsection (1), there are reasonable grounds for believing that it is necessary to search premises occupied or controlled by the person in question which are not specified in the application in order to find the material referred to in paragraph (b) of that subsection, and that it is not reasonably practicable to specify in the application all the premises which he occupies or controls and which might need to be searched. Under s.8(1C), the warrant may authorise entry to and search of premises on more than one occasion if, on the application, the justice of the peace is satisfied that it is necessary to authorise multiple entries in order to achieve the purpose for which he issues the warrant; under s.8(1D), if it authorises multiple entries, the number of entries authorised may be unlimited, or limited to a maximum (s.8(1A) to (1D) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/8)). Section 8(5) says the power to issue a warrant conferred by that section is in addition to any such power otherwise conferred (s.8(5) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/8)). The wording is “any of the conditions specified in subsection (3)”. Section 8(3) says the conditions mentioned in subsection (1)(e) are: that it is not practicable to communicate with any person entitled to grant entry to the premises; that it is practicable to communicate with a person entitled to grant entry to the premises but it is not practicable to communicate with any person entitled to grant access to the evidence; that entry to the premises will not be granted unless a warrant is produced; that the purpose of a search may be frustrated or seriously prejudiced unless a constable arriving at the premises can secure immediate entry to them (s.8(3) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/8)). Section 23 says “premises” includes any place and, in particular, includes any vehicle, vessel, aircraft or hovercraft (s.23 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/23)). For how England and Wales compares with other places, see the warrant comparison (https://phoneseized.com/compare/warrant).

### What the warrant has to say, and what officers must do at the door
Section 15(1) says an entry on or search of premises under a warrant is unlawful unless it complies with s.15 and s.16 (s.15(1) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/15)). Under s.15(6), a warrant shall specify the name of the person who applies for it, the date on which it is issued, the enactment under which it is issued, and each set of premises to be searched (or, in the case of an all premises warrant, the person who is in occupation or control of premises to be searched, together with any premises under his occupation or control which can be specified and which are to be searched), and shall identify, so far as is practicable, the articles or persons to be sought (s.15(6) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/15)). Entry and search under a warrant must be within three months from the date of its issue (s.16(3) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/16)), and must be at a reasonable hour unless it appears to the constable executing it that the purpose of a search may be frustrated on an entry at a reasonable hour (s.16(4) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/16)). If the warrant is an all premises warrant, no premises which are not specified in it may be entered or searched unless a police officer of at least the rank of inspector has in writing authorised them to be entered; and no premises may be entered or searched for the second or any subsequent time under a warrant which authorises multiple entries unless a police officer of at least the rank of inspector has in writing authorised that entry to those premises (s.16(3A) and (3B) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/16)). A search under a warrant may only be a search to the extent required for the purpose for which the warrant was issued (s.16(8) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/16)). Section 16(5) is worded for the case where the occupier is present: where the occupier of premises which are to be entered and searched is present at the time when a constable seeks to execute a warrant to enter and search them, the constable shall identify himself to the occupier and, if not in uniform, shall produce to him documentary evidence that he is a constable; shall produce the warrant to him; and shall supply him with a copy of it (s.16(5) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/16)). Section 16(6) says that, where the occupier of such premises is not present at the time when a constable seeks to execute such a warrant, but some other person who appears to the constable to be in charge of the premises is present, s.16(5) shall have effect as if any reference to the occupier were a reference to that other person. Under s.16(7), if there is no person who appears to the constable to be in charge of the premises, he shall leave a copy of the warrant in a prominent place on the premises (s.16(6) and (7) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/16)). PACE Code B para 6.7 says that if an officer conducts a search to which the Code applies the officer shall, unless it is impracticable to do so, provide the occupier with a copy of a Notice in a standard format specifying if the search is made under warrant, with consent, or in the exercise of the powers described in paragraphs 4.1 to 4.3; summarising the extent of the powers of search and seizure conferred by PACE and other relevant legislation as appropriate; explaining the rights of the occupier and the owner of the property seized; explaining compensation may be payable in appropriate cases for damages caused entering and searching premises, and giving the address to send a compensation application (see Note 6A); and stating this Code is available at any police station (Code B (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/65804a3a83ba380013e1b769/PACE+Code+B+2023.pdf)). Para 6.8 says that, if the occupier is present, copies of the Notice and warrant shall, if practicable, be given to them before the search begins, unless the officer in charge of the search reasonably believes this would frustrate the object of the search or endanger officers or other people; if the occupier is not present, copies of the Notice and warrant shall be left in a prominent place on the premises or appropriate part of the premises and endorsed, subject to paragraph 2.9, with the name of the officer in charge of the search, the date and time of the search. Para 2.9 says nothing in the Code requires the identity of officers, or anyone accompanying them during a search of premises, to be recorded or disclosed in the case of enquiries linked to national security including terrorism, or if officers reasonably believe recording or disclosing their names might put them in danger; in these cases officers should use warrant or other identification numbers and the name of their police station (Code B para 2.9 (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/65804a3a83ba380013e1b769/PACE+Code+B+2023.pdf)). Para 6.9 says premises may be searched only to the extent necessary to achieve the purpose of the search, having regard to the size and nature of whatever is sought.

### Searching a home after an arrest: s.18
Subject to the other provisions of s.18, a constable may enter and search any premises occupied or controlled by a person who is under arrest for an indictable offence, if he has reasonable grounds for suspecting that there is on the premises evidence, other than items subject to legal privilege, that relates to that offence or to some other indictable offence which is connected with or similar to that offence (s.18(1) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/18)). As quoted, s.18 does not mention a warrant. Under s.18(3), the power to search is only a power to search to the extent that is reasonably required for the purpose of discovering such evidence. Under s.18(4), subject to subsection (5), the powers conferred by the section may not be exercised unless an officer of the rank of inspector or above has authorised them in writing. Under s.18(5), a constable may conduct a search under subsection (1) before the person is taken to a police station or released under section 30A, and without obtaining an authorisation under subsection (4), if the condition in subsection (5A) is satisfied; under s.18(5A), that condition is that the presence of the person at a place (other than a police station) is necessary for the effective investigation of the offence. Seizure after arrest of a person, and from premises where an officer is lawfully present, is covered on the seizure page (https://phoneseized.com/uk/seizure-pace).

### What can be taken, and how data is produced
Under s.8(2), a constable may seize and retain anything for which a search has been authorised under subsection (1) (s.8(2) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/8)). Under s.18(2), a constable may seize and retain anything for which he may search under subsection (1). Section 20(1) says every power of seizure which is conferred by an enactment to which s.20 applies on a constable who has entered premises in the exercise of a power conferred by an enactment shall be construed as including a power to require any information stored in any electronic form contained in a computer and accessible from the premises to be produced in a form in which it can be taken away and in which it is visible and legible or from which it can readily be produced in a visible and legible form. Section 20(2) says it applies to any enactment contained in an Act passed before the 1984 Act, to sections 8 and 18, to paragraph 13 of Schedule 1, and to any enactment contained in an Act passed after it (s.20 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/20)). No power of seizure conferred on a constable under any enactment (including an enactment contained in an Act passed after the 1984 Act) is to be taken to authorise the seizure of an item which the constable exercising the power has reasonable grounds for believing to be subject to legal privilege (s.19(6) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/19)). The quoted words of s.19(6) refer to legal privilege only. Section 50(2) of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 says that, where a person who is lawfully on any premises finds anything on those premises (“the seizable property”) which he would be entitled to seize but for its being comprised in something else that he has (apart from that subsection) no power to seize, the power under which that person would have power to seize the seizable property is a power to which section 50 applies, and in all the circumstances it is not reasonably practicable for the seizable property to be separated, on those premises, from that in which it is comprised, that person’s powers of seizure include power under section 50 to seize both the seizable property and that from which it is not reasonably practicable to separate it (s.50(2) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/50)). Section 50(4) of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 says that section 19(6) of the 1984 Act (powers of seizure not to include power to seize anything that a person has reasonable grounds for believing is legally privileged) shall not apply to the power of seizure conferred by s.50(2) (s.50(4) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/50)). As quoted, the provisions on this page do not mention a passcode; section 49 notices are covered on the RIPA notice page (https://phoneseized.com/uk/ripa-notice). Removing a device to sort what may be seized is covered on the seize and sift page (https://phoneseized.com/uk/seize-and-sift-cjpa-50-51), and what happens once a device has been seized on the extraction page (https://phoneseized.com/uk/extraction-after-seizure).

### Legal privilege, excluded material and special procedure material
One of the matters listed in s.8(1) is that the justice of the peace is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the material “does not consist of or include items subject to legal privilege, excluded material or special procedure material” (s.8(1) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/8)). Journalistic material is covered on the page on journalistic and source material (https://phoneseized.com/scenarios/journalist-source-material).

### See also
Link only, not relied on as authority here: Code B, seizure and retention of property, on bluelinehub.co.uk (https://bluelinehub.co.uk/legal/pace-codes/B/7-seizure-and-retention-of-property) (the officer-side text of the Code), and the police-seize-phone scenario on uklawreference.com (https://uklawreference.com/scenarios/police-seize-phone).

### What they can do
- Under s.8(1), if on an application made by a constable a justice of the peace is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that an indictable offence has been committed; that there is material on premises mentioned in subsection (1A) which is likely to be of substantial value (whether by itself or together with other material) to the investigation of the offence; that the material is likely to be relevant evidence; that it does not consist of or include items subject to legal privilege, excluded material or special procedure material; and that any of the conditions specified in subsection (3) applies, he may issue a warrant authorising a constable to enter and search the premises in relation to each set of premises specified in the application.
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.8(1) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/8
- Under s.8(2), a constable may seize and retain anything for which a search has been authorised under subsection (1).
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.8(2) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/8
- Under s.8(1C), the warrant may authorise entry to and search of premises on more than one occasion if, on the application, the justice of the peace is satisfied that it is necessary to authorise multiple entries in order to achieve the purpose for which he issues the warrant. Under s.8(1D), if it authorises multiple entries, the number of entries authorised may be unlimited, or limited to a maximum.
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.8(1A) to (1D) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/8
- Subject to the following provisions of s.18, a constable may enter and search any premises occupied or controlled by a person who is under arrest for an indictable offence, if he has reasonable grounds for suspecting that there is on the premises evidence, other than items subject to legal privilege, that relates to that offence or to some other indictable offence which is connected with or similar to that offence; under s.18(2), a constable may seize and retain anything for which he may search under subsection (1).
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.18(1) to (5A) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/18
- Section 20(1) provides that every power of seizure which is conferred by an enactment to which s.20 applies on a constable who has entered premises in the exercise of a power conferred by an enactment shall be construed as including a power to require any information stored in any electronic form contained in a computer and accessible from the premises to be produced in a form in which it can be taken away and in which it is visible and legible or from which it can readily be produced in a visible and legible form. Section 20(2) says it applies to any enactment in an Act passed before the 1984 Act, to sections 8 and 18, to paragraph 13 of Schedule 1, and to any enactment in an Act passed after it.
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.20(1) and (2) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/20
- Section 50(2) of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 says that, where a person who is lawfully on any premises finds anything on those premises (“the seizable property”) which he would be entitled to seize but for its being comprised in something else that he has (apart from that subsection) no power to seize, the power under which that person would have power to seize the seizable property is a power to which section 50 applies, and in all the circumstances it is not reasonably practicable for the seizable property to be separated, on those premises, from that in which it is comprised, that person’s powers of seizure include power under section 50 to seize both the seizable property and that from which it is not reasonably practicable to separate it.
  Source: Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.50(2) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/50
- Section 50(4) of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 says that section 19(6) of the 1984 Act (powers of seizure not to include power to seize anything that a person has reasonable grounds for believing is legally privileged) shall not apply to the power of seizure conferred by s.50(2) of the 2001 Act.
  Source: Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.50(4) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/50

### Limits on them
- Section 8(3) says the conditions mentioned in subsection (1)(e) are: that it is not practicable to communicate with any person entitled to grant entry to the premises; that it is practicable to communicate with a person entitled to grant entry to the premises but it is not practicable to communicate with any person entitled to grant access to the evidence; that entry to the premises will not be granted unless a warrant is produced; that the purpose of a search may be frustrated or seriously prejudiced unless a constable arriving at the premises can secure immediate entry to them.
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.8(3) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/8
- Under s.8(1B), if the application is for an all premises warrant, the justice of the peace must also be satisfied that because of the particulars of the offence referred to in paragraph (a) of subsection (1), there are reasonable grounds for believing that it is necessary to search premises occupied or controlled by the person in question which are not specified in the application in order to find the material referred to in paragraph (b) of that subsection; and that it is not reasonably practicable to specify in the application all the premises which he occupies or controls and which might need to be searched.
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.8(1A) to (1D) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/8
- Section 15(1) says an entry on or search of premises under a warrant is unlawful unless it complies with s.15 and s.16.
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.15(1) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/15
- Under s.15(6), a warrant shall specify the name of the person who applies for it, the date on which it is issued, the enactment under which it is issued, and each set of premises to be searched (or, in the case of an all premises warrant, the person who is in occupation or control of premises to be searched, together with any premises under his occupation or control which can be specified and which are to be searched), and shall identify, so far as is practicable, the articles or persons to be sought.
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.15(6) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/15
- Entry and search under a warrant must be within three months from the date of its issue.
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.16(3) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/16
- Under s.16(3A), if the warrant is an all premises warrant, no premises which are not specified in it may be entered or searched unless a police officer of at least the rank of inspector has in writing authorised them to be entered. Under s.16(3B), no premises may be entered or searched for the second or any subsequent time under a warrant which authorises multiple entries unless a police officer of at least the rank of inspector has in writing authorised that entry to those premises.
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.16(3A) and (3B) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/16
- Entry and search under a warrant must be at a reasonable hour unless it appears to the constable executing it that the purpose of a search may be frustrated on an entry at a reasonable hour.
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.16(4) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/16
- Where the occupier of premises which are to be entered and searched is present at the time when a constable seeks to execute a warrant to enter and search them, the constable shall identify himself to the occupier and, if not in uniform, shall produce to him documentary evidence that he is a constable; shall produce the warrant to him; and shall supply him with a copy of it.
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.16(5) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/16
- Under s.16(6), where the occupier of such premises is not present at the time when a constable seeks to execute such a warrant, but some other person who appears to the constable to be in charge of the premises is present, s.16(5) shall have effect as if any reference to the occupier were a reference to that other person. Under s.16(7), if there is no person who appears to the constable to be in charge of the premises, he shall leave a copy of the warrant in a prominent place on the premises.
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.16(6) and (7) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/16
- A search under a warrant may only be a search to the extent required for the purpose for which the warrant was issued.
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.16(8) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/16
- Under s.18(3), the power to search conferred by subsection (1) is only a power to search to the extent that is reasonably required for the purpose of discovering such evidence. Under s.18(4), subject to subsection (5), the powers conferred by the section may not be exercised unless an officer of the rank of inspector or above has authorised them in writing. Under s.18(5), a constable may conduct a search under subsection (1) before the person is taken to a police station or released under section 30A, and without obtaining an authorisation under subsection (4), if the condition in subsection (5A) is satisfied; under s.18(5A), that condition is that the presence of the person at a place (other than a police station) is necessary for the effective investigation of the offence.
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.18(1) to (5A) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/18
- No power of seizure conferred on a constable under any enactment (including an enactment contained in an Act passed after the 1984 Act) is to be taken to authorise the seizure of an item which the constable exercising the power has reasonable grounds for believing to be subject to legal privilege.
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.19(6) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/19
- PACE Code B para 6.7 says that if an officer conducts a search to which the Code applies the officer shall, unless it is impracticable to do so, provide the occupier with a copy of a Notice in a standard format specifying if the search is made under warrant, with consent, or in the exercise of the powers described in paragraphs 4.1 to 4.3; summarising the extent of the powers of search and seizure conferred by PACE and other relevant legislation as appropriate; explaining the rights of the occupier and the owner of the property seized; explaining compensation may be payable in appropriate cases for damages caused entering and searching premises, and giving the address to send a compensation application (see Note 6A); and stating this Code is available at any police station.
  Source: PACE Code B (2023), para 6.7 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/65804a3a83ba380013e1b769/PACE+Code+B+2023.pdf
- PACE Code B para 6.8 says that, if the occupier is present, copies of the Notice and warrant shall, if practicable, be given to them before the search begins, unless the officer in charge of the search reasonably believes this would frustrate the object of the search or endanger officers or other people; if the occupier is not present, copies of the Notice and warrant shall be left in a prominent place on the premises or appropriate part of the premises and endorsed, subject to paragraph 2.9, with the name of the officer in charge of the search, the date and time of the search.
  Source: PACE Code B (2023), para 6.8 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/65804a3a83ba380013e1b769/PACE+Code+B+2023.pdf
- PACE Code B para 6.9 says premises may be searched only to the extent necessary to achieve the purpose of the search, having regard to the size and nature of whatever is sought.
  Source: PACE Code B (2023), para 6.9 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/65804a3a83ba380013e1b769/PACE+Code+B+2023.pdf

### What the sources say
- Section 8(1A) says the premises referred to in subsection (1)(b) are one or more sets of premises specified in the application (in which case the application is for a “specific premises warrant”); or any premises occupied or controlled by a person specified in the application, including such sets of premises as are so specified (in which case the application is for an “all premises warrant”).
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.8(1A) to (1D) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/8
- Section 113(3)(b) of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 says that, in s.8(1) of the 1984 Act, in paragraph (e), at the end, the words “in relation to each set of premises specified in the application” are added.
  Source: Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005, s.113(1), (2) and (3)(b) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2005/15/section/113
- PACE Code B para 2.9 says nothing in the Code requires the identity of officers, or anyone accompanying them during a search of premises, to be recorded or disclosed in the case of enquiries linked to national security including terrorism, or if officers reasonably believe recording or disclosing their names might put them in danger; in these cases officers should use warrant or other identification numbers and the name of their police station.
  Source: PACE Code B (2023), para 2.9 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/65804a3a83ba380013e1b769/PACE+Code+B+2023.pdf
- Section 8(5) says the power to issue a warrant conferred by that section is in addition to any such power otherwise conferred.
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.8(5) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/8
- Section 23 says “premises” includes any place and, in particular, includes any vehicle, vessel, aircraft or hovercraft.
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.23 (definition of “premises”) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/23

## Property taken in police custody: PACE s.54
URL: https://phoneseized.com/uk/custody-property-s54
Jurisdictions: England & Wales
Last reviewed: 2026-10-04

### What happens to your property when you are booked in
This page is about the custody desk after an arrest. Section 54(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) says the custody officer at a police station shall ascertain everything which a person has with him when he is brought to the station after being arrested elsewhere or after being committed to custody by an order of sentence of a court, or is arrested at the station or detained there, as a person falling within section 34(7), under section 37 or as a person to whom section 46ZA(4) or (5) applies (s.54(1) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/54)). As enacted, s.54(1)(a) reads “brought to the station after being arrested elsewhere or after being committed to custody by an order or sentence of a court”; the revised text on legislation.gov.uk prints “order of sentence” (s.54(1)(a) as enacted (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/54/enacted)). Section 54(2) says the custody officer may record or cause to be recorded all or any of the things which he ascertains under subsection (1). Subject to subsection (4), a custody officer may seize and retain any such thing or cause any such thing to be seized and retained (s.54(3) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/54)). PACE Code C para 4.2 says that, subject to paragraph 4.3A, detainees may retain clothing and personal effects at their own risk unless the custody officer considers they may use them to cause harm to themselves or others, interfere with evidence, damage property, effect an escape or they are needed as evidence; in this event the custody officer may withhold such articles as they consider necessary and must tell the detainee why (Code C (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6580543083ba38000de1b792/PACE+Code+C+2023.pdf)).

### When a custody officer can take clothes and personal effects
Under s.54(4), clothes and personal effects may only be seized if the custody officer believes that the person from whom they are seized may use them to cause physical injury to himself or any other person, to damage property, to interfere with evidence, or to assist him to escape; or has reasonable grounds for believing that they may be evidence relating to an offence. The first limb is worded “believes”; the second is worded “has reasonable grounds for believing” (s.54(3) and (4) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/54)). Where anything is seized, the person from whom it is seized shall be told the reason for the seizure unless he is violent or likely to become violent, or incapable of understanding what is said to him (s.54(5) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/54)). Code C para 4.5 says that if a detainee is not allowed to keep any article of clothing or personal effects, the reason must be recorded (Code C (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6580543083ba38000de1b792/PACE+Code+C+2023.pdf)). Code C para 4.4 says it is a matter for the custody officer to determine whether a record should be made of the property a detained person has with him or had taken from him on arrest; whenever a record is made the detainee shall be allowed to check and sign the record of property as correct; and any refusal to sign shall be recorded (Code C (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6580543083ba38000de1b792/PACE+Code+C+2023.pdf)). Code C para 4.3 says personal effects are those items a detainee may lawfully need, use or refer to while in detention but do not include cash and other items of value (Code C (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6580543083ba38000de1b792/PACE+Code+C+2023.pdf)). The provisions quoted on this page do not mention a phone, and this site has not sourced an authority on whether a phone is a “personal effect”. Neither s.54(4) nor Code C para 4.3, as quoted, names a mobile phone.

### Later searches in custody
A person who is in custody at a police station or is in police detention otherwise than at a police station may at any time be searched in order to ascertain whether he has with him anything which he could use for any of the purposes specified in s.54(4)(a). Subject to s.54(6C), a constable may seize and retain, or cause to be seized and retained, anything found on such a search. A constable may only seize clothes and personal effects in the circumstances specified in s.54(4) (s.54(6A) to (6C) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/54)).

### How long it can be kept
Section 22(1) to (4) are set out here as worded. Its subsection (1) says that, subject to subsection (4), anything which has been seized by a constable or taken away by a constable following a requirement made by virtue of section 19 or 20 may be retained so long as is necessary in all the circumstances (s.22(1) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/22)). Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), anything seized for the purposes of a criminal investigation may be retained, except as provided by subsection (4), for use as evidence at a trial for an offence, or for forensic examination or for investigation in connection with an offence; and anything may be retained in order to establish its lawful owner, where there are reasonable grounds for believing that it has been obtained in consequence of the commission of an offence (s.22(2) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/22)). Nothing seized on the ground that it may be used to cause physical injury to any person, to damage property, to interfere with evidence, or to assist in escape from police detention or lawful custody may be retained when the person from whom it was seized is no longer in police detention or the custody of a court or is in the custody of a court but has been released on bail (s.22(3) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/22)). Nothing may be retained for either of the purposes mentioned in subsection (2)(a) if a photograph or copy would be sufficient for that purpose (s.22(4)). Section 22(5) says nothing in that section affects any power of a court to make an order under section 1 of the Police (Property) Act 1897 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Vict/60-61/30/section/1) (s.22(5) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/22)). The quoted words of s.22(1) speak of things seized by a constable and things taken away following a section 19 or 20 requirement, and the quoted words of s.22(2) speak of anything seized for the purposes of a criminal investigation. Retention generally is covered on the retention and deletion page (https://phoneseized.com/uk/retention-and-deletion).

### Getting a record of what was seized
A constable who seizes anything in the exercise of a power conferred by any enactment, including an enactment contained in an Act passed after the 1984 Act, shall, if so requested by a person showing himself to be the occupier of premises on which it was seized, or to have had custody or control of it immediately before the seizure, provide that person with a record of what he seized (s.21(1) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/21)). Section 59(10) of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 lists the relevant powers of seizure for the purposes of s.59: the powers of seizure conferred by sections 50 and 51; each of the powers of seizure specified in Parts 1 and 2 of Schedule 1; and any power of seizure (not falling within those) conferred on a constable by or under any enactment, including an enactment passed after that Act (s.59(10) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/59)). The quoted words do not name s.54. The s.59 application is covered on the seize and sift page (https://phoneseized.com/uk/seize-and-sift-cjpa-50-51). A phone that belongs to someone other than the person detained is covered on the page on an employer-owned phone (https://phoneseized.com/scenarios/employer-owned-phone).

### Being asked for the PIN in custody
Section 54(3), as quoted, is a power to seize and retain. As quoted, it says nothing about a passcode or about examining what is on a device. Section 49 notices are covered on the RIPA notice page (https://phoneseized.com/uk/ripa-notice), and compelled-unlock questions on rightsandlimits.com (https://rightsandlimits.com/devices/phone-passwords) (link only). Seizure from premises and from an arrested person is covered on the seizure page (https://phoneseized.com/uk/seizure-pace).

### What they can do
- Under s.54(1), the custody officer at a police station shall ascertain everything which a person has with him when he is brought to the station after being arrested elsewhere or after being committed to custody by an order of sentence of a court, or is arrested at the station or detained there, as a person falling within section 34(7), under section 37 or as a person to whom section 46ZA(4) or (5) applies.
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.54(1) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/54
- Under s.54(3), subject to s.54(4), a custody officer may seize and retain any such thing or cause any such thing to be seized and retained.
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.54(3) and (4) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/54
- A person who is in custody at a police station or is in police detention otherwise than at a police station may at any time be searched in order to ascertain whether he has with him anything which he could use for any of the purposes specified in s.54(4)(a); subject to s.54(6C), a constable may seize and retain, or cause to be seized and retained, anything found on such a search; and a constable may only seize clothes and personal effects in the circumstances specified in s.54(4).
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.54(6A) to (6C) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/54
- Under s.22(2), without prejudice to the generality of s.22(1), anything seized for the purposes of a criminal investigation may be retained, except as provided by s.22(4), for use as evidence at a trial for an offence, or for forensic examination or for investigation in connection with an offence; and anything may be retained in order to establish its lawful owner, where there are reasonable grounds for believing that it has been obtained in consequence of the commission of an offence.
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.22(2) and (4) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/22

### Limits on them
- Under s.54(4), clothes and personal effects may only be seized if the custody officer believes that the person from whom they are seized may use them to cause physical injury to himself or any other person, to damage property, to interfere with evidence, or to assist him to escape; or has reasonable grounds for believing that they may be evidence relating to an offence.
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.54(3) and (4) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/54
- Under s.54(5), where anything is seized, the person from whom it is seized shall be told the reason for the seizure unless he is violent or likely to become violent, or incapable of understanding what is said to him.
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.54(5) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/54
- Under s.22(3), nothing seized on the ground that it may be used to cause physical injury to any person, to damage property, to interfere with evidence, or to assist in escape from police detention or lawful custody may be retained when the person from whom it was seized is no longer in police detention or the custody of a court or is in the custody of a court but has been released on bail.
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.22(3) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/22
- Under s.22(4), nothing may be retained for either of the purposes mentioned in subsection (2)(a) if a photograph or copy would be sufficient for that purpose.
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.22(2) and (4) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/22
- PACE Code C para 4.2 says that, subject to paragraph 4.3A, detainees may retain clothing and personal effects at their own risk unless the custody officer considers they may use them to cause harm to themselves or others, interfere with evidence, damage property, effect an escape or they are needed as evidence; in this event the custody officer may withhold such articles as they consider necessary and must tell the detainee why.
  Source: PACE Code C (2023), para 4.2 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6580543083ba38000de1b792/PACE+Code+C+2023.pdf
- PACE Code C para 4.5 says that if a detainee is not allowed to keep any article of clothing or personal effects, the reason must be recorded.
  Source: PACE Code C (2023), para 4.5 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6580543083ba38000de1b792/PACE+Code+C+2023.pdf
- PACE Code C para 4.4 says it is a matter for the custody officer to determine whether a record should be made of the property a detained person has with him or had taken from him on arrest; whenever a record is made the detainee shall be allowed to check and sign the record of property as correct; and any refusal to sign shall be recorded.
  Source: PACE Code C (2023), para 4.4 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6580543083ba38000de1b792/PACE+Code+C+2023.pdf
- A constable who seizes anything in the exercise of a power conferred by any enactment, including an enactment contained in an Act passed after the 1984 Act, shall, if so requested by a person showing himself to be the occupier of premises on which it was seized, or to have had custody or control of it immediately before the seizure, provide that person with a record of what he seized.
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.21(1) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/21

### What the sources say
- As enacted, s.54(1)(a) reads “brought to the station after being arrested elsewhere or after being committed to custody by an order or sentence of a court”; the revised text on legislation.gov.uk prints “order of sentence”.
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.54(1)(a) as enacted — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/54/enacted
- Section 22(5) says nothing in that section affects any power of a court to make an order under section 1 of the Police (Property) Act 1897.
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.22(5) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/22
- Section 54(2) says the custody officer may record or cause to be recorded all or any of the things which he ascertains under s.54(1).
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.54(2) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/54
- PACE Code C para 4.3 says personal effects are those items a detainee may lawfully need, use or refer to while in detention but do not include cash and other items of value.
  Source: PACE Code C (2023), para 4.3 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6580543083ba38000de1b792/PACE+Code+C+2023.pdf
- Section 59(10) of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 lists the relevant powers of seizure for the purposes of s.59: the powers of seizure conferred by sections 50 and 51; each of the powers of seizure specified in Parts 1 and 2 of Schedule 1; and any power of seizure (not falling within those) conferred on a constable by or under any enactment, including an enactment passed after that Act.
  Source: Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.59(10) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/59

## Seize and sift: removing property to examine it elsewhere
URL: https://phoneseized.com/uk/seize-and-sift-cjpa-50-51
Jurisdictions: England & Wales
Last reviewed: 2026-10-04

### Removing something to work out what can be seized: section 50
Section 50(1) of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/50) says that, where each of the following is met, that person’s powers of seizure “shall include power under this section to seize so much of what he has found as it is necessary to remove from the premises to enable that to be determined”: a person who is lawfully on any premises finds anything on those premises that he has reasonable grounds for believing may be or may contain something for which he is authorised to search on those premises; a power of seizure to which section 50 applies, or the power conferred by subsection (2), would entitle him, if he found it, to seize whatever it is that he has grounds for believing that thing to be or to contain; and in all the circumstances, it is not reasonably practicable for it to be determined, on those premises, whether what he has found is something that he is entitled to seize, or the extent to which what he has found contains something that he is entitled to seize. Under s.50(2) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/50), where a person lawfully on premises finds something he would be entitled to seize but for its being comprised in something else that he has (apart from that subsection) no power to seize, the power under which he would seize it is one to which section 50 applies, and in all the circumstances it is not reasonably practicable for the seizable property to be separated, on those premises, from that in which it is comprised, his powers of seizure include power under section 50 to seize both the seizable property and that from which it is not reasonably practicable to separate it. Section 50(4) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/50) says that section 19(6) of the 1984 Act (powers of seizure not to include power to seize anything that a person has reasonable grounds for believing is legally privileged) shall not apply to the power of seizure conferred by s.50(2). Section 50(3) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/50) says the factors to be taken into account in considering whether it is reasonably practicable on particular premises for something to be determined, or for something to be separated from something else, “shall be confined to” a list: how long it would take to carry out the determination or separation on those premises; the number of persons that would be required to carry it out there within a reasonable period; whether it would (or would if carried out on those premises) involve damage to property; the apparatus or equipment that it would be necessary or appropriate to use; and, in the case of separation, whether the separation would be likely, or if carried out by the only means that are reasonably practicable on those premises would be likely, to prejudice the use of some or all of the separated seizable property for a purpose for which something seized under the power in question is capable of being used. Schedule 1 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/schedule/1), under the heading “Powers to which section 50 applies”, lists for the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 each of the powers of seizure conferred by the provisions of Part 2 or 3 of the 1984 Act (police powers of entry, search and seizure). How PACE entry and search powers work is covered on the warrants and premises page (https://phoneseized.com/uk/warrants-and-premises).

### The power on a search of a person: section 51
Section 51(1) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/51) makes provision for a search of a person. Where a person carrying out a lawful search of any person finds something that he has reasonable grounds for believing may be or may contain something for which he is authorised to search; a power of seizure to which section 51 applies or the power conferred by subsection (2) of section 51 would entitle him, if he found it, to seize whatever it is that he has grounds for believing that thing to be or to contain; and in all the circumstances it is not reasonably practicable for it to be determined, at the time and place of the search, whether what he has found is something that he is entitled to seize, or the extent to which what he has found contains something that he is entitled to seize, that person’s powers of seizure “shall include power under this section to seize so much of what he has found as it is necessary to remove from that place to enable that to be determined”. Section 51(2) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/51) says that, where a person carrying out a lawful search of any person finds something (“the seizable property”) which he would be entitled to seize but for its being comprised in something else that he has (apart from that subsection) no power to seize, the power under which that person would have power to seize the seizable property is a power to which section 51 applies, and in all the circumstances it is not reasonably practicable for the seizable property to be separated, at the time and place of the search, from that in which it is comprised, that person’s powers of seizure include power under section 51 to seize both the seizable property and that from which it is not reasonably practicable to separate it. Section 51(3) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/51) says the factors to be taken into account in considering whether it is reasonably practicable, at the time and place of a search, for something to be determined, or for something to be separated from something else, “shall be confined to” a list: how long it would take to carry out the determination or separation at that time and place; the number of persons that would be required to carry it out at that time and place within a reasonable period; whether it would (or would if carried out at that time and place) involve damage to property; the apparatus or equipment that it would be necessary or appropriate to use; and, in the case of separation, whether the separation would be likely, or if carried out by the only means that are reasonably practicable at that time and place would be likely, to prejudice the use of some or all of the separated seizable property for a purpose for which something seized under the power in question is capable of being used. Section 51(4) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/51) says that section 19(6) of the 1984 Act (powers of seizure not to include power to seize anything a person has reasonable grounds for believing is legally privileged) shall not apply to the power of seizure conferred by subsection (2). Schedule 1 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/schedule/1), under the heading “Powers to which section 51 applies”, lists for the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 each of the powers of seizure conferred by the provisions of Part 3 of the 1984 Act (police powers of search and seizure on arrest). The PACE arrest-search power on this site is described on the page on what police can seize under PACE (https://phoneseized.com/uk/seizure-pace); paragraphs 1 and 74, as quoted, refer to Parts of the 1984 Act and do not name individual sections. This page also does not say that section 50 or 51 applies to property taken from a person in police detention, which is covered on the custody property page (https://phoneseized.com/uk/custody-property-s54).

### The written notice after a seizure
Section 52(1) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/52) says that where a person exercises a power of seizure conferred by section 50, it is (subject to subsections (2) and (3)) his duty, on doing so, to give to the occupier of the premises a written notice specifying what has been seized in reliance on the powers conferred by that section; specifying the grounds on which those powers have been exercised; setting out the effect of sections 59 to 61; specifying the name and address of the person to whom notice of an application under section 59(2) to the appropriate judicial authority in respect of any of the seized property must be given; and specifying the name and address of the person to whom an application may be made to be allowed to attend the initial examination required by any arrangements made for the purposes of section 53(2). Under subsection (2), where it appears that the occupier is not present but that some other person present is in charge of the premises, subsection (1) has effect as if it required the notice to be given to that other person; under subsection (3), where it appears that there is no one present on the premises to whom a notice may be given, the person must, before leaving, instead attach a notice of that kind in a prominent place to the premises. For a seizure under section 51, s.52(4) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/52) says it is the seizing person’s duty, on doing so, to give a written notice to the person from whom the seizure is made, specifying what has been seized, the grounds on which the powers have been exercised, the effect of sections 59 to 61, the name and address of the person to whom notice of any section 59(2) application must be given, and the name and address of the person to whom an application may be made to be allowed to attend the initial examination.

### What must happen next: examine, separate, return
Under s.53(1) and (2) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/53), where anything has been seized under a power conferred by section 50 or 51, it is the duty of the person for the time being in possession of the seized property in consequence of the exercise of that power to secure that there are arrangements in force which (subject to section 61) ensure that an initial examination of the property is carried out as soon as reasonably practicable after the seizure; that the examination is confined to whatever is necessary for determining how much of the property falls within subsection (3); that anything found, on that examination, not to fall within subsection (3) is separated from the rest of the seized property and is returned as soon as reasonably practicable after the examination of all the seized property has been completed; and that, until the initial examination of all the seized property has been completed and anything which does not fall within subsection (3) has been returned, the seized property is kept separate from anything seized under any other power. That return duty has limits. Section 53(3) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/53) says the seized property falls within that subsection to the extent only that it is property for which the person seizing it had power to search when he made the seizure but is not property the return of which is required by section 54; that it is property the retention of which is authorised by section 56; or that it is something which, in all the circumstances, it will not be reasonably practicable, following the examination, to separate from property falling within paragraph (a) or (b). Section 53(5) says that, in that section, references to whether or not it is reasonably practicable to separate part of the seized property from the rest of it are references to whether or not it is reasonably practicable to do so without prejudicing the use of the rest of that property, or a part of it, for purposes for which (disregarding the part to be separated) the use of the whole or of a part of the rest of the property, if retained, would be lawful. Section 53(4) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/53) says that, in determining the earliest practicable time for the initial examination, due regard shall be had to the desirability of allowing the person from whom the property was seized, or a person with an interest in that property, an opportunity of being present or (if he chooses) of being represented at the examination. PACE Code B para 7.8 (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/65804a3a83ba380013e1b769/PACE+Code+B+2023.pdf) says property seized under sections 50 or 51 must be kept securely and separately from any material seized under other powers, and that an examination under section 53 to determine which elements may be retained must be carried out at the earliest practicable time, having due regard to the desirability of allowing the person from whom the property was seized, or a person with an interest in the property, an opportunity of being present or represented at the examination. Para 7.9 says material which there is no power to retain must be separated from the rest of the seized property and returned as soon as reasonably practicable after examination of all the seized property; and para 7.9B says privileged, excluded or special procedure material (or, in the case of the National Security Act 2023, confidential material) which cannot be retained must be returned as soon as reasonably practicable and without waiting for the whole examination. Section 54 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/54) deals with an item subject to legal privilege: if, at any time after a seizure of anything has been made in exercise of a power of seizure to which section 54 applies, it appears to the person for the time being having possession of the seized property in consequence of the seizure that the property is such an item or has one comprised in it, and (where the item is comprised in something else which has been lawfully seized) it is not comprised in property falling within section 54(2), that person must secure that the item is returned as soon as reasonably practicable after the seizure. Section 57(3) and (4) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/57) say that nothing in any of sections 53 to 56 authorises the retention of any property at any time when its retention would not (apart from the provisions of this Part) be authorised by “the relevant provisions”, and that nothing in any of the relevant provisions authorises the retention of anything after an obligation to return it has arisen under this Part. Section 57(1) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/57) lists the relevant provisions; the first listed is section 22 of the 1984 Act, which is covered on the PACE seizure page (https://phoneseized.com/uk/seizure-pace) and, for how long property can be kept, on the retention and deletion page (https://phoneseized.com/uk/retention-and-deletion).

### What may be kept anyway
Section 56 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/56) says the retention of property seized on any premises by a constable who was lawfully on the premises, property seized on any premises by a relevant person who was on the premises accompanied by a constable, and property seized by a constable carrying out a lawful search of any person, is authorised by that section if the property falls within subsection (2) or (3). Property falls within subsection (2) to the extent that there are reasonable grounds for believing that it is property obtained in consequence of the commission of an offence and that it is necessary for it to be retained in order to prevent its being concealed, lost, damaged, altered or destroyed. Property falls within subsection (3) to the extent that there are reasonable grounds for believing that it is evidence in relation to any offence and that it is necessary for it to be retained in order to prevent its being concealed, lost, altered or destroyed. Subsection (4) says nothing in section 56 authorises the retention (except in pursuance of section 54(2)) of anything at any time when its return is required by section 54. The last limb of section 53(3) covers something which, in all the circumstances, it will not be reasonably practicable, following the examination, to separate from property falling within paragraph (a) or (b), as set out above. Section 62(1) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/62) says that section applies to property, other than property which is for the time being required to be secured in pursuance of section 61, if it has been seized under any power conferred by section 50 or 51 or specified in Part 1 or 2 of Schedule 1, and it is “inextricably linked property”. Section 62(5) says property is inextricably linked property for the purposes of that section if it falls within any of subsections (6) to (8); under s.62(6), property falls within that subsection if it has been seized under a power conferred by section 50 or 51 and, but for subsection (3)(c) of section 53, arrangements under subsection (2) of that section in relation to the property would be required to ensure the return of the property as mentioned in subsection (2)(c) of that section. Subsections (7) and (8) are not quoted here. Under subsection (2), subject to subsection (3), it is the duty of the person for the time being having possession, in consequence of the seizure, of the inextricably linked property to ensure that arrangements are in force which secure that the property (without being returned) is not at any time, except with the consent of the person from whom it was seized, either examined or copied, or put to any other use. Subsection (3) says subsection (2) does not require that the arrangements prevent inextricably linked property from being put to any use falling within subsection (4); and subsection (4) says a use falls within it to the extent that it is use which is necessary for facilitating the use, in any investigation or proceedings, of property in which the inextricably linked property is comprised.

### Asking a court to order return
Section 59(2) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/59) says any person with a relevant interest in the seized property may apply to the appropriate judicial authority, on one or more of the grounds mentioned in subsection (3), for the return of the whole or a part of the seized property. Section 59(11) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/59) says a person with a relevant interest is the person from whom the property was seized; any person with an interest in the property; or any person, not falling within either of those descriptions, who had custody or control of the property immediately before the seizure. Section 64(1) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/64) says that, subject to subsections (2) and (4), in that Part “appropriate judicial authority” means, in relation to England and Wales and Northern Ireland, a judge of the Crown Court and, in relation to Scotland, a sheriff. Section 59(3) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/59) gives the grounds: that there was no power to make the seizure; that the seized property is or contains an item subject to legal privilege that is not comprised in property falling within section 54(2); that it is or contains any excluded material or special procedure material which has been seized under a power to which section 55 applies, is not comprised in property falling within section 55(2) or (3), and is not property the retention of which is authorised by section 56; or that it is or contains something seized under section 50 or 51 which does not fall within section 53(3). Subsections (5) and (6) of section 55 apply for the purposes of paragraph (c) as they apply for the purposes of that section. Schedule 1 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/schedule/1), under the heading “Powers to which section 55 applies”, lists for the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 the power of seizure conferred by section 8(2) of the 1984 Act (police power, on exercise of search warrant, to seize property searched for). Section 59(4) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/59) says that, subject to subsection (6), the appropriate judicial authority, on an application under subsection (2), shall, if satisfied as to any of the matters mentioned in subsection (3), order the return of so much of the seized property as is property in relation to which the authority is so satisfied, and, to the extent that it is not so satisfied, dismiss the application. Subsection (6) says that on any application under section 59 the appropriate judicial authority may authorise the retention of any property which has been seized in exercise, or purported exercise, of a relevant power of seizure and would otherwise fall to be returned, if that authority is satisfied that the retention of the property is justified on grounds falling within subsection (7). Subsection (7) says those grounds are that (if the property were returned) it would immediately become appropriate (a) to issue, on the application of the person who is in possession of the property at the time of the application under section 59, a warrant in pursuance of which, or of the exercise of which, it would be lawful to seize the property; or (b) to make an order under paragraph 4 of Schedule 1 to the 1984 Act, paragraph 4 of Schedule 1 to the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989, section 20BA of the Taxes Management Act 1970, paragraph 5 of Schedule 5 to the Terrorism Act 2000, or paragraph 3 of Schedule 2 to the National Security Act 2023, under which the property would fall to be delivered up or produced to the person mentioned in paragraph (a). An application is therefore something a person can make; this page does not say what order a court will make on one. Section 59(5) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/59) says the appropriate judicial authority may give such directions as it thinks fit as to the examination, retention, separation or return of the whole or any part of the seized property on an application under subsection (2); on an application made by the person for the time being having possession of anything in consequence of its seizure under a relevant power of seizure; or on an application made by a person with a relevant interest in anything seized under section 50 or 51 on the grounds that the requirements of section 53(2) have not been or are not being complied with. The same question in the other jurisdictions this site covers is at getting a phone back or deleted (https://phoneseized.com/compare/get-it-back-or-deleted).

### When an application triggers the duty to secure: sections 60 and 61
Section 60 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/60) says that, where property has been seized in exercise, or purported exercise, of any power of seizure conferred by section 50 or 51, a duty to secure arises under section 61 in relation to the seized property if a person entitled to do so makes an application under section 59 for the return of the property; in relation to England, Wales and Northern Ireland, at least one of the conditions set out in subsections (2) and (3) is satisfied; in relation to Scotland, the condition set out in subsection (2) is satisfied; and notice of the application is given to a relevant person. The first condition is that the application is made on the grounds that the seized property is or contains an item subject to legal privilege that is not comprised in property falling within section 54(2). The second condition is that the seized property was seized by a person who had, or purported to have, power under that Part to seize it by virtue only of one or more of the powers specified in subsection (6), and the application is made on the ground that the seized property is or contains something which does not fall within section 53(3) and states that it is or contains special procedure material or excluded material. Section 61(1) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/61) says the duty to secure is a duty of the person for the time being having possession, in consequence of the seizure, of the seized property to secure that arrangements are in force that ensure that the seized property (without being returned) is not, at any time after the giving of the notice of the application under section 60(1), either examined or copied, or put to any use to which its seizure would, apart from that subsection, entitle it to be put, except with the consent of the applicant or in accordance with the directions of the appropriate judicial authority. Subsection (2) says subsection (1) does not have effect in relation to any time after the withdrawal of the application to which the notice relates. PACE Code B para 7.11 (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/65804a3a83ba380013e1b769/PACE+Code+B+2023.pdf) says securing involves making sure the property is not examined, copied, imaged or put to any other use except at the request, or with the consent, of the applicant or in accordance with the directions of the appropriate judicial authority. Section 61(3) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/61) says nothing in any arrangements for the purposes of that section is to be taken to prevent the giving of a notice under section 49 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (notices for the disclosure of material protected by encryption etc.) in respect of any information contained in the seized material; but subsection (1) applies to anything disclosed for the purpose of complying with such a notice as it applies to the seized material in which the information in question is contained. Section 49 notices are covered on the RIPA notice page (https://phoneseized.com/uk/ripa-notice).

### Copies count as seizure
Section 63 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/63) says that, subject to subsection (3), in that Part “seize” includes “take a copy of”, and cognate expressions are to be construed accordingly, and that the Part applies as if any copy taken under any power to which any provision of the Part applies were the original of that of which it is a copy. Subsection (3) says subsection (1) does not apply to section 50(6) or 57. PACE Code B para 7.7 (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/65804a3a83ba380013e1b769/PACE+Code+B+2023.pdf) says the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, Part 2 gives officers limited powers to seize property from premises or persons so they can sift or examine it elsewhere; officers must be careful they only exercise these powers when it is essential and they do not remove any more material than necessary; the removal of large volumes of material, much of which may not ultimately be retainable, may have serious implications for the owners, particularly when they are involved in business or activities such as journalism or the provision of medical services; officers must carefully consider if removing copies or images of relevant material or data would be a satisfactory alternative to removing originals; and when originals are taken, officers must be prepared to facilitate the provision of copies or images for the owners when reasonably practicable. What a full extraction contains is covered on what a full extraction contains (https://phoneseized.com/on-your-phone/what-a-full-extraction-contains).

### What this page does not cover, and where to read on
This site does not quote UK case law, so it does not say how the courts have applied sections 50 to 53, or the factors listed in sections 50(3) and 51(3), to a phone or other electronic device. The statutory text quoted on this page is worded for “anything”, “property” and “material” and does not mention a phone by name. This page is about England and Wales; the only wording about Scotland that it quotes is where section 60 and section 64(1) name Scotland. See also retention and deletion (https://phoneseized.com/uk/retention-and-deletion) and warrants and premises (https://phoneseized.com/uk/warrants-and-premises). A phone owned by an employer is covered on a separate page (https://phoneseized.com/scenarios/employer-owned-phone). On another site, bluelinehub.co.uk’s page on digital evidence (https://bluelinehub.co.uk/operational/digital-evidence) is a separate resource.

### What they can do
- Under s.50(1), where each of the following is met, that person’s powers of seizure include power under that section to seize so much of what he has found as it is necessary to remove from the premises to enable that to be determined: a person who is lawfully on any premises finds anything on those premises that he has reasonable grounds for believing may be or may contain something for which he is authorised to search on those premises; a power of seizure to which the section applies, or the power conferred by subsection (2), would entitle him, if he found it, to seize whatever it is that he has grounds for believing that thing to be or to contain; and, in all the circumstances, it is not reasonably practicable for it to be determined, on those premises, whether what he has found is something that he is entitled to seize, or the extent to which what he has found contains something that he is entitled to seize.
  Source: Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.50(1) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/50
- Under s.50(2), where a person lawfully on premises finds something he would be entitled to seize but for its being comprised in something else that he has (apart from that subsection) no power to seize, the power under which he would seize it is one to which s.50 applies, and in all the circumstances it is not reasonably practicable for the seizable property to be separated, on those premises, from that in which it is comprised, his powers of seizure include power under s.50 to seize both the seizable property and that from which it is not reasonably practicable to separate it.
  Source: Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.50(2) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/50
- Section 50(4) says that section 19(6) of the 1984 Act (powers of seizure not to include power to seize anything that a person has reasonable grounds for believing is legally privileged) shall not apply to the power of seizure conferred by s.50(2).
  Source: Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.50(4) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/50
- Section 51(1) makes provision for a search of a person: where a person carrying out a lawful search of any person finds something that he has reasonable grounds for believing may be or may contain something for which he is authorised to search; a power of seizure to which s.51 applies or the power conferred by subsection (2) of section 51 would entitle him, if he found it, to seize whatever it is that he has grounds for believing that thing to be or to contain; and in all the circumstances it is not reasonably practicable for it to be determined, at the time and place of the search, whether what he has found is something that he is entitled to seize, or the extent to which what he has found contains something that he is entitled to seize — his powers of seizure include power under s.51 to seize so much of what he has found as it is necessary to remove from that place to enable that to be determined.
  Source: Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.51(1) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/51
- Section 51(2) says that, where a person carrying out a lawful search of any person finds something (“the seizable property”) which he would be entitled to seize but for its being comprised in something else that he has (apart from that subsection) no power to seize, the power under which that person would have power to seize the seizable property is a power to which section 51 applies, and in all the circumstances it is not reasonably practicable for the seizable property to be separated, at the time and place of the search, from that in which it is comprised, that person’s powers of seizure include power under section 51 to seize both the seizable property and that from which it is not reasonably practicable to separate it.
  Source: Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.51(2) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/51
- Section 51(4) says that section 19(6) of the 1984 Act (powers of seizure not to include power to seize anything a person has reasonable grounds for believing is legally privileged) shall not apply to the power of seizure conferred by subsection (2).
  Source: Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.51(4) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/51
- Under s.56(1), the retention of property seized on any premises by a constable who was lawfully on the premises, property seized on any premises by a relevant person who was on the premises accompanied by a constable, and property seized by a constable carrying out a lawful search of any person, is authorised by s.56 if the property falls within subsection (2) or (3). Property falls within subsection (2) to the extent that there are reasonable grounds for believing that it is property obtained in consequence of the commission of an offence and that it is necessary for it to be retained in order to prevent its being concealed, lost, damaged, altered or destroyed. Property falls within subsection (3) to the extent that there are reasonable grounds for believing that it is evidence in relation to any offence and that it is necessary for it to be retained in order to prevent its being concealed, lost, altered or destroyed. Under s.56(4), nothing in s.56 authorises the retention (except in pursuance of section 54(2)) of anything at any time when its return is required by section 54.
  Source: Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.56(1)-(4) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/56
- Under s.59(6), on any application under s.59, the appropriate judicial authority may authorise the retention of any property which has been seized in exercise, or purported exercise, of a relevant power of seizure and would otherwise fall to be returned, if that authority is satisfied that the retention of the property is justified on grounds falling within subsection (7). Under s.59(7), those grounds are that (if the property were returned) it would immediately become appropriate (a) to issue, on the application of the person who is in possession of the property at the time of the application under s.59, a warrant in pursuance of which, or of the exercise of which, it would be lawful to seize the property; or (b) to make an order under paragraph 4 of Schedule 1 to the 1984 Act, paragraph 4 of Schedule 1 to the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989, section 20BA of the Taxes Management Act 1970, paragraph 5 of Schedule 5 to the Terrorism Act 2000, or paragraph 3 of Schedule 2 to the National Security Act 2023, under which the property would fall to be delivered up or produced to the person mentioned in paragraph (a).
  Source: Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.59(4), (6) and (7) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/59

### Limits on them
- Under s.50(3), the factors to be taken into account in considering, for the purposes of s.50, whether or not it is reasonably practicable on particular premises for something to be determined, or for something to be separated from something else, are confined to the following: how long it would take to carry out the determination or separation on those premises; the number of persons that would be required to carry out that determination or separation on those premises within a reasonable period; whether the determination or separation would (or would if carried out on those premises) involve damage to property; the apparatus or equipment that it would be necessary or appropriate to use for the carrying out of the determination or separation; and, in the case of separation, whether the separation would be likely, or if carried out by the only means that are reasonably practicable on those premises would be likely, to prejudice the use of some or all of the separated seizable property for a purpose for which something seized under the power in question is capable of being used.
  Source: Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.50(3) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/50
- Under s.51(3), the factors to be taken into account in considering, for the purposes of s.51, whether or not it is reasonably practicable, at the time and place of a search, for something to be determined, or for something to be separated from something else, are confined to the following: how long it would take to carry out the determination or separation at that time and place; the number of persons that would be required to carry out that determination or separation at that time and place within a reasonable period; whether the determination or separation would (or would if carried out at that time and place) involve damage to property; the apparatus or equipment that it would be necessary or appropriate to use for the carrying out of the determination or separation; and, in the case of separation, whether the separation would be likely, or if carried out by the only means that are reasonably practicable at that time and place would be likely, to prejudice the use of some or all of the separated seizable property for a purpose for which something seized under the power in question is capable of being used.
  Source: Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.51(3) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/51
- Under s.52(1), where a person exercises a power of seizure conferred by s.50, it is (subject to subsections (2) and (3)) his duty, on doing so, to give to the occupier of the premises a written notice specifying what has been seized in reliance on the powers conferred by that section; specifying the grounds on which those powers have been exercised; setting out the effect of sections 59 to 61; specifying the name and address of the person to whom notice of an application under section 59(2) to the appropriate judicial authority in respect of any of the seized property must be given; and specifying the name and address of the person to whom an application may be made to be allowed to attend the initial examination required by any arrangements made for the purposes of section 53(2). Under subsection (2), where it appears that the occupier is not present but some other person present is in charge of the premises, subsection (1) has effect as if it required the notice to be given to that other person; under subsection (3), where it appears that there is no one present on the premises to whom he may give a notice, he must, before leaving the premises, instead attach a notice such as is mentioned in subsection (1) in a prominent place to the premises.
  Source: Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.52(1)-(3) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/52
- Under s.52(4), where a person exercises a power of seizure conferred by s.51 it is his duty, on doing so, to give a written notice to the person from whom the seizure is made, specifying what has been seized in reliance on the powers conferred by that section; specifying the grounds on which those powers have been exercised; setting out the effect of sections 59 to 61; specifying the name and address of the person to whom notice of any application under section 59(2) to the appropriate judicial authority in respect of any of the seized property must be given; and specifying the name and address of the person to whom an application may be made to be allowed to attend the initial examination required by any arrangements made for the purposes of section 53(2).
  Source: Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.52(4) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/52
- Under s.53(1) and (2), where anything has been seized under a power conferred by section 50 or 51, it is the duty of the person for the time being in possession of the seized property in consequence of the exercise of that power to secure that there are arrangements in force which (subject to section 61) ensure: that an initial examination of the property is carried out as soon as reasonably practicable after the seizure; that that examination is confined to whatever is necessary for determining how much of the property falls within subsection (3); that anything which is found, on that examination, not to fall within subsection (3) is separated from the rest of the seized property and is returned as soon as reasonably practicable after the examination of all the seized property has been completed; and that, until the initial examination of all the seized property has been completed and anything which does not fall within subsection (3) has been returned, the seized property is kept separate from anything seized under any other power. What falls within subsection (3), including something that it will not be reasonably practicable to separate, is set out in the s.53(3) and (5) item below.
  Source: Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.53(1)-(2) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/53
- Section 53(3) says the seized property falls within that subsection to the extent only that it is property for which the person seizing it had power to search when he made the seizure but is not property the return of which is required by section 54; that it is property the retention of which is authorised by section 56; or that it is something which, in all the circumstances, it will not be reasonably practicable, following the examination, to separate from property falling within paragraph (a) or (b). Section 53(5) says that, in that section, references to whether or not it is reasonably practicable to separate part of the seized property from the rest of it are references to whether or not it is reasonably practicable to do so without prejudicing the use of the rest of that property, or a part of it, for purposes for which (disregarding the part to be separated) the use of the whole or of a part of the rest of the property, if retained, would be lawful.
  Source: Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.53(3) and (5) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/53
- Under s.53(4), in determining for the purposes of s.53 the earliest practicable time for the carrying out of an initial examination of the seized property, due regard shall be had to the desirability of allowing the person from whom it was seized, or a person with an interest in that property, an opportunity of being present or (if he chooses) of being represented at the examination.
  Source: Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.53(4) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/53
- Under s.54, if, at any time after a seizure of anything has been made in exercise of a power of seizure to which s.54 applies, it appears to the person for the time being having possession of the seized property in consequence of the seizure that the property is an item subject to legal privilege, or has such an item comprised in it, and (in a case where the item is comprised in something else which has been lawfully seized) it is not comprised in property falling within subsection (2), it is the duty of that person to secure that the item is returned as soon as reasonably practicable after the seizure. Property in which an item subject to legal privilege is comprised falls within s.54(2) if the whole or a part of the rest of the property is property falling within subsection (3) or property the retention of which is authorised by section 56, and in all the circumstances it is not reasonably practicable for that item to be separated from the rest of that property (or, as the case may be, from that part of it) without prejudicing the use of the rest of that property, or that part of it, for purposes for which (disregarding that item) its use, if retained, would be lawful.
  Source: Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.54(1)-(2) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/54
- Section 57(3) says nothing in any of sections 53 to 56 authorises the retention of any property at any time when its retention would not (apart from the provisions of this Part) be authorised by “the relevant provisions”; s.57(4) says nothing in any of the relevant provisions authorises the retention of anything after an obligation to return it has arisen under this Part.
  Source: Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.57(3)-(4) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/57
- Any person with a relevant interest in the seized property may apply to the appropriate judicial authority, on one or more of the grounds mentioned in subsection (3), for the return of the whole or a part of the seized property.
  Source: Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.59(2) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/59
- The s.59(3) grounds are: that there was no power to make the seizure; that the seized property is or contains an item subject to legal privilege that is not comprised in property falling within section 54(2); that the seized property is or contains any excluded material or special procedure material which has been seized under a power to which section 55 applies, is not comprised in property falling within section 55(2) or (3), and is not property the retention of which is authorised by section 56; or that the seized property is or contains something seized under section 50 or 51 which does not fall within section 53(3); and subsections (5) and (6) of section 55 apply for the purposes of paragraph (c) as they apply for the purposes of that section.
  Source: Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.59(3) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/59
- Under s.59(4), subject to subsection (6), the appropriate judicial authority, on an application under subsection (2), shall, if satisfied as to any of the matters mentioned in subsection (3), order the return of so much of the seized property as is property in relation to which the authority is so satisfied, and, to the extent that that authority is not so satisfied, dismiss the application. The exception in s.59(6) is that on any application under s.59 the appropriate judicial authority may authorise the retention of any property which has been seized in exercise, or purported exercise, of a relevant power of seizure and would otherwise fall to be returned, if that authority is satisfied that the retention of the property is justified on grounds falling within subsection (7). Under s.59(7), those grounds are that (if the property were returned) it would immediately become appropriate (a) to issue, on the application of the person who is in possession of the property at the time of the application under s.59, a warrant in pursuance of which, or of the exercise of which, it would be lawful to seize the property; or (b) to make an order under paragraph 4 of Schedule 1 to the 1984 Act, paragraph 4 of Schedule 1 to the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989, section 20BA of the Taxes Management Act 1970, paragraph 5 of Schedule 5 to the Terrorism Act 2000, or paragraph 3 of Schedule 2 to the National Security Act 2023, under which the property would fall to be delivered up or produced to the person mentioned in paragraph (a).
  Source: Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.59(4), (6) and (7) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/59
- Under s.59(5), the appropriate judicial authority may give such directions as it thinks fit as to the examination, retention, separation or return of the whole or any part of the seized property on an application under subsection (2); on an application made by the person for the time being having possession of anything in consequence of its seizure under a relevant power of seizure; or on an application made by a person with a relevant interest in anything seized under section 50 or 51 and on the grounds that the requirements of section 53(2) have not been or are not being complied with.
  Source: Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.59(5) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/59
- Under s.60(1), where property has been seized in exercise, or purported exercise, of any power of seizure conferred by section 50 or 51, a duty to secure arises under section 61 in relation to the seized property if a person entitled to do so makes an application under section 59 for the return of the property; in relation to England, Wales and Northern Ireland, at least one of the conditions set out in subsections (2) and (3) is satisfied; in relation to Scotland, the condition set out in subsection (2) is satisfied; and notice of the application is given to a relevant person. The first condition (subsection (2)) is that the application is made on the grounds that the seized property is or contains an item subject to legal privilege that is not comprised in property falling within section 54(2). The second condition (subsection (3)) is that the seized property was seized by a person who had, or purported to have, power under that Part to seize it by virtue only of one or more of the powers specified in subsection (6), and the application is made on the ground that the seized property is or contains something which does not fall within section 53(3) and states that the seized property is or contains special procedure material or excluded material.
  Source: Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.60(1)-(3) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/60
- Under s.61(1), the duty to secure is a duty of the person for the time being having possession, in consequence of the seizure, of the seized property to secure that arrangements are in force that ensure that the seized property (without being returned) is not, at any time after the giving of the notice of the application under section 60(1), either examined or copied, or put to any use to which its seizure would, apart from that subsection, entitle it to be put, except with the consent of the applicant or in accordance with the directions of the appropriate judicial authority. Under s.61(2), subsection (1) does not have effect in relation to any time after the withdrawal of the application to which the notice relates.
  Source: Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.61(1)-(2) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/61
- Under s.62(1), that section applies to property, other than property which is for the time being required to be secured in pursuance of section 61, if it has been seized under any power conferred by section 50 or 51 or specified in Part 1 or 2 of Schedule 1, and it is inextricably linked property. Under s.62(2), subject to subsection (3), it is the duty of the person for the time being having possession, in consequence of the seizure, of the inextricably linked property to ensure that arrangements are in force which secure that that property (without being returned) is not at any time, except with the consent of the person from whom it was seized, either examined or copied, or put to any other use. Under s.62(3), subsection (2) does not require that the arrangements prevent inextricably linked property from being put to any use falling within subsection (4); under s.62(4), a use falls within that subsection to the extent that it is use which is necessary for facilitating the use, in any investigation or proceedings, of property in which the inextricably linked property is comprised. Under s.62(5), property is inextricably linked property for the purposes of s.62 if it falls within any of subsections (6) to (8); under s.62(6), property falls within that subsection if it has been seized under a power conferred by section 50 or 51 and, but for subsection (3)(c) of section 53, arrangements under subsection (2) of that section in relation to the property would be required to ensure the return of the property as mentioned in subsection (2)(c) of that section. Subsections (7) and (8) are not quoted here.
  Source: Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.62(1)-(6) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/62
- PACE Code B para 7.7 says the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, Part 2 gives officers limited powers to seize property from premises or persons so they can sift or examine it elsewhere; officers must be careful they only exercise these powers when it is essential and they do not remove any more material than necessary; the removal of large volumes of material, much of which may not ultimately be retainable, may have serious implications for the owners, particularly when they are involved in business or activities such as journalism or the provision of medical services; officers must carefully consider if removing copies or images of relevant material or data would be a satisfactory alternative to removing originals; and when originals are taken, officers must be prepared to facilitate the provision of copies or images for the owners when reasonably practicable.
  Source: PACE Code B (2023), para 7.7 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/65804a3a83ba380013e1b769/PACE+Code+B+2023.pdf
- PACE Code B para 7.8 says property seized under the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, sections 50 or 51 must be kept securely and separately from any material seized under other powers, and that an examination under section 53 to determine which elements may be retained must be carried out at the earliest practicable time, having due regard to the desirability of allowing the person from whom the property was seized, or a person with an interest in the property, an opportunity of being present or represented at the examination.
  Source: PACE Code B (2023), para 7.8 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/65804a3a83ba380013e1b769/PACE+Code+B+2023.pdf
- PACE Code B para 7.9 says material which there is no power to retain must be separated from the rest of the seized property and returned as soon as reasonably practicable after examination of all the seized property; and para 7.9B says privileged, excluded or special procedure material (or, in the case of the National Security Act 2023, confidential material) which cannot be retained must be returned as soon as reasonably practicable and without waiting for the whole examination.
  Source: PACE Code B (2023), paras 7.9 and 7.9B — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/65804a3a83ba380013e1b769/PACE+Code+B+2023.pdf
- PACE Code B para 7.11 says securing involves making sure the property is not examined, copied, imaged or put to any other use except at the request, or with the consent, of the applicant or in accordance with the directions of the appropriate judicial authority.
  Source: PACE Code B (2023), para 7.11 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/65804a3a83ba380013e1b769/PACE+Code+B+2023.pdf

### What the sources say
- Under the heading “Powers to which section 50 applies”, Schedule 1 (Part 1, para 1) lists, for the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (c. 60), each of the powers of seizure conferred by the provisions of Part 2 or 3 of the 1984 Act (police powers of entry, search and seizure).
  Source: Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, Sch.1 Pt 1 para 1 — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/schedule/1
- Under the heading “Powers to which section 51 applies”, Schedule 1 (Part 2, para 74) lists, for the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (c. 60), each of the powers of seizure conferred by the provisions of Part 3 of the 1984 Act (police powers of search and seizure on arrest).
  Source: Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, Sch.1 Pt 2 para 74 — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/schedule/1
- Under the heading “Powers to which section 55 applies”, Schedule 1 (Part 3, para 84) lists, for the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (c. 60), the power of seizure conferred by section 8(2) of the 1984 Act (police power, on exercise of search warrant, to seize property searched for).
  Source: Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, Sch.1 Pt 3 para 84 — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/schedule/1
- Section 63 says that, subject to subsection (3), in that Part “seize” includes “take a copy of”, and cognate expressions are to be construed accordingly, and that the Part applies as if any copy taken under any power to which any provision of the Part applies were the original of that of which it is a copy. Section 63(3) says subsection (1) does not apply to section 50(6) or 57.
  Source: Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.63(1)(a)-(b) and (3) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/63
- Section 64(1) says that, subject to subsections (2) and (4), in that Part “appropriate judicial authority” means, in relation to England and Wales and Northern Ireland, a judge of the Crown Court; and in relation to Scotland, a sheriff.
  Source: Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.64(1) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/64
- Section 59(11) says references in that section to a person with a relevant interest in seized property are references to the person from whom it was seized; any person with an interest in the property; or any person, not falling within either of those descriptions, who had custody or control of the property immediately before the seizure.
  Source: Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.59(11) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/59
- Section 57(1) says the section has effect in relation to the following provisions (which are about the retention of items which have been seized and are referred to in that section as “the relevant provisions”); the first listed is section 22 of the 1984 Act.
  Source: Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.57(1)(a) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/57
- Section 61(3) says nothing in any arrangements for the purposes of that section is to be taken to prevent the giving of a notice under section 49 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (notices for the disclosure of material protected by encryption etc.) in respect of any information contained in the seized material; but subsection (1) applies to anything disclosed for the purpose of complying with such a notice as it applies to the seized material in which the information in question is contained.
  Source: Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.61(3) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/61

## Seizure and cyber kiosks in Scotland
URL: https://phoneseized.com/scotland/seizure-and-cyber-kiosks
Jurisdictions: Scotland
Last reviewed: 2026-10-06

### What Police Scotland says about cyber kiosks
Police Scotland’s cyber kiosks page says: “We will only examine a digital device where there is a legal basis and where it is necessary, justified and proportionate to the incident or crime under investigation.” It also says that “all information is securely deleted from the cyber kiosk at the end of each examination”. Section 120(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/120) says: “Subject to the following provisions of this section, this Act extends to England and Wales only.” The provisions below are the ones this site has sourced for Scotland.

### Answering questions: Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2016, s.34(1) and (4)
Section 34(1) of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2016 says that subsections (2) and (4) apply where a person is in police custody in relation to an offence, and the person has not been officially accused of committing the offence or an offence arising from the same circumstances as the offence. Section 34(4) then says: “The person is under no obligation to answer any question, other than to give the following information” — the person’s name, address, date of birth, place of birth (in such detail as a constable considers necessary or expedient for the purpose of establishing the person’s identity) and nationality. Section 34 is about answering questions; the RIPA and Schedule 7 provisions below are separate provisions. This page is about what happens to a seized phone. For the fuller picture of what you must and do not have to answer in a Scottish police interview, see rights and limits’ guide to what you must answer in Scotland (https://rightsandlimits.com/scotland-what-you-must-answer).

### RIPA section 49 and Schedule 7
Section 49 notices under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 and Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 are covered here. Section 53(1) of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 says a person to whom a section 49 notice has been given is guilty of an offence if he knowingly fails, in accordance with the notice, to make the disclosure required by virtue of the giving of the notice. Section 53(5) says a person guilty of an offence under that section is liable, on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding “the appropriate maximum term” or to a fine, or to both; and, on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to both. Section 53(5A) defines “the appropriate maximum term” as five years in a national security case or a child indecency case, and two years in any other case. Schedule 2 to that Act says that, subject to the other provisions of that Schedule, a person has the appropriate permission in relation to any protected information “if, and only if, written permission for the giving of section 49 notices in relation to that information has been granted” — in England and Wales, by a Circuit judge; in Scotland, by a sheriff; or in Northern Ireland, by a county court judge. Paragraph 4 of that Schedule applies to protected information falling within section 49(1)(a), (b) or (c) which is not information in the case of which paragraph 2 or 3 applies; paragraph 4(2) says that, subject to paragraph 6, where the statutory power was exercised, or is likely to be exercised, by the police, the police have the appropriate permission in relation to the protected information, without any grant of permission under paragraph 1. Paragraph 2 of that Schedule (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/schedule/2) applies in the case of protected information falling within section 49(1)(a), (b) or (c) where the statutory power in question is one exercised, or to be exercised, in accordance with a warrant issued by the Secretary of State or a person holding judicial office, an authorisation under Part III of the Police Act 1997, or a targeted equipment interference warrant issued under section 106 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016; paragraph 2(2) says that, subject to sub-paragraphs (3) to (5) and paragraph 6(1), a person has the appropriate permission in relation to that protected information (without any grant of permission under paragraph 1) if the warrant or authorisation contained the relevant authority’s permission for the giving of section 49 notices in relation to protected information to be obtained under the warrant or authorisation, or if, since the issue of the warrant or authorisation, written permission has been granted by the relevant authority for the giving of such notices in relation to protected information obtained under the warrant or authorisation. Paragraph 2(9) says that protected information that comes into a person’s possession by means of the exercise of any statutory power which is exercisable without a warrant, but is so exercisable in the course of, or in connection with, the exercise of another statutory power for which a warrant is required, shall not be taken, by reason only of the warrant required for the exercise of that other statutory power, to be information in the case of which paragraph 2 applies. Paragraph 6(2) of that Schedule says that, subject to sub-paragraph (3), a constable does not by virtue of paragraph 1, 4 or 5 have the appropriate permission in relation to any protected information unless he is of or above the rank of superintendent, or permission to give a section 49 notice in relation to that information has been granted by a person holding the rank of superintendent, or any higher rank. Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 is a separate power. Section 130(1) of that Act (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/section/130) says that, subject to subsections (2) to (6), the Act extends to the whole of the United Kingdom. Paragraph 5(a) says a person questioned under paragraph 2 or 3 must give the examining officer any information in his possession which the officer requests. The Schedule 7 Code of Practice says information requested under paragraph 5(a) may include passwords to electronic devices; the same paragraph says an examining officer may not, however, compel a person to disclose or confirm the identity of a source of journalistic information or disclose information subject to legal privilege. That is a rule for the examining officer. As quoted, it does not give the person a right to refuse any Schedule 7 duty. The Code also says that the person must provide access to any electronic device to allow for a search to be undertaken, including where that requires the person to unlock a device through application of their thumb or finger, or any other form of access control. Paragraph 18(1) says a person commits an offence if he wilfully fails to comply with a duty imposed under or by virtue of the Schedule, wilfully contravenes a prohibition imposed under or by virtue of that Schedule, or wilfully obstructs, or seeks to frustrate, a search or examination under or by virtue of that Schedule; paragraph 18(2) says a person guilty of an offence under that paragraph is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months, a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale, or both. This power is covered at ports and Schedule 7 (https://phoneseized.com/uk/ports-schedule-7), and Scotland’s wider encounter rights are covered at rights and limits’ guide to what you must answer in Scotland (https://rightsandlimits.com/scotland-what-you-must-answer).

### Extraction under the PCSC Act 2022: with agreement, and under section 40
Section 207(2) of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/207) says that sections 37 to 44 (and Schedule 3) extend to England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Section 37(1) of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 says an authorised person may extract information stored on an electronic device from that device if a user of the device has voluntarily provided it to an authorised person and has agreed to the extraction. Section 39(1) says a person (‘P’) is treated for the purposes of section 37 or 38 as having voluntarily provided an electronic device to an authorised person and agreed to the extraction of information from it only if the requirements of section 39 have been met. Under s.39(3)(d), an authorised person must have given P notice in writing stating that P may refuse to provide the device or agree to the extraction of information from it. Under s.39(3)(e), the notice in writing that an authorised person must have given to P must state that the investigation or enquiry for the purposes of which the information is sought will not be brought to an end merely because P refuses to provide the device or agree to the extraction of information from it. Section 40(1) says that, if any of conditions A to C is met, an authorised person may exercise the power in section 37(1) to extract information stored on an electronic device from that device even though the device has not been voluntarily provided to an authorised person by a user of the device, or no user of the device has agreed to the extraction of information from the device by an authorised person. Section 40(2) says Condition A is that a person who was a user of the electronic device has died, and the person was a user of the device immediately before their death. Section 40(3) says Condition B is that a user of the electronic device is a child or an adult without capacity, and an authorised person reasonably believes that the user’s life is at risk or there is a risk of serious harm to the user. Section 40(4) says Condition C is that a person who was a user of the electronic device is missing, the person was a user of the device immediately before they went missing, and an authorised person reasonably believes that the person’s life is at risk or there is a risk of serious harm to the person. Section 40(5) says the exercise of the power in subsection (1) of section 37 by virtue of this section is subject to that section. Section 47(1) of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2016 says that nothing in that Part affects any rule of law by virtue of which a constable may exercise a power of the type described in subsection (2) — a power exercised in relation to a person by reason of the person’s having been arrested and charged with an offence by a constable. Section 47(3) says powers of that type include the power to seize any item in the person’s possession.

### You must
- A person who is questioned under paragraph 2 or 3 of Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 must give the examining officer any information in his possession which the officer requests.
  Source: Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 5(a) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/schedule/7
- The Schedule 7 Code says the person must provide access to any electronic device to allow for a search to be undertaken, including where access to a device requires the person to unlock a device through application of their thumb or finger, or any other form of access control.
  Source: Schedule 7 (Terrorism Act 2000) Code of Practice (Oct 2025), para 61 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68e7b52b187483de54d766d2/Schedule+7+Code+of+Practice.pdf
- A person commits an offence if he wilfully fails to comply with a duty imposed under or by virtue of Schedule 7, wilfully contravenes a prohibition imposed under or by virtue of that Schedule, or wilfully obstructs, or seeks to frustrate, a search or examination under or by virtue of that Schedule.
  Source: Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 18(1) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/schedule/7/paragraph/18
- A person guilty of an offence under paragraph 18 of Schedule 7 is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months, a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale, or both.
  Source: Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 18(2) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/schedule/7/paragraph/18
- Make the disclosure required by a section 49 notice given to you, in accordance with the notice — knowingly failing to do so is an offence under s.53(1) of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000.
  Section 53(1): a person to whom a section 49 notice has been given is guilty of an offence if he knowingly fails, in accordance with the notice, to make the disclosure required by virtue of the giving of the notice.
  Source: Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, s.53(1) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/section/53
- A person guilty of an offence under s.53 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding "the appropriate maximum term" or to a fine, or to both, where s.53(5A) defines "the appropriate maximum term" as five years in a national security case or a child indecency case and two years in any other case; on summary conviction the person is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to both.
  Source: Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, s.53(5) and (5A) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/section/53

### You may refuse
- Under s.34(1) and (4) of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2016, where a person is in police custody in relation to an offence and has not been officially accused of committing the offence or an offence arising from the same circumstances as the offence, the person is under no obligation to answer any question, other than to give the person's name, address, date of birth, place of birth (in such detail as a constable considers necessary or expedient for the purpose of establishing the person's identity) and nationality.
  Source: Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2016, s.34(1) and (4) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/asp/2016/1/section/34
- Under s.39(1) of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, a person (‘P’) is treated for the purposes of section 37 or 38 as having voluntarily provided an electronic device to an authorised person and agreed to the extraction of information from it only if the requirements of section 39 have been met. Under s.39(3)(d), an authorised person must have given P notice in writing stating that P may refuse to provide the device or agree to the extraction of information from it.
  Source: Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.39(1) and (3) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/39

### What they can do
- The Schedule 7 Code says information requested by an examining officer under paragraph 5(a) may include passwords to electronic devices; the same paragraph says an examining officer may not, however, compel a person to disclose or confirm the identity of a source of journalistic information or disclose information subject to legal privilege.
  The second part is a rule for the examining officer. As quoted, it does not give the person a right to refuse any Schedule 7 duty.
  Source: Schedule 7 (Terrorism Act 2000) Code of Practice (Oct 2025), para 55 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68e7b52b187483de54d766d2/Schedule+7+Code+of+Practice.pdf
- In Scotland, s.47(1) of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2016 says that nothing in that Part affects any rule of law by virtue of which a constable may exercise a power of the type described in subsection (2) — a power exercised in relation to a person by reason of the person’s having been arrested and charged with an offence by a constable — and s.47(3) says powers of that type include the power to seize any item in the person’s possession.
  Source: Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2016, s.47(1), (2) and (3)(b) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/asp/2016/1/section/47
- Under s.40(1) of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, if any of conditions A to C is met, an authorised person may exercise the power in section 37(1) to extract information stored on an electronic device from that device even though the device has not been voluntarily provided to an authorised person by a user of the device, or no user of the device has agreed to the extraction of information from the device by an authorised person. Section 40(2) says Condition A is that a person who was a user of the electronic device has died, and the person was a user of the device immediately before their death. Section 40(3) says Condition B is that a user of the electronic device is a child or an adult without capacity, and an authorised person reasonably believes that the user’s life is at risk or there is a risk of serious harm to the user. Section 40(4) says Condition C is that a person who was a user of the electronic device is missing, the person was a user of the device immediately before they went missing, and an authorised person reasonably believes that the person’s life is at risk or there is a risk of serious harm to the person. Section 40(5) says the exercise of the power in subsection (1) of section 37 by virtue of this section is subject to that section.
  Source: Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.40(1) to (5) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/40

### Limits on them
- Under s.39(3)(e) of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, the notice in writing that an authorised person must have given to a person (‘P’) before P is treated for the purposes of section 37 or 38 as having voluntarily provided an electronic device and agreed to the extraction of information from it must state that the investigation or enquiry for the purposes of which the information is sought will not be brought to an end merely because P refuses to provide the device or agree to the extraction of information from it.
  Source: Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.39(1) and (3) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/39
- Paragraph 6(2) of Schedule 2 to the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 says that, subject to sub-paragraph (3), a constable does not by virtue of paragraph 1, 4 or 5 have the appropriate permission in relation to any protected information unless he is of or above the rank of superintendent, or permission to give a section 49 notice in relation to that information has been granted by a person holding the rank of superintendent, or any higher rank.
  Source: Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, Sch.2 para 6(2) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/schedule/2

### What the sources say
- Schedule 2 to the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 says that, subject to the other provisions of that Schedule, a person has the appropriate permission in relation to any protected information if, and only if, written permission for the giving of section 49 notices in relation to that information has been granted — in England and Wales, by a Circuit judge; in Scotland, by a sheriff; or in Northern Ireland, by a county court judge.
  Source: Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, Sch.2 para 1(1) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/schedule/2
- Paragraph 4 of that Schedule applies to protected information falling within section 49(1)(a), (b) or (c) which is not information in the case of which paragraph 2 or 3 applies; paragraph 4(2) says that, subject to paragraph 6, where the statutory power was exercised, or is likely to be exercised, by the police, the police have the appropriate permission in relation to the protected information, without any grant of permission under paragraph 1.
  Source: Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, Sch.2 para 4(1)(a) and (2) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/schedule/2
- Paragraph 2 of that Schedule applies in the case of protected information falling within section 49(1)(a), (b) or (c) where the statutory power in question is one exercised, or to be exercised, in accordance with a warrant issued by the Secretary of State or a person holding judicial office, an authorisation under Part III of the Police Act 1997, or a targeted equipment interference warrant issued under section 106 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016; paragraph 2(2) says that, subject to sub-paragraphs (3) to (5) and paragraph 6(1), a person has the appropriate permission in relation to that protected information (without any grant of permission under paragraph 1) if the warrant or authorisation contained the relevant authority’s permission for the giving of section 49 notices in relation to protected information to be obtained under the warrant or authorisation, or if, since the issue of the warrant or authorisation, written permission has been granted by the relevant authority for the giving of such notices in relation to protected information obtained under the warrant or authorisation. Paragraph 2(9) says that protected information that comes into a person’s possession by means of the exercise of any statutory power which is exercisable without a warrant, but is so exercisable in the course of, or in connection with, the exercise of another statutory power for which a warrant is required, shall not be taken, by reason only of the warrant required for the exercise of that other statutory power, to be information in the case of which paragraph 2 applies.
  Source: Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, Sch.2 para 2(1), (2) and (9) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/schedule/2
- Section 130(1) of the Terrorism Act 2000 says that, subject to subsections (2) to (6), the Act extends to the whole of the United Kingdom.
  Source: Terrorism Act 2000, s.130(1) (extent) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/section/130
- Section 207(2) of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 says sections 37 to 44 (and Schedule 3) extend to England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.
  Source: Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.207(2)(b) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/207

## Your data after a phone examination in Scotland
URL: https://phoneseized.com/scotland/retention
Jurisdictions: Scotland
Last reviewed: 2026-10-02

### After a cyber kiosk examination
Police Scotland’s own cyber kiosks page (https://www.scotland.police.uk/about-us/what-we-do/specialist-crime-division/cybercrime-investigations-and-digital-forensics/cyber-kiosks/) states that “all information is securely deleted from the cyber kiosk at the end of each examination.” That statement is about the kiosk itself, covered on the previous page. The quoted sentence does not mention a fuller extraction sent on to a digital forensics lab.

### Data protection principles in Part 3 of the Data Protection Act 2018
Part 3 of the Data Protection Act 2018 sets data protection principles for the processing of personal data for any of the law enforcement purposes. Under the Act, that processing “must be lawful and fair (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2018/12/section/35)”; personal data processed for any of the law enforcement purposes must be “adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purpose for which it is processed (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2018/12/section/37)”; and it must be “kept for no longer than is necessary for the purpose for which it is processed (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2018/12/section/39).”

### The extraction Code's deletion rule
The Code of Practice on extraction of information from electronic devices, issued under the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, says in paragraph 138 (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/634810a38fa8f53463dcb957/E02802691_Electronic_Devices_Code_of_Practice_WEB.pdf): “Information which is extracted and deemed not relevant must be deleted unless there is a lawful basis to retain it.” The same Code (paragraph 4 (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/634810a38fa8f53463dcb957/E02802691_Electronic_Devices_Code_of_Practice_WEB.pdf)) says it “only applies as regards the powers in Chapter 3 of Part 2 of the Act” and that “If another power is being used as the basis for extracting information from an electronic device, the guidance/code for that power will apply.” Section 37(1) of the 2022 Act is a power to extract information from a device a user has voluntarily provided and agreed to the extraction from. This site has not sourced a deletion rule specific to a phone seized under Scottish seizure powers.

### What the quoted passages do not say
The Data Protection Act’s fifth principle, s.39(1), states a necessity test — data “kept for no longer than is necessary for the purpose for which it is processed” — and no period of days. Para 138 of the Code, as quoted above, does not say who decides that information is “deemed not relevant” or how that is checked. The quoted sentence from Police Scotland’s cyber kiosks page is about the kiosk itself and does not mention material sent on for a fuller extraction. For the equivalent position in England and Wales — including how the same PCSC Code and Data Protection Act provisions apply there — see retention and deletion (https://phoneseized.com/uk/retention-and-deletion).

## Can Border Force search my phone, and must I unlock it?
URL: https://phoneseized.com/australia/border-abf
Jurisdictions: Australia
Last reviewed: 2026-10-04

### Two different questions, one Commonwealth law
This page is about Commonwealth law — the Customs Act 1901 — and Australian Border Force policy, not state law. The state pages in this section cover separate statutes: New South Wales, Queensland and Victoria each have their own scheme. Two questions get run together at the border, and they have different answers. The first is what an officer may do to examine goods under customs control, which is what s.186 of the Customs Act 1901 covers. The second is whether you must unlock your phone for them — and that one works differently.

### What an officer can do without your help
Under s.186 of the Customs Act 1901 (https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1901A00006/2026-09-19/2026-09-19/text/original/pdf/3), any officer may, subject to subsections (2) and (3), examine any goods subject to customs control, and the expense of the examination, including the cost of removal to the place of examination, is borne by the owner. Under s.186A (https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1901A00006/2026-09-19/2026-09-19/text/original/pdf/3), if a document is examined under section 186 or 186AA and, as a result of that examination, an officer of Customs is satisfied that the document or part of the document may contain information relevant to an importation or exportation, or a proposed importation or exportation, of prohibited goods, the commission or attempted commission of any other offence against the Customs Act or of any offence against a prescribed Act, the performance of functions under section 17 of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 or section 6 of the Intelligence Services Act 2001, or security, the officer of Customs may make a copy of, or take an extract from, the document, or arrange for another officer of Customs or other person having the necessary experience to make such a copy or take such an extract. The ABF’s written answer to the Senate committee, quoted below, refers to the examination of a device under the Customs or Migration acts — and the passcode question is separate.

### The passcode question: a written answer, not a statute
The Customs Act sections quoted on this page do not mention a passcode. What this site has instead is a written answer (AE22-050) to a question taken on notice at the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs’ Additional Budget Estimates hearing of 14 February 2022. In that answer the Australian Border Force said: “There is no legal compulsion for a traveller to provide a password/passcode or provide assistance to an electronic device at the border.” (https://www.aph.gov.au/api/qon/downloadattachment?attachmentId=bd0902f9-1209-49d9-9c86-b6858c22020d) That is an agency’s written answer to a parliamentary question, not a section of an Act, and not a court order such as a s.3LA order. It is reported here as what the ABF said, not as a rule of law.

### What the ABF’s answer said about seizure and retention
The same written ABF answer said that if an individual refuses to comply with a request or provide a password for an examination of their electronic device, and an ABF officer considers there to be a risk to the border, the ABF officer is authorised to seize that device for further examination prior to being returned. The answer also said that the ABF has powers under the Customs Act 1901, the Migration Act 1958 and the Maritime Powers Act 2013 to examine and copy electronic devices, and that “None of the aforementioned legislation provide a time limit for the retention of goods subject to examination.” (https://www.aph.gov.au/api/qon/downloadattachment?attachmentId=bd0902f9-1209-49d9-9c86-b6858c22020d) That is what the ABF said in its answer, not a section quoted from those Acts. It also said that “current ABF policy” was to retain electronic devices held for examination for no longer than 14 days, unless it is reasonable that the examination will take longer or content is located on the device that renders the device subject to seizure. The same answer said the ABF does not alter or delete any data as a result of an examination of a device under the Customs or Migration acts, and that copied data can only be shared depending on the type of information and the specific legislation that applies to that type of information, such as Part 6 of the Australian Border Force Act, Privacy Act or Migration Act. See how this compares with other countries (https://phoneseized.com/compare/at-the-border), what to do before you travel (https://phoneseized.com/protect/before-a-border), and the wider question of when you must give police the code (https://phoneseized.com/compare/must-i-give-the-code) generally.

### What they can do
- Any officer may, subject to subsections (2) and (3) of s.186, examine any goods subject to customs control, and the expense of the examination, including the cost of removal to the place of examination, is borne by the owner.
  Source: Customs Act 1901 (Cth), s.186(1) — general power to examine goods (Compilation No. 193, 19 Sep 2026) — https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1901A00006/2026-09-19/2026-09-19/text/original/pdf/3
- If a document is examined under section 186 or 186AA and, as a result of that examination, an officer of Customs is satisfied that the document or part of the document may contain information relevant to an importation or exportation, or a proposed importation or exportation, of prohibited goods, the commission or attempted commission of any other offence against the Customs Act or of any offence against a prescribed Act, the performance of functions under section 17 of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 or section 6 of the Intelligence Services Act 2001, or security, the officer of Customs may make a copy of, or take an extract from, the document, or arrange for another officer of Customs or other person having the necessary experience to make such a copy or take such an extract.
  Source: Customs Act 1901 (Cth), s.186A(1) — power to copy documents and data (Compilation No. 193, 19 Sep 2026) — https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1901A00006/2026-09-19/2026-09-19/text/original/pdf/3

### What the sources say
- In a written answer to a question on notice taken at Senate Additional Budget Estimates (AE22-050), the Australian Border Force said: “There is no legal compulsion for a traveller to provide a password/passcode or provide assistance to an electronic device at the border.”
  Source: Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Additional Budget Estimates, ABF written answer AE22-050 (document headed 14 Feb 2022) — no legal compulsion — https://www.aph.gov.au/api/qon/downloadattachment?attachmentId=bd0902f9-1209-49d9-9c86-b6858c22020d
- The same answer said that if an individual refuses to comply with a request or provide a password for an examination of their electronic device, and an ABF officer considers there to be a risk to the border, the ABF officer is authorised to seize that device for further examination prior to being returned.
  Source: Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Additional Budget Estimates, ABF written answer AE22-050 (document headed 14 Feb 2022) — consequence of refusal — https://www.aph.gov.au/api/qon/downloadattachment?attachmentId=bd0902f9-1209-49d9-9c86-b6858c22020d
- The ABF said in that answer that it has powers under the Customs Act 1901, the Migration Act 1958 and the Maritime Powers Act 2013 to examine and copy electronic devices, which includes mobile phones, computers and removable storage devices such as USB drives, and that “None of the aforementioned legislation provide a time limit for the retention of goods subject to examination.”
  Source: Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Additional Budget Estimates, ABF written answer AE22-050 (document headed 14 Feb 2022) — no statutory time limit on retention — https://www.aph.gov.au/api/qon/downloadattachment?attachmentId=bd0902f9-1209-49d9-9c86-b6858c22020d
- The ABF said in that answer that “current ABF policy” was to retain electronic devices held for examination for no longer than 14 days, unless it is reasonable that the examination will take longer or content is located on the device that renders the device subject to seizure.
  Source: Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Additional Budget Estimates, ABF written answer AE22-050 (document headed 14 Feb 2022) — retention policy — https://www.aph.gov.au/api/qon/downloadattachment?attachmentId=bd0902f9-1209-49d9-9c86-b6858c22020d
- The ABF said in that answer that it does not alter or delete any data as a result of an examination of a device under the Customs or Migration acts.
  Source: Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Additional Budget Estimates, ABF written answer AE22-050 (document headed 14 Feb 2022) — data not altered or deleted — https://www.aph.gov.au/api/qon/downloadattachment?attachmentId=bd0902f9-1209-49d9-9c86-b6858c22020d
- The ABF said in that answer that copied data can only be shared depending on the type of information and the specific legislation that applies to that type of information, such as Part 6 of the Australian Border Force Act, Privacy Act or Migration Act.
  Source: Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Additional Budget Estimates, ABF written answer AE22-050 (document headed 14 Feb 2022) — sharing copied data — https://www.aph.gov.au/api/qon/downloadattachment?attachmentId=bd0902f9-1209-49d9-9c86-b6858c22020d

## Computer access orders under s.3LA of the Crimes Act
URL: https://phoneseized.com/australia/assistance-orders-3la
Jurisdictions: Australia
Last reviewed: 2026-10-02

### A Commonwealth court order, not a request
Section 3LA of the Crimes Act 1914 is a Commonwealth provision, separate from the state schemes covered on this site for New South Wales (https://phoneseized.com/australia/nsw-digital-evidence-access-orders), Queensland (https://phoneseized.com/australia/qld-device-information-orders) and Victoria (https://phoneseized.com/australia/vic-assistance-orders-465aa). A constable may apply to a magistrate for an order under s.3LA requiring a specified person to provide the information or assistance that is reasonable and necessary to allow a constable to do one or more of the listed things, including accessing data held in, or accessible from, a computer or data storage device that is on warrant premises, is found in the course of an ordinary search or a frisk search of a person authorised by a warrant under section 3E, has been moved under subsection 3K(2) and is at a place for examination or processing, or has been seized under this Division of the Act.

### What the order requires
Section 3LA(1) describes an order requiring a specified person to provide any information or assistance that is reasonable and necessary to allow a constable to do one or more of the listed things. Section 3LA(5) makes it an offence where a person subject to the order, who is capable of complying with a requirement in it, omits to do an act and the omission contravenes the requirement.

### The warrant and on-site powers behind it
The s.3LA(1) text refers to data on warrant premises and to an ordinary search or a frisk search of a person authorised by a warrant under section 3E. A warrant to search premises is issued under s.3E (https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1), and an issuing officer may issue that warrant if satisfied, by information on oath or affirmation, that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting evidential material is at the premises now, or will be within the next 72 hours. Separately, the executing officer of a warrant in relation to premises, or a constable assisting, may operate electronic equipment at the warrant premises to access data (including data not held at the premises) under s.3L(1) (https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1), if he or she suspects on reasonable grounds that the data constitutes evidential material or suggests the existence of a digital asset that may be seized under the warrant. If they suspect on reasonable grounds that data accessed that way constitutes evidential material or suggests the existence of such an asset, they may copy any or all of the data accessed to a disk, tape or other associated device brought to the premises, under s.3L(1A) (https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1).

### Before the order is made
Under s.3LA(2) (https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1) the magistrate may grant the order if the magistrate is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that evidential material is held in, or is accessible from, the computer or data storage device; and the specified person is reasonably suspected of having committed the offence stated in the relevant warrant, or the owner or lessee of the computer or device, or an employee of the owner or lessee of the computer or device, or a person engaged under a contract for services by the owner or lessee of the computer or device, or a person who uses or has used the computer or device, or a person who is or was a system administrator for the system including the computer or device; and the specified person has relevant knowledge of the computer or device or a computer network of which the computer or device forms or formed a part, or measures applied to protect data held in, or accessible from, the computer or device. The s.3LA(5) and (6) offences quoted on this page are framed around a person who “is subject to an order under this section”. This site has not quoted any Commonwealth offence for declining an informal request made before an order is in place.

### The offences and penalties for failing to comply
Section 3LA(5) provides that a person commits an offence if they are subject to an order under the section, are capable of complying with a requirement in the order, omit to do an act, and the omission contravenes the requirement. The penalty is imprisonment for 5 years or 300 penalty units, or both. Section 3LA(6) provides that a person commits an offence if they are subject to an order under s.3LA, are capable of complying with a requirement in the order, omit to do an act, and the omission contravenes the requirement, and the offence to which the relevant warrant relates is a serious offence or a serious terrorism offence. The penalty is imprisonment for 10 years or 600 penalty units, or both. See how this compares with New South Wales’ digital evidence access orders (https://phoneseized.com/australia/nsw-digital-evidence-access-orders), Queensland’s device information orders (https://phoneseized.com/australia/qld-device-information-orders), Victoria’s s.465AA orders (https://phoneseized.com/australia/vic-assistance-orders-465aa), and when you must give police the code (https://phoneseized.com/compare/must-i-give-the-code) generally.

### You must
- A person commits an offence under s.3LA(5) if the person is subject to an order under the section, is capable of complying with a requirement in the order, omits to do an act, and the omission contravenes the requirement — penalty: imprisonment for 5 years or 300 penalty units, or both.
  Source: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3LA(5) — penalty tier one (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026) — https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1
- Section 3LA(6) provides that a person commits an offence if they are subject to an order under s.3LA, are capable of complying with a requirement in the order, omit to do an act, and the omission contravenes the requirement, and the offence to which the relevant warrant relates is a serious offence or a serious terrorism offence. The penalty is imprisonment for 10 years or 600 penalty units, or both.
  Source: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3LA(6) — offence elements and penalty tier two (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026) — https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1

### What they can do
- A constable may apply to a magistrate for an order requiring a specified person to provide any information or assistance that is reasonable and necessary to allow a constable to do one or more of the listed things, including accessing data held in, or accessible from, a computer or data storage device on warrant premises.
  Source: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3LA(1) — order power (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026) — https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1
- An issuing officer may issue a warrant to search premises if satisfied, by information on oath or affirmation, that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that there is, or will be within the next 72 hours, any evidential material at the premises.
  Source: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3E(1) — when a search warrant can be issued (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026) — https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1
- The executing officer of a warrant in relation to premises, or a constable assisting, may operate electronic equipment at the warrant premises to access data (including data not held at the premises) if he or she suspects on reasonable grounds that the data constitutes evidential material or suggests the existence of a digital asset that may be seized under the warrant.
  Source: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3L(1) — operating electronic equipment at warrant premises (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026) — https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1
- If the executing officer or constable assisting suspects on reasonable grounds that data accessed by operating the electronic equipment constitutes evidential material or suggests the existence of a digital asset that may be seized under the warrant, he or she may copy any or all of the data accessed to a disk, tape or other associated device brought to the premises.
  Source: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3L(1A)(a) — copying accessed data to a device (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026) — https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1

### Limits on them
- Under s.3LA(2) the magistrate may grant the order if the magistrate is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that evidential material is held in, or is accessible from, the computer or data storage device; and the specified person is reasonably suspected of having committed the offence stated in the relevant warrant, or the owner or lessee of the computer or device, or an employee of the owner or lessee of the computer or device, or a person engaged under a contract for services by the owner or lessee of the computer or device, or a person who uses or has used the computer or device, or a person who is or was a system administrator for the system including the computer or device; and the specified person has relevant knowledge of the computer or device or a computer network of which the computer or device forms or formed a part, or measures applied to protect data held in, or accessible from, the computer or device.
  Source: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3LA(2) — matters the magistrate must be satisfied of (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026) — https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1

## NSW digital evidence access orders: what police can require
URL: https://phoneseized.com/australia/nsw-digital-evidence-access-orders
Jurisdictions: Australia
Last reviewed: 2026-10-02

### New South Wales law, not Commonwealth
This page covers New South Wales law specifically — the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (LEPRA). The Commonwealth s.3LA order is a separate provision, covered on this site’s Crimes Act page (https://phoneseized.com/australia/assistance-orders-3la).

### What a digital evidence access order requires
The executing officer for a digital evidence access order may direct the specified person to give the officer any information or assistance reasonable and necessary to enable the officer to access data held in or accessible from a computer specified in, or within the scope of, the order. A specified person for a digital evidence access order must not, without reasonable excuse, fail to comply with a direction given, in accordance with the order, by the executing officer. Section 76AO carries a maximum penalty of 100 penalty units or imprisonment for 5 years, or both. Section 76AO(2) (https://legislation.nsw.gov.au/view/whole/html/inforce/current/act-2002-103) says that, without limiting subsection (1), it is not a reasonable excuse for a specified person for a digital evidence access order to fail to comply with the order or a requirement made in accordance with the order on the ground that complying with the order or the requirement would tend to incriminate the person or otherwise expose the person to a penalty.

### The limits on the order
The direction power in s.76AM(1) is framed around a computer specified in, or within the scope of, the order. The prohibition in s.76AO is worded “without reasonable excuse”, and s.76AO(2) (https://legislation.nsw.gov.au/view/whole/html/inforce/current/act-2002-103) says that, without limiting subsection (1), it is not a reasonable excuse for a specified person for a digital evidence access order to fail to comply with the order or a requirement made in accordance with the order on the ground that complying with the order or the requirement would tend to incriminate the person or otherwise expose the person to a penalty.

### The Act that inserted Division 4A
The historical note to LEPRA’s Part 5, Division 4A reads “Ins 2022 No 47, Sch 1[5]” (https://legislation.nsw.gov.au/view/whole/html/inforce/current/act-2002-103) — that is, it was inserted by the 2022 amending Act (2022 No 47). See how this compares with the Commonwealth’s s.3LA order (https://phoneseized.com/australia/assistance-orders-3la), Queensland’s device information orders (https://phoneseized.com/australia/qld-device-information-orders), Victoria’s s.465AA orders (https://phoneseized.com/australia/vic-assistance-orders-465aa), and when you must give police the code (https://phoneseized.com/compare/must-i-give-the-code) generally.

### You must
- A specified person for a digital evidence access order must not, without reasonable excuse, fail to comply with a direction given, in accordance with the order, by the executing officer for the order — maximum penalty 100 penalty units or imprisonment for 5 years, or both.
  Source: Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW), s.76AO(1) — failure to comply, offence and maximum penalty — https://legislation.nsw.gov.au/view/whole/html/inforce/current/act-2002-103

### What they can do
- The executing officer for a digital evidence access order may direct the specified person to give the officer any information or assistance reasonable and necessary to enable the officer to access data held in or accessible from a computer specified in, or within the scope of, the order.
  Source: Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW), s.76AM(1) — effect of a digital evidence access order — https://legislation.nsw.gov.au/view/whole/html/inforce/current/act-2002-103

### Limits on them
- A digital evidence access order reaches a computer specified in the order, or within the scope of the order — the direction power in s.76AM(1) is framed around that computer.
  Source: Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW), s.76AM(1) — effect of a digital evidence access order — https://legislation.nsw.gov.au/view/whole/html/inforce/current/act-2002-103
- The s.76AO prohibition on failing to comply with a direction applies to a failure that is without reasonable excuse, but s.76AO(2) says that, without limiting subsection (1), it is not a reasonable excuse for a specified person for a digital evidence access order to fail to comply with the order or a requirement made in accordance with the order on the ground that complying with the order or the requirement would tend to incriminate the person or otherwise expose the person to a penalty.
  Source: Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW), s.76AO(1)–(2) — failure to comply, and self-incrimination is not a reasonable excuse — https://legislation.nsw.gov.au/view/whole/html/inforce/current/act-2002-103

### What the sources say
- The historical note to Part 5, Division 4A of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW) reads “Ins 2022 No 47, Sch 1[5]”.
  Source: Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW), Part 5 Division 4A — insertion historical note — https://legislation.nsw.gov.au/view/whole/html/inforce/current/act-2002-103

## Queensland device information orders under the PPRA
URL: https://phoneseized.com/australia/qld-device-information-orders
Jurisdictions: Australia
Last reviewed: 2026-10-04

### Queensland law
This page covers Queensland law — the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (PPRA) and the Criminal Code. The Commonwealth’s s.3LA order (https://phoneseized.com/australia/assistance-orders-3la) is a separate provision, covered on its own page.

### What an order can require
If the issuer is a magistrate or a judge, the issuer may, in a search warrant, order a specified person, in relation to a digital device at the place, to give a police officer access information for the device or any assistance necessary for the officer to gain access to device information from the device (https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/view/pdf/inforce/current/act-2000-005) (s.154(1)(b)). On the same condition, the issuer may order a specified person, in relation to a digital device at the place, to allow a police officer to use access information for the device to gain access to device information from the device (https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/view/pdf/inforce/current/act-2000-005) (s.154(1)(c)(i)). If the issuer of a search warrant is a magistrate or a judge, the issuer may also, in the search warrant, order that a specified person is required to do a thing mentioned in s.154(1)(b) or (c) in relation to a digital device seized and removed from the place, after the device has been removed. Separately, where s.154A applies, a magistrate or judge may, on a police officer’s application, make an order requiring a specified person to do a thing mentioned in s.154(1)(b) or (c) — a distinct order power from the one that can be included in the search warrant. The condition in s.154A(5) on making that order is set out under “How the separate order is made” below.

### The offence for contravening an order
A person who, without reasonable excuse, contravenes an order made under PPRA s.154(1) or (2), s.154A(2) or s.178A(1) commits a crime under s.205A of the Criminal Code (https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/view/pdf/inforce/current/act-1899-009), carrying a maximum penalty of 5 years imprisonment. Section 205A(1) also covers an order made under the Crime and Corruption Act 2001, section 88A(1) or (2) or 88B(2). The offence in s.205A is worded “without reasonable excuse” — the Code builds the qualification directly into it. Section 205A(2) of the Criminal Code (Qld) (https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/view/pdf/inforce/current/act-1899-009) says it is not a reasonable excuse to contravene the order on the basis that complying with the order might tend to incriminate the person or expose the person to a penalty.

### How the separate order is made
Section 154A(1) (https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/view/pdf/inforce/current/act-2000-005) says the section applies if a digital device is seized under a search warrant and removed from a place, and either the search warrant did not contain an order made under section 154(1) or (2), or the search warrant contained an order made under section 154(1) or (2) but further access information is required for a police officer to gain access to device information from the device that may be relevant evidence; or a digital device is otherwise lawfully seized under this Act, other than under section 176(1)(j), and removed from a place. The separate order under s.154A(2) is one that a magistrate or a judge may make on the application of a police officer. Section 154A(5) (https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/view/pdf/inforce/current/act-2000-005) says that a magistrate or a judge (the judicial officer) may make an order under subsection (2) only if, for a digital device seized under a search warrant issued by a magistrate or judge, the judicial officer is satisfied there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that device information from the digital device may be relevant evidence; or, otherwise, the judicial officer is satisfied there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that device information from the digital device may be evidence of a crime scene threshold offence, or of an offence against section 223, 227A or 227B of the Criminal Code. See how this compares with the Commonwealth’s s.3LA order (https://phoneseized.com/australia/assistance-orders-3la), New South Wales’ digital evidence access orders (https://phoneseized.com/australia/nsw-digital-evidence-access-orders), Victoria’s s.465AA orders (https://phoneseized.com/australia/vic-assistance-orders-465aa), and when you must give police the code (https://phoneseized.com/compare/must-i-give-the-code) generally.

### You must
- A person who, without reasonable excuse, contravenes an order made under PPRA s.154(1) or (2), s.154A(2) or s.178A(1) commits a crime under s.205A of the Criminal Code, carrying a maximum penalty of 5 years imprisonment.
  Source: Criminal Code (Qld), s.205A(1) — contravening a device information order, offence and penalty (current as at 1 June 2026) — https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/view/pdf/inforce/current/act-1899-009
- Section 205A(2) of the Criminal Code (Qld) says it is not a reasonable excuse to contravene the order on the basis that complying with the order might tend to incriminate the person or expose the person to a penalty.
  Source: Criminal Code (Qld), s.205A(1)–(2) — the offence, and self-incrimination as no reasonable excuse (current as at 1 June 2026) — https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/view/pdf/inforce/current/act-1899-009

### What they can do
- If the issuer is a magistrate or a judge, the issuer may, in a search warrant, order a specified person, in relation to a digital device at the place, to give a police officer access information for the device or any assistance necessary for the officer to gain access to device information from the device.
  Source: Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld), s.154(1)(b) — order to give a police officer access information (current as at 1 July 2026) — https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/view/pdf/inforce/current/act-2000-005
- If the issuer is a magistrate or a judge, the issuer may, in a search warrant, order a specified person, in relation to a digital device at the place, to allow a police officer to use access information for the device to gain access to device information from the device.
  Source: Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld), s.154(1)(c)(i) — order to allow a police officer to use access information (current as at 1 July 2026) — https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/view/pdf/inforce/current/act-2000-005
- If the issuer of a search warrant is a magistrate or a judge, the issuer may also, in the search warrant, order that a specified person is required to do a thing mentioned in s.154(1)(b) or (c) in relation to a digital device seized and removed from the place, after the device has been removed.
  This order is made in the search warrant itself.
  Source: Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld), s.154(2) — order extending to a device after removal (current as at 1 July 2026) — https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/view/pdf/inforce/current/act-2000-005
- On the application of a police officer, a magistrate or a judge may make an order requiring a specified person to do a thing mentioned in s.154(1)(b) or (c).
  This is a distinct order power from the one a magistrate or judge can include in the search warrant.
  Source: Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld), s.154A(2) — post-seizure order (current as at 1 July 2026) — https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/view/pdf/inforce/current/act-2000-005

### Limits on them
- A separate order under s.154A(2) is made on the application of a police officer.
  Source: Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld), s.154A(2) — post-seizure order (current as at 1 July 2026) — https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/view/pdf/inforce/current/act-2000-005
- Section 154A applies if a digital device is seized under a search warrant and removed from a place, and either the search warrant did not contain an order made under section 154(1) or (2), or the search warrant contained an order made under section 154(1) or (2) but further access information is required for a police officer to gain access to device information from the device that may be relevant evidence; or a digital device is otherwise lawfully seized under this Act, other than under section 176(1)(j), and removed from a place.
  Source: Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld), s.154A(1) — when the post-seizure order section applies (current as at 1 July 2026) — https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/view/pdf/inforce/current/act-2000-005
- A magistrate or a judge (the judicial officer) may make an order under s.154A(2) only if, for a digital device seized under a search warrant issued by a magistrate or judge, the judicial officer is satisfied there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that device information from the digital device may be relevant evidence; or, otherwise, the judicial officer is satisfied there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that device information from the digital device may be evidence of a crime scene threshold offence, or of an offence against section 223, 227A or 227B of the Criminal Code.
  Source: Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld), s.154A(5) — when a judicial officer may make a post-seizure order (current as at 1 July 2026) — https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/view/pdf/inforce/current/act-2000-005
- The Criminal Code offence of contravening a device information order applies to a contravention that is without reasonable excuse, but s.205A(2) says it is not a reasonable excuse to contravene the order on the basis that complying with the order might tend to incriminate the person or expose the person to a penalty.
  Source: Criminal Code (Qld), s.205A(1)–(2) — the offence, and self-incrimination as no reasonable excuse (current as at 1 June 2026) — https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/view/pdf/inforce/current/act-1899-009

## Victoria's s.465AA assistance orders
URL: https://phoneseized.com/australia/vic-assistance-orders-465aa
Jurisdictions: Australia
Last reviewed: 2026-10-02

### Victorian law
This page covers Victoria — the Crimes Act 1958. The Commonwealth’s s.3LA order (https://phoneseized.com/australia/assistance-orders-3la) is a separate provision, covered on its own page.

### What a s.465AA order requires
The Magistrates’ Court may, on the application of a police officer of or above the rank of senior sergeant, make an order under s.465AA requiring a specified person to provide any information or assistance that is reasonable and necessary to allow a police officer to do one or more of the things specified in subsection (3). Under s.465AA(9) (https://content.legislation.vic.gov.au/sites/default/files/2026-10/58-6231aa323-authorised.pdf), a person commits an offence if the person has relevant knowledge of the computer or data storage device or a computer network of which the computer or data storage device forms or formed a part, or of measures applied to protect data held in, or accessible from, the computer or data storage device; the person is informed by a police officer of the order made under this section and of its terms, and that it is an indictable offence punishable by imprisonment to fail to comply with the order; and the person fails to comply with the order without reasonable excuse. Section 465AA(6) (https://content.legislation.vic.gov.au/sites/default/files/2026-10/58-6231aa323-authorised.pdf) says a person is not excused from complying with an order on the ground that complying with it may result in information being provided that might incriminate the person.

### The limits on the order
Section 465AA(1) says the section applies if a magistrate has issued a warrant under section 465 in relation to warrant premises. The court may make the order on the application of a police officer of or above the rank of senior sergeant. Under s.465AA(9)(a) and (b), the offence applies to a person who has relevant knowledge of the computer or data storage device or a computer network of which it forms or formed a part, or of measures applied to protect data held in, or accessible from, it, and who is informed by a police officer of the order and its terms and that it is an indictable offence punishable by imprisonment to fail to comply with the order.

### The penalty
A person who commits an offence against s.465AA(9) is liable to level 6 imprisonment (5 years maximum). See how this compares with the Commonwealth’s s.3LA order (https://phoneseized.com/australia/assistance-orders-3la), New South Wales’ digital evidence access orders (https://phoneseized.com/australia/nsw-digital-evidence-access-orders), Queensland’s device information orders (https://phoneseized.com/australia/qld-device-information-orders), and when you must give police the code (https://phoneseized.com/compare/must-i-give-the-code) generally.

### You must
- A person commits an offence if the person has relevant knowledge of the computer or data storage device or a computer network of which the computer or data storage device forms or formed a part, or of measures applied to protect data held in, or accessible from, the computer or data storage device; the person is informed by a police officer of the order made under s.465AA and of its terms, and that it is an indictable offence punishable by imprisonment to fail to comply with the order; and the person fails to comply with the order without reasonable excuse.
  Source: Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), s.465AA(9) — offence, Authorised Version No. 323 — https://content.legislation.vic.gov.au/sites/default/files/2026-10/58-6231aa323-authorised.pdf
- Section 465AA(6) says a person is not excused from complying with an order on the ground that complying with it may result in information being provided that might incriminate the person.
  Source: Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), s.465AA(6) and (9)(c) — self-incrimination is no ground for non-compliance; the offence, Authorised Version No. 323 — https://content.legislation.vic.gov.au/sites/default/files/2026-10/58-6231aa323-authorised.pdf
- A person who commits an offence against s.465AA(9) is liable to level 6 imprisonment (5 years maximum).
  Source: Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), s.465AA(10) — penalty, Authorised Version No. 323 — https://content.legislation.vic.gov.au/sites/default/files/2026-10/58-6231aa323-authorised.pdf

### What they can do
- The Magistrates’ Court may, on the application of a police officer of or above the rank of senior sergeant, make an order requiring a specified person to provide any information or assistance that is reasonable and necessary to allow a police officer to do one or more of the things specified in s.465AA(3).
  Source: Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), s.465AA(2) — order on application of a senior sergeant or above, Authorised Version No. 323 — https://content.legislation.vic.gov.au/sites/default/files/2026-10/58-6231aa323-authorised.pdf

### Limits on them
- Section 465AA applies if a magistrate has issued a warrant under section 465 in relation to warrant premises.
  Source: Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), s.465AA(1) — application, Authorised Version No. 323 — https://content.legislation.vic.gov.au/sites/default/files/2026-10/58-6231aa323-authorised.pdf
- The s.465AA(9) offence applies to a person who has relevant knowledge of the computer or data storage device or a computer network of which the computer or data storage device forms or formed a part, or of measures applied to protect data held in, or accessible from, the computer or data storage device, and who is informed by a police officer of the order made under s.465AA and of its terms, and that it is an indictable offence punishable by imprisonment to fail to comply with the order.
  Source: Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), s.465AA(9) — offence, Authorised Version No. 323 — https://content.legislation.vic.gov.au/sites/default/files/2026-10/58-6231aa323-authorised.pdf

## Identify and Disrupt Act 2021 and related provisions, quoted
URL: https://phoneseized.com/australia/identify-and-disrupt-2021
Jurisdictions: Australia
Last reviewed: 2026-10-04

### What this page covers
This page is about the Surveillance Legislation Amendment (Identify and Disrupt) Act 2021 (Cth), a warrant defined in the Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth), and sunset provisions in that Act and in the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). The provisions quoted below — a commencement provision, a definition and sunset provisions — do not themselves mention a passcode or a person’s own phone. For the provisions this site does quote on unlocking a phone, see the Border Force (https://phoneseized.com/australia/border-abf) and s.3LA order (https://phoneseized.com/australia/assistance-orders-3la) pages.

### A commencement provision and a definition
The Act’s commencement table provides that sections 1 to 3 and anything in the Act not elsewhere covered by the table commence on the day the Act receives the Royal Assent, 3 September 2021 (https://www.legislation.gov.au/C2021A00098/asmade/2021-09-03/text/original/pdf). The Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (https://www.legislation.gov.au/C2004A01387/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf) defines “data disruption warrant” as “a warrant issued under section 27KC or subsection 35B(2) or (3)”. That definition identifies the warrant only by the sections it is issued under; it does not on its own say what the warrant authorises.

### Sunset provisions
Section 27KAA of the Surveillance Devices Act 2004, headed “Sunsetting” and in the Division headed “Data disruption warrants”, provides that “This Division is repealed at the end of 4 September 2029” (https://www.legislation.gov.au/C2004A01387/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf). Other sections headed “Sunsetting” carry the same sentence, among them s.27KKA of the Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (https://www.legislation.gov.au/C2004A01387/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf), in the Division headed “Network activity warrants”, and s.3ZZUMA of the Crimes Act 1914 (https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1), in the Division headed “Account takeover warrants”, and s.3ZZUWA of the Crimes Act 1914 (https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1), in the Division headed “Emergency authorisations”, each of which reads “This Division is repealed at the end of 4 September 2029”.

### Where to look instead
If you are trying to work out what a police officer or Border Force officer can actually require of you and your phone, this page is not the one that answers that. See Border Force examination and the passcode question (https://phoneseized.com/australia/border-abf), the Commonwealth s.3LA order (https://phoneseized.com/australia/assistance-orders-3la), and the state pages for New South Wales (https://phoneseized.com/australia/nsw-digital-evidence-access-orders), Queensland (https://phoneseized.com/australia/qld-device-information-orders) and Victoria (https://phoneseized.com/australia/vic-assistance-orders-465aa) — or the cross-country comparison of when you must give police the code (https://phoneseized.com/compare/must-i-give-the-code).

### What the sources say
- The commencement table in s.2 of the Surveillance Legislation Amendment (Identify and Disrupt) Act 2021 (Cth), as made, lists “Sections 1 to 3 and anything in this Act not elsewhere covered by this table” against “The day this Act receives the Royal Assent”, 3 September 2021.
  Source: Surveillance Legislation Amendment (Identify and Disrupt) Act 2021 (Cth), s.2 commencement table, item 1 (as made) — https://www.legislation.gov.au/C2021A00098/asmade/2021-09-03/text/original/pdf
- Section 6(1) of the Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth) says that “data disruption warrant” means a warrant issued under section 27KC or subsection 35B(2) or (3).
  Source: Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth), s.6(1) — definition of "data disruption warrant" (Compilation No. 62, 27 Aug 2026) — https://www.legislation.gov.au/C2004A01387/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf
- Section 27KAA, in the Division headed “Data disruption warrants” in the Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth), says: “This Division is repealed at the end of 4 September 2029.”
  Source: Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth), s.27KAA — sunsetting of the data disruption warrant Division (Compilation No. 62, 27 Aug 2026) — https://www.legislation.gov.au/C2004A01387/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf
- Section 27KKA, in the Division headed “Network activity warrants” in the Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth), says: “This Division is repealed at the end of 4 September 2029.”
  Source: Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth), s.27KKA — sunsetting of the network activity warrant Division (Compilation No. 62, 27 Aug 2026) — https://www.legislation.gov.au/C2004A01387/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf
- Section 3ZZUMA, in the Division headed “Account takeover warrants” in the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), says: “This Division is repealed at the end of 4 September 2029.”
  Source: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3ZZUMA — sunsetting of the account takeover warrant Division (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026) — https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1
- Section 3ZZUWA, in the Division headed “Emergency authorisations” in the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), says: “This Division is repealed at the end of 4 September 2029.”
  Source: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3ZZUWA — sunsetting of the emergency authorisation Division (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026) — https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1

## Commonwealth warrants: moved for examination, and return
URL: https://phoneseized.com/australia/moved-for-examination-and-return
Jurisdictions: Australia
Last reviewed: 2026-10-04

### Two different things: seized and moved
This page is about Commonwealth law — the Crimes Act 1914 — not state law. The state schemes covered on this site are separate statutes: New South Wales (https://phoneseized.com/australia/nsw-digital-evidence-access-orders), Queensland (https://phoneseized.com/australia/qld-device-information-orders) and Victoria (https://phoneseized.com/australia/vic-assistance-orders-465aa). Under s.3F(1) (https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1), a warrant that is in force in relation to premises authorises the executing officer or a constable assisting to search the premises for the kinds of evidential material specified in the warrant, and to seize things of that kind found at the premises. The provision also authorises the executing officer or a constable assisting to seize other things found at the premises in the course of the search that they believe on reasonable grounds to be evidential material in relation to an offence to which the warrant relates, evidential material in relation to another offence that is an indictable offence, or evidential material (within the meaning of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002) or tainted property (within the meaning of that Act), if they believe on reasonable grounds that seizure of the things is necessary to prevent their concealment, loss or destruction or their use in committing an offence; and to seize other things found at the premises in the course of the search that they believe on reasonable grounds to be seizable items. Separately, s.3K(2) (https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1) says that a thing found at warrant premises, or a thing found during a search under a warrant that is in force in relation to a person, may be moved to another place for examination or processing in order to determine whether the thing may be seized under a warrant, or the thing suggests the existence of a digital asset that may be seized under a warrant. That applies if both of two things are true: it is significantly more practicable to do so, having regard to the timeliness and cost of examining or processing the thing at another place and the availability of expert assistance, and the executing officer or constable assisting suspects on reasonable grounds that the thing contains or constitutes evidential material or suggests the existence of such a digital asset. It also applies, as alternatives, if for a thing found at warrant premises the occupier of the premises consents in writing, or for a thing found during a search under a warrant in force in relation to a person the person consents in writing.

### The 30- and 14-day periods apply to a thing moved, and can be extended
Section 3K(3A) (https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1) says that the thing “may be moved to another place for examination or processing for no longer than whichever of the following is applicable”: 30 days if the thing is a computer or data storage device, and otherwise 14 days. That is the period for a thing moved under s.3K(2); the provision quoted does not state a period for a thing seized. None of the provisions quoted on this page states a statutory time limit on how long a seized thing may be kept. That period can be extended. Section 3K(3B) (https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1) says an executing officer may apply to an issuing officer for “one or more extensions” of that time if the executing officer believes on reasonable grounds that the thing cannot be examined or processed within the time applicable under subsection (3A) or that time as previously extended. The executing officer must give notice of the application to the person referred to in paragraph (2)(b) or (c) (as the case requires), and that person is entitled to be heard in relation to the application. A single extension cannot exceed 14 days if the thing is a computer or data storage device, and otherwise 7 days. The text quoted here limits each extension but states no cap on how many extensions there may be.

### Being told, and being there
Section 3K(3) (https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1) says that if a thing is moved to another place for the purpose of examination or processing under subsection (2), the executing officer must, if it is practicable to do so, inform the person referred to in paragraph (2)(b) or (c) (as the case requires) of the address of the place and the time at which the examination or processing will be carried out, and allow that person or his or her representative to be present during the examination or processing. The executing officer need not comply with paragraph (3)(a) or (b) if he or she believes on reasonable grounds that to do so might endanger the safety of a person or prejudice an investigation or prosecution. The person referred to is the one named in the consent limbs of s.3K(2) (https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1), quoted above: the occupier of the premises (for a thing found at warrant premises) or the person (for a thing found during a search under a warrant that is in force in relation to a person).

### What officers may do with the device meanwhile
Section 3ZQV (https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1) applies to electronic equipment “seized under this Part or moved under section 3K”. The electronic equipment may be operated at any location after it has been seized or moved, for the purpose of determining whether data that is evidential material, or whether data that suggests the existence of a digital asset that may be seized under a warrant, is held on or accessible from the electronic equipment, and obtaining access to such data. That data includes, but is not limited to, data held on the equipment, including data held on it when operated under the section that was not held on it at the time it was seized, and data not held on the equipment but accessible by using it, including data that was not accessible at the time the equipment was seized. See also what lives in the cloud and with your carrier (https://phoneseized.com/on-your-phone/cloud-and-carrier). If the electronic equipment was seized under a warrant, subsection (2) does not apply to data that was generated after the expiry of the warrant. Subsection (4) says that if the electronic equipment was seized under a warrant or moved under section 3K, it may be operated before or after the expiry of the warrant. Section 3ZQV(5) says the section does not limit the operation of other provisions of this Part that relate to dealing with items seized under this Part or moved under section 3K; its Note says that, for example, the section does not affect the operation of the time limits in section 3K on examination or processing of a thing moved under that section. A computer or data storage device that “has been moved under subsection 3K(2) and is at a place for examination or processing” is also within s.3LA(1) (https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1), under which a constable may apply to a magistrate for an order requiring a specified person to provide the information or assistance that is reasonable and necessary to allow a constable to access data held in, or accessible from, it. The offences for not complying with such an order are set out on the s.3LA page (https://phoneseized.com/australia/assistance-orders-3la).

### When a seized thing must come back
Section 3ZQX(1) (https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1) says that if the Commissioner (defined in s.3(1) (https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1), unless the contrary intention appears, as the Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police) is satisfied that a thing seized under Division 2 or 4 is not required (or is no longer required) for a purpose mentioned in section 3ZQU or for other judicial or administrative review proceedings, the Commissioner must take reasonable steps to return the thing to the person from whom it was seized or to the owner if that person is not entitled to possess it. The Commissioner does not have to take those steps if the thing may be retained because of an order under subsection 3ZQZB(3), or any other order under that subsection has been made in relation to the thing; or the Commissioner has applied for such an order and the application has not been determined; or the thing may otherwise be retained, destroyed or disposed of under a law, or an order of a court or tribunal, of the Commonwealth or of a State or a Territory; or the thing is forfeited or forfeitable to the Commonwealth or is the subject of a dispute as to ownership. That provision is worded as a duty on the Commissioner. The text quoted here states no time by which the return must happen. The provisions quoted on this page do not include one under which the owner applies for the return of a thing seized under Division 2 or 4. Under s.3ZQZB(1) (https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1), a magistrate may, on application by the Commissioner, make an order under subsection (2) or (3) in relation to a thing seized or a document produced under this Part. Under s.3ZQZB(3) and (4) (https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1), the magistrate may order that a thing be retained for the period specified in the order, be forfeited to the Commonwealth, be sold, or be destroyed or otherwise disposed of, if satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that, if it is returned to the owner or to the person from whom it was seized, it is likely to be used by that person or another person in the commission of a terrorist act, a terrorism offence or a serious offence. Under s.3ZQZB(5) (https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1), the magistrate must order that a thing be returned if the magistrate is not satisfied as mentioned in subsection (2) or (3). Under s.3ZQZB(6) and (7) (https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1), before making an application the Commissioner must take reasonable steps to discover who has an interest in the thing or document and, if it is practicable to do so, notify each person who the Commissioner believes to have such an interest of the proposed application; the magistrate must allow a person who has an interest in the thing or document to appear and be heard in determining the application. The 14-day figure on the Border Force page (https://phoneseized.com/australia/border-abf) is a different thing: it is the ABF’s description of its own policy (https://www.aph.gov.au/api/qon/downloadattachment?attachmentId=bd0902f9-1209-49d9-9c86-b6858c22020d), given in a written answer to a Senate committee, and not a figure from the Crimes Act provisions on this page. See also the cross-country comparisons of how long a device is kept (https://phoneseized.com/compare/how-long-kept) and of getting it back or having it deleted (https://phoneseized.com/compare/get-it-back-or-deleted).

### What they can do
- Under s.3F(1) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), a warrant that is in force in relation to premises authorises the executing officer or a constable assisting to search the premises for the kinds of evidential material specified in the warrant, and to seize things of that kind found at the premises; to seize other things found at the premises in the course of the search that the executing officer or a constable assisting believes on reasonable grounds to be evidential material in relation to an offence to which the warrant relates, evidential material in relation to another offence that is an indictable offence, or evidential material (within the meaning of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002) or tainted property (within the meaning of that Act), if the executing officer or a constable assisting believes on reasonable grounds that seizure of the things is necessary to prevent their concealment, loss or destruction or their use in committing an offence; and to seize other things found at the premises in the course of the search that the executing officer or a constable assisting believes on reasonable grounds to be seizable items.
  Source: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3F(1)(c)–(e) — search and seizure under a warrant in relation to premises (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026) — https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1
- Under s.3K(2), a thing found at warrant premises, or a thing found during a search under a warrant that is in force in relation to a person, may be moved to another place for examination or processing in order to determine whether the thing may be seized under a warrant, or the thing suggests the existence of a digital asset that may be seized under a warrant, if both of these apply — it is significantly more practicable to do so having regard to the timeliness and cost of examining or processing the thing at another place and the availability of expert assistance, and the executing officer or constable assisting suspects on reasonable grounds that the thing contains or constitutes evidential material or the thing suggests the existence of a digital asset that may be seized under a warrant; or, for a thing found at warrant premises, the occupier of the premises consents in writing; or, for a thing found during a search under a warrant that is in force in relation to a person, the person consents in writing.
  Source: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3K(2) — power to move a thing to another place for examination or processing (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026) — https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1
- Section 3ZQV applies to electronic equipment “seized under this Part or moved under section 3K”: the electronic equipment may be operated at any location after it has been seized or moved, for the purpose of determining whether data that is evidential material, or whether data that suggests the existence of a digital asset that may be seized under a warrant, is held on or accessible from the electronic equipment, and obtaining access to such data. That data includes, but is not limited to, data held on the electronic equipment, including data held on it when operated under the section that was not held on it at the time it was seized, and data not held on the electronic equipment but accessible by using it, including data that was not accessible at the time the electronic equipment was seized.
  Source: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3ZQV(1)–(5) — operating seized electronic equipment (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026) — https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1
- Under s.3ZQV(4), if the electronic equipment was seized under a warrant or moved under section 3K, the electronic equipment may be operated before or after the expiry of the warrant. Section 3ZQV(5) says the section does not limit the operation of other provisions of this Part that relate to dealing with items seized under this Part or moved under section 3K; its Note says that, for example, the section does not affect the operation of the time limits in section 3K on examination or processing of a thing moved under that section.
  Source: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3ZQV(1)–(5) — operating seized electronic equipment (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026) — https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1
- Under s.3K(3B), an executing officer may apply to an issuing officer for one or more extensions of the s.3K(3A) time if the executing officer believes on reasonable grounds that the thing cannot be examined or processed within the time applicable under subsection (3A) or that time as previously extended.
  Source: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3K(3B)–(3D) — extensions of the examination time limit (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026) — https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1
- Under s.3ZQZB(1), a magistrate may, on application by the Commissioner, make an order under subsection (2) or (3) in relation to a thing seized or a document produced under this Part.
  Source: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3ZQZB(1) — orders a magistrate may make on application by the Commissioner (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026) — https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1
- Under s.3ZQZB(3) and (4), the magistrate may make any of the orders in subsection (4) if satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that, if a thing seized or document produced under this Part is returned to the owner of the thing or document, to the person from whom the thing was seized, or to the person who produced the document, it is likely to be used by that person or another person in the commission of a terrorist act, a terrorism offence or a serious offence. The orders are: that the thing or document may be retained for the period specified in the order; that it is forfeited to the Commonwealth; for a thing that is not a document, that the thing be sold and the proceeds given to the owner, or sold in some other way; or that the thing or document is to be destroyed or otherwise disposed of.
  Source: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3ZQZB(3)–(4) — magistrate may order a thing seized to be retained, forfeited, sold or destroyed (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026) — https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1

### Limits on them
- Under s.3K(3A), a thing moved under s.3K(2) may be moved to another place for examination or processing for no longer than whichever of the following is applicable: 30 days if the thing is a computer or data storage device, and otherwise 14 days.
  This is the period for a thing moved under s.3K(2); the provision quoted does not state a period for a thing seized. Read with the next item: s.3K(3B) provides for one or more extensions of this time.
  Source: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3K(3A) — time limit on moving a thing for examination or processing (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026) — https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1
- The executing officer must give notice of an application for an extension to the person referred to in paragraph (2)(b) or (c) of s.3K (as the case requires), and that person is entitled to be heard in relation to the application. A single extension cannot exceed 14 days if the thing is a computer or data storage device, and otherwise 7 days. The text quoted here states no cap on the number of extensions.
  Source: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3K(3B)–(3D) — extensions of the examination time limit (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026) — https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1
- If a thing is moved to another place for the purpose of examination or processing under s.3K(2), the executing officer must, if it is practicable to do so, inform the person referred to in paragraph (2)(b) or (c) (as the case requires) of the address of the place and the time at which the examination or processing will be carried out, and allow that person or his or her representative to be present during the examination or processing; the executing officer need not comply if he or she believes on reasonable grounds that to do so might endanger the safety of a person or prejudice an investigation or prosecution.
  Source: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3K(3)–(3AA) — notice and presence when a thing is moved for examination, and when that need not be done (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026) — https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1
- Under s.3ZQV(3A), if the electronic equipment was seized under a warrant, subsection (2) does not apply to data that was generated after the expiry of the warrant.
  Source: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3ZQV(1)–(5) — operating seized electronic equipment (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026) — https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1
- Under s.3ZQX(1), if the Commissioner is satisfied that a thing seized under Division 2 or 4 is not required (or is no longer required) for a purpose mentioned in section 3ZQU or for other judicial or administrative review proceedings, the Commissioner must take reasonable steps to return the thing to the person from whom it was seized or to the owner if that person is not entitled to possess it. Under s.3ZQX(2), the Commissioner does not have to take those steps if the thing may be retained because of an order under subsection 3ZQZB(3), or any other order under that subsection has been made in relation to the thing; or the Commissioner has applied for such an order and the application has not been determined; or the thing may otherwise be retained, destroyed or disposed of under a law, or an order of a court or tribunal, of the Commonwealth or of a State or a Territory; or the thing is forfeited or forfeitable to the Commonwealth or is the subject of a dispute as to ownership.
  Source: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3ZQX(1)–(2) — return of a thing seized under Division 2 or 4, and when return is not required (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026) — https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1
- Under s.3ZQZB(5), the magistrate must order that a thing or document be returned if the magistrate is not satisfied as mentioned in subsection (2) or (3): in the case of a thing, to the person from whom the thing was seized; in the case of a document, to the person who produced the document; or, if that person is not entitled to possess the thing or document, to the owner of the thing or document.
  Source: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3ZQZB(5) — magistrate must order return if not satisfied as to retention (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026) — https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1
- Under s.3ZQZB(6) and (7), before making an application the Commissioner must take reasonable steps to discover who has an interest in the thing or document and, if it is practicable to do so, notify each person who the Commissioner believes to have such an interest of the proposed application; the magistrate must allow a person who has an interest in the thing or document to appear and be heard in determining the application.
  Source: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3ZQZB(6)–(7) — notice to persons with an interest, and the right to appear and be heard (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026) — https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1

### What the sources say
- Section 3(1) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) says that in that Act, unless the contrary intention appears, “Commissioner means the Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police.”
  Source: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3(1) — definition of “Commissioner” (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026) — https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1

## Do police need a warrant to search my phone?
URL: https://phoneseized.com/usa/riley-warrant
Jurisdictions: United States
Last reviewed: 2026-10-02

### Federal law — and where it doesn’t reach
This page describes federal constitutional law under the Fourth Amendment, as the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted it in Riley v. California (2014). Related questions that Riley’s rule does not itself answer — such as compelled unlocking and border searches — are covered on the sibling pages instead of being folded into this one.

### The rule Riley set
The Supreme Court’s own words on what has to happen before police search a cell phone taken from someone they arrest: what police “must do before searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest is accordingly simple—get a warrant.” The Court said that “Cell phones differ in both a quantitative and a qualitative sense from other objects that might be kept on an arrestee’s person.” (https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/13-132) It also said: “With all they contain and all they may reveal, they hold for many Americans ‘the privacies of life’ (https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/13-132)”.

### The exception Riley didn’t erase
The Court said that “other case-specific exceptions may still justify a warrantless search of a particular phone” (https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/13-132). It referred to “the exigencies of the situation” that “make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment,” and said that “unlike the search incident to arrest exception, the exigent circumstances exception requires a court to examine whether an emergency justified a warrantless search in each particular case.”

### What a valid warrant has to say
The Fourth Amendment says that no warrants shall issue “but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized (https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/fourth_amendment).” Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(e)(2)(A) says that, “[e]xcept for a tracking-device warrant, the warrant must identify the person or property to be searched, identify any person or property to be seized, and designate the magistrate judge to whom it must be returned.” (https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcrmp/rule_41) Rule 41(e)(2)(B) says that “A warrant under Rule 41(e)(2)(A) may authorize the seizure of electronic storage media or the seizure or copying of electronically stored information. Unless otherwise specified, the warrant authorizes a later review of the media or information consistent with the warrant.” (https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcrmp/rule_41)

### Location history is a different question
Riley is about searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest. Carpenter v. United States (2018) concerned cell-site location information (CSLI). In a footnote, the Court wrote: “It is sufficient for our purposes today to hold that accessing seven days of CSLI constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.” (https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/16-402) The opinion also said: “Our decision today is a narrow one. We do not express a view on matters not before us: real-time CSLI or ‘tower dumps’ (a download of information on all the devices that connected to a particular cell site during a particular interval).” (https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/16-402) Carrier and cloud-account data is covered on Cloud and carrier data (https://phoneseized.com/on-your-phone/cloud-and-carrier), not here.

### Read the opinions
Both rulings are worth reading in full rather than taking a summary’s word for it: Riley v. California (https://policecensus.com/law/cases/riley-v-california) and Carpenter v. United States (https://policecensus.com/law/cases/carpenter-v-us).

### What they can do
- Riley says that “other case-specific exceptions may still justify a warrantless search of a particular phone”, referring to “the exigencies of the situation” that “make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment”.
  Unlike the search-incident-to-arrest exception, the exigent circumstances exception requires a court to examine whether an emergency justified a warrantless search in each particular case.
  Source: Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014) — https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/13-132
- Rule 41(e)(2)(B) says that a warrant under Rule 41(e)(2)(A) may authorize the seizure of electronic storage media or the seizure or copying of electronically stored information, and that, unless otherwise specified, the warrant authorizes a later review of the media or information consistent with the warrant.
  Source: Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e)(2)(B) — https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcrmp/rule_41

### Limits on them
- Riley says that what police must do before searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest is “get a warrant”.
  Source: Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014) — https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/13-132
- The Fourth Amendment says that no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
  Source: U.S. Constitution, Fourth Amendment — https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/fourth_amendment
- Rule 41(e)(2)(A) says that, except for a tracking-device warrant, the warrant must identify the person or property to be searched, identify any person or property to be seized, and designate the magistrate judge to whom it must be returned.
  Source: Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e)(2)(A) — https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcrmp/rule_41

## Thumb unlocks: what two federal appeals courts held
URL: https://phoneseized.com/usa/passcode-vs-biometrics
Jurisdictions: United States
Last reviewed: 2026-10-06

### Two appeals courts, two thumb unlocks
This page describes what two federal courts of appeals held about compelled phone unlocks under the Fifth Amendment, which says no person shall “be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” Both holdings below concern a thumb used to unlock a phone. Rulings of state supreme courts on compelled passcodes are on Compelled passcodes: state supreme court rulings, by state (https://phoneseized.com/usa/state-passcode-rulings).

### What the Ninth Circuit held in Payne, and its own limit
In United States v. Payne (9th Cir., decided Apr. 17, 2024), the court held “that the compelled use of Payne’s thumb to unlock his phone (which he had already identified for the officers) required no cognitive exertion, placing it firmly in the same category as a blood draw or fingerprint taken at booking,” and that “the use of Payne’s thumb to unlock his phone was not a testimonial act and the Fifth Amendment does not apply.” The court then limited its own ruling: “Fifth Amendment questions like this one are highly fact dependent and the line between what is testimonial and what is not is particularly fine. Our opinion should not be read to extend to all instances where a biometric is used to unlock an electronic device.” It added that “the outcome on the testimonial prong may have been different had Officer Coddington required Payne to independently select the finger that he placed on the phone,” and said of such possibilities: “We mention these possibilities not to opine on the right result”. The opinion’s text describes what the officer did this way: “Officer Coddington forcibly grabbed Payne’s thumb and used it to unlock the phone via a built-in biometric unlocking feature. (https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2024/04/17/22-50262.pdf)” A footnote in the same opinion qualifies that account; it is quoted under “What Brown says about Payne” below. The Supreme Court’s docket for Payne v. United States (https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/24-5871.html), No. 24-5871, records “Petition DENIED” on Nov. 25, 2024. That is a docket entry; this page does not describe it as more than that.

### What the D.C. Circuit held in Brown, and on what facts
In United States v. Brown (D.C. Cir., decided Jan. 17, 2025), the court described the unlock this way: “the record reveals that an FBI agent ordered Schwartz to open the cellphone, and Schwartz complied by placing his thumb on the cellphone.” Its holding: “we hold that, in compelling Schwartz to unlock his cellphone, law enforcement violated the Fifth Amendment.”

### What Brown says about Payne
A footnote in Brown (https://media.cadc.uscourts.gov/opinions/docs/2025/01/23-3074-2094718.pdf) says: “This holding is consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Payne.” It explains: “In that case, instead of instructing the defendant to open his phone, as the FBI instructed Schwartz to do,” the police “forcibly grabbed Payne’s thumb and used it to unlock the phone.” It then quotes Payne’s statement that “the outcome on the testimonial prong may have been different” had the officer “required Payne to independently select the finger that he placed on the phone,” and adds: “That is this case.” Payne’s opinion says Officer Coddington “forcibly grabbed Payne’s thumb and used it to unlock the phone”; but a footnote in Payne (https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2024/04/17/22-50262.pdf) says that whether he did so or Payne “reluctantly unlocked the cell phone using his thumb print” “was disputed before the district court,” and that for the purposes of the appeal the government “accepted the defendant’s version of the facts, i.e., ‘that defendant’s thumbprint was compelled.’” In Brown, an FBI agent ordered Schwartz to open the cellphone, and he did so by placing his thumb on it. Payne itself says it mentioned its finger-selection possibility “not to opine on the right result”. This site does not describe the two decisions as conflicting: the later court says its holding is consistent with Payne.

### State supreme courts on passcodes
The holdings quoted above concern a thumb. The state supreme court rulings below concern a passcode, and each is a ruling of one state’s court about the act that was before it. Some are quoted here; the rest are on Compelled passcodes: state supreme court rulings, by state (https://phoneseized.com/usa/state-passcode-rulings). In Utah, in State v. Valdez (2023), the Supreme Court of Utah wrote: “We hold that verbally providing a cell phone passcode to law enforcement is testimonial for Fifth Amendment purposes.” It described the act before it this way: “Here, law enforcement asked Valdez to verbally provide his passcode. (http://www.utcourts.gov/opinions/supopin/State%20v.%20Valdez20231214.pdf)” In New Jersey, in State v. Andrews (2020), the Supreme Court of New Jersey wrote that the appeal presented the question “whether a court order requiring a criminal defendant to disclose the passcodes to his passcode-protected cellphones violates the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution or New Jersey’s common law or statutory protections against self-incrimination,” and then wrote: “We conclude that it does not and affirm the Appellate Division’s judgment.”

### A statement in Brown about a situation that case did not involve
Brown (https://media.cadc.uscourts.gov/opinions/docs/2025/01/23-3074-2094718.pdf) said that if Schwartz had instead been compelled “to verbally disclose the password, those answers unquestionably would be testimonial communications” — a statement about a situation that case did not involve.

### Choosing an unlock method
These opinions do not say which unlock method to choose, and this page does not either. What the vendors say is narrower and purely technical: Apple’s own documentation describes the key for its Complete Protection data class as discarded shortly after the user locks the device (https://support.apple.com/guide/security/data-protection-classes-secb010e978a/web), with that data inaccessible “until the user enters the passcode again or unlocks (logs in to) the device using Optic ID, Face ID, or Touch ID”. GrapheneOS’s features page (https://grapheneos.org/features) says of one feature that it “allows users to make use of diceware passwords if they don't want to depend on the security of the secure element”. Neither vendor statement is about the Fifth Amendment; they describe what the device does, not what a court will hold. For the device-side steps, see Passcode and software updates (https://phoneseized.com/protect/passcode-and-updates).

### What they can do
- In United States v. Payne, the Ninth Circuit held that the compelled use of Payne’s thumb to unlock his phone (which he had already identified for the officers) was not a testimonial act and that the Fifth Amendment does not apply.
  The Ninth Circuit’s own caveat on this holding: “Our opinion should not be read to extend to all instances where a biometric is used to unlock an electronic device.”
  Source: United States v. Payne, 99 F.4th 495 (9th Cir. 2024) — https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2024/04/17/22-50262.pdf
- Caveat on the Payne holding: the Ninth Circuit said the outcome on the testimonial prong may have been different had the officer required Payne to independently select the finger that he placed on the phone, and said it mentioned such possibilities not to opine on the right result.
  Source: United States v. Payne, 99 F.4th 495 (9th Cir. 2024) — https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2024/04/17/22-50262.pdf

### Limits on them
- The Fifth Amendment says no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.
  Source: U.S. Constitution, Fifth Amendment — https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/fifth_amendment
- In United States v. Brown, the D.C. Circuit held that, in compelling Schwartz to unlock his cellphone, law enforcement violated the Fifth Amendment; the record reveals that an FBI agent ordered Schwartz to open the cellphone, and Schwartz complied by placing his thumb on the cellphone.
  Source: United States v. Brown, No. 23-3074 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 17, 2025) — https://media.cadc.uscourts.gov/opinions/docs/2025/01/23-3074-2094718.pdf

### What the sources say
- Caveat on the Payne facts: footnote 2 of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion says that whether Officer Coddington forcibly used Payne’s thumb to unlock the phone or Payne “reluctantly unlocked the cell phone using his thumb print” was disputed before the district court, and that for the purposes of the appeal the government accepted the defendant’s version of the facts, i.e., “that defendant’s thumbprint was compelled.”
  Source: United States v. Payne, 99 F.4th 495 (9th Cir. 2024), n.2 — https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2024/04/17/22-50262.pdf
- The Supreme Court of the United States docket for Payne v. United States, No. 24-5871, records “Petition DENIED” on 25 November 2024.
  A docket entry only; this page does not describe it as more than that.
  Source: Payne v. United States, No. 24-5871 (U.S.), docket entry: petition for certiorari denied Nov. 25, 2024 (United States v. Payne, 9th Cir. No. 22-50262, below) — https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/24-5871.html

## CBP and your phone at the U.S. border
URL: https://phoneseized.com/usa/border-cbp
Jurisdictions: United States
Last reviewed: 2026-10-06

### A policy, not a statute — and where courts have weighed in
This page describes CBP Directive No. 3340-049B, the agency’s own policy on searching electronic devices at ports of entry (effective 1 January 2026), plus federal circuit-court opinions on border searches of devices. The directive is CBP policy, not an act of Congress, and it says of itself that it “is an internal policy statement of CBP and does not create or confer any rights, privileges, or benefits on any person or party.” (https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/2026-01/cbp_directive_3340-049b_jan_2026_508.pdf) A Supreme Court docket entry is noted at the end. For how this compares with other countries this site covers, see At the border (https://phoneseized.com/compare/at-the-border); for what to do before you travel, see Before a border crossing (https://phoneseized.com/protect/before-a-border).

### Basic search vs. advanced search
Basic search The directive defines (https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/2026-01/cbp_directive_3340-049b_jan_2026_508.pdf) a basic search as any border search of a device that does not qualify as advanced — an officer reviewing or analyzing information already on the device. An officer may conduct a basic search “with or without suspicion, subject to the requirements and limitations provided herein and applicable law.” Advanced search The directive describes an advanced search as any search in which an officer connects equipment, wired or wireless, to copy and/or analyze the contents of an electronic device. The same definition (https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/2026-01/cbp_directive_3340-049b_jan_2026_508.pdf) says: “Use of external equipment (including a CBP standalone computer) merely to make the contents of the device available for inspection (including, for example, to bypass a password, overcome encryption, translate content, view files contained in an external drive or other electronic device lacking a screen, or charge a device) does not constitute an advanced search.” The directive says an officer “may perform an advanced search of an electronic device only in instances in which there is reasonable suspicion of activity in violation of the laws enforced or administered by CBP or, in the absence of individualized reasonable suspicion when there is a national security concern.” (https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/2026-01/cbp_directive_3340-049b_jan_2026_508.pdf) The next sentence reads: “All advanced searches require supervisory approval at the Grade 14 level or higher (or a manager with comparable responsibilities).” Where the inspecting officer and approving supervisor rely on the presence of a national security concern, without reasonable suspicion, to conduct an advanced search, the directive says “approval from the Director, Field Operations; Chief Patrol Agent; Director, Air Operations; Director, Marine Operations; Special Agent in Charge; or their delegate, is required prior to conducting the search.” (https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/2026-01/cbp_directive_3340-049b_jan_2026_508.pdf) It adds: “In compelling circumstances where operational considerations prevent prior approval, notification shall be made as soon as possible.”

### What you’re obligated to present
The directive states this plainly: “Travelers are obligated to present electronic devices and the information contained therein in a condition that allows inspection of the device and its contents.” That is what the directive says, and this page does not go beyond it — it does not tell you that you can decline, because the directive itself frames presenting the device as an obligation. If officers obtain a passcode or other means of access during a border inspection, the directive says it “will only be utilized to facilitate the inspection of devices and information subject to border search,” (https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/2026-01/cbp_directive_3340-049b_jan_2026_508.pdf) and “may not be utilized to access information that is only stored remotely.”

### If officers can’t get in
If a device is protected by a passcode or encryption and an officer cannot complete the inspection, the directive says the officer “may, in accordance with section 5.4 below, detain the device pending a determination as to its admissibility, exclusion, or other disposition.” (https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/2026-01/cbp_directive_3340-049b_jan_2026_508.pdf) That is what the directive says may follow when a device stays locked; this page does not advise testing it.

### What happens to a copy afterward
The directive says that “CBP may retain copies of information from an electronic device when, based on a review of the information encountered or on other facts and circumstances, they determine there is probable cause to believe the information contains digital contraband or evidence of a violation of law that CBP is authorized to enforce or administer” (https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/2026-01/cbp_directive_3340-049b_jan_2026_508.pdf), subject to “the requirements and limitations provided herein and applicable law.” Section 5.6.2 of the directive says: “Without probable cause, CBP may retain only information from the border search of an electronic device relating to immigration, customs, and other enforcement matters if such retention is consistent with the applicable system of records notice and subject to the requirements and limitations provided herein and applicable law.” It also says that, following the completion of the border search, CBP “will retain no copies of the information beyond twenty-one (21) calendar days following the conclusion of the border search unless retention is permissible or required consistent with sections 5.6.1, 5.6.2, or 5.6.3.” The directive’s definition of retention (section 3.7) says (https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/2026-01/cbp_directive_3340-049b_jan_2026_508.pdf): “Retention and retained do not include the temporary maintenance of information for a period of up to twenty-one (21) days following the conclusion of a border search to review and assess whether the information should be retained as outlined in section 5.6 of this Directive.” Section 5.6.3 says (https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/2026-01/cbp_directive_3340-049b_jan_2026_508.pdf): “Notwithstanding sections 5.6.1 and 5.6.2, there may be instances when, in consultation with the Office of Chief Counsel, it is determined that the information should be retained consistent with discovery obligations in ongoing or reasonably anticipated litigation. In such instances, retention procedures, including the appropriate method for storage, will be determined on a case-by-case basis.” See Getting a seized phone back (https://phoneseized.com/usa/return-and-retention-rule-41) for how that compares with the general federal picture away from the border.

### What CBP reports about how often
CBP’s own report to Congress (https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2025-02/2024_1126_cbp_border_searches_of_electronic_devices_at_ports_of_entry.pdf) states that “travelers are not referred to secondary inspection for the purpose of accessing digital content,” and that in FY 2023, CBP conducted “such searches for less than 0.01 percent of arriving travelers at a POE (https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2025-02/2024_1126_cbp_border_searches_of_electronic_devices_at_ports_of_entry.pdf).” CBP’s live statistics page puts a more recent number on it: “In FY 2025, out of the over 419 million travelers CBP processed at ports of entry, CBP only searched the electronic devices of 55,318 international travelers. (https://www.cbp.gov/travel/cbp-search-authority/border-search-electronic-devices)” No FY2024 figure is published on that page as of this review — this site is not substituting the FY2023 or FY2025 number for a year that has no published figure of its own.

### The courts so far
The First Circuit, in Alasaad v. Wolf (2021), joined the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits “in holding that basic border searches of electronic devices are routine searches that may be performed without reasonable suspicion,” and held that “advanced searches of electronic devices at the border do not require a warrant or probable cause.” The Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Belmonte Cardozo (2026), wrote: “Under our precedent, forensic searches of cell phones are nonroutine,” and joined “all our sister circuits that have addressed this issue in holding that manual searches of cell phones at the border are routine and thus do not require individualized suspicion.” The Second Circuit, in United States v. Alisigwe (decided 17 September 2026), wrote: “Those precedents lead to the conclusion that the search of a traveler’s property at the border—including a cellphone—is a routine search that the government may conduct without suspicion.” (https://ww3.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/OPN/24-960_complete_opn.pdf) It also wrote, in a footnote: “Because this case involves only a manual review of the contents of the cellphone, we need not decide whether the use of ‘sophisticated forensic search methods,’ such as ‘the off-site forensic analysis of the phone’s data,’ might qualify as a nonroutine search requiring reasonable suspicion.” Judge Lee wrote a separate opinion; it says (https://ww3.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/OPN/24-960_complete_opn.pdf): “While I agree that neither a warrant nor probable cause is necessary to search a cellphone at an international airport, which is the only basis on which Alisigwe seeks suppression of the evidence seized as a result of the cellphone searches in this case, I disagree with the majority’s additional and broad conclusion that such searches are ‘routine,’ requiring neither reasonable suspicion, nor any other kind of individualized suspicion. Accordingly, I concur only in the court’s judgment.” The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Cano (2019), wrote: “Accordingly, we hold that manual searches of cell phones at the border are reasonable without individualized suspicion, whereas the forensic examination of a cell phone requires a showing of reasonable suspicion.” (https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2019/08/16/17-50151.pdf) In the same opinion it wrote: “We clarify Cotterman by holding that ‘reasonable suspicion’ in this context means that officials must reasonably suspect that the cell phone contains digital contraband. We further conclude that cell phone searches at the border, whether manual or forensic, must be limited in scope to a search for digital contraband.” (https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2019/08/16/17-50151.pdf) The Eleventh Circuit, in United States v. Pulido (2025), wrote: “Because our precedents in the border-search context state both (1) that we require reasonable suspicion only for highly intrusive searches of a person’s body and (2) that forensic searches of electronic devices don’t require any level of suspicion, we affirm the district court’s holding that the government’s search of Pulido’s iPhone and MacBook didn’t violate the Fourth Amendment.” (https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/202210709.pdf) The Supreme Court’s docket page for Anibowei v. Blanche (https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/26-208.html), No. 26-208, as fetched on 6 October 2026 (UTC), names the Fifth Circuit as the lower court, case number 24-11042, with “Decision Date: November 19, 2025” and “Rehearing Denied: March 20, 2026”. Among the lines it showed that day are “Docketed: August 19, 2026”, “Petition for a writ of certiorari filed. (Response due September 18, 2026)”, “Waiver of right of respondent Federal Respondents to respond filed.”, “DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 10/9/2026.” and, as its last entry, “Response Requested. (Due October 29, 2026)”. Those are the entries quoted here; they do not say what the petition asks.

### What they can do
- If officers cannot complete an inspection of an electronic device because it is protected by a passcode or encryption, the directive says they may, in accordance with section 5.4 of the directive, detain the device pending a determination as to its admissibility, exclusion, or other disposition.
  Source: CBP Directive No. 3340-049B §5.3.3 (eff. 1 Jan 2026) — https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/2026-01/cbp_directive_3340-049b_jan_2026_508.pdf
- The directive says an officer may conduct a basic search of an electronic device with or without suspicion, subject to the requirements and limitations provided in the directive and applicable law.
  Source: CBP Directive No. 3340-049B §5.1.3 (eff. 1 Jan 2026) — https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/2026-01/cbp_directive_3340-049b_jan_2026_508.pdf
- The First Circuit held that advanced searches of electronic devices at the border do not require a warrant or probable cause.
  Source: Alasaad v. Wolf, 988 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2021) — https://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/20-1077P-01A.pdf
- The First Circuit joined the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits in holding that basic border searches of electronic devices are routine searches that may be performed without reasonable suspicion.
  Source: Alasaad v. Wolf, 988 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2021) — https://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/20-1077P-01A.pdf
- The Fourth Circuit said it joins all its sister circuits that have addressed the issue in holding that manual searches of cell phones at the border are routine and thus do not require individualized suspicion.
  Source: United States v. Belmonte Cardozo, No. 25-4239 (4th Cir. July 13, 2026) — https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/254239.P.pdf

### Limits on them
- The directive says an officer may perform an advanced search of an electronic device only in instances in which there is reasonable suspicion of activity in violation of the laws enforced or administered by CBP or, in the absence of individualized reasonable suspicion when there is a national security concern; all advanced searches require supervisory approval at the Grade 14 level or higher (or a manager with comparable responsibilities). Where the inspecting officer and approving supervisor rely on the presence of a national security concern, without reasonable suspicion, to conduct an advanced search, the directive says approval from the Director, Field Operations; Chief Patrol Agent; Director, Air Operations; Director, Marine Operations; Special Agent in Charge; or their delegate, is required prior to conducting the search, and that in compelling circumstances where operational considerations prevent prior approval, notification shall be made as soon as possible.
  Source: CBP Directive No. 3340-049B §5.1.4 (eff. 1 Jan 2026) — https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/2026-01/cbp_directive_3340-049b_jan_2026_508.pdf
- The directive says passcodes or other means of access obtained during a border inspection will only be utilized to facilitate the inspection of devices and information subject to border search, and may not be utilized to access information that is only stored remotely.
  Source: CBP Directive No. 3340-049B §5.3.2 (eff. 1 Jan 2026) — https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/2026-01/cbp_directive_3340-049b_jan_2026_508.pdf
- The directive says that, following the completion of the border search, CBP will retain no copies of the information beyond twenty-one (21) calendar days following the conclusion of the border search unless retention is permissible or required consistent with sections 5.6.1, 5.6.2, or 5.6.3. Section 5.6.2 of the directive says that, without probable cause, CBP may retain only information from the border search of an electronic device relating to immigration, customs, and other enforcement matters if such retention is consistent with the applicable system of records notice and subject to the requirements and limitations provided in the directive and applicable law.
  Source: CBP Directive No. 3340-049B §§5.6.1, 5.6.2, 5.6.4 (eff. 1 Jan 2026) — https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/2026-01/cbp_directive_3340-049b_jan_2026_508.pdf

### What the sources say
- CBP’s directive states that travelers are obligated to present electronic devices and the information contained therein in a condition that allows inspection of the device and its contents.
  Source: CBP Directive No. 3340-049B §5.3.1 (eff. 1 Jan 2026) — https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/2026-01/cbp_directive_3340-049b_jan_2026_508.pdf
- CBP’s directive says that it is an internal policy statement of CBP and does not create or confer any rights, privileges, or benefits on any person or party.
  Source: CBP Directive No. 3340-049B §8.1 (eff. 1 Jan 2026) — https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/2026-01/cbp_directive_3340-049b_jan_2026_508.pdf
- CBP’s directive defines retention (section 3.7): it says that, when used with respect to information, retention and retained refers to CBP’s maintenance of information obtained from an electronic device after the conclusion of a border search consistent with the applicable system of records notice, and that retention and retained do not include the temporary maintenance of information for a period of up to twenty-one (21) days following the conclusion of a border search to review and assess whether the information should be retained as outlined in section 5.6 of the directive.
  Source: CBP Directive No. 3340-049B §3.7 (eff. 1 Jan 2026) — https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/2026-01/cbp_directive_3340-049b_jan_2026_508.pdf
- CBP’s directive says (section 5.6.3) that, notwithstanding sections 5.6.1 and 5.6.2, there may be instances when, in consultation with the Office of Chief Counsel, it is determined that the information should be retained consistent with discovery obligations in ongoing or reasonably anticipated litigation, and that in such instances retention procedures, including the appropriate method for storage, will be determined on a case-by-case basis.
  Source: CBP Directive No. 3340-049B §5.6.3 (eff. 1 Jan 2026) — https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/2026-01/cbp_directive_3340-049b_jan_2026_508.pdf

## Getting a seized phone back, and how long copies are kept
URL: https://phoneseized.com/usa/return-and-retention-rule-41
Jurisdictions: United States
Last reviewed: 2026-10-06

### Asking a court for it back
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g) says: “A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure of property or by the deprivation of property may move for the property’s return. The motion must be filed in the district where the property was seized.” (https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcrmp/rule_41)

### What a warrant already allows with a copy
Except for a tracking-device warrant, Rule 41(e)(2)(A) requires the warrant to “designate the magistrate judge to whom it must be returned.” Rule 41(e)(2)(B) says that a warrant under Rule 41(e)(2)(A) “may authorize the seizure of electronic storage media or the seizure or copying of electronically stored information. Unless otherwise specified, the warrant authorizes a later review of the media or information consistent with the warrant.” (https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcrmp/rule_41)

### At the border, there’s an actual number
CBP’s own directive says that, following the completion of the border search, CBP “will retain no copies of the information beyond twenty-one (21) calendar days following the conclusion of the border search unless retention is permissible or required consistent with sections 5.6.1, 5.6.2, or 5.6.3.” (https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/2026-01/cbp_directive_3340-049b_jan_2026_508.pdf) Section 5.6.1 of the directive says CBP may retain copies where it determines there is probable cause to believe the information contains digital contraband or evidence of a violation of law that CBP is authorized to enforce or administer, subject to the requirements and limitations provided in the directive and applicable law. Section 5.6.2 says: “Without probable cause, CBP may retain only information from the border search of an electronic device relating to immigration, customs, and other enforcement matters if such retention is consistent with the applicable system of records notice and subject to the requirements and limitations provided herein and applicable law.” See CBP and your phone at the U.S. border (https://phoneseized.com/usa/border-cbp) for the rest of that directive.

### Away from the border, we have not found a general rule
Outside CBP’s border-specific 21-day figure and the Rule 41(g) motion described above, this site has not found a general federal rule that fixes how long a copy of your phone’s data may be kept once ordinary domestic law enforcement has extracted it. That is a statement about what we could not find, not a claim that no such rule exists anywhere — if you know of one, please tell us so it can be checked and added.

### One state: what a bill enrolled in 2019 said
The state text quoted on this page is Utah’s, and only as a bill as enrolled in 2019: the enrolled copy of H.B. 57 (2019) (https://le.utah.gov/~2019/bills/hbillenr/HB0057.pdf) said that, except as provided in Subsection (2), for a criminal investigation or prosecution, a law enforcement agency may not obtain, without a search warrant issued by a court upon probable cause, the location information, stored data, or transmitted data of an electronic device. This is the text of a bill as enrolled in 2019. This page does not quote the current Utah Code section 77-23c-102 and does not say what it now provides. Subsection (2)(a) of the same section, as that enrolled copy printed it, was about location information, not stored data: it said (https://le.utah.gov/~2019/bills/hbillenr/HB0057.pdf) that a law enforcement agency may obtain location information without a warrant for an electronic device in the circumstances it listed, which are set out under “What the sources say” on this page. Subsection (2)(b) was a separate list, for stored or transmitted data; it is set out there too. Subsection (2) of the enrolled bill had further text not set out here. Other states’ statutes are not on this page. Rulings of state supreme courts on compelled passcodes, which is a different question, are on Compelled passcodes: state supreme court rulings, by state (https://phoneseized.com/usa/state-passcode-rulings).

### What they can do
- The directive says CBP may retain copies of information from an electronic device when, based on a review of the information encountered or on other facts and circumstances, they determine there is probable cause to believe the information contains digital contraband or evidence of a violation of law that CBP is authorized to enforce or administer, subject to the requirements and limitations provided in the directive and applicable law.
  Source: CBP Directive No. 3340-049B §§5.6.1, 5.6.2, 5.6.4 (eff. 1 Jan 2026) — https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/2026-01/cbp_directive_3340-049b_jan_2026_508.pdf
- Rule 41(e)(2)(B) says that a warrant under Rule 41(e)(2)(A) may authorize the seizure of electronic storage media or the seizure or copying of electronically stored information, and that, unless otherwise specified, the warrant authorizes a later review of the media or information consistent with the warrant.
  Source: Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e)(2)(B) — https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcrmp/rule_41

### Limits on them
- Rule 41(e)(2)(A) says that, except for a tracking-device warrant, the warrant must identify the person or property to be searched, identify any person or property to be seized, and designate the magistrate judge to whom it must be returned.
  Source: Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e)(2)(A) — https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcrmp/rule_41
- The directive says that, following the completion of the border search, CBP will retain no copies of the information beyond twenty-one (21) calendar days following the conclusion of the border search unless retention is permissible or required consistent with sections 5.6.1, 5.6.2, or 5.6.3. Section 5.6.2 of the directive says that, without probable cause, CBP may retain only information from the border search of an electronic device relating to immigration, customs, and other enforcement matters if such retention is consistent with the applicable system of records notice and subject to the requirements and limitations provided in the directive and applicable law.
  Source: CBP Directive No. 3340-049B §§5.6.1, 5.6.2, 5.6.4 (eff. 1 Jan 2026) — https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/2026-01/cbp_directive_3340-049b_jan_2026_508.pdf
- Rule 41(g) says that a person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure of property or by the deprivation of property may move for the property’s return, and that the motion must be filed in the district where the property was seized.
  Source: Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g) — https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcrmp/rule_41

### What the sources say
- Utah H.B. 57, as enrolled in 2019, said that, except as provided in Subsection (2), for a criminal investigation or prosecution, a law enforcement agency may not obtain, without a search warrant issued by a court upon probable cause, the location information, stored data, or transmitted data of an electronic device. This is the text of a bill as enrolled in 2019. This page does not quote the current Utah Code section 77-23c-102 and does not say what it now provides.
  Source: Utah H.B. 57, as enrolled, 2019, amending Utah Code §77-23c-102(1)(a) — https://le.utah.gov/~2019/bills/hbillenr/HB0057.pdf
- Utah H.B. 57, as enrolled in 2019, said in Subsection (2)(a) that a law enforcement agency may obtain location information without a warrant for an electronic device: (i) in accordance with Section 53-10-104.5; (ii) if the device is reported stolen by the owner; (iii) with the informed, affirmative consent of the owner or user of the electronic device; (iv) in accordance with a judicially recognized exception to warrant requirements; (v) if the owner has voluntarily and publicly disclosed the location information; or (vi) from the remote computing service provider if the remote computing service provider voluntarily discloses the location information, (A) under a belief that an emergency exists involving an imminent risk to an individual of death, serious physical injury, sexual abuse, live-streamed sexual exploitation, kidnapping, or human trafficking, or (B) that is inadvertently discovered by the remote computing service provider and appears to pertain to the commission of a felony, or of a misdemeanor involving physical violence, sexual abuse, or dishonesty.
  This is the text of a bill as enrolled in 2019. This page does not quote the current Utah Code section 77-23c-102 and does not say what it now provides. Subsection (2)(a) concerned location information. Subsection (2)(b) of the enrolled bill was a separate list, for stored or transmitted data: it said that a law enforcement agency may obtain stored or transmitted data from an electronic device, or electronic information or data transmitted by the owner of the electronic information or data to a remote computing service provider, without a warrant (i) with the informed consent of the owner of the electronic device or electronic information or data; (ii) in accordance with a judicially recognized exception to warrant requirements; (iii) in connection with a report forwarded by the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2258A; or (iv) subject to Subsection 77-23c-102(2)(a)(vi)(B), from a remote computing service provider if the remote computing service provider voluntarily discloses the stored or transmitted data as otherwise permitted under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2702. Subsection (2) of the enrolled bill had further text not set out here.
  Source: Utah H.B. 57, as enrolled, 2019, Subsection (2)(a)–(b) — https://le.utah.gov/~2019/bills/hbillenr/HB0057.pdf

## Compelled passcodes: state supreme court rulings, by state
URL: https://phoneseized.com/usa/state-passcode-rulings
Jurisdictions: United States
Last reviewed: 2026-10-06

### Why this page is state by state
In Utah, the Supreme Court said (http://www.utcourts.gov/opinions/supopin/State%20v.%20Valdez20231214.pdf) in its December 2023 opinion: “Whether an accused has a Fifth Amendment right not to disclose a passcode to an electronic device when law enforcement has a valid warrant to search the device is a question of first impression for this court. The United States Supreme Court has not yet addressed this specific question”. Each decision below is a ruling of one state’s highest court, or of one federal circuit, in the case before it, and a ruling about one state is not a statement about another. The act a court was dealing with (saying a passcode aloud, entering it, producing an unlocked phone, disclosing passcodes, or a password to a computer) and the ground it decided on (the Fifth Amendment, a state constitution, or state common law and statute) differ from case to case, so both are given for each state. For how the United States compares with the other countries on whether you must give police the passcode, see Must I give them the passcode? (https://phoneseized.com/compare/must-i-give-the-code). For the federal appeals court decisions on compelled thumb unlocks, see the page on thumb unlocks (https://phoneseized.com/usa/passcode-vs-biometrics).

### State by state at a glance
State and case The act, and the ground What the court said Utah — State v. Valdez (14 December 2023) Law enforcement asked Valdez to verbally provide his passcode; the Fifth Amendment Testimonial, and the foregone conclusion exception is inapplicable (http://www.utcourts.gov/opinions/supopin/State%20v.%20Valdez20231214.pdf) Indiana — Seo v. State (23 June 2020) The compelled production of an unlocked smartphone; the Fifth Amendment Testimonial and entitled to protection unless the State demonstrates the foregone conclusion exception applies; the State had failed to make that showing (https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2020/06/23/katelin_eunjoo_seo_v._state_of_indiana.pdf) Pennsylvania — Commonwealth v. Davis (20 November 2019) Disclosing a password to a computer, not a phone; the Fifth Amendment Testimonial and privileged (https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Supreme/out/J-42-2019mo%20-%2010422940787775633.pdf); a password to a computer cannot fit within the foregone conclusion exception (https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Supreme/out/J-42-2019mo%20-%2010422940787775633.pdf) New Jersey — State v. Andrews (10 August 2020) Disclosing the passcodes to passcode-protected cellphones; the Fifth Amendment and New Jersey’s common law and statutory protections A testimonial act of production (https://www.njcourts.gov/system/files/court-opinions/2020/a_72_18.pdf); the foregone conclusion test applies to the production of the passcodes themselves (https://www.njcourts.gov/system/files/court-opinions/2020/a_72_18.pdf); based on the record before the court, the exception applied (https://www.njcourts.gov/system/files/court-opinions/2020/a_72_18.pdf); the order does not violate those protections; judgment affirmed (https://www.njcourts.gov/system/files/court-opinions/2020/a_72_18.pdf) Illinois — People v. Sneed (15 June 2023) Entering the passcode into the phone; the Fifth Amendment Testimonial to the extent entering it implicitly asserts the ability to unlock the phone; the foregone conclusion doctrine applies as an exception in this case (https://www.illinoiscourts.gov/resources/eeff3005-c65c-4cc5-a95f-5cf2a201175f/file); the judgment of the appellate court affirmed, albeit on different grounds (https://www.illinoiscourts.gov/resources/eeff3005-c65c-4cc5-a95f-5cf2a201175f/file); as to the Illinois provision, the court found that the defendant failed to provide the substantial grounds necessary to warrant departing from the lockstep interpretation and to interpret the Illinois provision as “applying more expansively” than the federal provision in this case (https://www.illinoiscourts.gov/resources/eeff3005-c65c-4cc5-a95f-5cf2a201175f/file) Massachusetts — Commonwealth v. Jones (6 March 2019) Decrypting an electronic device by entering a password; art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights The Commonwealth must prove the defendant knows the password beyond a reasonable doubt for the foregone conclusion exception to apply; it met its burden in that case (https://web.archive.org/web/20190315055659id_/https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2019/03/06/12564.pdf) Oregon — State v. Pittman (28 January 2021) Unlocking a cell phone; Article I, section 12 of the Oregon Constitution Decision of the Court of Appeals and judgment of the circuit court reversed; Article I, section 12 permits an order compelling a defendant to unlock a cell phone in certain circumstances, which were not present in that case (https://ojd.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/api/collection/p17027coll3/id/9369/download); to obtain such an order the state must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that it already knows the information that the act would communicate (https://ojd.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/api/collection/p17027coll3/id/9369/download)

### Utah — a spoken passcode
In Utah, the court said (http://www.utcourts.gov/opinions/supopin/State%20v.%20Valdez20231214.pdf) that “law enforcement asked Valdez to verbally provide his passcode”. It held (http://www.utcourts.gov/opinions/supopin/State%20v.%20Valdez20231214.pdf) that “verbally providing a cell phone passcode to law enforcement is testimonial for Fifth Amendment purposes” and that “the foregone conclusion exception is inapplicable”. It affirmed (http://www.utcourts.gov/opinions/supopin/State%20v.%20Valdez20231214.pdf) the court of appeals: “We affirm the court of appeals and remand to the district court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.” The court said that questions about how the Fifth Amendment extends to efforts to unlock seized devices “have proven to be especially complex where law enforcement attempts to access the contents of a seized device by means that do not require the suspect to disclose the actual passcode—like, for example, obtaining an order to compel the suspect to provide an unlocked device”, and that “that is not the situation we have before us”. It also said (http://www.utcourts.gov/opinions/supopin/State%20v.%20Valdez20231214.pdf) that “while speaking a passcode and turning over an unlocked phone may be equivalent in many respects, they are not the same for Fifth Amendment purposes”. On the State’s elicitation and use of Valdez’s refusal at trial, the court said (http://www.utcourts.gov/opinions/supopin/State%20v.%20Valdez20231214.pdf): “On these facts, the State’s elicitation and use of Valdez’s refusal at trial do not constitute a permissible ‘fair response’ to an argument initiated by Valdez.” In a footnote the court said (http://www.utcourts.gov/opinions/supopin/State%20v.%20Valdez20231214.pdf) that “the State did not move in the district court to compel Valdez to provide his passcode (or an unlocked phone)”. It added: “Because the State has not disputed that the communication here was compelled and incriminating, we need not address those Fifth Amendment elements and we focus only on the testimonial nature of the communication at issue. We express no opinion as to whether the communication here was compelled and incriminating.” In Utah, in Valdez, the Supreme Court of the United States docket (https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/23-1020.html) for Utah v. Valdez, No. 23-1020, records: “Utah, Petitioner v. Alfonso Valdez—Jun 24 2024 Petition DENIED.” That is a docket entry.

### Indiana — an order to unlock
In Indiana, the court recorded (https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2020/06/23/katelin_eunjoo_seo_v._state_of_indiana.pdf) that “the detective got a second warrant that ordered Seo to unlock her iPhone. She refused, and the trial court held her in contempt.” It reversed the contempt order. It said (https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2020/06/23/katelin_eunjoo_seo_v._state_of_indiana.pdf) that “Forcing Seo to unlock her iPhone would violate her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination”. The court held (https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2020/06/23/katelin_eunjoo_seo_v._state_of_indiana.pdf): “The compelled production of an unlocked smartphone is testimonial and entitled to Fifth Amendment protection— unless the State demonstrates the foregone conclusion exception applies. Here, the State has failed to make that showing”. It said (https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2020/06/23/katelin_eunjoo_seo_v._state_of_indiana.pdf) that giving law enforcement an unlocked smartphone “communicates to the State, at a minimum, that (1) the suspect knows the password; (2) the files on the device exist; and (3) the suspect possesses those files.” The quoted passages do not say what would have happened had the State made the showing the court describes.

### Pennsylvania — a computer password
In Pennsylvania, the device was a computer, not a phone. The court considered (https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Supreme/out/J-42-2019mo%20-%2010422940787775633.pdf) “Whether a defendant may be compelled to disclose a password to allow the Commonwealth access to the defendant’s lawfully-seized, but encrypted, computer” and held that “the compelled recollection of Appellant’s password is testimonial in nature, and, consequently, privileged under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” About the foregone conclusion exception, it concluded (https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Supreme/out/J-42-2019mo%20-%2010422940787775633.pdf) that “the compulsion of a password to a computer cannot fit within this exception”. In a footnote the court said (https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Supreme/out/J-42-2019mo%20-%2010422940787775633.pdf) that, because the case concerned a password to a computer, it “need not address the related, but distinct, area involving biometric features like fingerprints, thumbprints, iris scanning, and facial recognition”. In Pennsylvania, in Davis, the Supreme Court docket (https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/19-1254.html) for Pennsylvania v. Davis, No. 19-1254, records: “Pennsylvania, Petitioner v. Joseph J. Davis—Oct 05 2020 Petition DENIED.”

### New Jersey — passcodes ordered disclosed
In New Jersey, the question was “whether a court order requiring a criminal defendant to disclose the passcodes to his passcode-protected cellphones violates the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution or New Jersey’s common law or statutory protections against self-incrimination” (https://www.njcourts.gov/system/files/court-opinions/2020/a_72_18.pdf). The court’s answer: “We conclude that it does not and affirm the Appellate Division’s judgment.” The court said (https://www.njcourts.gov/system/files/court-opinions/2020/a_72_18.pdf) that “Communicating or entering a passcode requires facts contained within the holder’s mind”, and: “It is a testimonial act of production.” It found (https://www.njcourts.gov/system/files/court-opinions/2020/a_72_18.pdf) that “the foregone conclusion test applies to the production of the passcodes themselves, rather than to the phones’ contents.” On the record, it said (https://www.njcourts.gov/system/files/court-opinions/2020/a_72_18.pdf): “Based on the record before us, we have little difficulty concluding that compelled production of the passcodes falls within the foregone conclusion exception.” It affirmed (https://www.njcourts.gov/system/files/court-opinions/2020/a_72_18.pdf) “the Order of the Appellate Division compelling Andrews’s disclosure of the passcodes to his cellphones seized consistent with the trial court’s order of production, and remand[ed] to the trial court for further proceedings.” The opinion ends (https://www.njcourts.gov/system/files/court-opinions/2020/a_72_18.pdf) by recording that a dissent was filed by Justice LaVecchia, in which Justices Albin and Timpone joined. The dissent is not quoted on this page and is not the court’s holding; the rest of the opinion is at the link under “Read the opinions”. In New Jersey, in Andrews, the Supreme Court docket (https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/20-937.html) for Andrews v. New Jersey, No. 20-937, records: “Robert Andrews, Petitioner v. New Jersey—May 17 2021 Petition DENIED.”

### Illinois — entering the passcode
In Illinois, the court concluded (https://www.illinoiscourts.gov/resources/eeff3005-c65c-4cc5-a95f-5cf2a201175f/file) that “compelling the act of producing the passcode to a cell phone by entering it into the phone is testimonial to the extent that performing the act of entering the passcode implicitly asserts that the person entering it has the ability to unlock the phone”, that “the foregone conclusion test is applicable in the context of the compelled production of cell phone passcodes”, and that “the foregone conclusion doctrine applies as an exception to the fifth amendment privilege in this case.” Because the State’s motion sought an order for the defendant “to either enter the passcode or provide it to officers”, the court said it “need not consider whether disclosing the passcode is sufficiently testimonial to be privileged where entering the passcode would not be.” It affirmed “the judgment of the appellate court, albeit on different grounds.” The court stated (https://www.illinoiscourts.gov/resources/eeff3005-c65c-4cc5-a95f-5cf2a201175f/file) that, for the exception to apply, “the State must establish that, at the time it sought the act of production, it knew with reasonable particularity that (1) the passcode existed, (2) the passcode was within defendant’s possession or control, and (3) the passcode was authentic.” Elsewhere in the opinion the court noted (https://www.illinoiscourts.gov/resources/eeff3005-c65c-4cc5-a95f-5cf2a201175f/file) that cell phones “may also be unlocked biometrically by using one’s fingerprint, facial recognition technology, or retina scans”, and then said: “Regardless of what method is used to unlock a cell phone, we find them all equally comparable to using a key to unlock a door, and we decline to distinguish between the methods for purposes of fifth amendment application.” The act in this case was entering a passcode: the court also concluded (https://www.illinoiscourts.gov/resources/eeff3005-c65c-4cc5-a95f-5cf2a201175f/file) that “compelling defendant to enter the passcode to his cell phone is testimonial—not because it involves delving into the contents of defendant’s mind—but because entering the passcode implicitly asserts that defendant is able to unlock the phone”. In Illinois, in Sneed, the Supreme Court docket (https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/23-5827.html) for Sneed v. Illinois, No. 23-5827, records: “Keiron K. Sneed, Petitioner v. Illinois—Feb 26 2024 Petition DENIED.”

### Massachusetts — art. 12 and Gelfgatt
In Massachusetts, art. 12 is Article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. The court said (https://web.archive.org/web/20190315055659id_/https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2019/03/06/12564.pdf) that the central legal issue concerned “whether compelling the defendant to enter the password to the cell phone would violate his privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by both the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.” The burden holding is stated under art. 12: the court concluded that “when the Commonwealth seeks an order pursuant to our decision in Gelfgatt (Gelfgatt order or motion) compelling a defendant to decrypt an electronic device by entering a password, art. 12 requires the Commonwealth to prove that the defendant knows the password beyond a reasonable doubt for the foregone conclusion exception to apply.” It also concluded that “the Commonwealth met its burden in this case.” The court ordered (https://web.archive.org/web/20190315055659id_/https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2019/03/06/12564.pdf): “We therefore reverse the judge’s denial of the Commonwealth’s renewed Gelfgatt motion, and we remand the case to the Superior Court for entry of an order compelling the defendant to enter the password into the cell phone at issue.” In a footnote the court said (https://web.archive.org/web/20190315055659id_/https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2019/03/06/12564.pdf): “We need not, and do not, resolve this distinction here, and our decision is therefore limited to only the physical entry of the password by the defendant, as we required in Gelfgatt. The defendant may therefore only be compelled to enter the password to the LG phone, not disclose it.” Earlier in the same footnote the court recorded “some debate among courts and commenters as to whether the foregone conclusion exception can apply in cases where the government seeks to compel the defendant to disclose -- whether orally or in writing -- the actual password, as opposed to cases requiring merely physically entering it into the device.” In Massachusetts, in Jones, the Supreme Court docket (https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/19-6275.html) for Jones v. Massachusetts, No. 19-6275, records: “Dennis Jones, Petitioner v. Massachusetts—Nov 18 2019 Petition DENIED.”

### Oregon — Article I, section 12
In Oregon, the court began (https://ojd.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/api/collection/p17027coll3/id/9369/download) with “the Oregon Constitution and, in particular, Article I, section 12” and said: “Because we conclude that the trial court’s order violated that state constitutional provision, we do not reach defendant’s Fifth Amendment argument.” It reversed (https://ojd.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/api/collection/p17027coll3/id/9369/download) the decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court: “Although Article I, section 12, permits a trial court order compelling a defendant to unlock a cell phone in certain circumstances, those circumstances are not present in this case.” Faced with “the circumstances and law as they presently exist”, the court construed Article I, section 12, “to permit an order compelling a defendant to unlock a cell phone so long as the state (1) has a valid warrant authorizing it to seize and search the phone; (2) already knows the information that the act of unlocking the phone, by itself, would communicate; and (3) is prohibited from using defendant’s act against defendant, except to obtain access to the contents of the phone.” It also concluded (https://ojd.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/api/collection/p17027coll3/id/9369/download) that “to obtain an order requiring a defendant to unlock a cell phone, the state must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that it already knows the information that that act would communicate.”

### Federal courts
In the Eleventh Circuit, in 2012, the court held (https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201112268.pdf) that “Doe’s decryption and production of the hard drives’ contents would trigger Fifth Amendment protection because it would be testimonial”. The devices were hard drives, not a phone. On the foregone conclusion point it said: “Nothing in the record before us reveals that the Government knows whether any files exist and are located on the hard drives”. In the Third Circuit, in 2017, the court affirmed (https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/153537p.pdf) an order holding John Doe in civil contempt for refusing to comply with an order “which required him to produce several seized devices in a fully unencrypted state”. It said that “The District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding Doe to be in contempt of the Decryption Order.” On the Fifth Amendment point it said: “Even if we could assess the Fifth Amendment decision of the Magistrate Judge, our review would be limited to plain error.” It also said: “However, because our review is limited to plain error, and no plain error was committed by the District Court in finding that the Government established that the contents of the encrypted hard drives are known to it, we need not decide here that the inquiry can be limited to the question of whether Doe’s knowledge of the password itself is sufficient to support application of the foregone conclusion doctrine.” In the Third Circuit, in a later appeal in the same matter (2020), the court said (https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/173205p.pdf) that Rawls sought release arguing that 28 U.S.C. § 1826 limits his maximum permissible confinement for civil contempt, and: “Because we conclude § 1826 applies to Rawls, we will reverse the order of the District Court and order Rawls’ release.” The quoted text concerns release from civil-contempt confinement. In the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Payne, the Supreme Court docket (https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/24-5871.html) (Payne v. United States, No. 24-5871) records: “Jeremy Travis Payne, Petitioner v. United States—Nov 25 2024 Petition DENIED.” That is a docket entry. In the D.C. Circuit, Brown (https://media.cadc.uscourts.gov/opinions/docs/2025/01/23-3074-2094718.pdf) said that if Schwartz had instead been compelled “to verbally disclose the password, those answers unquestionably would be testimonial communications” — a statement about a situation that case did not involve. For the Ninth and D.C. Circuit thumb-unlock decisions, see the page on thumb unlocks (https://phoneseized.com/usa/passcode-vs-biometrics).

### What the courts say about each other
In New Jersey, the court said (https://www.njcourts.gov/system/files/court-opinions/2020/a_72_18.pdf) that “courts in other jurisdictions have grappled with the applicability of the exception beyond that context, and many have considered whether the exception applies to compelled decryption or to the compelled production of passcodes and passwords, reaching divergent results.” This page asserts nothing further about how the courts relate to one another.

### At the border
CBP’s own directive states that “Travelers are obligated to present electronic devices and the information contained therein in a condition that allows inspection of the device and its contents.” (https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/2026-01/cbp_directive_3340-049b_jan_2026_508.pdf) That is an agency directive, CBP’s own policy, not a ruling of any of the courts above. See CBP and your phone at the U.S. border (https://phoneseized.com/usa/border-cbp).

### Read the opinions
Each ruling is worth reading in full rather than taking a summary’s word for it. Utah: State v. Valdez (http://www.utcourts.gov/opinions/supopin/State%20v.%20Valdez20231214.pdf) (copy (https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2023/12/14/state_v._valdez.pdf)) Indiana: Seo v. State (https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2020/06/23/katelin_eunjoo_seo_v._state_of_indiana.pdf) (CourtListener copy of the court’s opinion) Pennsylvania: Commonwealth v. Davis (https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Supreme/out/J-42-2019mo%20-%2010422940787775633.pdf) (copy (https://web.archive.org/web/20250911053750id_/https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Supreme/out/J-42-2019mo%20-%2010422940787775633.pdf)) New Jersey: State v. Andrews (https://www.njcourts.gov/system/files/court-opinions/2020/a_72_18.pdf) (copy (https://web.archive.org/web/20240226211754id_/https://www.njcourts.gov/system/files/court-opinions/2020/a_72_18.pdf)) Illinois: People v. Sneed (https://www.illinoiscourts.gov/resources/eeff3005-c65c-4cc5-a95f-5cf2a201175f/file) (copy (https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2023/06/15/people_v._sneed.pdf)) Massachusetts: Commonwealth v. Jones (https://web.archive.org/web/20190315055659id_/https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2019/03/06/12564.pdf) (an archived copy of the court’s PDF) Oregon: State v. Pittman (https://ojd.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/api/collection/p17027coll3/id/9369/download) (copy (https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2021/01/28/state_v._pittman.pdf)) Eleventh Circuit: In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25, 2011 (https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201112268.pdf) Third Circuit: United States v. Apple MacPro Computer (https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/153537p.pdf)

### What they can do
- In New Jersey, the Supreme Court held that a court order requiring a criminal defendant to disclose the passcodes to his passcode-protected cellphones did not violate the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution or New Jersey’s common law or statutory protections against self-incrimination, and affirmed the Appellate Division’s judgment.
  The act the order required was disclosing the passcodes. The court applied the foregone conclusion exception “based on the record before us”; see the New Jersey items under “What the sources say”.
  Source: State v. Andrews, 234 A.3d 1254 (N.J. Aug. 10, 2020), opinion of the Court (Solomon, J.), opening paragraph (holding) — https://www.njcourts.gov/system/files/court-opinions/2020/a_72_18.pdf
- In New Jersey, the court affirmed the order of the Appellate Division compelling Andrews’s disclosure of the passcodes to his cellphones seized consistent with the trial court’s order of production, and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
  Source: State v. Andrews, 234 A.3d 1254 (N.J. Aug. 10, 2020), opinion of the Court (Solomon, J.), Part V (disposition) — https://www.njcourts.gov/system/files/court-opinions/2020/a_72_18.pdf
- In Illinois, the Supreme Court concluded that compelling the act of producing the passcode to a cell phone by entering it into the phone is testimonial to the extent that performing the act of entering the passcode implicitly asserts that the person entering it has the ability to unlock the phone; that the foregone conclusion test is applicable in the context of the compelled production of cell phone passcodes; that the proper focus is on the passcode itself rather than on the contents of the phone; and that the foregone conclusion doctrine applies as an exception to the fifth amendment privilege in that case. Because the State’s motion to compel sought an order for the defendant to either enter the passcode or provide it to officers, the court said it need not consider whether disclosing the passcode is sufficiently testimonial to be privileged where entering the passcode would not be. The court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court, albeit on different grounds.
  The act the court was dealing with was entering the passcode into the phone.
  Source: People v. Sneed, 2023 IL 127968, 230 N.E.3d 97 (Ill. June 15, 2023), ¶ 3, ¶ 115 and n.7 (attached to ¶ 113), opinion of the Court (holding) — https://www.illinoiscourts.gov/resources/eeff3005-c65c-4cc5-a95f-5cf2a201175f/file
- In Massachusetts, the Supreme Judicial Court concluded that when the Commonwealth seeks an order pursuant to its decision in Gelfgatt compelling a defendant to decrypt an electronic device by entering a password, art. 12 requires the Commonwealth to prove that the defendant knows the password beyond a reasonable doubt for the foregone conclusion exception to apply, and that the Commonwealth met its burden in that case.
  The act was entering a password. The burden holding is stated under art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights; the central legal issue, as the court described it, concerned whether compelling the defendant to enter the password to the cell phone would violate his privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by both the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.
  Source: Commonwealth v. Jones, 481 Mass. 540, 117 N.E.3d 702 (Mass. Mar. 6, 2019), slip op. at 2-4, opinion of the Court (Kafker, J.) (holding under art. 12) (archived copy of the court’s slip opinion) — https://web.archive.org/web/20190315055659id_/https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2019/03/06/12564.pdf
- In Massachusetts, the court reversed the judge’s denial of the Commonwealth’s renewed Gelfgatt motion and remanded the case to the Superior Court for entry of an order compelling the defendant to enter the password into the cell phone at issue.
  Source: Commonwealth v. Jones, 481 Mass. 540, 117 N.E.3d 702 (Mass. Mar. 6, 2019), slip op. at 5, opinion of the Court (Kafker, J.) (disposition) (archived copy of the court’s slip opinion) — https://web.archive.org/web/20190315055659id_/https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2019/03/06/12564.pdf

### Limits on them
- In Oregon, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court: although Article I, section 12 of the Oregon Constitution permits a trial court order compelling a defendant to unlock a cell phone in certain circumstances, those circumstances were not present in that case. Faced with the circumstances and law as they presently exist, it construed Article I, section 12 to permit such an order so long as the state (1) has a valid warrant authorizing it to seize and search the phone; (2) already knows the information that the act of unlocking the phone, by itself, would communicate; and (3) is prohibited from using the defendant’s act against the defendant, except to obtain access to the contents of the phone.
  The act was unlocking a phone. The ground is the Oregon Constitution; see the Oregon item under “What the sources say” for what the court did not reach.
  Source: State v. Pittman, 367 Or. 498, 479 P.3d 1028 (Or. Jan. 28, 2021), opinion of the Court (Walters, C.J.), 367 Or. at 525 and 534 (the requirements and the disposition) — https://ojd.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/api/collection/p17027coll3/id/9369/download
- In Utah, the Supreme Court held that verbally providing a cell phone passcode to law enforcement is testimonial for Fifth Amendment purposes, that, since the disclosure of a passcode involves traditional oral testimony, the act-of-production analysis urged by the State does not apply, and that, for the same reasons, the foregone conclusion exception is inapplicable.
  The act was saying the passcode aloud, not handing over an unlocked phone; see the Utah items under “What the sources say”.
  Source: State v. Valdez, 2023 UT 26, 552 P.3d 159 (Utah Dec. 14, 2023), ¶ 73, opinion of the Court (holding) — http://www.utcourts.gov/opinions/supopin/State%20v.%20Valdez20231214.pdf
- In Utah, the court said that, on the facts of that case, the State’s elicitation and use of Valdez’s refusal at trial did not constitute a permissible “fair response” to an argument initiated by Valdez.
  Source: State v. Valdez, 2023 UT 26 (Utah Dec. 14, 2023), ¶ 72, opinion of the Court (use of the refusal at trial) — http://www.utcourts.gov/opinions/supopin/State%20v.%20Valdez20231214.pdf
- In Indiana, the Supreme Court said that forcing Seo to unlock her iPhone would violate her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, and that by unlocking her smartphone Seo would provide law enforcement with information it does not already know, which the State could then use in its prosecution against her.
  Source: Seo v. State, 148 N.E.3d 952 (Ind. June 23, 2020), slip op. at 2, opinion of the Court (summary of the holding) (CourtListener copy of the court's opinion) — https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2020/06/23/katelin_eunjoo_seo_v._state_of_indiana.pdf
- In Indiana, the court said that the compelled production of an unlocked smartphone is testimonial and entitled to Fifth Amendment protection unless the State demonstrates the foregone conclusion exception applies, that the State had failed to make that showing in that case, and that the case also highlights concerns with extending the limited exception to this context.
  The act was producing an unlocked smartphone.
  Source: Seo v. State, 148 N.E.3d 952 (Ind. June 23, 2020), slip op. at 5, opinion of the Court (holding) (CourtListener copy of the court's opinion) — https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2020/06/23/katelin_eunjoo_seo_v._state_of_indiana.pdf
- In Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court held that compelling a defendant to disclose a password to allow the Commonwealth access to the defendant’s lawfully seized, encrypted computer violates the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition against self-incrimination, and that the compelled recollection of the appellant’s password is testimonial in nature and, consequently, privileged under the Fifth Amendment.
  The device was a computer, not a phone.
  Source: Commonwealth v. Davis, 220 A.3d 534 (Pa. Nov. 20, 2019), opinion of the Court (Todd, J.), slip op. at 1 and 24 (holding; the password to a computer) — https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Supreme/out/J-42-2019mo%20-%2010422940787775633.pdf
- In Pennsylvania, the court concluded that the compulsion of a password to a computer cannot fit within the foregone conclusion exception, and, until the United States Supreme Court holds otherwise, construed the foregone conclusion rationale to be one of limited application and believed the exception to be inapplicable to compel the disclosure of a defendant’s password to assist the Commonwealth in gaining access to a computer.
  Source: Commonwealth v. Davis, 220 A.3d 534 (Pa. Nov. 20, 2019), opinion of the Court (Todd, J.), slip op. at 24–25 (the foregone conclusion exception and a computer password) — https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Supreme/out/J-42-2019mo%20-%2010422940787775633.pdf
- In Oregon, the Supreme Court concluded that, to obtain an order requiring a defendant to unlock a cell phone, the state must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that it already knows the information that that act would communicate.
  The ground is Article I, section 12 of the Oregon Constitution; see the Oregon item under “What the sources say”.
  Source: State v. Pittman, 367 Or. 498, 479 P.3d 1028 (Or. Jan. 28, 2021), opinion of the Court (Walters, C.J.), 367 Or. at 533 (the burden of proof under Article I, section 12) — https://ojd.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/api/collection/p17027coll3/id/9369/download
- In Massachusetts, the Supreme Judicial Court said, in a footnote, that there is some debate among courts and commenters as to whether the foregone conclusion exception can apply in cases where the government seeks to compel the defendant to disclose, whether orally or in writing, the actual password, as opposed to cases requiring merely physically entering it into the device; that it need not, and does not, resolve this distinction; that its decision is limited to only the physical entry of the password by the defendant, as it required in Gelfgatt; and that the defendant may therefore only be compelled to enter the password to the LG phone, not disclose it.
  The act was entering a password, not disclosing it.
  Source: Commonwealth v. Jones, 481 Mass. 540, 117 N.E.3d 702 (Mass. Mar. 6, 2019), n.9, opinion of the Court (Kafker, J.) (the decision is limited to physical entry of the password) (archived copy of the court’s slip opinion) — https://web.archive.org/web/20190315055659id_/https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2019/03/06/12564.pdf
- In the Eleventh Circuit (2012), the court held that the act of Doe’s decryption and production of the contents of the hard drives would sufficiently implicate the Fifth Amendment privilege. It said it reached this holding by concluding that (1) Doe’s decryption and production of the contents of the drives would be testimonial, not merely a physical act, and (2) the explicit and implicit factual communications associated with the decryption and production are not foregone conclusions. On the second point, it said that nothing in the record before it revealed that the Government knows whether any files exist and are located on the hard drives.
  The devices were hard drives, not a phone. A ruling of the Eleventh Circuit is a ruling of that circuit.
  Source: In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25, 2011, 670 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. Feb. 23, 2012), opinion of the court (Tjoflat, J.), Part II (holding; decryption of hard drives under a grand jury subpoena) — https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201112268.pdf

### What the sources say
- In Utah, the court said in its December 2023 opinion that whether an accused has a Fifth Amendment right not to disclose a passcode to an electronic device when law enforcement has a valid warrant to search the device is a question of first impression for that court, and that the United States Supreme Court has not yet addressed this specific question, so it analysed existing Fifth Amendment precedent to determine how it should extend to this new factual context.
  Source: State v. Valdez, 2023 UT 26 (Utah Dec. 14, 2023), ¶ 6, opinion of the Court (the court's statement as of its decision date) — http://www.utcourts.gov/opinions/supopin/State%20v.%20Valdez20231214.pdf
- In Utah, the court said that questions about how the Fifth Amendment extends to efforts to unlock seized devices have proven to be especially complex where law enforcement attempts to access the contents of a seized device by means that do not require the suspect to disclose the actual passcode, such as obtaining an order to compel the suspect to provide an unlocked device, and that this was not the situation before it: law enforcement asked Valdez to verbally provide his passcode.
  Source: State v. Valdez, 2023 UT 26 (Utah Dec. 14, 2023), ¶¶ 7–8, opinion of the Court (the court's description of what the case did not involve) — http://www.utcourts.gov/opinions/supopin/State%20v.%20Valdez20231214.pdf
- In Utah, the court said that Valdez was asked to verbally communicate his passcode to police, a traditional testimonial statement, and that while speaking a passcode and turning over an unlocked phone may be equivalent in many respects, they are not the same for Fifth Amendment purposes.
  Source: State v. Valdez, 2023 UT 26 (Utah Dec. 14, 2023), ¶ 57, opinion of the Court (reasoning) — http://www.utcourts.gov/opinions/supopin/State%20v.%20Valdez20231214.pdf
- In Utah, the court said, in a footnote, that if there would have been a dispute about whether the communication was compelled or incriminating, it would have been difficult to resolve those issues on that record, because the State did not move in the district court to compel Valdez to provide his passcode (or an unlocked phone), so that there was no direct litigation in the district court as to whether the Fifth Amendment shielded Valdez from doing so; that, because the State had not disputed that the communication was compelled and incriminating, it did not need to address those Fifth Amendment elements and focused only on the testimonial nature of the communication; and that it expressed no opinion as to whether the communication was compelled and incriminating.
  See the other Utah items for the act before the court (law enforcement asked Valdez to verbally provide his passcode) and for the State’s use of his refusal at trial.
  Source: State v. Valdez, 2023 UT 26 (Utah Dec. 14, 2023), ¶ 39 n.8, opinion of the Court (footnote 8: what the court did not decide about compulsion) — http://www.utcourts.gov/opinions/supopin/State%20v.%20Valdez20231214.pdf
- In Utah, the court affirmed the court of appeals and remanded to the district court for further proceedings in accordance with its opinion.
  Source: State v. Valdez, 2023 UT 26 (Utah Dec. 14, 2023), ¶ 75, opinion of the Court (disposition) — http://www.utcourts.gov/opinions/supopin/State%20v.%20Valdez20231214.pdf
- In Utah, in Valdez, the docket of the Supreme Court of the United States (Utah v. Valdez, No. 23-1020) records “Petition DENIED” on 24 June 2024.
  The quoted text is the docket entry itself.
  Source: Utah v. Valdez, No. 23-1020 (U.S.), docket entry of June 24, 2024 (petition for certiorari denied) — https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/23-1020.html
- In Indiana, the court said that giving law enforcement an unlocked smartphone communicates to the State, at a minimum, that (1) the suspect knows the password; (2) the files on the device exist; and (3) the suspect possesses those files.
  Source: Seo v. State, 148 N.E.3d 952 (Ind. June 23, 2020), slip op. at 5, Part I, opinion of the Court (reasoning) (CourtListener copy of the court's opinion) — https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2020/06/23/katelin_eunjoo_seo_v._state_of_indiana.pdf
- In Indiana, the court said that a detective got a second warrant that ordered Seo to unlock her iPhone, that she refused, and that the trial court held her in contempt; the Supreme Court reversed the contempt order.
  Source: Seo v. State, 148 N.E.3d 952 (Ind. June 23, 2020), slip op. at 2, opinion of the Court (disposition) (CourtListener copy of the court's opinion) — https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2020/06/23/katelin_eunjoo_seo_v._state_of_indiana.pdf
- In Pennsylvania, because the case concerned a motion to require an individual to recall and disclose a memorized password to a computer, the court said it need not address the related, but distinct, area involving biometric features like fingerprints, thumbprints, iris scanning, and facial recognition, or whether the foregone conclusion rationale would be appropriate in these circumstances.
  Source: Commonwealth v. Davis, 220 A.3d 534 (Pa. Nov. 20, 2019), opinion of the Court (Todd, J.), n.7, slip op. at 24 (what the court did not address) — https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Supreme/out/J-42-2019mo%20-%2010422940787775633.pdf
- In Pennsylvania, in Davis, the docket of the Supreme Court of the United States (Pennsylvania v. Davis, No. 19-1254) records “Petition DENIED” on 5 October 2020.
  The quoted text is the docket entry itself.
  Source: Pennsylvania v. Davis, No. 19-1254 (U.S.), docket entry of Oct. 5, 2020 (petition for certiorari denied) — https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/19-1254.html
- In New Jersey, the court said that access to the cellphones’ contents depended there upon entry of their passcodes; that a cellphone’s passcode is analogous to the combination to a safe, not a key; and that communicating or entering a passcode requires facts contained within the holder’s mind — the numbers, letters, or symbols composing the passcode — and is a testimonial act of production.
  Source: State v. Andrews, 234 A.3d 1254 (N.J. Aug. 10, 2020), opinion of the Court (Solomon, J.), Part III.C.1 (reasoning) — https://www.njcourts.gov/system/files/court-opinions/2020/a_72_18.pdf
- In New Jersey, the court said that, to determine the exception’s applicability, it must first determine to what the exception might apply — the act of producing the passcodes, or the act of producing the cellphones’ contents through the passcodes — and that, to be consistent with the Supreme Court case law that gave rise to the exception, it found that the foregone conclusion test applies to the production of the passcodes themselves, rather than to the phones’ contents.
  Source: State v. Andrews, 234 A.3d 1254 (N.J. Aug. 10, 2020), opinion of the Court (Solomon, J.), Part III.C.2 (reasoning) — https://www.njcourts.gov/system/files/court-opinions/2020/a_72_18.pdf
- In New Jersey, the court said that, although the act of producing the passcodes is presumptively protected by the Fifth Amendment, its testimonial value and constitutional protection may be overcome if the passcodes’ existence, possession, and authentication are foregone conclusions, and that, based on the record before it, it had little difficulty concluding that compelled production of the passcodes falls within the foregone conclusion exception.
  Source: State v. Andrews, 234 A.3d 1254 (N.J. Aug. 10, 2020), opinion of the Court (Solomon, J.), Parts III.C.2–3 (the exception applied on the record before the court) — https://www.njcourts.gov/system/files/court-opinions/2020/a_72_18.pdf
- In New Jersey, the court said that, although the United States Supreme Court had considered the application of the foregone conclusion exception only in the context of document production, courts in other jurisdictions had grappled with its applicability beyond that context, and many had considered whether it applies to compelled decryption or to the compelled production of passcodes and passwords, reaching divergent results.
  This is the New Jersey court’s description of other courts’ decisions, not its own holding.
  Source: State v. Andrews, 234 A.3d 1254 (N.J. Aug. 10, 2020), opinion of the Court (Solomon, J.), Part III.B.3 (the court's description of other courts' decisions, not its holding) — https://www.njcourts.gov/system/files/court-opinions/2020/a_72_18.pdf
- In New Jersey, Chief Justice Rabner and Justices Patterson and Fernandez-Vina joined Justice Solomon’s opinion, and Justice LaVecchia filed a dissent, in which Justices Albin and Timpone joined.
  The dissent is not quoted on this page and is not the court’s holding.
  Source: State v. Andrews, 234 A.3d 1254 (N.J. Aug. 10, 2020), end of the opinion of the Court (the vote; the dissent is not quoted) — https://www.njcourts.gov/system/files/court-opinions/2020/a_72_18.pdf
- In New Jersey, in Andrews, the docket of the Supreme Court of the United States (Andrews v. New Jersey, No. 20-937) records “Petition DENIED” on 17 May 2021.
  The quoted text is the docket entry itself.
  Source: Andrews v. New Jersey, No. 20-937 (U.S.), docket entry of May 17, 2021 (petition for certiorari denied) — https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/20-937.html
- In Illinois, the court said that, for the exception to apply, the State must establish that, at the time it sought the act of production, it knew with reasonable particularity that (1) the passcode existed, (2) the passcode was within the defendant’s possession or control, and (3) the passcode was authentic.
  Source: People v. Sneed, 2023 IL 127968, 230 N.E.3d 97 (Ill. June 15, 2023), ¶ 106, opinion of the Court (the test applied) — https://www.illinoiscourts.gov/resources/eeff3005-c65c-4cc5-a95f-5cf2a201175f/file
- In Illinois, the court said that cell phones may also be unlocked biometrically by using one’s fingerprint, facial recognition technology, or retina scans, and that, regardless of what method is used to unlock a cell phone, it finds them all equally comparable to using a key to unlock a door and declines to distinguish between the methods for purposes of fifth amendment application. In the same passage it also concluded that compelling the defendant to enter the passcode to his cell phone is testimonial not because it involves delving into the contents of his mind but because entering the passcode implicitly asserts that he is able to unlock the phone, which establishes that the passcode exists, he possesses or controls the passcode, and the passcode is authentic.
  The methods the court declined to distinguish between are a passcode and biometric unlocks (fingerprint, facial recognition, retina scan). The act in this case was entering a passcode.
  Source: People v. Sneed, 2023 IL 127968, 230 N.E.3d 97 (Ill. June 15, 2023), ¶¶ 83–85, opinion of the Court (reasoning) — https://www.illinoiscourts.gov/resources/eeff3005-c65c-4cc5-a95f-5cf2a201175f/file
- In Illinois, the court said that it found that the defendant failed to provide the substantial grounds necessary to warrant departing from the lockstep interpretation and to interpret the Illinois provision as “applying more expansively” than the federal provision in that case.
  This item concerns the Illinois provision, as the court called it, and the federal provision; for the act in this case see the other Illinois items.
  Source: People v. Sneed, 2023 IL 127968, 230 N.E.3d 97 (Ill. June 15, 2023), ¶ 67, opinion of the Court (the Illinois constitutional ground) — https://www.illinoiscourts.gov/resources/eeff3005-c65c-4cc5-a95f-5cf2a201175f/file
- In Illinois, in Sneed, the docket of the Supreme Court of the United States (Sneed v. Illinois, No. 23-5827) records “Petition DENIED” on 26 February 2024.
  The quoted text is the docket entry itself.
  Source: Sneed v. Illinois, No. 23-5827 (U.S.), docket entry of Feb. 26, 2024 (petition for certiorari denied) — https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/23-5827.html
- In Massachusetts, in Jones, the docket of the Supreme Court of the United States (Jones v. Massachusetts, No. 19-6275) records “Petition DENIED” on 18 November 2019.
  The quoted text is the docket entry itself.
  Source: Jones v. Massachusetts, No. 19-6275 (U.S.), docket entry of Nov. 18, 2019 (petition for certiorari denied) — https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/19-6275.html
- In Oregon, the court said that it began with the Oregon Constitution and, in particular, Article I, section 12, and that, because it concluded that the trial court’s order violated that state constitutional provision, it did not reach the defendant’s Fifth Amendment argument.
  Source: State v. Pittman, 367 Or. 498, 479 P.3d 1028 (Or. Jan. 28, 2021), opinion of the Court (Walters, C.J.), 367 Or. at 508 (the constitutional ground) — https://ojd.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/api/collection/p17027coll3/id/9369/download
- In the Third Circuit (2017), the court affirmed the order holding John Doe in civil contempt for refusing to comply with an order issued under the All Writs Act which required him to produce several seized devices in a fully unencrypted state. It said that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding Doe to be in contempt of the Decryption Order; that, even if it could assess the Fifth Amendment decision of the Magistrate Judge, its review would be limited to plain error; that the Magistrate Judge did not commit a clear or obvious error in his application of the foregone conclusion doctrine; and that, because its review was limited to plain error and no plain error was committed by the District Court in finding that the Government established that the contents of the encrypted hard drives are known to it, it did not need to decide that the inquiry can be limited to the question of whether Doe’s knowledge of the password itself is sufficient to support application of the foregone conclusion doctrine.
  A ruling of the Third Circuit is a ruling of that circuit.
  Source: United States v. Apple MacPro Computer, 851 F.3d 238 (3d Cir. Mar. 20, 2017), opinion of the court (Vanaskie, J.) (affirming a civil-contempt order; the Fifth Amendment challenge was reviewed for plain error only) — https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/153537p.pdf
- In the Third Circuit (2020), in a later appeal in the same matter, the court said that Rawls sought release arguing that 28 U.S.C. § 1826 limits his maximum permissible confinement for civil contempt, and that, because it concluded § 1826 applies to Rawls, it would reverse the order of the District Court and order Rawls’ release.
  A ruling of the Third Circuit is a ruling of that circuit. This is a later appeal in the same matter as the 2017 decision above; the quoted text concerns release from civil-contempt confinement.
  Source: United States v. Apple MacPro Computer, 949 F.3d 102 (3d Cir. Feb. 6, 2020) (No. 17-3205), opinion of the court (Fuentes, J.), opening (a later appeal in the same matter: release from civil-contempt confinement) — https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/173205p.pdf
- In the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Payne, the docket of the Supreme Court of the United States (Payne v. United States, No. 24-5871) records “Petition DENIED” on 25 November 2024.
  The quoted text is the docket entry itself.
  Source: Payne v. United States, No. 24-5871 (U.S.), docket entry: petition for certiorari denied Nov. 25, 2024 (United States v. Payne, 9th Cir. No. 22-50262, below) — https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/24-5871.html
- In the D.C. Circuit, Brown said that if Schwartz had instead been compelled to disclose whether he could open the phone, and made to say yes or to verbally disclose the password, those answers unquestionably would be testimonial communications — a statement about a situation that case did not involve.
  Source: United States v. Brown, No. 23-3074 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 17, 2025), slip op. 25–26 — https://media.cadc.uscourts.gov/opinions/docs/2025/01/23-3074-2094718.pdf

## Reporting abuse or a sexual offence: requests for your phone
URL: https://phoneseized.com/scenarios/complainant-asked-for-phone
Jurisdictions: England & Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland
Last reviewed: 2026-10-06

### Who this page is for, and what it does not cover
This page is for a person who has reported an offence and is asked for their own phone. Nothing on it tells you to agree or to refuse; it sets out what the Act and the Code say, in their words. Section 37(1) of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/37) says an authorised person may extract information stored on an electronic device from that device if a user of the device has voluntarily provided the device to an authorised person, and that user has agreed to the extraction of information from the device by an authorised person. The power and its conditions are covered on the PCSC page (https://phoneseized.com/uk/victims-witnesses-pcsc). The Code says it “only applies as regards the powers in Chapter 3 of Part 2 of the Act” (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/634810a38fa8f53463dcb957/E02802691_Electronic_Devices_Code_of_Practice_WEB.pdf) and that “If another power is being used as the basis for extracting information from an electronic device, the guidance/code for that power will apply.” Read every Code paragraph quoted below with that scope in mind. A phone taken under a seizure power is a different situation: for England and Wales, see extraction after seizure (https://phoneseized.com/uk/extraction-after-seizure). Section 207(2) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/207) says sections 37 to 44 (and Schedule 3) extend to England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. For Scotland, see seizure and cyber kiosks in Scotland (https://phoneseized.com/scotland/seizure-and-cyber-kiosks).

### Saying no, and what the notice must tell you
Section 39(1) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/39) says a person (‘P’) is treated for the purposes of section 37 or 38 as having voluntarily provided an electronic device to an authorised person and agreed to the extraction of information from it only if the requirements of section 39 have been met. Under section 39(3), an authorised person must have given P notice in writing specifying or describing the information that is sought; specifying the reason why the information is sought; specifying how the information will be dealt with once it has been extracted; stating that P may refuse to provide the device or agree to the extraction of information from it; and stating that the investigation or enquiry for the purposes of which the information is sought will not be brought to an end merely because P refuses to provide the device or agree to the extraction of information from it. Paragraphs (d) and (e) are worded as things the written notice must state, in the Act’s words. Section 39(2) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/39) says an authorised person must not have placed undue pressure on P to provide the device or agree to the extraction of information from it. The Code (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/634810a38fa8f53463dcb957/E02802691_Electronic_Devices_Code_of_Practice_WEB.pdf) says the individual must not have had any undue pressure placed on them or been coerced by anyone (including an authorised person) to provide the device or agree to the extraction of information from it. It describes “undue pressure” as making the person feel as though they do not have a choice about volunteering the device and agreeing to extraction, and says there may be cases where the information on the device is the only remaining reasonable line of enquiry, which should be clearly explained to the individual; and that it is recognised that in some circumstances the very act of making a request for a device and the extraction of information from it may make the victim or witness feel a degree of pressure, which the authorised person should take into account when communicating the reason for the request.

### Agreeing: what must be recorded
Section 39(4) to (7) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/39) sets further requirements for P to be treated as having voluntarily provided the device and agreed to the extraction. Subject to subsection (5), P must have confirmed in writing that P has voluntarily provided the device and agreed to the extraction. If P was unable to provide that confirmation in writing as a result of P’s physical impairment or lack of literacy skills, P must have given it orally and an authorised person must have recorded it in writing. If the confirmation was given in writing and in hard copy form, the authorised person must have given P a copy of it (in hard copy or electronic form); if it was given orally, the authorised person must have given P a copy of the record of it (in hard copy or electronic form).

### Changing your mind
Code paragraph 158 (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/634810a38fa8f53463dcb957/E02802691_Electronic_Devices_Code_of_Practice_WEB.pdf) says the device user, or the person who has voluntarily provided the device and agreed to the extraction of information from it in accordance with Section 38, has the right to withdraw their agreement for information to be extracted from the device; that it is that individual’s decision to give the authorised person the device and to agree to the extraction, and they can change their mind; and that, in the case of a device that is used by multiple users, only the person who voluntarily provided the device and agreed to the extraction can withdraw that agreement. Code paragraph 159 (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/634810a38fa8f53463dcb957/E02802691_Electronic_Devices_Code_of_Practice_WEB.pdf) says: “It should be made clear that withdrawal of agreement will mean that the device is returned, if the extraction has not already taken place, then the information will not be taken from the device. However, if agreement is withdrawn after the extraction of information has taken place, it may not be possible to delete or return it. This is because of the duties on investigating agencies and prosecution services to disclose information to the defence.”

### How much they should take, and whether you can be there
The Code says that in all cases authorised persons must ensure information extraction is not excessive, minimising intrusion into the device user’s privacy and the privacy of others (paragraph 133 (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/634810a38fa8f53463dcb957/E02802691_Electronic_Devices_Code_of_Practice_WEB.pdf)), and that in all cases, before exercising the Section 37 power, an authorised person must consider other methods for obtaining the required information that do not have the same level of intrusion (paragraph 191 (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/634810a38fa8f53463dcb957/E02802691_Electronic_Devices_Code_of_Practice_WEB.pdf)). Paragraph 134 (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/634810a38fa8f53463dcb957/E02802691_Electronic_Devices_Code_of_Practice_WEB.pdf) adds that in some cases, it may be necessary to extract a larger subset of information to understand the context of it, for example viewing the conversation immediately before and after a relevant comment. Paragraph 136 (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/634810a38fa8f53463dcb957/E02802691_Electronic_Devices_Code_of_Practice_WEB.pdf) says that where the Section 37 power is used, the device user, or person providing agreement if different, should be offered an opportunity to be present when the extraction takes place. The exceptions are where the authorised persons consider it impractical or inappropriate to do so, or where there are technical limitations that do not allow it.

### Getting the phone back
These are the Code’s words; “should” is its verb in paragraphs 135, 195 and 197, not “must”. Paragraph 135 (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/634810a38fa8f53463dcb957/E02802691_Electronic_Devices_Code_of_Practice_WEB.pdf) says authorised persons should make every effort to limit the time that a device user is left without their device. Paragraph 195 (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/634810a38fa8f53463dcb957/E02802691_Electronic_Devices_Code_of_Practice_WEB.pdf) says that in all cases where a person has provided agreement to extract information, authorised persons should aim to return a device as quickly as possible; in the case of a rape victim, the device should ideally be returned within 24 hours of “the being taken” (the Code’s wording), and the 24-hour period starts at the point the device is physically transferred to the authority for the extraction. Paragraph 197 (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/634810a38fa8f53463dcb957/E02802691_Electronic_Devices_Code_of_Practice_WEB.pdf) says that where a rape victim’s electronic device is taken for examination and it is not possible to return it within 24 hours, they should be provided with a replacement device or support in obtaining one. Paragraph 159 (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/634810a38fa8f53463dcb957/E02802691_Electronic_Devices_Code_of_Practice_WEB.pdf) adds that in all cases the extracted information and the device must only be retained where there is a lawful basis to do so and as long as necessary in line with each authority’s data retention policies and other relevant guidance. What the Code says about deleting information that is not relevant is covered, for England and Wales, on how long police can keep your phone data (https://phoneseized.com/uk/retention-and-deletion).

### If the user is a child
Section 37(13) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/37) says that in this Chapter “child” means a person aged under 18. Section 38 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/38) says a child is not to be treated for the purposes of section 37(1) as being capable of voluntarily providing an electronic device to an authorised person for those purposes, or agreeing for those purposes to the extraction of information from the device. If a child is a user of an electronic device, a person who is not a user of the device but is listed in subsection (3) may do both: a parent or guardian of the child or, if the child is in the care of a relevant authority or voluntary organisation, a person representing that authority or organisation, or, if no such person is available, any responsible person who is aged 18 or over other than a relevant authorised person. Before exercising the power by virtue of subsection (2), an authorised person must, so far as it is reasonably practicable to do so, ascertain the views of the child and have regard to any views so ascertained, taking account of the child’s age and maturity. If an authorised person exercises the power under section 37(1) as a result of action taken under subsection (2) by a person within subsection (3)(b), the authorised person must, unless they consider that it is not appropriate to do so, inform a person within subsection (3)(a) that they have exercised the power. Nothing in the section prevents any other user of an electronic device who is not a child or an adult without capacity from voluntarily providing the device to an authorised person for the purposes of section 37(1), or agreeing for those purposes to the extraction of information from the device by an authorised person. The section is subject to section 39.

### Other powers still exist
Section 37(12) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/37) says that section 37 does not affect any power relating to the extraction or production of information, or any power to seize any item or obtain any information, conferred by an enactment or rule of law. Code paragraph 193 (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/634810a38fa8f53463dcb957/E02802691_Electronic_Devices_Code_of_Practice_WEB.pdf) deals with a vulnerable victim who is involved in an activity where they are a victim but does not see themselves as such: it says that in cases where the only option is to examine a device belonging to someone who does not believe they are a victim, it may be necessary to use a different power to obtain the device that does not rely on the individual’s agreement, and that any use of an alternative power in these circumstances should be carefully considered and must only be used in the case of a victim as a last resort. For what the PACE seizure powers are in England and Wales, see can police take my phone (https://phoneseized.com/uk/seizure-pace); for Scotland, see seizure and cyber kiosks in Scotland (https://phoneseized.com/scotland/seizure-and-cyber-kiosks).

### What the Code is worth
Section 37(11) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/37) says an authorised person must have regard to the code of practice for the time being in force under section 42 in exercising, or deciding whether to exercise, the power in subsection (1). Section 42(9) and (10) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/42) say a failure on the part of an authorised person to act in accordance with the code does not of itself render the person liable to any criminal or civil proceedings, but the code is admissible in evidence in criminal or civil proceedings and a court may take into account a failure to act in accordance with it in determining a question in the proceedings.

### More help
See also rightsandlimits.com’s page on victim phone extraction (https://rightsandlimits.com/devices/victim-phone-extraction). Related pages on this site: the phone of someone who has died (https://phoneseized.com/scenarios/phone-of-someone-who-has-died) and what a full extraction contains (https://phoneseized.com/on-your-phone/what-a-full-extraction-contains).

### You may refuse
- Under s.39(1) of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, a person (‘P’) is treated for the purposes of section 37 or 38 as having voluntarily provided an electronic device to an authorised person and agreed to the extraction of information from it only if the requirements of section 39 have been met. Under s.39(3)(d), an authorised person must have given P notice in writing stating that P may refuse to provide the device or agree to the extraction of information from it.
  Source: Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.39(1) and (3) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/39

### Limits on them
- Under s.39(3)(e) of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, the notice in writing that an authorised person must have given to a person (‘P’) before P is treated for the purposes of section 37 or 38 as having voluntarily provided an electronic device and agreed to the extraction of information from it must state that the investigation or enquiry for the purposes of which the information is sought will not be brought to an end merely because P refuses to provide the device or agree to the extraction of information from it.
  Source: Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.39(1) and (3) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/39
- Under s.39(1) and (2) of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, a person (‘P’) is treated for the purposes of section 37 or 38 as having voluntarily provided an electronic device to an authorised person and agreed to the extraction of information from it only if the requirements of section 39 have been met; one of those requirements is that an authorised person must not have placed undue pressure on P to provide the device or agree to the extraction of information from it.
  Source: Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.39(1) and (2) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/39
- The extraction Code says the individual must not have had any undue pressure placed on them or been coerced by anyone (including an authorised person) to provide the device or agree to the extraction of information from it; that ‘undue pressure’ means making the person feel as though they do not have a choice about volunteering the device and agreeing to extraction, for example if they are made to feel that an investigation will be discontinued prematurely, or other reasonable lines of enquiry not followed if they do not agree to extraction; and that there may be cases where the information on the device is the only remaining reasonable line of enquiry, which should be clearly explained to the individual; and that it is recognised that in some circumstances the very act of making a request for a device and the extraction of information from it may make the victim or witness feel a degree of pressure, which the authorised person should take into account when communicating the reason for the request.
  Source: Extraction of Information from Electronic Devices: Code of Practice (Oct 2022), paras 145 and 146 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/634810a38fa8f53463dcb957/E02802691_Electronic_Devices_Code_of_Practice_WEB.pdf
- Under s.39(1) and (4) to (7) of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, a person (‘P’) is treated for the purposes of section 37 or 38 as having voluntarily provided an electronic device and agreed to the extraction of information from it only if the requirements of section 39 have been met, which include: subject to subsection (5), P must have confirmed in writing that P has voluntarily provided the device and agreed to the extraction; if P was unable to provide that confirmation in writing as a result of P’s physical impairment or lack of literacy skills, P must have given it orally and an authorised person must have recorded it in writing; if P’s confirmation was given in writing and in hard copy form, the authorised person must have given P a copy of that confirmation (in hard copy or electronic form); and if it was given orally, the authorised person must have given P a copy of the record of it (in hard copy or electronic form).
  Source: Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.39(1) and (4) to (7) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/39
- Under s.38 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, a child is not to be treated for the purposes of section 37(1) as being capable of voluntarily providing an electronic device to an authorised person for those purposes, or agreeing for those purposes to the extraction of information from the device; if a child is a user of the device, a person who is not a user but is listed in subsection (3) (a parent or guardian of the child or, if the child is in the care of a relevant authority or voluntary organisation, a person representing that authority or organisation, or, if no such person is available, any responsible person aged 18 or over other than a relevant authorised person) may do so; before exercising the power by virtue of subsection (2), an authorised person must, so far as it is reasonably practicable to do so, ascertain the views of the child and have regard to any views so ascertained, taking account of the child’s age and maturity; if an authorised person exercises the power under section 37(1) as a result of action taken under subsection (2) by a person within subsection (3)(b), the authorised person must, unless they consider that it is not appropriate to do so, inform a person within subsection (3)(a) that they have exercised the power; nothing in the section prevents any other user of an electronic device who is not a child or an adult without capacity from voluntarily providing the device to an authorised person for the purposes of section 37(1), or agreeing for those purposes to the extraction of information from the device by an authorised person; and the section is subject to section 39.
  Source: Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.38(1) to (5), (9) and (12) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/38
- The extraction Code says that in all cases, before exercising the Section 37 power, an authorised person must consider other methods for obtaining the required information that do not have the same level of intrusion.
  Source: Extraction of Information from Electronic Devices: Code of Practice (Oct 2022), para 191 (first sentence) — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/634810a38fa8f53463dcb957/E02802691_Electronic_Devices_Code_of_Practice_WEB.pdf
- The extraction Code says that in all cases authorised persons must ensure information extraction is not excessive, minimising intrusion into the device user’s privacy and the privacy of others; and that in some cases, it may be necessary to extract a larger subset of information to understand the context of it, for example viewing the conversation immediately before and after a relevant comment.
  Source: Extraction of Information from Electronic Devices: Code of Practice (Oct 2022), paras 133 and 134 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/634810a38fa8f53463dcb957/E02802691_Electronic_Devices_Code_of_Practice_WEB.pdf
- The extraction Code says that where the Section 37 power is used, the device user, or person providing agreement if different, should be offered an opportunity to be present when the extraction takes place; the exceptions are where the authorised persons consider it impractical or inappropriate to do so, or where there are technical limitations that do not allow it.
  Source: Extraction of Information from Electronic Devices: Code of Practice (Oct 2022), para 136 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/634810a38fa8f53463dcb957/E02802691_Electronic_Devices_Code_of_Practice_WEB.pdf
- The extraction Code says authorised persons should make every effort to limit the time that a device user is left without their device.
  Source: Extraction of Information from Electronic Devices: Code of Practice (Oct 2022), para 135 (first sentence) — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/634810a38fa8f53463dcb957/E02802691_Electronic_Devices_Code_of_Practice_WEB.pdf
- The extraction Code says that in all cases where a person has provided agreement to extract information, authorised persons should aim to return a device as quickly as possible; in the case of a rape victim, the device should ideally be returned within 24 hours of “the being taken” (the Code’s wording), and the 24-hour period starts at the point the device is physically transferred to the authority for the extraction.
  Source: Extraction of Information from Electronic Devices: Code of Practice (Oct 2022), para 195 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/634810a38fa8f53463dcb957/E02802691_Electronic_Devices_Code_of_Practice_WEB.pdf
- The extraction Code says that where a rape victim’s electronic device is taken for examination and it is not possible to return it within 24 hours, they should be provided with a replacement device or support in obtaining one.
  Source: Extraction of Information from Electronic Devices: Code of Practice (Oct 2022), para 197 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/634810a38fa8f53463dcb957/E02802691_Electronic_Devices_Code_of_Practice_WEB.pdf
- The extraction Code says that in all cases the extracted information and the device must only be retained where there is a lawful basis to do so and as long as necessary in line with each authority’s data retention policies and other relevant guidance.
  Source: Extraction of Information from Electronic Devices: Code of Practice (Oct 2022), para 159 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/634810a38fa8f53463dcb957/E02802691_Electronic_Devices_Code_of_Practice_WEB.pdf
- Under s.37(11) of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, an authorised person must have regard to the code of practice for the time being in force under section 42 in exercising, or deciding whether to exercise, the power in subsection (1).
  Source: Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.37(11) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/37

### What the sources say
- The extraction Code says it does not supersede guidance/codes that accompany other pieces of legislation, and only applies as regards the powers in Chapter 3 of Part 2 of the Act, and that if another power is being used as the basis for extracting information from an electronic device, the guidance/code for that power will apply.
  Source: Extraction of Information from Electronic Devices: Code of Practice (Oct 2022), para 4 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/634810a38fa8f53463dcb957/E02802691_Electronic_Devices_Code_of_Practice_WEB.pdf
- Section 37(13) of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 says that in this Chapter “child” means a person aged under 18.
  Source: Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.37(13) (interpretation: "child") — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/37
- Section 207(2) of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 says sections 37 to 44 (and Schedule 3) extend to England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.
  Source: Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.207(2)(b) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/207
- The extraction Code says the device user, or the person who has voluntarily provided the device and agreed to the extraction of information from it in accordance with Section 38, has the right to withdraw their agreement for information to be extracted from the device; that it is that individual’s decision to give the authorised person the device and to agree to the extraction of information from it, and they can change their mind; and that, in the case of a device that is used by multiple users, only the person who voluntarily provided the device and agreed to the extraction of information from it can withdraw that agreement.
  Source: Extraction of Information from Electronic Devices: Code of Practice (Oct 2022), para 158 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/634810a38fa8f53463dcb957/E02802691_Electronic_Devices_Code_of_Practice_WEB.pdf
- The extraction Code says: “It should be made clear that withdrawal of agreement will mean that the device is returned, if the extraction has not already taken place, then the information will not be taken from the device. However, if agreement is withdrawn after the extraction of information has taken place, it may not be possible to delete or return it. This is because of the duties on investigating agencies and prosecution services to disclose information to the defence.”
  Source: Extraction of Information from Electronic Devices: Code of Practice (Oct 2022), para 159 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/634810a38fa8f53463dcb957/E02802691_Electronic_Devices_Code_of_Practice_WEB.pdf
- Section 37(12) of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 says that section 37 does not affect any power relating to the extraction or production of information, or any power to seize any item or obtain any information, conferred by an enactment or rule of law.
  Source: Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.37(12) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/37
- The extraction Code says that there may be cases when a vulnerable victim is involved in an activity where they are a victim, but do not see themselves as such, for example if they have been sexually abused, groomed or are the victim of domestic abuse, but believe they are in a consenting relationship with their abuser; that in such cases the authorised person will need to work carefully with the vulnerable victim and any support representative to decide on the right course of action; that in cases where the only option is to examine a device belonging to someone who does not believe they are a victim, it may be necessary to use a different power to obtain the device that does not rely on the individual’s agreement; and that any use of an alternative power in these circumstances should be carefully considered and must only be used in the case of a victim as a last resort.
  Source: Extraction of Information from Electronic Devices: Code of Practice (Oct 2022), para 193 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/634810a38fa8f53463dcb957/E02802691_Electronic_Devices_Code_of_Practice_WEB.pdf
- Section 42(9) and (10) of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 say a failure on the part of an authorised person to act in accordance with the code does not of itself render the person liable to any criminal or civil proceedings, but the code is admissible in evidence in criminal or civil proceedings and a court may take into account a failure to act in accordance with it in determining a question in the proceedings.
  Source: Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.42(9) and (10) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/42

## Police and the phone of someone who has died
URL: https://phoneseized.com/scenarios/phone-of-someone-who-has-died
Jurisdictions: England & Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland
Last reviewed: 2026-10-06

### Section 40 and section 41
Section 40(1) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/40) of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 says that, if any of conditions A to C is met, an authorised person may exercise the power in section 37(1) to extract information stored on an electronic device from that device even though the device has not been voluntarily provided to an authorised person by a user of the device, or no user of the device has agreed to the extraction of information from the device by an authorised person. Condition A is that a person who was a user of the electronic device has died, and the person was a user of the device immediately before their death. Section 40(5) says the exercise of the power in subsection (1) of section 37 by virtue of section 40 is subject to that section. Section 41 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/41) is a separate provision. It says an authorised person may extract information stored on an electronic device from that device if a person who was a user of the device has died and was a user of the device immediately before their death. The power may be exercised only for the purposes of an investigation into the person’s death under Chapter 1 of Part 1 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, an inquest into the person’s death under the Coroners Act (Northern Ireland) 1959, or an investigation into the person’s death by the Lord Advocate. References to exercising it for the purposes of an investigation or inquest include exercising it for the purposes of determining whether an investigation should be conducted or an inquest should be held. Code paragraph 68 (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/634810a38fa8f53463dcb957/E02802691_Electronic_Devices_Code_of_Practice_WEB.pdf) says the section 41 power is separate to the power in Section 37, which may also be used where a person has died if the purpose for obtaining information is for the detection, investigation or prosecution of a criminal offence related to their death. Section 207(2) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/207) lists sections 37 to 44 (and Schedule 3) among the provisions of the 2022 Act that extend to England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. For other Scottish pages on seizure, see seizure and cyber kiosks in Scotland (https://phoneseized.com/scotland/seizure-and-cyber-kiosks).

### Agreement, and the conditions that still apply
Section 40(1) is worded “even though” the device has not been voluntarily provided by a user, or no user has agreed to the extraction. It does not remove the other conditions. Code paragraphs 61 and 62 (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/634810a38fa8f53463dcb957/E02802691_Electronic_Devices_Code_of_Practice_WEB.pdf) say the guidance that follows only applies in the cases they list (a user who has died and was a user immediately before they died; a child or an adult without capacity where the authorised person reasonably believes that their life is at risk, or there is risk of serious harm to them; a user who is missing, was a user immediately before they went missing and where the authorised person reasonably believes that their life is at risk or there is a risk of serious harm to them); in these cases the authorised person may extract information from the device even though it has not been voluntarily provided and agreement to extract information from it has not been given; however, the other provisions of Section 37 still apply (for example, the authorised person must still reasonably believe that information stored on the device is relevant to a purpose for which they may exercise the power). Section 37(2) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/37) says the power in subsection (1) may be exercised only for the purposes of preventing, detecting, investigating or prosecuting crime; helping to locate a missing person; or protecting a child or an at-risk adult from neglect or physical, mental or emotional harm. Section 37(5) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/37) says an authorised person may exercise that power only if, in a case where they propose to exercise it for the crime purpose, they reasonably believe that information stored on the device is relevant to a reasonable line of enquiry which is being, or is to be, pursued by an authorised person; in a case where they propose to exercise it for the missing-person or protection purpose, they reasonably believe that information stored on the device is relevant to that purpose; and in any case they are satisfied that exercise of the power is necessary and proportionate to achieve the purpose for which they propose to exercise it. Section 37(6) and (7) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/37) add a requirement where the authorised person thinks there is a risk of obtaining information other than information necessary for a purpose for which the power may be exercised (set out in the table below). For section 41, section 41(4) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/41) says an authorised person may exercise the power in subsection (1) only if they reasonably believe that information stored on the device is relevant to a purpose within section 41(2), and are satisfied that exercise of the power is necessary and proportionate to achieve that purpose. Code paragraph 67 (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/634810a38fa8f53463dcb957/E02802691_Electronic_Devices_Code_of_Practice_WEB.pdf) says authorised persons do not need to obtain agreement to exercise the section 41 power for this purpose, but must ensure that the requirements of necessity, proportionality, and assessment of risk of obtaining other information or confidential information have been met.

### Who may use the section 41 power
Section 44 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/44) says that, subject to subsections (2) and (3), “authorised person” in this Chapter means a person listed in Schedule 3; that the power in section 41(1) may be exercised only by a person listed in Part 1 of Schedule 3. This page does not set out what Schedule 3 lists. The voluntary pathway and section 40 are covered on the PCSC page (https://phoneseized.com/uk/victims-witnesses-pcsc).

### What the Code says ‘immediately before they died’ means
Code paragraph 69 (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/634810a38fa8f53463dcb957/E02802691_Electronic_Devices_Code_of_Practice_WEB.pdf) says ‘Immediately before they died’ means that they were the user of the device around the time of their death, but not necessarily that they were actively using it at the moment of their death. Section 37(13) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/37) says that in this Chapter “user”, in relation to an electronic device, means a person who ordinarily uses the device.

### What happens to what is taken
Section 42(1) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/42) says the Secretary of State must prepare a code of practice containing guidance about the exercise of the powers in sections 37(1) and 41(1). The Code (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/634810a38fa8f53463dcb957/E02802691_Electronic_Devices_Code_of_Practice_WEB.pdf) says it “only applies as regards the powers in Chapter 3 of Part 2 of the Act” and that “If another power is being used as the basis for extracting information from an electronic device, the guidance/code for that power will apply.” It also says: “Information which is extracted and deemed not relevant must be deleted unless there is a lawful basis to retain it.” More on retention is, for England and Wales, on how long police can keep your phone data (https://phoneseized.com/uk/retention-and-deletion) and, for Scotland, on the Scotland retention page (https://phoneseized.com/scotland/retention).

### What this page does not say
Nothing quoted on this page says who is entitled to the device or its contents afterwards, whether relatives must be told, or how a coroner’s own powers to take a device work. Section 41(11) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/41) says section 41 does not affect any power relating to the extraction or production of information, or any power to seize any item or obtain any information, conferred by an enactment or rule of law, and Code paragraph 67 says the section 41 power is separate to any other power for the seizure of devices, such as those contained in the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. See also requests for a complainant’s phone (https://phoneseized.com/scenarios/complainant-asked-for-phone) and what they can extract (https://phoneseized.com/compare/what-they-can-extract).

### What they can do
- Section 40(1) of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 says that, if any of conditions A to C is met, an authorised person may exercise the power in section 37(1) to extract information stored on an electronic device from that device even though the device has not been voluntarily provided to an authorised person by a user of the device, or no user of the device has agreed to the extraction of information from the device by an authorised person. Section 40(2) says Condition A is that a person who was a user of the electronic device has died, and the person was a user of the device immediately before their death. Section 40(5) says the exercise of the power in subsection (1) of section 37 by virtue of this section is subject to that section.
  Source: Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.40(1) to (5) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/40
- Under s.41(1) of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, an authorised person may extract information stored on an electronic device from that device if a person who was a user of the device has died and was a user of the device immediately before their death. Under s.41(2), that power may be exercised only for the purposes of an investigation into the person’s death under Chapter 1 of Part 1 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, an inquest into the person’s death under the Coroners Act (Northern Ireland) 1959, or an investigation into the person’s death by the Lord Advocate. Under s.41(3), references in s.41(2) to the exercise of the power for the purposes of an investigation or inquest include exercising it for the purposes of determining whether an investigation should be conducted or an inquest should be held.
  Source: Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.41(1) to (3) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/41
- The extraction Code says the power in Section 41 is separate to the power in Section 37, which may also be used where a person has died if the purpose for obtaining information is for the detection, investigation or prosecution of a criminal offence related to their death.
  Source: Extraction of Information from Electronic Devices: Code of Practice (Oct 2022), paras 65 (first sentence) and 68 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/634810a38fa8f53463dcb957/E02802691_Electronic_Devices_Code_of_Practice_WEB.pdf

### Limits on them
- Section 37(2) of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 says the power in section 37(1) may be exercised only for the purposes of preventing, detecting, investigating or prosecuting crime; helping to locate a missing person; or protecting a child or an at-risk adult from neglect or physical, mental or emotional harm. Section 37(4) says an adult is an at-risk adult if the authorised person reasonably believes that the adult is experiencing, or at risk of, neglect or physical, mental or emotional harm, and is unable to protect themselves against the neglect or harm or the risk of it.
  Source: Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.37(2) to (4) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/37
- Section 37(5) of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 says an authorised person may exercise the power in section 37(1) only if, in a case where they propose to exercise the power for the purpose of preventing, detecting, investigating or prosecuting crime, they reasonably believe that information stored on the device is relevant to a reasonable line of enquiry which is being, or is to be, pursued by an authorised person; in a case where they propose to exercise it for the purpose of helping to locate a missing person or protecting a child or an at-risk adult, they reasonably believe that information stored on the device is relevant to that purpose; and in any case they are satisfied that exercise of the power is necessary and proportionate to achieve the purpose for which they propose to exercise it.
  Source: Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.37(5) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/37
- Section 41(4) of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 says an authorised person may exercise the power in subsection (1) only if they reasonably believe that information stored on the device is relevant to a purpose within subsection (2), and are satisfied that exercise of the power is necessary and proportionate to achieve that purpose.
  Source: Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.41(4) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/41
- Section 44 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 says that, subject to subsections (2) and (3), in this Chapter “authorised person” means a person listed in Schedule 3; that the power in section 37(1) may be exercised for a purpose mentioned in section 37(2)(b) or (c) only by a person listed in Part 1 or 2 of Schedule 3; and that the power in section 41(1) may be exercised only by a person listed in Part 1 of Schedule 3.
  Source: Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.44(1) to (3) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/44
- Section 37(6) and (7) of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 say that, if the authorised person thinks that, in exercising the power in subsection (1), there is a risk of obtaining information other than information necessary for a purpose within subsection (2) for which they may exercise the power, or information necessary for a purpose within section 41(2) for which they may exercise the power in section 41(1), then to be satisfied that the exercise is proportionate they must be satisfied that there are no other means of obtaining the information sought which avoid that risk, or that there are such other means but it is not reasonably practicable to use them.
  Source: Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.37(6) and (7) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/37
- The extraction Code says the power in Section 41 is separate to any other power for the seizure of devices, such as those contained in the Coroners and Justice Act 2009; that authorised persons do not need to obtain agreement to exercise the power for this purpose; and that they must ensure that the requirements of necessity, proportionality, and assessment of risk of obtaining other information or confidential information have been met.
  Source: Extraction of Information from Electronic Devices: Code of Practice (Oct 2022), paras 65 to 67 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/634810a38fa8f53463dcb957/E02802691_Electronic_Devices_Code_of_Practice_WEB.pdf
- The extraction Code says the guidance that follows only applies in cases where the device user has died and was a user of the device immediately before they died; where the device user is a child or an adult without capacity and the authorised person reasonably believes that their life is at risk, or there is risk of serious harm to them; or where the device user is missing, was a user of the device immediately before they went missing and the authorised person reasonably believes that their life is at risk or there is a risk of serious harm to them. In these cases the authorised person may extract information from the device even though it has not been voluntarily provided and agreement to extract information from it has not been given; however, the other provisions of Section 37 still apply (e.g., the authorised person must still reasonably believe that information stored on the device is relevant to a purpose for which they may exercise the power).
  Source: Extraction of Information from Electronic Devices: Code of Practice (Oct 2022), paras 61 and 62 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/634810a38fa8f53463dcb957/E02802691_Electronic_Devices_Code_of_Practice_WEB.pdf
- The Code of Practice on extraction of information from electronic devices says it only applies as regards the powers in Chapter 3 of Part 2 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 (‘the Act’), and that information which is extracted and deemed not relevant must be deleted unless there is a lawful basis to retain it.
  Source: Extraction of Information from Electronic Devices: Code of Practice (Oct 2022), paras 1, 4 and 138 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/634810a38fa8f53463dcb957/E02802691_Electronic_Devices_Code_of_Practice_WEB.pdf

### What the sources say
- Section 41(11) of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 says section 41 does not affect any power relating to the extraction or production of information, or any power to seize any item or obtain any information, conferred by an enactment or rule of law.
  Source: Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.41(11) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/41
- The extraction Code says ‘Immediately before they died’ means that they were the user of the device around the time of their death, but not necessarily that they were actively using it at the moment of their death.
  Source: Extraction of Information from Electronic Devices: Code of Practice (Oct 2022), para 69 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/634810a38fa8f53463dcb957/E02802691_Electronic_Devices_Code_of_Practice_WEB.pdf
- Section 37(13) of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 says that in this Chapter “user”, in relation to an electronic device, means a person who ordinarily uses the device.
  Source: Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.37(13) (interpretation: "user") — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/37
- Section 207(2) of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 lists sections 37 to 44 (and Schedule 3) among the provisions that extend to England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.
  Source: Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.207(2)(b) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/207

## Journalists: police access to source material on a phone
URL: https://phoneseized.com/scenarios/journalist-source-material
Jurisdictions: England & Wales
Last reviewed: 2026-10-04

### What PACE counts as journalistic material, excluded material and special procedure material
Section 13 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/13) says that, subject to subsection (2), “journalistic material” means material acquired or created for the purposes of journalism. Material is only journalistic material if it is in the possession of a person who acquired or created it for the purposes of journalism (s.13(2)), and a person who receives material from someone who intends that the recipient shall use it for the purposes of journalism is to be taken to have acquired it for those purposes (s.13(3)). Section 11(1) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/11) says that, subject to the following provisions of s.11, “excluded material” means personal records which a person has acquired or created in the course of any trade, business, profession or other occupation or for the purposes of any paid or unpaid office and which he holds in confidence; human tissue or tissue fluid which has been taken for the purposes of diagnosis or medical treatment and which a person holds in confidence; and journalistic material which a person holds in confidence and which consists of documents or of records other than documents. Under s.11(2), a person holds material other than journalistic material in confidence if he holds it subject to an express or implied undertaking to hold it in confidence, or to a restriction on disclosure or an obligation of secrecy contained in any enactment, including an enactment contained in an Act passed after PACE. Under s.11(3), a person holds journalistic material in confidence if he holds it subject to such an undertaking, restriction or obligation, and it has been continuously held (by one or more persons) subject to such an undertaking, restriction or obligation since it was first acquired or created for the purposes of journalism. Section 14(1) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/14) says that “special procedure material” means material to which subsection (2) applies, and journalistic material, other than excluded material. Subject to the following provisions of s.14, subsection (2) applies to material, other than items subject to legal privilege and excluded material, in the possession of a person who acquired or created it in the course of any trade, business, profession or other occupation or for the purpose of any paid or unpaid office, and who holds it subject to an express or implied undertaking to hold it in confidence, or to a restriction or obligation such as is mentioned in section 11(2)(b). s.14(3) and (4) are quoted on the employer-owned phone page (https://phoneseized.com/scenarios/employer-owned-phone). Each definition carries the conditions set out above as worded, including “continuously held” in s.11(3) and “only … if it is in the possession of a person who acquired or created it for the purposes of journalism” in s.13(2).

### What section 8 and section 9 say about these categories
Section 8(1) is worded as a list of matters of which, if a justice of the peace is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing them, he may issue a warrant; one of the matters is that the material “does not consist of or include items subject to legal privilege, excluded material or special procedure material” (s.8(1) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/8)). Section 113(3)(b) of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 says that, in s.8(1) of the 1984 Act, in paragraph (e), at the end, the words “in relation to each set of premises specified in the application” are added (s.113 of the 2005 Act (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2005/15/section/113)); the revised text prints them at the end of the subsection. The other matters, and the conditions in s.8(3), are on the warrants and premises page (https://phoneseized.com/uk/warrants-and-premises); how England and Wales compares with other places is on the warrant comparison (https://phoneseized.com/compare/warrant). Section 9(1) says a constable may obtain access to excluded material or special procedure material for the purposes of a criminal investigation by making an application under Schedule 1 and in accordance with that Schedule (s.9(1) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/9)). Section 9(2) says that any Act (including a local Act) passed before PACE under which a search of premises for the purposes of a criminal investigation could be authorised by the issue of a warrant to a constable shall cease to have effect so far as it relates to the authorisation of searches for items subject to legal privilege; for excluded material; or for special procedure material consisting of documents or records other than documents (s.9(2) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/9)).

### The Schedule 1 route: an order from a circuit judge
Paragraph 1 of Schedule 1 to PACE (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/schedule/1) says that if on an application made by a constable a circuit judge is satisfied that one or other of the sets of access conditions is fulfilled, he may make an order under paragraph 4. Paragraph 2 says the first set of access conditions is fulfilled if: there are reasonable grounds for believing that an indictable offence has been committed; that there is material which consists of special procedure material or includes special procedure material and does not also include excluded material on premises specified in the application, or on premises occupied or controlled by a person specified in the application (including all such premises on which there are reasonable grounds for believing that there is such material as it is reasonably practicable so to specify); that the material is likely to be of substantial value (whether by itself or together with other material) to the investigation in connection with which the application is made; and that the material is likely to be relevant evidence; other methods of obtaining the material have been tried without success, or have not been tried because it appeared that they were bound to fail; and it is in the public interest, having regard to the benefit likely to accrue to the investigation if the material is obtained, and to the circumstances under which the person in possession of the material holds it, that the material should be produced or that access to it should be given. The first set is worded as material that “does not also include excluded material”. Paragraph 3 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/schedule/1) says the second set of access conditions is fulfilled if there are reasonable grounds for believing that there is material which consists of or includes excluded material or special procedure material on premises specified in the application, or on premises occupied or controlled by a person specified in the application (including all such premises on which there are reasonable grounds for believing that there is such material as it is reasonably practicable so to specify); but for section 9(2) a search of such premises for that material could have been authorised by the issue of a warrant to a constable under an enactment other than Schedule 1; and the issue of such a warrant would have been appropriate. Paragraph 4 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/schedule/1) says an order under that paragraph is an order that the person who appears to the circuit judge to be in possession of the material to which the application relates shall produce it to a constable for him to take away, or give a constable access to it, not later than the end of the period of seven days from the date of the order or the end of such longer period as the order may specify. Where the material consists of information stored in any electronic form, an order under paragraph 4(a) has effect as an order to produce the material in a form in which it can be taken away and in which it is visible and legible or from which it can readily be produced in a visible and legible form, and an order under paragraph 4(b) has effect as an order to give a constable access to the material in a form in which it is visible and legible. Paragraph 7 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/schedule/1) says an application for an order under paragraph 4 that relates to material that consists of or includes journalistic material shall be made inter partes. Paragraph 14(d), set out in the next section, is one of the further conditions mentioned in paragraph 12(a)(ii): that service of notice of an application for an order under paragraph 4 may seriously prejudice the investigation. Paragraph 11 of Schedule 1 is a duty on a person served with notice, and its words are: “Where notice of an application for an order under paragraph 4 above has been served on a person, he shall not conceal, destroy, alter or dispose of the material to which the application relates except— with the leave of a judge; or — with the written permission of a constable, until— the application is dismissed or abandoned; or — he has complied with an order under paragraph 4 above made on the application” (Schedule 1, para 11 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/schedule/1)). As quoted, para 11 is worded as a prohibition; this page does not set out the consequences of breaching it. Paragraph 15 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/schedule/1) says that if a person fails to comply with an order under paragraph 4, a circuit judge may deal with him as if he had committed a contempt of the Crown Court, and that any enactment relating to contempt of the Crown Court has effect in relation to such a failure as if it were such a contempt.

### When a circuit judge can issue a warrant instead
Paragraph 12 of Schedule 1 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/schedule/1) says that if on an application made by a constable a circuit judge is satisfied that either set of access conditions is fulfilled and that any of the further conditions set out in paragraph 14 is also fulfilled in relation to each set of premises specified in the application, or is satisfied that the second set of access conditions is fulfilled and that an order under paragraph 4 relating to the material has not been complied with, he may issue a warrant authorising a constable to enter and search the premises or (as the case may be) all premises occupied or controlled by the person referred to in paragraph 2(a)(ii) or 3(a), including such sets of premises as are specified in the application (an “all premises warrant”). The judge may not issue an all premises warrant unless he is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that it is necessary to search premises occupied or controlled by the person in question which are not specified in the application, as well as those which are, in order to find the material in question, and that it is not reasonably practicable to specify all the premises which he occupies or controls which might need to be searched. The further conditions mentioned in paragraph 12(a)(ii) are: that it is not practicable to communicate with any person entitled to grant entry to the premises; that it is practicable to communicate with a person entitled to grant entry to the premises but it is not practicable to communicate with any person entitled to grant access to the material; that the material contains information which is subject to a restriction or obligation such as is mentioned in section 11(2)(b), and is likely to be disclosed in breach of it if a warrant is not issued; and that service of notice of an application for an order under paragraph 4 may seriously prejudice the investigation. Paragraph 13 says that a constable may seize and retain anything for which a search has been authorised under paragraph 12 (para 13 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/schedule/1)). Paragraph 7 (an application for an order, where the material includes journalistic material, is made inter partes) and the last condition above (service of notice of an application for an order may seriously prejudice the investigation) are set out in Schedule 1 as worded.

### If a phone is seized anyway
Section 19(6) says that no power of seizure conferred on a constable under any enactment (including an enactment contained in an Act passed after PACE) is to be taken to authorise the seizure of an item which the constable exercising the power has reasonable grounds for believing to be subject to legal privilege (s.19(6) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/19)). As quoted, s.19(6) names legal privilege and does not mention journalistic material. Section 50(4) of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 says that section 19(6) of PACE shall not apply to the power of seizure conferred by s.50(2) of that Act (s.50(4) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/50)). Section 19(6) and s.50(4) are covered on the warrants and premises page (https://phoneseized.com/uk/warrants-and-premises) and the seize and sift page (https://phoneseized.com/uk/seize-and-sift-cjpa-50-51). Section 55(1) of the 2001 Act says that if, at any time after a seizure of anything has been made in exercise of a power to which that section applies, it appears to the person for the time being having possession of the seized property in consequence of the seizure that the property is excluded material or special procedure material, or has any excluded material or any special procedure material comprised in it, its retention is not authorised by section 56, and, in a case where the material is comprised in something else which has been lawfully seized, it is not comprised in property falling within subsection (2) or (3), it shall be the duty of that person to secure that the item is returned as soon as reasonably practicable after the seizure. Under s.55(4), the section applies (subject to subsection (5)) to each of the powers of seizure specified in Part 3 of Schedule 1 (s.55 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/55)). Paragraph 84 of Schedule 1 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/schedule/1), in Part 3, lists the power of seizure conferred by section 8(2) of PACE (police power, on exercise of search warrant, to seize property searched for). Subsections (2), (3) and (5) of s.55 are referred to in the quoted words and are not set out on this site. As quoted, this page does not say whether s.55 applies to a seizure under any other power, such as s.19 of PACE. Section 59 of the 2001 Act lists grounds for an application for the return of seized property, including a ground about excluded material or special procedure material seized under a power to which section 55 applies, with conditions of its own (s.59(3) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/59)); they are set out on the seize and sift page (https://phoneseized.com/uk/seize-and-sift-cjpa-50-51).

### If you are asked to hand a phone over voluntarily
Section 37(1) of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/37) says an authorised person may extract information stored on an electronic device from that device if a user of the device has voluntarily provided the device to an authorised person, and that user has agreed to the extraction of information from the device by an authorised person. Section 43(1) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/43) says that in that Chapter “confidential information” means information which constitutes or may constitute confidential journalistic material within the meaning of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (see section 264(6) and (7) of that Act), or protected material. Section 43(2) defines “protected material” separately for England and Wales, for Scotland and for Northern Ireland; for England and Wales it means items subject to legal privilege, within the meaning of PACE (see section 10 of that Act); material falling within section 11(1)(a) of that Act (certain personal records held in confidence); or material to which section 14(2) of that Act applies (other material acquired in the course of a trade etc that is held in confidence). Section 37(8) to (10) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/37) say that if the authorised person thinks that, in exercising the power in s.37(1), there is a risk of obtaining confidential information, then to be satisfied that the exercise of the power is proportionate they must have regard to the amount of confidential information likely to be stored on the device and its potential relevance to a purpose within s.37(2) (or s.41(2)) for which they may exercise the power, and be satisfied that there are no other means of obtaining the information sought which avoid that risk, or that there are such other means but it is not reasonably practicable to use them. The extraction Code of Practice says, at para 93 (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/634810a38fa8f53463dcb957/E02802691_Electronic_Devices_Code_of_Practice_WEB.pdf), that these powers must not be used where the intention is to extract confidential information, and that if the authorised person is seeking confidential information on the device that is relevant to the investigation, a different power such as, in England and Wales, the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, must be used to obtain it. At para 96 it says that in no circumstances should an authorised person ask a device user to waive their right to confidentiality for the purposes of obtaining confidential information, and that if a device user expresses their wish to do so, the authorised person should advise that this decision is only taken after the device user has received legal advice. At para 100 it says that where the device user is a lawyer or journalist and the device to be examined is used for their work, it may be reasonable to assume that their device will contain a high volume of the confidential information, and that in this scenario it is strongly advised that the authorised person should ask them whether confidential information is stored on their device. Extraction by agreement is covered on the victims and witnesses page (https://phoneseized.com/uk/victims-witnesses-pcsc), and for a complainant on the complainant page (https://phoneseized.com/scenarios/complainant-asked-for-phone).

### At a port or airport: the Schedule 7 duties come first
Paragraph 5(a) of Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 says that a person who is questioned under paragraph 2 or 3 must give the examining officer any information in his possession which the officer requests (para 5(a) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/schedule/7)). The Schedule 7 Code says the person must provide access to any electronic device to allow for a search to be undertaken, including where access to a device requires the person to unlock a device through application of their thumb or finger, or any other form of access control (Code, para 61 (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68e7b52b187483de54d766d2/Schedule+7+Code+of+Practice.pdf)). Paragraph 18(1) says a person commits an offence if he wilfully fails to comply with a duty imposed under or by virtue of that Schedule; wilfully contravenes a prohibition imposed under or by virtue of that Schedule; or wilfully obstructs, or seeks to frustrate, a search or examination under or by virtue of that Schedule (para 18(1) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/schedule/7/paragraph/18)). The provisions below limit what an examining officer may ask or examine, and sit beside those duties. The Code says that information requested by an examining officer under paragraph 5(a) may include passwords to electronic devices, and that an examining officer may not, however, compel a person to disclose or confirm the identity of a source of journalistic information or disclose information subject to legal privilege (Code, para 55 (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68e7b52b187483de54d766d2/Schedule+7+Code+of+Practice.pdf)). The limit on compelling disclosure is a rule for the examining officer. As quoted, it does not give the person a right to refuse any Schedule 7 duty. The Schedule 7 Code of Practice says that an examining officer may not ask a question under paragraph 2 or 3 of Schedule 7 where they have reasonable grounds to believe that the answer to the question would require a person to disclose or confirm the identity of a source of journalistic information or disclose information subject to legal privilege (Code, para 44 (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68e7b52b187483de54d766d2/Schedule+7+Code+of+Practice.pdf)). Paragraph 44 limits the questions an officer may ask. As quoted, it does not say that a person may refuse to answer a question that is asked. It is not, as quoted, a right to refuse any Schedule 7 duty. The Code says that, in the absence of any power other than Schedule 7 (such as Schedule 5 to the Terrorism Act 2000), material cannot be examined where the officer has reasonable grounds for believing it to be protected material, and that the officer may, however, examine any nonprotected material, subject to the conditions of the following paragraphs (Code, para 70 (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68e7b52b187483de54d766d2/Schedule+7+Code+of+Practice.pdf)). It defines “protected material” there as “confidential journalistic information” within the meaning of section 264(6) and (7) of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016; material which identifies or confirms a “source of journalistic information” within the meaning of section 263(1) of that Act; “items subject to legal privilege” within the meaning of section 263(1) of that Act; personal records which a person has acquired or created in the course of any trade, business, profession or other occupation or for the purposes of any paid or unpaid office and which he holds in confidence (see the definition of “excluded material” in section 11(1)(a) of PACE); and human tissue or tissue fluid which has been taken for the purposes of diagnosis or medical treatment and which a person holds in confidence (see section 11(1)(b) of that Act). Paragraph 71 of the Code says that if before an examining officer examines or copies an article, the officer has reasonable grounds for believing that the article consists of or includes protected material, the officer must only proceed to examine the article or make the copy if the protected material is capable of being separated from non-protected material; that if the officer has developed such reasonable grounds during the process of examining the article or copy, the officer must cease examining the article or copy and may only subsequently continue to examine it if the non-protected material has been separated from the protected material; and that, save as to any other power applying which permits retention, where it is assessed that protected material within an article or copy cannot be separated from non-protected material the article must be returned to the person from whom it was taken, and any copies of the article must be destroyed (Code, para 71 (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68e7b52b187483de54d766d2/Schedule+7+Code+of+Practice.pdf)). Paragraphs 70 and 71 limit what an officer may examine. They are rules for the examining officer. As quoted, they do not give the person a right to refuse any Schedule 7 duty. The Code says the examining officer should consider whether it is reasonably practicable for the protected material to be separated at the time and place of the Schedule 7 examination; that this can be done either using the sifting and independent review process described below, or in any other manner designed to prevent the examining officer or any other officer involved in an examination under Schedule 7 from accessing the protected material; and that if this is not reasonably practicable at the time and place of the Schedule 7 examination, the officer may retain the article or copy in accordance with paragraph 11 or 11A, as applicable, and during the retention period the sifting and independent review process in relation to an article or copy must be carried out (Code, para 72 (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68e7b52b187483de54d766d2/Schedule+7+Code+of+Practice.pdf)). One of the steps it lists is that, in cases where the material on the article or copy is electronic, voluminous and capable of being searched electronically, the person from whom the article has been taken (or from whose article a copy has been taken), or that person’s legal representative, must be given the opportunity to provide search terms to be applied to identify potential protected material; the ultimate decision as to which search terms are applied shall be for the relevant police force; those search terms must be applied by a member of the police digital forensic unit, who is independent of the Schedule 7 examination; the result of the search terms applied must be confined in a separate folder to which the examining officer and any other officer involved in the Schedule 7 examination do not have access; and any data which is not covered by the search terms can be provided to the examining officer for their review. That is the only step quoted on this page. It also says that an examining officer may only retain an article, or make and retain a copy of an article, which the officer has reasonable grounds for believing it consists of or includes protected material if the officer considers it necessary and proportionate to do so in accordance with paragraphs 11(2)(a)-(c) or 11A(3)(a)-(c) and a sifting and independent review process, or any other process designed to prevent the examining officer or any other officer involved in an examination under Schedule 7 examining the protected material, is possible (Code, para 75 (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68e7b52b187483de54d766d2/Schedule+7+Code+of+Practice.pdf)). These are rules for the examining officer. As quoted, they do not give the person a right to refuse any Schedule 7 duty. The Schedule 7 duties and the Code are covered on the Schedule 7 page (https://phoneseized.com/uk/ports-schedule-7) and the work phone at a port page (https://phoneseized.com/scenarios/work-phone-at-a-uk-port), and in more depth on rightsandlimits.com’s Schedule 7 page (https://rightsandlimits.com/borders/schedule-7).

### Sources in court
Section 10 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 says no court may require a person to disclose, nor is any person guilty of contempt of court for refusing to disclose, the source of information contained in a publication for which he is responsible, unless it be established to the satisfaction of the court that disclosure is necessary in the interests of justice or national security or for the prevention of disorder or crime (s.10 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1981/49/section/10)). It is worded about what a court may require and about contempt of court. As quoted, it does not mention a seizure, a Schedule 7 question or a section 49 notice. It is not, as quoted, a right to refuse any Schedule 7 duty.

### Coming: confidential information from online accounts
Once in force, s.176 of the Crime and Policing Act 2026 will apply where information has been extracted under the power conferred by virtue of section 173(1) and it appears to any person accessing the information as a result of the exercise of that power that the information is, or contains, confidential information. Subject to subsections (3) and (7), as soon as reasonably practicable after accessing the confidential information, that person will have to ensure that the information is made inaccessible or, where the extraction involved a copy being made of the confidential information, that the copy is destroyed. That duty will not apply if the confidential information is comprised in other information which is not confidential information and it is not reasonably practicable for the confidential information to be separated from that other information without prejudicing its use in relation to a reasonable line of enquiry of the kind mentioned in section 173(2)(a); where it is so disapplied, the person accessing the confidential information will have to ensure that it is not examined or copied, or put to any use other than as mentioned in subsection (3)(b) (s.176 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2026/20/section/176)). Once in force, s.176(5) and (6) will define “confidential information” for that section in its own terms: information which constitutes or may constitute confidential journalistic material within the meaning of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (see section 264(6) and (7) of that Act), or protected material; and, so far as the section applies to England and Wales, “protected material” will mean items subject to legal privilege, excluded material and special procedure material, each within the meaning of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. Those are the words of s.176 itself, and are worded separately from s.43 of the 2022 Act, set out above. The commencement regulations say that, subject to paragraph (2) of the regulation, sections 176(7) and 177 (extraction of online information: confidential information and code of practice) come into force on 29th June 2026 (S.I. 2026/689 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2026/689)). The rest of the power is covered on the online accounts page (https://phoneseized.com/uk/online-accounts-2026-act).

### What this page does not say
This site does not quote UK case law, so it does not say how the courts have applied the definitions of journalistic material, excluded material or special procedure material, the Schedule 1 conditions, or s.10 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981.

### See also
Link only, not relied on as authority here: rightsandlimits.com on Schedule 7 (https://rightsandlimits.com/borders/schedule-7), and the police-seize-phone scenario on uklawreference.com (https://uklawreference.com/scenarios/police-seize-phone). On this site: the RIPA notice page (https://phoneseized.com/uk/ripa-notice).

### You must
- If you are questioned under paragraph 2 or 3 of Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000, give the examining officer any information in your possession which the officer requests.
  Source: Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 5(a) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/schedule/7
- The Schedule 7 Code says the person must provide access to any electronic device to allow for a search to be undertaken, including where access to a device requires the person to unlock a device through application of their thumb or finger, or any other form of access control.
  Source: Schedule 7 (Terrorism Act 2000) Code of Practice (Oct 2025), para 61 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68e7b52b187483de54d766d2/Schedule+7+Code+of+Practice.pdf
- A person commits an offence if he wilfully fails to comply with a duty imposed under or by virtue of Schedule 7; wilfully contravenes a prohibition imposed under or by virtue of Schedule 7; or wilfully obstructs, or seeks to frustrate, a search or examination under or by virtue of Schedule 7.
  Source: Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 18(1) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/schedule/7/paragraph/18

### What they can do
- Under s.8(1), if on an application made by a constable a justice of the peace is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that an indictable offence has been committed; that there is material on premises mentioned in subsection (1A) which is likely to be of substantial value (whether by itself or together with other material) to the investigation of the offence; that the material is likely to be relevant evidence; that it does not consist of or include items subject to legal privilege, excluded material or special procedure material; and that any of the conditions specified in subsection (3) applies, he may issue a warrant authorising a constable to enter and search the premises in relation to each set of premises specified in the application.
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.8(1) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/8
- Under s.9(1), a constable may obtain access to excluded material or special procedure material for the purposes of a criminal investigation by making an application under Schedule 1 and in accordance with that Schedule.
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.9(1) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/9
- Under Schedule 1 paragraphs 1 and 2 to PACE, if on an application made by a constable a circuit judge is satisfied that one or other of the sets of access conditions is fulfilled, he may make an order under paragraph 4. The first set of access conditions is fulfilled if there are reasonable grounds for believing that an indictable offence has been committed; that there is material which consists of special procedure material or includes special procedure material and does not also include excluded material on premises specified in the application, or on premises occupied or controlled by a person specified in the application (including all such premises on which there are reasonable grounds for believing that there is such material as it is reasonably practicable so to specify); that the material is likely to be of substantial value (whether by itself or together with other material) to the investigation in connection with which the application is made; and that the material is likely to be relevant evidence; other methods of obtaining the material have been tried without success, or have not been tried because it appeared that they were bound to fail; and it is in the public interest, having regard to the benefit likely to accrue to the investigation if the material is obtained, and to the circumstances under which the person in possession of the material holds it, that the material should be produced or that access to it should be given.
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Schedule 1, paras 1 and 2 — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/schedule/1
- Under Schedule 1 paragraph 4 to PACE, an order under that paragraph is an order that the person who appears to the circuit judge to be in possession of the material to which the application relates shall produce it to a constable for him to take away, or give a constable access to it, not later than the end of the period of seven days from the date of the order or the end of such longer period as the order may specify. Where the material consists of information stored in any electronic form, an order under paragraph 4(a) has effect as an order to produce the material in a form in which it can be taken away and in which it is visible and legible or from which it can readily be produced in a visible and legible form, and an order under paragraph 4(b) has effect as an order to give a constable access to the material in a form in which it is visible and legible.
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Schedule 1, paras 4 and 5 — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/schedule/1
- Under Schedule 1 paragraph 3 to PACE, the second set of access conditions is fulfilled if there are reasonable grounds for believing that there is material which consists of or includes excluded material or special procedure material on premises specified in the application, or on premises occupied or controlled by a person specified in the application (including all such premises on which there are reasonable grounds for believing that there is such material as it is reasonably practicable so to specify); but for section 9(2) a search of such premises for that material could have been authorised by the issue of a warrant to a constable under an enactment other than Schedule 1; and the issue of such a warrant would have been appropriate.
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Schedule 1, para 3 — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/schedule/1
- Under Schedule 1 paragraph 12 to PACE, if on an application made by a constable a circuit judge is satisfied that either set of access conditions is fulfilled and that any of the further conditions set out in paragraph 14 is also fulfilled in relation to each set of premises specified in the application, or is satisfied that the second set of access conditions is fulfilled and that an order under paragraph 4 relating to the material has not been complied with, he may issue a warrant authorising a constable to enter and search the premises or (as the case may be) all premises occupied or controlled by the person referred to in paragraph 2(a)(ii) or 3(a), including such sets of premises as are specified in the application (an “all premises warrant”). The judge may not issue an all premises warrant unless he is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that it is necessary to search premises occupied or controlled by the person in question which are not specified in the application, as well as those which are, in order to find the material in question, and that it is not reasonably practicable to specify all the premises which he occupies or controls which might need to be searched. The further conditions mentioned in paragraph 12(a)(ii) are: that it is not practicable to communicate with any person entitled to grant entry to the premises; that it is practicable to communicate with a person entitled to grant entry to the premises but it is not practicable to communicate with any person entitled to grant access to the material; that the material contains information which is subject to a restriction or obligation such as is mentioned in section 11(2)(b), and is likely to be disclosed in breach of it if a warrant is not issued; and that service of notice of an application for an order under paragraph 4 may seriously prejudice the investigation.
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Schedule 1, paras 12, 12A and 14 — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/schedule/1
- Under Schedule 1 paragraph 13 to PACE, a constable may seize and retain anything for which a search has been authorised under paragraph 12.
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Schedule 1, para 13 — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/schedule/1
- If a person fails to comply with an order under Schedule 1 paragraph 4 to PACE, a circuit judge may deal with him as if he had committed a contempt of the Crown Court; any enactment relating to contempt of the Crown Court has effect in relation to such a failure as if it were such a contempt.
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Schedule 1, para 15 — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/schedule/1
- Section 50(4) of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 says that section 19(6) of the 1984 Act and Article 21(6) of the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 (powers of seizure not to include power to seize anything that a person has reasonable grounds for believing is legally privileged) shall not apply to the power of seizure conferred by subsection (2).
  Subsection (2) of s.50 is referred to in the quoted words and is not quoted here; it is set out on the warrants and premises page.
  Source: Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.50(4) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/50
- The Schedule 7 Code says the examining officer should consider whether it is reasonably practicable for the protected material to be separated at the time and place of the Schedule 7 examination. This can be done either using the sifting and independent review process described below, or in any other manner designed to prevent the examining officer or any other officer involved in an examination under Schedule 7 from accessing the protected material. If this is not reasonably practicable at the time and place of the Schedule 7 examination, the officer may retain the article or copy in accordance with paragraph 11 or 11A, as applicable, and during the retention period the sifting and independent review process in relation to an article or copy must be carried out. One of the steps it lists is that, in cases where the material on the article or copy is electronic, voluminous and capable of being searched electronically, the person from whom the article has been taken (or from whose article a copy has been taken), or that person’s legal representative, must be given the opportunity to provide search terms to be applied to identify potential protected material; the ultimate decision as to which search terms are applied shall be for the relevant police force; those search terms must be applied by a member of the police digital forensic unit, who is independent of the Schedule 7 examination; the result of the search terms applied must be confined in a separate folder to which the examining officer and any other officer involved in the Schedule 7 examination do not have access; and any data which is not covered by the search terms can be provided to the examining officer for their review. That is the only step quoted on this page.
  These are rules for the examining officer and the police. As quoted, they do not give the person a right to refuse any Schedule 7 duty.
  Source: Schedule 7 (Terrorism Act 2000) Code of Practice (Oct 2025), para 72 (separation at the time and place of the examination, sifting and independent review process: retention trigger and step (d)) — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68e7b52b187483de54d766d2/Schedule+7+Code+of+Practice.pdf

### Limits on them
- Section 9(2) says that any Act (including a local Act) passed before the 1984 Act under which a search of premises for the purposes of a criminal investigation could be authorised by the issue of a warrant to a constable shall cease to have effect so far as it relates to the authorisation of searches for items subject to legal privilege; for excluded material; or for special procedure material consisting of documents or records other than documents.
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.9(2) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/9
- An application for an order under Schedule 1 paragraph 4 to PACE that relates to material that consists of or includes journalistic material shall be made inter partes.
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Schedule 1, para 7 — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/schedule/1
- No power of seizure conferred on a constable under any enactment (including an enactment contained in an Act passed after the 1984 Act) is to be taken to authorise the seizure of an item which the constable exercising the power has reasonable grounds for believing to be subject to legal privilege.
  As quoted, s.19(6) names legal privilege and does not mention journalistic material.
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.19(6) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/19
- Under s.55(1) of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, if, at any time after a seizure of anything has been made in exercise of a power to which that section applies, it appears to the person for the time being having possession of the seized property in consequence of the seizure that the property is excluded material or special procedure material, or has any excluded material or any special procedure material comprised in it, its retention is not authorised by section 56, and, in a case where the material is comprised in something else which has been lawfully seized, it is not comprised in property falling within subsection (2) or (3), it shall be the duty of that person to secure that the item is returned as soon as reasonably practicable after the seizure. Under s.55(4), the section applies (subject to subsection (5)) to each of the powers of seizure specified in Part 3 of Schedule 1.
  Subsections (2), (3) and (5) of s.55 are referred to in the quoted words and are not quoted here.
  Source: Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.55(1) and (4) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/55
- Under the heading “Powers to which section 55 applies”, Part 3 of Schedule 1 (para 84) to the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 lists, for the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, the power of seizure conferred by section 8(2) of the 1984 Act (police power, on exercise of search warrant, to seize property searched for).
  Source: Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, Sch.1 Pt 3 para 84 — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/schedule/1
- Section 10 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 says no court may require a person to disclose, nor is any person guilty of contempt of court for refusing to disclose, the source of information contained in a publication for which he is responsible, unless it be established to the satisfaction of the court that disclosure is necessary in the interests of justice or national security or for the prevention of disorder or crime.
  It is not, as quoted, a right to refuse any Schedule 7 duty.
  Source: Contempt of Court Act 1981, s.10 — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1981/49/section/10
- Where an authorised person thinks that, in exercising the power in s.37(1) of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, there is a risk of obtaining confidential information, then to be satisfied that the exercise of the power is proportionate they must have regard to the amount of confidential information likely to be stored on the device and its potential relevance to a purpose within s.37(2) for which they may exercise the power, or to a purpose within s.41(2) for which they may exercise the power in s.41(1), and be satisfied that there are no other means of obtaining the information sought which avoid that risk, or that there are such other means but it is not reasonably practicable to use them.
  Source: Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.37(8) to (10) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/37
- The extraction Code of Practice says that these powers must not be used where the intention is to extract confidential information; if the authorised person is seeking confidential information on the device that is relevant to the investigation, a different power such as, in England and Wales, the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, must be used to obtain it.
  Source: Extraction of Information from Electronic Devices: Code of Practice (Oct 2022), para 93 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/634810a38fa8f53463dcb957/E02802691_Electronic_Devices_Code_of_Practice_WEB.pdf
- The extraction Code of Practice says that in no circumstances should an authorised person ask a device user to waive their right to confidentiality for the purposes of obtaining confidential information, and that if a device user expresses their wish to do so, the authorised person should advise that this decision is only taken after the device user has received legal advice.
  Source: Extraction of Information from Electronic Devices: Code of Practice (Oct 2022), para 96 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/634810a38fa8f53463dcb957/E02802691_Electronic_Devices_Code_of_Practice_WEB.pdf
- The Schedule 7 Code says information requested by an examining officer under paragraph 5(a) may include passwords to electronic devices, and that an examining officer may not, however, compel a person to disclose or confirm the identity of a source of journalistic information or disclose information subject to legal privilege.
  The limit on compelling disclosure is a rule for the examining officer. As quoted, it does not give the person a right to refuse any Schedule 7 duty.
  Source: Schedule 7 (Terrorism Act 2000) Code of Practice (Oct 2025), para 55 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68e7b52b187483de54d766d2/Schedule+7+Code+of+Practice.pdf
- The Schedule 7 Code of Practice says an examining officer may not ask a question under paragraph 2 or 3 of Schedule 7 where they have reasonable grounds to believe that the answer to the question would require a person to disclose or confirm the identity of a source of journalistic information or disclose information subject to legal privilege.
  It is a rule for the examining officer. As quoted, it does not give the person a right to refuse any Schedule 7 duty.
  Source: Schedule 7 (Terrorism Act 2000) Code of Practice (Oct 2025), para 44 (last sentence) — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68e7b52b187483de54d766d2/Schedule+7+Code+of+Practice.pdf
- The Schedule 7 Code says that, in the absence of any power other than Schedule 7 (such as Schedule 5 to the Terrorism Act 2000), material cannot be examined where the officer has reasonable grounds for believing it to be protected material, and that the officer may, however, examine any nonprotected material, subject to the conditions of the following paragraphs. It defines “protected material” as: “confidential journalistic information” within the meaning of section 264(6) and (7) of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016; material which identifies or confirms a “source of journalistic information” within the meaning of section 263(1) of that Act; “items subject to legal privilege” within the meaning of section 263(1) of that Act; personal records which a person has acquired or created in the course of any trade, business, profession or other occupation or for the purposes of any paid or unpaid office and which he holds in confidence (see the definition of “excluded material” in section 11(1)(a) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984); and human tissue or tissue fluid which has been taken for the purposes of diagnosis or medical treatment and which a person holds in confidence (see section 11(1)(b) of that Act).
  It is a rule for the examining officer. As quoted, it does not give the person a right to refuse any Schedule 7 duty.
  Source: Schedule 7 (Terrorism Act 2000) Code of Practice (Oct 2025), para 70 (second and third sentences) and footnote 18 (definition of "protected material") — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68e7b52b187483de54d766d2/Schedule+7+Code+of+Practice.pdf
- The Schedule 7 Code says that if, before an examining officer examines or copies an article, the officer has reasonable grounds for believing that the article consists of or includes protected material, the officer must only proceed to examine the article or make the copy if the protected material is capable of being separated from non-protected material; that if the officer has developed such reasonable grounds during the process of examining the article or copy, the officer must cease examining the article or copy and may only subsequently continue to examine the article or copy if the non-protected material has been separated from the protected material; and that, save as to any other power applying which permits retention, where it is assessed that protected material within an article or copy cannot be separated from non-protected material the article must be returned to the person from whom it was taken, and any copies of the article must be destroyed.
  It is a rule for the examining officer. As quoted, it does not give the person a right to refuse any Schedule 7 duty.
  Source: Schedule 7 (Terrorism Act 2000) Code of Practice (Oct 2025), para 71 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68e7b52b187483de54d766d2/Schedule+7+Code+of+Practice.pdf
- The Schedule 7 Code says an examining officer may only retain an article, or make and retain a copy of an article, which the officer has reasonable grounds for believing it consists of or includes protected material if the officer considers it necessary and proportionate to do so in accordance with paragraphs 11(2)(a)-(c) or 11A(3)(a)-(c) and a sifting and independent review process, or any other process designed to prevent the examining officer or any other officer involved in an examination under Schedule 7 examining the protected material, is possible.
  It is a rule for the examining officer. As quoted, it does not give the person a right to refuse any Schedule 7 duty.
  Source: Schedule 7 (Terrorism Act 2000) Code of Practice (Oct 2025), para 75 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68e7b52b187483de54d766d2/Schedule+7+Code+of+Practice.pdf
- Once in force, s.176 of the Crime and Policing Act 2026 will apply where information has been extracted under the power conferred by virtue of section 173(1) and it appears to any person accessing the information as a result of the exercise of that power that the information is, or contains, confidential information. Subject to subsections (3) and (7), as soon as reasonably practicable after accessing the confidential information, that person will have to ensure that the information is made inaccessible or, where the extraction involved a copy being made of the confidential information, that the copy is destroyed. That duty will not apply if the confidential information is comprised in other information which is not confidential information and it is not reasonably practicable for the confidential information to be separated from that other information without prejudicing its use in relation to a reasonable line of enquiry of the kind mentioned in section 173(2)(a); where the duty is so disapplied, the person accessing the confidential information will have to ensure that it is not examined or copied, or put to any use other than as mentioned in subsection (3)(b). Section 176(7) says the Secretary of State may by regulations provide for circumstances in which the duty in subsection (2) does not apply in relation to protected material of the kind mentioned in subsection (6)(a)(ii) and (iii), (b)(ii), and (c)(ii) and (iii). Once in force, s.176(5) and (6) will define “confidential information” for that section as information which constitutes or may constitute confidential journalistic material within the meaning of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (see section 264(6) and (7) of that Act), or protected material; so far as the section applies to England and Wales, “protected material” will mean items subject to legal privilege, excluded material and special procedure material, each within the meaning of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.
  Source: Crime and Policing Act 2026, s.176(1) to (7) (only s.176(7) is in force, from 29 June 2026) — NOT YET IN FORCE — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2026/20/section/176

### What the sources say
- Subject to the following provisions of s.11 of PACE, “excluded material” means personal records which a person has acquired or created in the course of any trade, business, profession or other occupation or for the purposes of any paid or unpaid office and which he holds in confidence; human tissue or tissue fluid which has been taken for the purposes of diagnosis or medical treatment and which a person holds in confidence; and journalistic material which a person holds in confidence and which consists of documents or of records other than documents. A person holds material other than journalistic material in confidence if he holds it subject to an express or implied undertaking to hold it in confidence, or to a restriction on disclosure or an obligation of secrecy contained in any enactment, including an enactment contained in an Act passed after that Act. A person holds journalistic material in confidence if he holds it subject to such an undertaking, restriction or obligation, and it has been continuously held (by one or more persons) subject to such an undertaking, restriction or obligation since it was first acquired or created for the purposes of journalism.
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.11(1) to (3) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/11
- Subject to subsection (2) of s.13 of PACE, “journalistic material” means material acquired or created for the purposes of journalism. Material is only journalistic material if it is in the possession of a person who acquired or created it for the purposes of journalism. A person who receives material from someone who intends that the recipient shall use it for the purposes of journalism is to be taken to have acquired it for those purposes.
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.13(1) to (3) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/13
- In PACE, “special procedure material” means material to which subsection (2) of s.14 applies, and journalistic material, other than excluded material. Subject to the following provisions of s.14, subsection (2) applies to material, other than items subject to legal privilege and excluded material, in the possession of a person who acquired or created it in the course of any trade, business, profession or other occupation or for the purpose of any paid or unpaid office, and who holds it subject to an express or implied undertaking to hold it in confidence, or to a restriction or obligation such as is mentioned in section 11(2)(b).
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.14(1) and (2) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/14
- In Chapter 3 of Part 2 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, “confidential information” means information which constitutes or may constitute confidential journalistic material within the meaning of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (see section 264(6) and (7) of that Act), or protected material. In relation to England and Wales, “protected material” means items subject to legal privilege, within the meaning of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (see section 10 of that Act); material falling within section 11(1)(a) of that Act (certain personal records held in confidence); or material to which section 14(2) of that Act applies (other material acquired in the course of a trade etc that is held in confidence). Section 43(2) gives separate definitions for Scotland and for Northern Ireland.
  Source: Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.43(1) and (2) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/43
- The extraction Code of Practice says that where the device user is a lawyer or journalist and the device to be examined is used for their work, it may be reasonable to assume that their device will contain a high volume of the confidential information; in this scenario, it is strongly advised that the authorised person should ask them whether confidential information is stored on their device.
  Source: Extraction of Information from Electronic Devices: Code of Practice (Oct 2022), para 100 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/634810a38fa8f53463dcb957/E02802691_Electronic_Devices_Code_of_Practice_WEB.pdf

## Employer-owned phone: who is the user, who gets it back
URL: https://phoneseized.com/scenarios/employer-owned-phone
Jurisdictions: England & Wales
Last reviewed: 2026-10-06

### Whose phone is it, for these purposes?
Some expressions in the law quoted on this page are defined in the statutes; these are set out here as worded. Section 37(13) of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/37) says that in Chapter 3 of Part 2 of that Act, “user”, in relation to an electronic device, means a person who ordinarily uses the device. Section 58(4) of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/58) says that references in that Part to the person from whom something has been seized, in relation to a case in which the power of seizure was exercisable by reason of that thing’s having been found on any premises, are references to the occupier of the premises at the time of the seizure. Section 58(5) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/58) says that references in that section to the occupier of any premises at the time of a seizure, in relation to a case in which a notice in connection with the entry or search of the premises in question, or with the seizure, was given to a person appearing in the occupier’s absence to be in charge of the premises, and it is practicable, for the purpose of returning something that has been seized, to identify that person but not to identify the occupier of the premises, are references to that person. Section 59(11) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/59) says that references in s.59 to a person with a relevant interest in seized property are references to the person from whom it was seized; any person with an interest in the property; or any person, not falling within those two descriptions, who had custody or control of the property immediately before the seizure.

### Seizure from premises: what section 19 says
Section 19 says that the powers conferred by subsections (2), (3) and (4) are exercisable by a constable who is lawfully on any premises, and s.19(3) says the constable may seize anything which is on the premises if he has reasonable grounds for believing that it is evidence in relation to an offence which he is investigating or any other offence, and that it is necessary to seize it in order to prevent the evidence being concealed, lost, altered or destroyed (s.19 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/19)). The quoted words speak of “anything which is on the premises”; they do not mention who owns it. Seizure under PACE is covered on the seizure page (https://phoneseized.com/uk/seizure-pace).

### Extraction by agreement under section 37
Section 37(1) of the 2022 Act (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/37) says an authorised person may extract information stored on an electronic device from that device if a user of the device has voluntarily provided the device to an authorised person, and that user has agreed to the extraction of information from the device by an authorised person. The Code of Practice says that in the case of a device that is used by multiple users, only the person who voluntarily provided the device and agreed to the extraction of information from it can withdraw that agreement (Code, para 158 (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/634810a38fa8f53463dcb957/E02802691_Electronic_Devices_Code_of_Practice_WEB.pdf)); the same paragraph says the device user, or the person who has voluntarily provided the device and agreed to the extraction of information from it in accordance with Section 38, has the right to withdraw their agreement for information to be extracted from the device. Paragraph 159 adds that it should be made clear that withdrawal of agreement will mean that the device is returned, if the extraction has not already taken place, then the information will not be taken from the device; however, if agreement is withdrawn after the extraction of information has taken place, it may not be possible to delete or return it. It says this is because of the duties on investigating agencies and prosecution services to disclose information to the defence, and that in all cases, however, the extracted information and the device must only be retained where there is a lawful basis to do so and as long as necessary in line with each authority’s data retention policies and other relevant guidance (Code, para 159 (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/634810a38fa8f53463dcb957/E02802691_Electronic_Devices_Code_of_Practice_WEB.pdf)). Section 37(2) to (4) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/37) say that the power in subsection (1) may be exercised only for the purposes of preventing, detecting, investigating or prosecuting crime, helping to locate a missing person, or protecting a child or an at-risk adult from neglect or physical, mental or emotional harm; that the reference in subsection (2) to crime is a reference to conduct which constitutes one or more criminal offences in any part of the United Kingdom, or conduct which, if it took place in any part of the United Kingdom, would constitute one or more criminal offences; and that for the purposes of subsection (2) an adult is an at-risk adult if the authorised person reasonably believes that the adult is experiencing, or at risk of, neglect or physical, mental or emotional harm, and is unable to protect themselves against the neglect or harm or the risk of it. Section 37(5) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/37) says that an authorised person may exercise the power in subsection (1) only if, in a case where the authorised person proposes to exercise the power for a purpose within subsection (2)(a), the authorised person reasonably believes that information stored on the electronic device is relevant to a reasonable line of enquiry which is being, or is to be, pursued by an authorised person; in a case where the authorised person proposes to exercise the power for a purpose within subsection (2)(b) or (c), the authorised person reasonably believes that information stored on the electronic device is relevant to that purpose; and in any case, the authorised person is satisfied that exercise of the power is necessary and proportionate to achieve the purpose within subsection (2) for which the person proposes to exercise the power. As quoted, s.37(1) is worded as “a user of the device”, and s.37(13) defines “user” as “a person who ordinarily uses the device”. Neither quotation mentions who owns the device, or an employer. The extraction Code says that if a device has multiple users, for example a shared laptop or tablet device, it is the responsibility of the authorised person to ensure that the person volunteering the device and agreeing to the extraction of information from it is a person who ordinarily uses the device; and that ‘ordinarily uses’ does not necessarily mean that this person was the original purchaser of the device or that they must own it outright — for example, a person may have a mobile phone or laptop that they regularly use which has been provided by their employer or other organisation (Code, paras 51 and 52 (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/634810a38fa8f53463dcb957/E02802691_Electronic_Devices_Code_of_Practice_WEB.pdf)). Section 37(12) says that the section does not affect any power relating to the extraction or production of information, or any power to seize any item or obtain any information, conferred by an enactment or rule of law (s.37(12) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/37)). Extraction by agreement is covered on the victims and witnesses page (https://phoneseized.com/uk/victims-witnesses-pcsc).

### Passwords and keys held by a company
Section 53(1) of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 says that a person to whom a section 49 notice has been given is guilty of an offence if he knowingly fails, in accordance with the notice, to make the disclosure required by virtue of the giving of the notice (s.53(1) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/section/53)). Section 49(2) says that if any person with the appropriate permission under Schedule 2 believes, on reasonable grounds, that a key to the protected information is in the possession of any person; that the imposition of a disclosure requirement in respect of the protected information is necessary on grounds falling within subsection (3), or necessary for the purpose of securing the effective exercise or proper performance by any public authority of any statutory power or statutory duty; that the imposition of such a requirement is proportionate to what is sought to be achieved by its imposition; and that it is not reasonably practicable for the person with the appropriate permission to obtain possession of the protected information in an intelligible form without the giving of a notice under that section, the person with that permission may, by notice to the person whom he believes to have possession of the key, impose a disclosure requirement in respect of the protected information (s.49(2) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/section/49)). The notice is covered on the RIPA notice page (https://phoneseized.com/uk/ripa-notice). Section 49(5) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/section/49) says that where it appears to a person with the appropriate permission that more than one person is in possession of the key to any protected information, that any of those persons is in possession of that key in his capacity as an officer or employee of any body corporate, and that another of those persons is the body corporate itself or another officer or employee of the body corporate, a notice under section 49 shall not be given, by reference to his possession of the key, to any officer or employee of the body corporate unless he is a senior officer of the body corporate or it appears to the person giving the notice that there is no senior officer of the body corporate and (in the case of an employee) no more senior employee of the body corporate to whom it is reasonably practicable to give the notice. Section 49(6) says that where it appears to a person with the appropriate permission that more than one person is in possession of the key to any protected information, that any of those persons is in possession of that key in his capacity as an employee of a firm, and that another of those persons is the firm itself or a partner of the firm, a notice under section 49 shall not be given, by reference to his possession of the key, to any employee of the firm unless it appears to the person giving the notice that there is neither a partner of the firm nor a more senior employee of the firm to whom it is reasonably practicable to give the notice. Section 49(7) says that subsections (5) and (6) shall not apply to the extent that there are special circumstances of the case that mean that the purposes for which the notice is given would be defeated, in whole or in part, if the notice were given to the person to whom it would otherwise be required to be given by those subsections. Section 49(10) says that in section 49 “senior officer”, in relation to a body corporate, means a director, manager, secretary or other similar officer of the body corporate; and for this purpose “director”, in relation to a body corporate whose affairs are managed by its members, means a member of the body corporate. Section 49(5) and (6) are worded as rules about to whom a notice shall not be given in the circumstances they describe. They are not, as quoted, a right to refuse a section 49 notice that has been given to you: s.53(1), above, is worded as an offence by a person to whom a section 49 notice has been given who knowingly fails, in accordance with the notice, to make the disclosure required. For how a notice differs from an informal request, see rightsandlimits.com’s phone passwords page (https://rightsandlimits.com/devices/phone-passwords).

### Seeing it, copying it, getting a list
Section 21(3) of PACE says that, subject to subsection (8), if a request for permission to be granted access to anything which has been seized by a constable and is retained by the police for the purpose of investigating an offence is made to the officer in charge of the investigation by a person who had custody or control of the thing immediately before it was so seized or by someone acting on behalf of such a person, the officer shall allow the person who made the request access to it under the supervision of a constable. Section 21(4) says that, subject to subsection (8), if a request for a photograph or copy of any such thing is made to the officer in charge of the investigation by a person who had custody or control of the thing immediately before it was so seized, or by someone acting on behalf of such a person, the officer shall allow the person who made the request access to it under the supervision of a constable for the purpose of photographing or copying it, or photograph or copy it, or cause it to be photographed or copied. Section 21(8) says there is no duty under that section to grant access to, or to supply a photograph or copy of, anything if the officer in charge of the investigation for the purposes of which it was seized has reasonable grounds for believing that to do so would prejudice that investigation; the investigation of an offence other than the offence for the purposes of investigating which the thing was seized; or any criminal proceedings which may be brought as a result of the investigation of which he is in charge or of any such investigation as is mentioned in paragraph (b) (s.21(3), (4) and (8) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/21)). As quoted, s.21 is worded by who had custody or control of the thing, and does not mention ownership. The s.21(1) record of what was seized is on the seizure page (https://phoneseized.com/uk/seizure-pace). PACE Code B para 7.16 says that if property is retained, the person who had custody or control of it immediately before seizure must, on request, be provided with a list or description of the property within a reasonable time (Code B (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/65804a3a83ba380013e1b769/PACE+Code+B+2023.pdf)). Para 7.17 opens “That person or their representative” and says they must be allowed supervised access to the property to examine it or have it photographed or copied, or must be provided with a photograph or copy, in either case within a reasonable time of any request and at their own expense, unless the officer in charge of an investigation has reasonable grounds for believing this would prejudice the investigation of any offence or criminal proceedings, or lead to the commission of an offence by providing access to unlawful material such as pornography (Code B (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/65804a3a83ba380013e1b769/PACE+Code+B+2023.pdf)).

### Who gets it back
Section 58(1) of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 says that where anything has been seized in exercise of any power of seizure, and there is an obligation under “this Part” for the whole or any part of the seized property to be returned, the obligation to return it shall (subject to the following provisions of that section) be an obligation to return it to the person from whom it was seized. Section 58(2) says that where any person is obliged under that Part to return anything that has been seized to the person from whom it was seized, and the person under that obligation is satisfied that some other person has a better right to that thing than the person from whom it was seized, his duty to return it shall, instead, be a duty to return it to that other person or, as the case may be, to the person appearing to him to have the best right to the thing in question. Section 58(3) says that where different persons claim to be entitled to the return of anything that is required to be returned under that Part, that thing may be retained for as long as is reasonably necessary for the determination in accordance with subsection (2) of the person to whom it must be returned (s.58(1) to (3) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/58)). As quoted, s.58(1) is worded as applying where there is an obligation under “this Part” for the whole or any part of the seized property to be returned; that Part is covered on the seize and sift page (https://phoneseized.com/uk/seize-and-sift-cjpa-50-51). Section 59(2) says that any person with a relevant interest in the seized property may apply to the appropriate judicial authority, on one or more of the grounds mentioned in subsection (3), for the return of the whole or a part of the seized property (s.59(2) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/59)). Section 64(1) says that, subject to subsections (2) and (4), in that Part “appropriate judicial authority” means, in relation to England and Wales and Northern Ireland, a judge of the Crown Court, and, in relation to Scotland, a sheriff (s.64(1) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/64)). Section 59(10) says that the relevant powers of seizure for the purposes of that section are the powers of seizure conferred by sections 50 and 51; each of the powers of seizure specified in Parts 1 and 2 of Schedule 1; and any power of seizure (not falling within paragraph (a) or (b)) conferred on a constable by or under any enactment, including an enactment passed after that Act (s.59(10) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/59)). The grounds are in s.59(3) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/59), and are set out on the seize and sift page (https://phoneseized.com/uk/seize-and-sift-cjpa-50-51). Section 1(1) of the Police (Property) Act 1897 says that where any property has come into the possession of the police in connexion with their investigation of a suspected offence, a court of summary jurisdiction may, on application, either by an officer of police or by a claimant of the property, make an order for the delivery of the property to the person appearing to the magistrate or court to be the owner thereof, or, if the owner cannot be ascertained, make such order with respect to the property as to the magistrate or court may seem meet (s.1(1) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Vict/60-61/30/section/1)). Section 1(2) says that an order under that section shall not affect the right of any person to take within six months from the date of the order legal proceedings against any person in possession of property delivered by virtue of the order for the recovery of the property, but on the expiration of those six months the right shall cease (s.1(2) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Vict/60-61/30/section/1)). PACE Code B para 2.2 says that the Notes for Guidance included are not provisions of that Code (Code B, para 2.2 (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/65804a3a83ba380013e1b769/PACE+Code+B+2023.pdf)). PACE Code B Note for guidance 7A says any person claiming property seized by the police may apply to a magistrates’ court under the Police (Property) Act 1897 for its possession and should, if appropriate, be advised of this procedure (Code B, Note for guidance 7A (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/65804a3a83ba380013e1b769/PACE+Code+B+2023.pdf)). Note for guidance 7D says that what constitutes a relevant interest in specific material may depend on the nature of that material and the circumstances in which it is seized, and that anyone with a reasonable claim to ownership of the material and anyone entrusted with its safe keeping by the owner should be considered (Code B, Note for guidance 7D (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/65804a3a83ba380013e1b769/PACE+Code+B+2023.pdf)). Getting property back is compared on the get-it-back comparison (https://phoneseized.com/compare/get-it-back-or-deleted).

### Confidential business material
Section 14(3) of PACE says that where material is acquired by an employee from his employer and in the course of his employment, or by a company from an associated company, it is only special procedure material if it was special procedure material immediately before the acquisition. Section 14(4) says that where material is created by an employee in the course of his employment, it is only special procedure material if it would have been special procedure material had his employer created it (s.14(3) and (4) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/14)). The definition of special procedure material is set out on the journalist page (https://phoneseized.com/scenarios/journalist-source-material); how the Schedule 7 Code treats confidential business material is covered on the work phone at a port page (https://phoneseized.com/scenarios/work-phone-at-a-uk-port).

### See also
Link only, not relied on as authority here: rightsandlimits.com on phone passwords (https://rightsandlimits.com/devices/phone-passwords), and the police-seize-phone scenario on uklawreference.com (https://uklawreference.com/scenarios/police-seize-phone).

### You must
- Make the disclosure required by a section 49 notice given to you, in accordance with the notice — a person to whom a section 49 notice has been given is guilty of an offence if he knowingly fails, in accordance with the notice, to make the disclosure required by virtue of the giving of the notice.
  Source: Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, s.53(1) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/section/53

### What they can do
- Under s.49(2), if a person with the appropriate permission under Schedule 2 believes, on reasonable grounds, that a key to the protected information is in the possession of any person, that a disclosure requirement is necessary on grounds falling within subsection (3) or for the purpose of securing the effective exercise or proper performance by any public authority of any statutory power or statutory duty, that imposing it is proportionate to what is sought to be achieved, and that it is not reasonably practicable for the person with the appropriate permission to obtain possession of the protected information in an intelligible form without the giving of a notice under that section, that person may by notice to the person he believes to have possession of the key impose a disclosure requirement in respect of the protected information.
  Source: Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, s.49(2) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/section/49
- An authorised person may extract information stored on an electronic device from that device if a user of the device has voluntarily provided the device to an authorised person, and that user has agreed to the extraction of information from the device by an authorised person.
  Source: Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.37(1) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/37

### Limits on them
- Section 37(2) to (4) of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 say that the power in subsection (1) may be exercised only for the purposes of preventing, detecting, investigating or prosecuting crime, helping to locate a missing person, or protecting a child or an at-risk adult from neglect or physical, mental or emotional harm. The reference in subsection (2) to crime is a reference to conduct which constitutes one or more criminal offences in any part of the United Kingdom, or conduct which, if it took place in any part of the United Kingdom, would constitute one or more criminal offences. For the purposes of subsection (2) an adult is an at-risk adult if the authorised person reasonably believes that the adult is experiencing, or at risk of, neglect or physical, mental or emotional harm, and is unable to protect themselves against the neglect or harm or the risk of it.
  Source: Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.37(2) to (4) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/37
- Section 37(5) of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 says that an authorised person may exercise the power in subsection (1) only if, in a case where the authorised person proposes to exercise the power for a purpose within subsection (2)(a), the authorised person reasonably believes that information stored on the electronic device is relevant to a reasonable line of enquiry which is being, or is to be, pursued by an authorised person; in a case where the authorised person proposes to exercise the power for a purpose within subsection (2)(b) or (c), the authorised person reasonably believes that information stored on the electronic device is relevant to that purpose; and in any case, the authorised person is satisfied that exercise of the power is necessary and proportionate to achieve the purpose within subsection (2) for which the person proposes to exercise the power.
  Source: Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.37(5) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/37
- Section 49(5) of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 says that where it appears to a person with the appropriate permission that more than one person is in possession of the key to any protected information, that any of those persons is in possession of that key in his capacity as an officer or employee of any body corporate, and that another of those persons is the body corporate itself or another officer or employee of the body corporate, a notice under section 49 shall not be given, by reference to his possession of the key, to any officer or employee of the body corporate unless he is a senior officer of the body corporate or it appears to the person giving the notice that there is no senior officer of the body corporate and (in the case of an employee) no more senior employee of the body corporate to whom it is reasonably practicable to give the notice. Section 49(6) says that where it appears to a person with the appropriate permission that more than one person is in possession of the key to any protected information, that any of those persons is in possession of that key in his capacity as an employee of a firm, and that another of those persons is the firm itself or a partner of the firm, a notice under section 49 shall not be given, by reference to his possession of the key, to any employee of the firm unless it appears to the person giving the notice that there is neither a partner of the firm nor a more senior employee of the firm to whom it is reasonably practicable to give the notice. Section 49(7) says that subsections (5) and (6) shall not apply to the extent that there are special circumstances of the case that mean that the purposes for which the notice is given would be defeated, in whole or in part, if the notice were given to the person to whom it would otherwise be required to be given by those subsections. Section 49(10) says that in section 49 “senior officer”, in relation to a body corporate, means a director, manager, secretary or other similar officer of the body corporate; and for this purpose “director”, in relation to a body corporate whose affairs are managed by its members, means a member of the body corporate.
  As quoted, subsections (5) and (6) are worded as rules about to whom a notice shall not be given; they do not say a notice that has been given may be refused. Section 53(1), under “You must” on this page, is worded as an offence by a person to whom a section 49 notice has been given who knowingly fails, in accordance with the notice, to make the disclosure required.
  Source: Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, s.49(5) to (7) and (10) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/section/49
- The extraction Code of Practice says that the device user, or the person who has voluntarily provided the device and agreed to the extraction of information from it in accordance with Section 38, has the right to withdraw their agreement for information to be extracted from the device; that it is that individual’s decision to give the authorised person the device and to agree to the extraction of information from it, and they can change their mind; and that in the case of a device that is used by multiple users, only the person who voluntarily provided the device and agreed to the extraction of information from it can withdraw that agreement.
  Source: Extraction of Information from Electronic Devices: Code of Practice (Oct 2022), para 158 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/634810a38fa8f53463dcb957/E02802691_Electronic_Devices_Code_of_Practice_WEB.pdf
- Where anything has been seized in exercise of any power of seizure and there is an obligation under “this Part” of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 for the whole or any part of the seized property to be returned, the obligation to return it is (subject to the following provisions of s.58) an obligation to return it to the person from whom it was seized (s.58(1)). Where the person under that obligation is satisfied that some other person has a better right to that thing than the person from whom it was seized, his duty to return it is instead a duty to return it to that other person or, as the case may be, to the person appearing to him to have the best right to the thing in question (s.58(2)). Where different persons claim to be entitled to the return of anything that is required to be returned under that Part, that thing may be retained for as long as is reasonably necessary for the determination in accordance with s.58(2) of the person to whom it must be returned (s.58(3)).
  Source: Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.58(1)-(3) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/58
- Any person with a relevant interest in the seized property may apply to the appropriate judicial authority, on one or more of the grounds mentioned in s.59(3), for the return of the whole or a part of the seized property.
  Source: Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.59(2) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/59
- Subject to s.21(8) of PACE, if a request for permission to be granted access to anything which has been seized by a constable and is retained by the police for the purpose of investigating an offence is made to the officer in charge of the investigation by a person who had custody or control of the thing immediately before it was so seized or by someone acting on behalf of such a person, the officer shall allow the person who made the request access to it under the supervision of a constable (s.21(3)). Subject to s.21(8), if a request for a photograph or copy of any such thing is made to the officer in charge of the investigation by a person who had custody or control of the thing immediately before it was so seized, or by someone acting on behalf of such a person, the officer shall allow the person who made the request access to it under the supervision of a constable for the purpose of photographing or copying it, or photograph or copy it, or cause it to be photographed or copied (s.21(4)). Under s.21(8), there is no duty under s.21 to grant access to, or to supply a photograph or copy of, anything if the officer in charge of the investigation for the purposes of which it was seized has reasonable grounds for believing that to do so would prejudice that investigation; the investigation of an offence other than the offence for the purposes of investigating which the thing was seized; or any criminal proceedings which may be brought as a result of the investigation of which he is in charge or of any such investigation as is mentioned in paragraph (b).
  As quoted, s.21 is worded by who had custody or control of the thing, and does not mention ownership.
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.21(3), (4) and (8) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/21
- PACE Code B para 7.17 says that “That person or their representative” must be allowed supervised access to the property to examine it or have it photographed or copied, or must be provided with a photograph or copy, in either case within a reasonable time of any request and at their own expense, unless the officer in charge of an investigation has reasonable grounds for believing this would prejudice the investigation of any offence or criminal proceedings, or lead to the commission of an offence by providing access to unlawful material such as pornography.
  Source: PACE Code B (2023), para 7.17 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/65804a3a83ba380013e1b769/PACE+Code+B+2023.pdf
- PACE Code B para 7.16 says that if property is retained, the person who had custody or control of it immediately before seizure must, on request, be provided with a list or description of the property within a reasonable time.
  Source: PACE Code B (2023), para 7.16 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/65804a3a83ba380013e1b769/PACE+Code+B+2023.pdf
- Under s.1(1) of the Police (Property) Act 1897, where any property has come into the possession of the police in connexion with their investigation of a suspected offence, a court of summary jurisdiction may, on application, either by an officer of police or by a claimant of the property, make an order for the delivery of the property to the person appearing to the magistrate or court to be the owner thereof, or, if the owner cannot be ascertained, make such order with respect to the property as to the magistrate or court may seem meet.
  Source: Police (Property) Act 1897, s.1(1) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Vict/60-61/30/section/1

### What the sources say
- PACE Code B para 2.2 says that the Notes for Guidance included are not provisions of that Code.
  Source: PACE Code B (2023), para 2.2 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/65804a3a83ba380013e1b769/PACE+Code+B+2023.pdf
- PACE Code B Note for guidance 7A says any person claiming property seized by the police may apply to a magistrates’ court under the Police (Property) Act 1897 for its possession and should, if appropriate, be advised of this procedure.
  Source: PACE Code B (2023), Note for guidance 7A — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/65804a3a83ba380013e1b769/PACE+Code+B+2023.pdf
- In Chapter 3 of Part 2 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, “user”, in relation to an electronic device, means a person who ordinarily uses the device.
  Source: Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.37(13) (interpretation: "user") — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/37
- References in s.59 of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 to a person with a relevant interest in seized property are references to the person from whom it was seized; any person with an interest in the property; or any person, not falling within those two descriptions, who had custody or control of the property immediately before the seizure.
  Source: Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.59(11) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/59
- References in that Part of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 to the person from whom something has been seized, in relation to a case in which the power of seizure was exercisable by reason of that thing’s having been found on any premises, are references to the occupier of the premises at the time of the seizure.
  Source: Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.58(4) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/58
- References in s.58 of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 to the occupier of any premises at the time of a seizure, in relation to a case in which a notice in connection with the entry or search of the premises in question, or with the seizure, was given to a person appearing in the occupier’s absence to be in charge of the premises, and it is practicable, for the purpose of returning something that has been seized, to identify that person but not to identify the occupier of the premises, are references to that person.
  Source: Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.58(5) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/58
- Under s.14(3) and (4) of PACE, where material is acquired by an employee from his employer and in the course of his employment, or by a company from an associated company, it is only special procedure material if it was special procedure material immediately before the acquisition; and where material is created by an employee in the course of his employment, it is only special procedure material if it would have been special procedure material had his employer created it.
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.14(3) and (4) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/14
- Section 37(12) of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 says that the section does not affect any power relating to the extraction or production of information, or any power to seize any item or obtain any information, conferred by an enactment or rule of law.
  Source: Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.37(12) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/section/37
- The extraction Code of Practice says that if a device has multiple users, for example a shared laptop or tablet device, it is the responsibility of the authorised person to ensure that the person volunteering the device and agreeing to the extraction of information from it is a person who ordinarily uses the device; and that ‘ordinarily uses’ does not necessarily mean that this person was the original purchaser of the device or that they must own it outright — for example, a person may have a mobile phone or laptop that they regularly use which has been provided by their employer or other organisation.
  Source: Extraction of Information from Electronic Devices: Code of Practice (Oct 2022), paras 51 and 52 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/634810a38fa8f53463dcb957/E02802691_Electronic_Devices_Code_of_Practice_WEB.pdf
- The extraction Code of Practice says it should be made clear that withdrawal of agreement will mean that the device is returned, if the extraction has not already taken place, then the information will not be taken from the device. However, if agreement is withdrawn after the extraction of information has taken place, it may not be possible to delete or return it. This is because of the duties on investigating agencies and prosecution services to disclose information to the defence. In all cases, however, the extracted information and the device must only be retained where there is a lawful basis to do so and as long as necessary in line with each authority’s data retention policies and other relevant guidance.
  Source: Extraction of Information from Electronic Devices: Code of Practice (Oct 2022), para 159 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/634810a38fa8f53463dcb957/E02802691_Electronic_Devices_Code_of_Practice_WEB.pdf
- Section 1(2) of the Police (Property) Act 1897 says that an order under that section shall not affect the right of any person to take within six months from the date of the order legal proceedings against any person in possession of property delivered by virtue of the order for the recovery of the property, but on the expiration of those six months the right shall cease.
  Source: Police (Property) Act 1897, s.1(2) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Vict/60-61/30/section/1
- PACE Code B Note for guidance 7D says that what constitutes a relevant interest in specific material may depend on the nature of that material and the circumstances in which it is seized, and that anyone with a reasonable claim to ownership of the material and anyone entrusted with its safe keeping by the owner should be considered.
  Source: PACE Code B (2023), Note for guidance 7D — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/65804a3a83ba380013e1b769/PACE+Code+B+2023.pdf

## A pupil’s phone at school in England: search, seize, erase
URL: https://phoneseized.com/scenarios/pupil-phone-searched-at-school
Jurisdictions: England & Wales
Last reviewed: 2026-10-04

### This page is about a school in England
This page is about a school in England. The DfE guidance Searching, screening and confiscation (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/62d1643e8fa8f50bfbefa55c/Searching__Screening_and_Confiscation_guidance_July_2022.pdf) says it is for school leaders, school staff, governing bodies, proprietors and trust boards in all maintained schools, academies, free schools and independent schools in England, and for local authorities, and that the powers to search outlined in the guidance only apply in England. Section 550ZA of the Education Act 1996 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/56/section/550ZA) applies where a member of staff of a school in England has reasonable grounds for suspecting that a pupil at the school may have a prohibited item with him or her or in his or her possessions, and falls within section 550ZB(1); it then says the member of staff may search the pupil or the pupil’s possessions for that item. The powers on this page are the powers of school staff, not of the police. Section 550ZB(1) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/56/section/550ZB) says a person may carry out a search under section 550ZA only if that person is the head teacher of the school or has been authorised by the head teacher to carry out the search; subsection (2) says an authorisation may be given in relation to searches under section 550ZA generally, a particular search under that section, or a particular description of searches under that section; and subsection (3) says nothing in any enactment, instrument or agreement shall be construed as authorising a head teacher of a school in England to require a person other than a member of the security staff of the school to carry out a search under section 550ZA.

### Wales and the rest of the UK
For Wales, section 550AA(1) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/56/section/550AA) says a member of the staff of a school in Wales who has reasonable grounds for suspecting that a pupil at the school may have with him or in his possessions an article to which section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 applies (knives and blades etc.), or an offensive weapon (within the meaning of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953), may search that pupil or his possessions for such articles and weapons. This page quotes only section 550AA(1). Section 583(6) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/56/section/583) says that, subject to subsections (7) and (8), the Act extends to England and Wales only. Subsection (7) says that section 583, section 493 and section 569 so far as relating to regulations under section 493 extend also to Scotland, and that section 583 extends also to Northern Ireland; subsection (8) says section 582 and Schedules 37 to 40 have the same extent as the enactments to which they relate. This page quotes no Scottish provision on searching a pupil’s phone.

### When a phone can be searched for and taken
As quoted, section 550ZA(3) does not mention a phone. Section 550C (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/56/section/550C) does: subsection (1) says the appropriate person for a school in England must have regard to guidance described in subsection (2) in exercising functions in relation to the conduct of the school, and subsection (2) says the guidance referred to in subsection (1) is guidance issued from time to time by the Secretary of State about registered pupils at schools having mobile phones and other personal interactive communication devices with them, and using them during school hours, and on school premises. The DfE guidance Mobile phones in schools (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/mobile-phones-in-schools/mobile-phones-in-schools) says it applies to England, that it became statutory on 29 June 2026, and that headteachers “can and should identify mobile phones and similar devices as something that may be searched for in their school behaviour policy”. Section 550ZA(3) lists the “prohibited items” for the purposes of sections 550ZA and 550ZC, and they include an article that the member of staff reasonably suspects has been, or is likely to be, used to commit an offence, or to cause personal injury to, or damage to the property of, any person (including P) (subsection (3)(ea)), and any other item which the school rules identify as an item for which a search may be made (subsection (3)(g)) (section 550ZA(3) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/56/section/550ZA)). Section 550ZB(4) says a search under section 550ZA may be carried out only where the member of staff and the pupil are on the premises of the school, or they are elsewhere and the member of staff has lawful control or charge of the pupil (section 550ZB(4) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/56/section/550ZB)). Under section 550ZB(7) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/56/section/550ZB), a pupil’s possessions may not be searched under section 550ZA except in the presence of the pupil and another member of staff, unless the condition in subsection (7A) is satisfied: the person carrying out the search reasonably believes that there is a risk that serious harm will be caused to a person if the search is not carried out as a matter of urgency, and in the time available it is not reasonably practicable for the search to be carried out in the presence of another member of staff. Section 550ZB(6) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/56/section/550ZB) sets separate rules for a search of the pupil, including that the person searching may not require the pupil to remove any clothing other than outer clothing. A person carrying out a search under section 550ZA may seize anything found in the course of the search which that person has reasonable grounds for suspecting is a prohibited item, and any other thing which that person has reasonable grounds for suspecting is evidence in relation to an offence (section 550ZC(1) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/56/section/550ZC)). Section 550ZA(6) says the powers conferred by that section and sections 550ZB and 550ZC are in addition to any powers exercisable by the member of staff in question apart from those sections and are not to be construed as restricting such powers (section 550ZA(6) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/56/section/550ZA)). The DfE guidance Mobile phones in schools (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/mobile-phones-in-schools/mobile-phones-in-schools) says schools should feel confident to use their power to confiscate mobile phones or similar devices as a disciplinary penalty where their policy is clearly breached, for instance where a mobile phone is used by a pupil or is heard ringing in a pupil’s bag; that the law protects staff from liability in any proceedings brought against them for any loss or damage to items they have confiscated as a sanction, providing they have acted lawfully; that staff should consider whether the confiscation is proportionate and consider any special circumstances relevant to the case; and that headteachers are backed by DfE to confiscate mobile phones and similar devices, if they consider it proportionate, for whatever length of time they deem proportionate. Paragraph 80 of the Searching, screening and confiscation guidance (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/62d1643e8fa8f50bfbefa55c/Searching__Screening_and_Confiscation_guidance_July_2022.pdf) says schools’ general power to discipline enables a member of staff to confiscate, retain or dispose of a pupil’s property as a disciplinary penalty, where reasonable to do so; its footnote to that sentence reads “Section 91 of the Education and Inspections Act 2006.” This page does not quote that section.

### Looking through it
Subsections (6E) and (6F) of section 550ZC apply only to an item that has been seized under subsection (1), is a prohibited item by virtue of section 550ZA(3)(ea) or (g), and is an electronic device (section 550ZC(6D) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/56/section/550ZC)). Each of those conditions must be met for subsections (6E) and (6F) to apply. Under subsection (6E), the person who seized the item may examine any data or files on the device, if the person thinks there is a good reason to do so; under subsection (6G), in determining whether there is a good reason, the person must have regard to any guidance issued for the purposes of the section by the Secretary of State. Paragraph 76 of the Department for Education’s Searching, screening and confiscation guidance (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/62d1643e8fa8f50bfbefa55c/Searching__Screening_and_Confiscation_guidance_July_2022.pdf) (July 2022) says that if a member of staff finds any image, data or file that they suspect might constitute a specified offence, then they must be delivered to the police as soon as is reasonably practicable. Its paragraph 77 says that, in exceptional circumstances, members of staff may dispose of the image or data if there is a good reason to do so, and that, in determining a ‘good reason’ to examine or erase the data or files, the member of staff must have regard to the following guidance issued by the Secretary of State in its paragraphs 78 and 79. Paragraph 74 of the same document says staff may examine any data or files on an electronic device they have confiscated as a result of a search, as defined in its paragraph 57, if there is good reason to do so. Its paragraph 78 says that, in determining whether there is a ‘good reason’ to examine the data or files, the member of staff should reasonably suspect that the data or file on the device has been, or could be used, to cause harm, undermine the safe environment of the school and disrupt teaching, or be used to commit an offence. Paragraph 57’s list of what may be confiscated is the guidance’s list, not the Act’s: it includes an item that “poses a risk to staff or pupils”, a ground that is not in the words of section 550ZC(1) as quoted above.

### Deleting what is on it
Under section 550ZC(6F) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/56/section/550ZC), following an examination under subsection (6E), if the person has decided to return the item to its owner, retain it or dispose of it, the person may erase any data or files from the device if the person thinks there is a good reason to do so. Each of the conditions in subsection (6D) must be met for subsections (6E) and (6F) to apply. Subsection (6G) again requires the person to have regard to the Secretary of State’s guidance. The July 2022 edition of the DfE guidance, paragraph 79 (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/62d1643e8fa8f50bfbefa55c/Searching__Screening_and_Confiscation_guidance_July_2022.pdf) (read with the first sentence of paragraph 77, quoted above), says that, in determining whether there is a ‘good reason’ to erase any data or files from the device, the member of staff should consider whether the material found may constitute evidence relating to a suspected offence; in those instances, the data or files should not be deleted, and the device must be handed to the police as soon as it is reasonably practicable. It also says that, if the data or files are not suspected to be evidence in relation to an offence, a member of staff may delete them if their continued existence is likely to continue to cause harm to any person and the pupil and/or the parent refuses to delete the data or files themselves. Section 550ZD(2B) to (3) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/56/section/550ZD) says that a person who erases data or a file from an electronic device under section 550ZC(6F), and proves that the erasure was lawful, is not liable in any proceedings in respect of the seizure, retention, disposal or erasure, or any damage or loss which arises in consequence of it; subsection (4) adds that subsections (2), (2B) and (3) do not prevent any person from relying on any defence on which the person is entitled to rely apart from those subsections.

### When it goes to the police
A person who, under section 550ZC(1), seizes an article to which section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 applies (knives and blades etc.), an offensive weapon, or anything which that person has reasonable grounds for suspecting is evidence in relation to an offence, must deliver it to a police constable as soon as reasonably practicable (section 550ZC(8) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/56/section/550ZC)). Subsection (9) says subsection (8)(c) is subject to subsections (3), (4), (5) and (6A) and regulations made under subsection (7). Section 550ZC(6A), for an item that is a prohibited item by virtue of section 550ZA(3)(ea), lists delivery to a police constable alongside returning the item to its owner, retaining it, or disposing of it (section 550ZC(6A) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/56/section/550ZC)). The July 2022 edition of the DfE guidance, paragraph 76 (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/62d1643e8fa8f50bfbefa55c/Searching__Screening_and_Confiscation_guidance_July_2022.pdf), says that if a member of staff finds any image, data or file that they suspect might constitute a specified offence, then they must be delivered to the police as soon as is reasonably practicable. Section 550ZD(1) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/56/section/550ZD) says the Police (Property) Act 1897 applies to property which has come into the possession of a police constable under section 550ZC(4)(a), (5)(a), (6A)(a) or (8) as it applies to property which has come into the possession of the police in the circumstances mentioned in that Act. For what police can do with a phone once they have it, see Can police take my phone (https://phoneseized.com/uk/seizure-pace) and Retention and deletion (https://phoneseized.com/uk/retention-and-deletion).

### What the quoted sections do not cover
Section 550ZB(5) is worded for a search for “an item within section 550ZA(3)(a) to (f)”, and section 550ZC(2) for seizing “an item within section 550ZA(3)(a) to (f) or anything within subsection (1)(b)” (see section 550ZB(5) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/56/section/550ZB) and section 550ZC(2) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/56/section/550ZC)). An item the school rules identify is the item described in section 550ZA(3)(g). Paragraph 19 of the DfE guidance (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/62d1643e8fa8f50bfbefa55c/Searching__Screening_and_Confiscation_guidance_July_2022.pdf) (July 2022 edition) says the authorised member of staff should always seek the co-operation of the pupil before conducting a search, and that if the pupil is not willing to co-operate with the search, the member of staff should consider why this is. Its paragraph 20 says that if a pupil continues to refuse to co-operate, the member of staff may sanction the pupil in line with the school’s behaviour policy, ensuring that they are responding to misbehaviour consistently and fairly. Its paragraph 22 (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/62d1643e8fa8f50bfbefa55c/Searching__Screening_and_Confiscation_guidance_July_2022.pdf) says that if the pupil still refuses to co-operate, the member of staff should assess whether it is appropriate to use reasonable force to conduct the search, and that a member of staff can use such force as is reasonable to search for any prohibited items identified in its paragraph 3 (a list this page does not quote), but not to search for items which are identified only in the school rules. The Act quotations on this page do not mention parental consent, a passcode or unlocking a phone. What they say about force is in sections 550ZB(5) and 550ZC(2), quoted above. The guidance paragraph quoted above for erasing data mentions the pupil and/or the parent refusing to delete the data or files themselves. For what a phone holds, see What is on your phone (https://phoneseized.com/tools/whats-on-your-phone) and Deleted is not gone (https://phoneseized.com/on-your-phone/deleted-is-not-gone).

### What they can do
- Section 550ZA applies where a member of staff of a school in England has reasonable grounds for suspecting that a pupil at the school may have a prohibited item with him or her or in his or her possessions, and falls within section 550ZB(1); the member of staff may search the pupil (“P”) or P’s possessions for that item. In sections 550ZA and 550ZB, “member of staff”, in relation to a school, means any teacher who works at the school, and any other person who, with the authority of the head teacher, has lawful control or charge of pupils for whom education is being provided at the school; and “possessions”, in relation to P, includes any goods over which P has or appears to have control.
  Source: Education Act 1996, s.550ZA(1), (2) and (5) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/56/section/550ZA
- A person carrying out a search under section 550ZA (that is, a member of staff of a school in England within section 550ZB(1), as quoted above) may seize any of the following found in the course of the search: anything which that person has reasonable grounds for suspecting is a prohibited item; any other thing which that person has reasonable grounds for suspecting is evidence in relation to an offence.
  Source: Education Act 1996, s.550ZC(1) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/56/section/550ZC
- Subsections (6E) and (6F) of section 550ZC apply to an item that has been seized under subsection (1), is a prohibited item by virtue of section 550ZA(3)(ea) or (g), and is an electronic device. Under subsection (6E), the person who seized the item (a person carrying out a search under section 550ZA, as quoted above) may examine any data or files on the device, if the person thinks there is a good reason to do so.
  Source: Education Act 1996, s.550ZC(6D) to (6G) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/56/section/550ZC
- Subsection (6F) of section 550ZC applies to an item that has been seized under subsection (1), is a prohibited item by virtue of section 550ZA(3)(ea) or (g), and is an electronic device. Following an examination under subsection (6E), if the person has decided to return the item to its owner, retain it or dispose of it, the person (the person who seized the item) may erase any data or files from the device if the person thinks there is a good reason to do so.
  Source: Education Act 1996, s.550ZC(6D) to (6G) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/56/section/550ZC
- A person exercising the power in section 550ZA (the search power of a member of staff of a school in England, as quoted above) to search for an item within section 550ZA(3)(a) to (f) may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances for exercising that power.
  Source: Education Act 1996, s.550ZB(5) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/56/section/550ZB
- A person exercising the power in section 550ZC(1) (the seizure power of a person carrying out a search under section 550ZA, as quoted above) to seize an item within section 550ZA(3)(a) to (f) or anything within subsection (1)(b) may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances for exercising that power.
  Source: Education Act 1996, s.550ZC(2) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/56/section/550ZC
- In Wales, section 550AA(1) says a member of the staff of a school in Wales who has reasonable grounds for suspecting that a pupil at the school may have with him or in his possessions an article to which section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 applies (knives and blades etc.), or an offensive weapon (within the meaning of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953), may search that pupil or his possessions for such articles and weapons.
  Source: Education Act 1996, s.550AA(1) (Wales) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/56/section/550AA

### Limits on them
- A person may carry out a search under section 550ZA only if that person is the head teacher of the school, or has been authorised by the head teacher to carry out the search. An authorisation for the purposes of subsection (1)(b) may be given in relation to searches under section 550ZA generally, a particular search under that section, or a particular description of searches under that section. Nothing in any enactment, instrument or agreement shall be construed as authorising a head teacher of a school in England to require a person other than a member of the security staff of the school to carry out a search under section 550ZA.
  Source: Education Act 1996, s.550ZB(1) to (3) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/56/section/550ZB
- A search under section 550ZA may be carried out only where the member of staff and P are on the premises of the school, or they are elsewhere and the member of staff has lawful control or charge of P.
  Source: Education Act 1996, s.550ZB(4) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/56/section/550ZB
- P’s possessions may not be searched under section 550ZA except in the presence of P and another member of staff, unless the condition in subsection (7A) is satisfied. The condition is satisfied if the person carrying out the search reasonably believes that there is a risk that serious harm will be caused to a person if the search is not carried out as a matter of urgency, and in the time available it is not reasonably practicable for the search to be carried out in the presence of another member of staff.
  Source: Education Act 1996, s.550ZB(7) and (7A) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/56/section/550ZB
- A person carrying out a search of P under section 550ZA may not require P to remove any clothing other than outer clothing; must be of the same sex as P, unless the condition in subsection (6A) is satisfied; may carry out the search only in the presence of another member of staff, unless the condition in subsection (6A) is satisfied; and must ensure that the other member of staff is of the same sex as P if it is reasonably practicable to do so. The condition in subsection (6A) is satisfied if the person carrying out the search reasonably believes that there is a risk that serious harm will be caused to a person if the search is not carried out as a matter of urgency, and in the time available it is not reasonably practicable for the search to be carried out by a person of the same sex as P or in the presence of another member of staff (as the case may be).
  Source: Education Act 1996, s.550ZB(6) and (6A) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/56/section/550ZB
- In determining whether there is a good reason for the purposes of subsection (6E) (examining data or files) or (6F) (erasing data or files), the person must have regard to any guidance issued for the purposes of section 550ZC by the Secretary of State.
  Source: Education Act 1996, s.550ZC(6D) to (6G) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/56/section/550ZC
- A person who, under section 550ZC(1), seizes an article to which section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 applies (knives and blades etc.), an offensive weapon, or anything which that person has reasonable grounds for suspecting is evidence in relation to an offence, must deliver it to a police constable as soon as reasonably practicable. Subsection (8)(c) is subject to subsections (3), (4), (5) and (6A) and regulations made under subsection (7).
  Source: Education Act 1996, s.550ZC(8) to (10) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/56/section/550ZC

### What the sources say
- The DfE guidance for schools in England, Searching, screening and confiscation (July 2022 edition), says it is for school leaders, school staff, governing bodies, proprietors and trust boards in all maintained schools, academies, free schools and independent schools in England, and for local authorities; and that the powers to search outlined in the guidance only apply in England.
  Source: DfE, Searching, screening and confiscation (July 2022), Summary (who the guidance is for) and footnote 9 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/62d1643e8fa8f50bfbefa55c/Searching__Screening_and_Confiscation_guidance_July_2022.pdf
- Section 550ZA(3) says that, for the purposes of sections 550ZA and 550ZC, each of the following is a “prohibited item”: (a) an article to which section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 applies (knives and blades etc.); (b) an offensive weapon, within the meaning of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953; (c) alcohol, within the meaning of section 191 of the Licensing Act 2003; (d) a controlled drug, within the meaning of section 2 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, which section 5(1) of that Act makes it unlawful for P to have in P’s possession; (e) a stolen article; (ea) an article that the member of staff reasonably suspects has been, or is likely to be, used to commit an offence, or to cause personal injury to, or damage to the property of, any person (including P); (f) an article of a kind specified in regulations; and (g) any other item which the school rules identify as an item for which a search may be made. Subsection (4A) says that in subsection (3)(ea)(i), “offence” includes anything that would be an offence but for the operation of any presumption that a person under a particular age is incapable of committing an offence. Subsection (4B) says that in subsection (3)(g), the “school rules” means, in the case of a maintained school or a non-maintained special school, rules in force at the school that are made under measures determined and publicised by the head teacher under section 89 of the Education and Inspections Act 2006, and, in the case of any other school, measures relating to discipline in the school that are determined and publicised in accordance with regulations. Subsection (4C) says that in subsection (4B)(a), “maintained school” means a community, foundation or voluntary school, a community or foundation special school, a maintained nursery school, or a pupil referral unit, and “non-maintained special school” means a school that is approved under section 342.
  Source: Education Act 1996, s.550ZA(3) to (4C) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/56/section/550ZA
- Section 550ZA(6) says the powers conferred by that section and sections 550ZB and 550ZC are in addition to any powers exercisable by the member of staff in question apart from those sections and are not to be construed as restricting such powers.
  Source: Education Act 1996, s.550ZA(6) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/56/section/550ZA
- The DfE guidance for schools in England (July 2022 edition), paragraph 19, says the authorised member of staff should always seek the co-operation of the pupil before conducting a search, and that if the pupil is not willing to co-operate with the search, the member of staff should consider why this is. Paragraph 20 says that if a pupil continues to refuse to co-operate, the member of staff may sanction the pupil in line with the school’s behaviour policy, ensuring that they are responding to misbehaviour consistently and fairly.
  Source: DfE, Searching, screening and confiscation (July 2022), paras 19 and 20 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/62d1643e8fa8f50bfbefa55c/Searching__Screening_and_Confiscation_guidance_July_2022.pdf
- The DfE guidance for schools in England (July 2022 edition), paragraph 22, says that if the pupil still refuses to co-operate, the member of staff should assess whether it is appropriate to use reasonable force to conduct the search, and that a member of staff can use such force as is reasonable to search for any prohibited items identified in its paragraph 3 (a list this page does not quote), but not to search for items which are identified only in the school rules.
  Source: DfE, Searching, screening and confiscation (July 2022), para 22 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/62d1643e8fa8f50bfbefa55c/Searching__Screening_and_Confiscation_guidance_July_2022.pdf
- Section 550C of the Education Act 1996 says that the appropriate person for a school in England must have regard to guidance described in subsection (2) in exercising functions in relation to the conduct of the school (subsection (1)); and that the guidance referred to in subsection (1) is guidance issued from time to time by the Secretary of State about registered pupils at schools having mobile phones and other personal interactive communication devices with them, and using them during school hours, and on school premises (subsection (2)). Subsections (4) to (6) apply for the purposes of the section: “appropriate person” means, for a community, foundation or voluntary school, a community or foundation special school, a maintained nursery school, a pupil referral unit, or a school approved by the Secretary of State under section 342 (approval of non-maintained special schools), the head teacher, and, for any other kind of school, the proprietor; “school hours”, in relation to a school, means any time between the start of the first school session on a school day and the end of the last school session on the same day; and references to mobile phones and other personal interactive communication devices do not include references to devices provided by or on behalf of the appropriate person for a school for use by registered pupils.
  Source: Education Act 1996, s.550C (guidance on mobile phones etc: schools in England) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/56/section/550C
- Section 550ZC(6A) to (6C) says that a person who seizes an item that is a prohibited item by virtue of section 550ZA(3)(ea) (article used in commission of offence or to cause personal injury or damage to property) under subsection (1) must deliver the item to a police constable as soon as reasonably practicable, return the item to its owner, retain the item, or dispose of the item; that a person who seizes an item that is a prohibited item by virtue of section 550ZA(3)(g) (item for which search may be made under school rules) under subsection (1) must return it to its owner, retain it or dispose of it; and that, in deciding what to do with an item under subsection (6A) or (6B), the person who seized it must have regard to guidance issued for the purpose of this section by the Secretary of State.
  Source: Education Act 1996, s.550ZC(6A) to (6C) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/56/section/550ZC
- Section 550ZD(2) to (4) says that subsection (3) applies where a person seizes, retains or disposes of an item within subsection (2A) under section 550ZC and proves that the seizure, retention or disposal was lawful; that the items referred to in subsection (2)(a) are alcohol or its container, a controlled drug, a stolen article, and an item that is a prohibited item by virtue of section 550ZA(3)(ea) or (g); that subsection (3) also applies where a person erases data or a file from an electronic device under section 550ZC(6F) and proves that the erasure was lawful; that such a person is not liable in any proceedings in respect of the seizure, retention, disposal or erasure, or any damage or loss which arises in consequence of it; and that subsections (2), (2B) and (3) do not prevent any person from relying on any defence on which the person is entitled to rely apart from those subsections.
  Source: Education Act 1996, s.550ZD(2) to (4) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/56/section/550ZD
- Section 550ZD(1) says the Police (Property) Act 1897 (disposal of property in the possession of the police) applies to property which has come into the possession of a police constable under section 550ZC(4)(a), (5)(a), (6A)(a) or (8) as it applies to property which has come into the possession of the police in the circumstances mentioned in that Act.
  Source: Education Act 1996, s.550ZD(1) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/56/section/550ZD
- Section 583(6) of the Education Act 1996 says that, subject to subsections (7) and (8), the Act extends to England and Wales only. Subsection (7) says that section 583, section 493 and section 569 so far as relating to regulations under section 493 extend also to Scotland, and that section 583 extends also to Northern Ireland; subsection (8) says that section 582 and Schedules 37 to 40 have the same extent as the enactments to which they relate.
  Source: Education Act 1996, s.583(6) to (8) (extent) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/56/section/583
- The DfE guidance for schools in England, Searching, screening and confiscation (July 2022 edition), paragraph 72, says electronic devices, including mobile phones, can contain files or data which relate to an offence, or which may cause harm to another person.
  Source: DfE, Searching, screening and confiscation (July 2022), para 72 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/62d1643e8fa8f50bfbefa55c/Searching__Screening_and_Confiscation_guidance_July_2022.pdf
- The summary of the DfE guidance for schools in England, Searching, screening and confiscation (July 2022 edition), says it includes statutory guidance which schools must have regard to, and that where its text uses the word ‘must’, the person in question is legally required to do something.
  Source: DfE, Searching, screening and confiscation (July 2022), Summary (status of the guidance) — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/62d1643e8fa8f50bfbefa55c/Searching__Screening_and_Confiscation_guidance_July_2022.pdf
- The DfE guidance for schools in England (July 2022 edition), paragraph 57, says an authorised staff member carrying out a search can confiscate any item that they have reasonable grounds for suspecting: poses a risk to staff or pupils; is prohibited, or identified in the school rules for which a search can be made (see paragraphs 2-3); or is evidence in relation to an offence. This is the guidance’s list; “poses a risk to staff or pupils” is not among the grounds in section 550ZC(1) as quoted on this page. Paragraph 74 says staff may examine any data or files on an electronic device they have confiscated as a result of a search, as defined in paragraph 57, if there is good reason to do so.
  Source: DfE, Searching, screening and confiscation (July 2022), paras 57 and 74 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/62d1643e8fa8f50bfbefa55c/Searching__Screening_and_Confiscation_guidance_July_2022.pdf
- The DfE guidance for schools in England (July 2022 edition), paragraph 62, says that if a member of staff finds a pornographic image, they may dispose of the image unless they have reasonable grounds to suspect that its possession constitutes a specified offence (i.e. it is extreme or an indecent image of a child) in which case it must be delivered to the police as soon as reasonably practicable. Paragraph 76 says that if a member of staff finds any image, data or file that they suspect might constitute a specified offence, then they must be delivered to the police as soon as is reasonably practicable.
  Source: DfE, Searching, screening and confiscation (July 2022), paras 62 and 76 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/62d1643e8fa8f50bfbefa55c/Searching__Screening_and_Confiscation_guidance_July_2022.pdf
- The DfE guidance for schools in England (July 2022 edition), paragraph 77, says that, in exceptional circumstances, members of staff may dispose of the image or data if there is a good reason to do so, and that, in determining a ‘good reason’ to examine or erase the data or files, the member of staff must have regard to the guidance issued by the Secretary of State in paragraphs 78 and 79. Paragraph 78 says that, in determining whether there is a ‘good reason’ to examine the data or files, the member of staff should reasonably suspect that the data or file on the device has been, or could be used, to cause harm, undermine the safe environment of the school and disrupt teaching, or be used to commit an offence.
  Source: DfE, Searching, screening and confiscation (July 2022), paras 77 and 78 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/62d1643e8fa8f50bfbefa55c/Searching__Screening_and_Confiscation_guidance_July_2022.pdf
- The DfE guidance for schools in England (July 2022 edition), paragraph 77, says that, in exceptional circumstances, members of staff may dispose of the image or data if there is a good reason to do so, and that, in determining a ‘good reason’ to examine or erase the data or files, the member of staff must have regard to the guidance issued by the Secretary of State in paragraphs 78 and 79. Paragraph 79 says that, in determining whether there is a ‘good reason’ to erase any data or files from the device, the member of staff should consider whether the material found may constitute evidence relating to a suspected offence; in those instances, the data or files should not be deleted, and the device must be handed to the police as soon as it is reasonably practicable; if the data or files are not suspected to be evidence in relation to an offence, a member of staff may delete the data or files if the continued existence of the data or file is likely to continue to cause harm to any person and the pupil and/or the parent refuses to delete the data or files themselves.
  Source: DfE, Searching, screening and confiscation (July 2022), paras 77 and 79 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/62d1643e8fa8f50bfbefa55c/Searching__Screening_and_Confiscation_guidance_July_2022.pdf
- The DfE guidance for schools in England, Mobile phones in schools, says it applies to England; that it became statutory on 29 June 2026; and that schools should begin following it from 1 September 2026.
  Source: DfE, Mobile phones in schools (statutory from 29 June 2026; page updated 29 June 2026), status — https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/mobile-phones-in-schools/mobile-phones-in-schools
- The DfE guidance for schools in England, Mobile phones in schools, says headteachers can and should identify mobile phones and similar devices as something that may be searched for in their school behaviour policy, and that staff should refer to the searching, screening and confiscation in schools guidance regarding searching a pupil.
  Source: DfE, Mobile phones in schools (statutory from 29 June 2026; page updated 29 June 2026), searching — https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/mobile-phones-in-schools/mobile-phones-in-schools
- The DfE guidance for schools in England, Mobile phones in schools, says schools should feel confident to use their power to confiscate mobile phones or similar devices as a disciplinary penalty where their policy is clearly breached, for instance where a mobile phone is used by a pupil or is heard ringing in a pupil’s bag; that the law protects staff from liability in any proceedings brought against them for any loss or damage to items they have confiscated as a sanction, providing they have acted lawfully; that staff should consider whether the confiscation is proportionate and consider any special circumstances relevant to the case; and that headteachers are backed by DfE to confiscate mobile phones and similar devices, if they consider it proportionate, for whatever length of time they deem proportionate.
  Source: DfE, Mobile phones in schools (statutory from 29 June 2026; page updated 29 June 2026), confiscation — https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/mobile-phones-in-schools/mobile-phones-in-schools
- The DfE guidance for schools in England (July 2022 edition), paragraph 80, says schools’ general power to discipline enables a member of staff to confiscate, retain or dispose of a pupil’s property as a disciplinary penalty, where reasonable to do so; its footnote 21 says “Section 91 of the Education and Inspections Act 2006.”
  Source: DfE, Searching, screening and confiscation (July 2022), para 80 and footnote 21 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/62d1643e8fa8f50bfbefa55c/Searching__Screening_and_Confiscation_guidance_July_2022.pdf

## Carrying a work phone through a UK port: Schedule 7
URL: https://phoneseized.com/scenarios/work-phone-at-a-uk-port
Jurisdictions: England & Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland
Last reviewed: 2026-10-06

### The Code’s words are “any electronic device”
Paragraph 5(a) of Schedule 7 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/schedule/7) to the Terrorism Act 2000 says a person who is questioned under paragraph 2 or 3 must give the examining officer any information in his possession which the officer requests. The Schedule 7 Code of Practice says the person must provide access to any electronic device to allow for a search to be undertaken, including where access to a device requires the person to unlock a device through application of their thumb or finger, or any other form of access control (Code para 61 (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68e7b52b187483de54d766d2/Schedule+7+Code+of+Practice.pdf)), and that information requested under paragraph 5(a) may include passwords to electronic devices, and that an examining officer may not, however, compel a person to disclose or confirm the identity of a source of journalistic information or disclose information subject to legal privilege (Code para 55 (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68e7b52b187483de54d766d2/Schedule+7+Code+of+Practice.pdf)). Paragraph 18(1) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/schedule/7/paragraph/18) says a person commits an offence if he wilfully fails to comply with a duty imposed under or by virtue of the Schedule, wilfully contravenes a prohibition imposed under or by virtue of the Schedule, or wilfully obstructs, or seeks to frustrate, a search or examination under or by virtue of the Schedule, and paragraph 18(2) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/schedule/7/paragraph/18) says a person guilty of an offence under that paragraph is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months, a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale, or both. The limit in Code para 55 and each limit that follows are limits on the examining officer and, where the quoted words say so, on another officer or the police; as quoted, none gives the person a right to refuse any Schedule 7 duty. The full Schedule 7 stop is on the Schedule 7 page (https://phoneseized.com/uk/ports-schedule-7) and, for the rest of it, rightsandlimits.com’s Schedule 7 page (https://rightsandlimits.com/borders/schedule-7). A RIPA section 49 notice is covered on the RIPA notice page (https://phoneseized.com/uk/ripa-notice). Section 130(1) of the Terrorism Act 2000 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/section/130) says that, subject to subsections (2) to (6), the Act extends to the whole of the United Kingdom. For Scotland, see Seizure and cyber kiosks in Scotland (https://phoneseized.com/scotland/seizure-and-cyber-kiosks).

### Confidential business material
The Code says that if, before an examining officer examines or copies an article, or during the process of examining the article or copy, the examining officer has reasonable grounds for believing that the article or copy consists of or includes (or would consist of or include, were the copy to be made) confidential business material within the meaning of section 14(2) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, the examining officer must obtain the authorisation of an officer of at least the rank of superintendent who has not been directly involved in the exercise of Schedule 7 powers to the article or copy’s retention, examination and use (Code para 76 (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68e7b52b187483de54d766d2/Schedule+7+Code+of+Practice.pdf)). It says the authorising officer may give such an authorisation only if satisfied that arrangements are in place that are sufficient for ensuring that the material is retained securely, and the material will be used only so far as necessary and proportionate in accordance with paragraphs 11(2)(a)-(c) or 11A(3)(a)-(c), as applicable. It also says that where authorisation is not given, confidential business material must be treated as if it were protected material, and a separation and independent review process (or any other process designed to prevent the examining officer or any other officer involved in an examination under Schedule 7 examining the protected material) applied to separate out the confidential business material, if the examining officer considers it necessary and proportionate to examine non-confidential business material within the article or copy. That is a rule for the examining officer. As quoted, it does not give the person a right to refuse any Schedule 7 duty. This page does not quote section 14(2) of PACE; for an employer-owned phone more generally, for England and Wales, see the employer-owned phone page (https://phoneseized.com/scenarios/employer-owned-phone).

### Legally privileged, journalistic and other protected material
The Code says an examining officer may not ask a question under paragraph 2 or 3 of Schedule 7 where they have reasonable grounds to believe that the answer to the question would require a person to disclose or confirm the identity of a source of journalistic information or disclose information subject to legal privilege (Code para 44 (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68e7b52b187483de54d766d2/Schedule+7+Code+of+Practice.pdf)). The Code says that, in the absence of any power other than Schedule 7 (such as Schedule 5 to the Terrorism Act 2000), material cannot be examined where the officer has reasonable grounds for believing it to be protected material; the officer may, however, examine any nonprotected material, subject to the conditions of the following paragraphs (Code para 70 (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68e7b52b187483de54d766d2/Schedule+7+Code+of+Practice.pdf), which also defines “protected material”). The Code says that, if before an examining officer examines or copies an article the officer has reasonable grounds for believing that the article consists of or includes protected material, the officer must only proceed to examine the article or make the copy if the protected material is capable of being separated from non-protected material; that, if the officer has developed such reasonable grounds during the process of examining the article or copy, the officer must cease examining the article or copy and may only subsequently continue to examine the article or copy if the non-protected material has been separated from the protected material; and that, save as to any other power applying which permits retention, where it is assessed that protected material within an article or copy cannot be separated from non-protected material the article must be returned to the person from whom it was taken, and any copies of the article must be destroyed (Code para 71 (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68e7b52b187483de54d766d2/Schedule+7+Code+of+Practice.pdf)). The Code says an examining officer may only retain an article, or make and retain a copy of an article, which the officer has reasonable grounds for believing consists of or includes protected material if the officer considers it necessary and proportionate to do so in accordance with paragraphs 11(2)(a)-(c) or 11A(3)(a)-(c) and a sifting and independent review process, or any other process designed to prevent the examining officer or any other officer involved in an examination under Schedule 7 examining the protected material, is possible (Code para 75 (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68e7b52b187483de54d766d2/Schedule+7+Code+of+Practice.pdf)). The Code says the examining officer should consider whether it is reasonably practicable for the protected material to be separated at the time and place of the Schedule 7 examination, and that, if this is not reasonably practicable at the time and place of the Schedule 7 examination, the officer may retain the article or copy in accordance with paragraph 11 or 11A, as applicable, and during the retention period the sifting and independent review process in relation to an article or copy must be carried out. It says that, in cases where the material on the article or copy is electronic, voluminous and capable of being searched electronically, the person from whom the article has been taken (or from whose article a copy has been taken), or that person’s legal representative, must be given the opportunity to provide search terms to be applied to identify potential protected material, and that the ultimate decision as to which search terms are applied shall be for the relevant police force (Code para 72 (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68e7b52b187483de54d766d2/Schedule+7+Code+of+Practice.pdf), one of the steps of the sifting and independent review process). Those paragraphs set limits on the examining officer and, for the search-terms process, the police, and Code para 70 also contains a definition; as quoted, none gives the person a right to refuse any Schedule 7 duty. For journalistic source material, for England and Wales, see the journalist source-material page (https://phoneseized.com/scenarios/journalist-source-material).

### Copies and how long the phone can be held
Paragraph 11(2) of Schedule 7 gives an examining officer grounds to detain a thing to which paragraph 11 applies: for the purpose of examination, for a period not exceeding seven days beginning with the day on which the detention commences; while he believes that it may be needed for use as evidence in criminal proceedings; or while he believes that it may be needed in connection with a decision by the Secretary of State whether to make a deportation order under the Immigration Act 1971 (paragraph 11 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/schedule/7/paragraph/11)). The seven days attach to the examination ground; they are not stated for the other grounds. Where the examining officer is a constable, paragraph 11A (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/schedule/7) allows copies: the officer may copy anything which is given to the examining officer in accordance with paragraph 5, is searched or found on a search under paragraph 8, or is examined under paragraph 9, and the copy may be retained for so long as is necessary for the purpose of determining whether a person falls within section 40(1)(b), while the examining officer believes that it may be needed for use as evidence in criminal proceedings, or while the examining officer believes that it may be needed in connection with a decision by the Secretary of State whether to make a deportation order under the Immigration Act 1971. The Code says the thing may be retained for as long as the examining officer believes it is needed for these purposes, “although not beyond 7 days if the thing is retained only under paragraph 11(2)(a)”, and that if the officer retains anything beyond the conclusion of the examination, he or she must inform the person of the power under which their property is being retained (Code paras 66 and 67 (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68e7b52b187483de54d766d2/Schedule+7+Code+of+Practice.pdf)). A footnote to paragraph 67 of the Code says it is important to note that where an examining officer has retained a thing under 11(2)(b) or (c), examination of the thing is permitted in order to fulfil the purpose of the retention (Code, footnote 17 (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68e7b52b187483de54d766d2/Schedule+7+Code+of+Practice.pdf)). For how long a phone can be kept in each country, see how long it is kept (https://phoneseized.com/compare/how-long-kept); for preparing before a border, see Before a border (https://phoneseized.com/protect/before-a-border) and the border preparation tool (https://phoneseized.com/tools/border-prep).

### Changes not yet in force
Once in force, section 238 of the Crime and Policing Act 2026 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2026/20/section/238) will amend paragraph 11 of Schedule 7 so that, in sub-paragraph (2)(a), “the period of” replaces “a period not exceeding”, and a senior officer will be able to extend that period by up to 7 days where an article is detained by virtue of that paragraph. Once in force, section 178 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2026/20/section/178) will insert into Schedule 7 a paragraph under which, where an electronic device is detained under paragraph 11 after having been searched or found on a search under paragraph 8, or examined under paragraph 9, a relevant senior officer will be able to authorise a constable to extract information accessible by means of one or more online accounts which were accessed by means of the device before the search or examination began. Once in force, section 238(3) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2026/20/section/238) will insert, in paragraph 11A after sub-paragraph (3), a provision under which an examining officer will be able to authorise another person to exercise the power conferred by sub-paragraph (2) on their behalf. legislation.gov.uk marked sections 238 and 178 as prospective when checked on 2026-10-04. Section 178 is also covered on the account-extraction page (https://phoneseized.com/uk/online-accounts-2026-act).

### Other borders
For how other countries treat a phone at the border, see the border comparison (https://phoneseized.com/compare/at-the-border), Australia: Border Force (https://phoneseized.com/australia/border-abf) and USA: CBP (https://phoneseized.com/usa/border-cbp).

### You must
- If you are questioned under paragraph 2 or 3 of Schedule 7, give the examining officer any information in your possession which the officer requests.
  Source: Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 5(a) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/schedule/7
- The Schedule 7 Code says the person must provide access to any electronic device to allow for a search to be undertaken, including where access to a device requires the person to unlock a device through application of their thumb or finger, or any other form of access control.
  Source: Schedule 7 (Terrorism Act 2000) Code of Practice (Oct 2025), para 61 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68e7b52b187483de54d766d2/Schedule+7+Code+of+Practice.pdf
- A person commits an offence if he wilfully fails to comply with a duty imposed under or by virtue of Schedule 7, wilfully contravenes a prohibition imposed under or by virtue of Schedule 7, or wilfully obstructs, or seeks to frustrate, a search or examination under or by virtue of Schedule 7.
  Source: Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 18(1) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/schedule/7/paragraph/18
- A person guilty of an offence under paragraph 18 is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months, a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale, or both.
  Source: Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 18(2) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/schedule/7/paragraph/18

### What they can do
- The Schedule 7 Code says information requested by an examining officer under paragraph 5(a) may include passwords to electronic devices; and that an examining officer may not, however, compel a person to disclose or confirm the identity of a source of journalistic information or disclose information subject to legal privilege.
  The second part is a rule for the examining officer. As quoted, it does not give the person a right to refuse any Schedule 7 duty.
  Source: Schedule 7 (Terrorism Act 2000) Code of Practice (Oct 2025), para 55 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68e7b52b187483de54d766d2/Schedule+7+Code+of+Practice.pdf
- Paragraph 11A of Schedule 7 applies where the examining officer is a constable. The examining officer may copy anything which is given to the examining officer in accordance with paragraph 5, is searched or found on a search under paragraph 8, or is examined under paragraph 9. The copy may be retained for so long as is necessary for the purpose of determining whether a person falls within section 40(1)(b), while the examining officer believes that it may be needed for use as evidence in criminal proceedings, or while the examining officer believes that it may be needed in connection with a decision by the Secretary of State whether to make a deportation order under the Immigration Act 1971.
  Source: Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 11A(1) to (3) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/schedule/7
- Paragraph 11 of Schedule 7 applies to anything which is given to an examining officer in accordance with paragraph 5(d), is searched or found on a search under paragraph 8, or is examined under paragraph 9; an examining officer may detain the thing for the purpose of examination, for a period not exceeding seven days beginning with the day on which the detention commences; while he believes that it may be needed for use as evidence in criminal proceedings; or while he believes that it may be needed in connection with a decision by the Secretary of State whether to make a deportation order under the Immigration Act 1971.
  Source: Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 11(1) and (2) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/schedule/7/paragraph/11
- Once in force, section 238 of the Crime and Policing Act 2026 will amend paragraph 11 of Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 so that, in sub-paragraph (2)(a), “the period of” is substituted for “a period not exceeding”, and will insert provisions under which, where an article is detained by virtue of paragraph (a) of sub-paragraph (2), a senior officer will be able to extend the period mentioned in that paragraph by up to 7 days. A senior officer will be able to exercise that power only if the senior officer has not been directly involved in the exercise of any power under this Part of this Schedule to take the article or to question a person from whom the article was taken. In those provisions “senior officer” will mean, where the examining officer who detained the article is a constable, a constable of a higher rank than the examining officer; where the examining officer is an immigration officer, an immigration officer of a higher grade than the examining officer; and where the examining officer is a customs officer, a customs officer of a higher grade than the examining officer.
  Source: Crime and Policing Act 2026, s.238(1) and (2) — Terrorism Act 2000 Sch.7 para 11(2)(a) amended; para 11(3) to (5) (inserted) — NOT YET IN FORCE — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2026/20/section/238
- Once in force, section 178 of the Crime and Policing Act 2026 will insert into Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000, after paragraph 11A, a paragraph that will apply where an electronic device is detained under paragraph 11 after having been searched or found on a search under paragraph 8, or examined under paragraph 9. A relevant senior officer will be able to authorise a constable to extract information accessible by means of one or more online accounts which were accessed by means of the device before the search or examination began; the power will be exercisable only to extract information which was accessible by means of the online accounts at the time the search or examination began, and only for so long as the electronic device continues to be detained under paragraph 11.
  Source: Crime and Policing Act 2026, s.178 — Terrorism Act 2000 Sch.7 para 11B(1)-(3) and (6) (inserted) — NOT YET IN FORCE — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2026/20/section/178

### Limits on them
- The Schedule 7 Code says an examining officer may not ask a question under paragraph 2 or 3 of Schedule 7 where they have reasonable grounds to believe that the answer to the question would require a person to disclose or confirm the identity of a source of journalistic information or disclose information subject to legal privilege.
  It is a rule for the examining officer. As quoted, it does not give the person a right to refuse any Schedule 7 duty.
  Source: Schedule 7 (Terrorism Act 2000) Code of Practice (Oct 2025), para 44 (last sentence) — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68e7b52b187483de54d766d2/Schedule+7+Code+of+Practice.pdf
- The Schedule 7 Code says that if, before an examining officer examines or copies an article, or during the process of examining the article or copy, the examining officer has reasonable grounds for believing that the article or copy consists of or includes (or would consist of or include, were the copy to be made) confidential business material within the meaning of section 14(2) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, the examining officer must obtain the authorisation of an officer of at least the rank of superintendent who has not been directly involved in the exercise of Schedule 7 powers to the article or copy’s retention, examination and use. The authorising officer may give such an authorisation only if satisfied that arrangements are in place that are sufficient for ensuring that the material is retained securely, and the material will be used only so far as necessary and proportionate in accordance with paragraphs 11(2)(a)-(c) or 11A(3)(a)-(c), as applicable. Where authorisation is not given, confidential business material must be treated as if it were protected material, and a separation and independent review process (or any other process designed to prevent the examining officer or any other officer involved in an examination under Schedule 7 examining the protected material) applied to separate out the confidential business material, if the examining officer considers it necessary and proportionate to examine non-confidential business material within the article or copy.
  It is a rule for the examining officer. As quoted, it does not give the person a right to refuse any Schedule 7 duty.
  Source: Schedule 7 (Terrorism Act 2000) Code of Practice (Oct 2025), para 76 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68e7b52b187483de54d766d2/Schedule+7+Code+of+Practice.pdf
- The Schedule 7 Code says that, in the absence of any power other than Schedule 7 (such as Schedule 5 to the Terrorism Act 2000), material cannot be examined where the officer has reasonable grounds for believing it to be protected material; the officer may, however, examine any nonprotected material, subject to the conditions of the following paragraphs. It defines “protected material” as: “confidential journalistic information” within the meaning of section 264(6) and (7) of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016; material which identifies or confirms a “source of journalistic information” within the meaning of section 263(1) of that Act; “items subject to legal privilege” within the meaning of section 263(1) of that Act; personal records which a person has acquired or created in the course of any trade, business, profession or other occupation or for the purposes of any paid or unpaid office and which he holds in confidence (see the definition of “excluded material” in section 11(1)(a) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984); and human tissue or tissue fluid which has been taken for the purposes of diagnosis or medical treatment and which a person holds in confidence (see section 11(1)(b) of that Act).
  The limit on examination is a rule for the examining officer. As quoted, it does not give the person a right to refuse any Schedule 7 duty.
  Source: Schedule 7 (Terrorism Act 2000) Code of Practice (Oct 2025), para 70 (second and third sentences) and footnote 18 (definition of "protected material") — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68e7b52b187483de54d766d2/Schedule+7+Code+of+Practice.pdf
- The Schedule 7 Code says that, if before an examining officer examines or copies an article the officer has reasonable grounds for believing that the article consists of or includes protected material, the officer must only proceed to examine the article or make the copy if the protected material is capable of being separated from non-protected material; that, if the officer has developed such reasonable grounds during the process of examining the article or copy, the officer must cease examining the article or copy and may only subsequently continue to examine the article or copy if the non-protected material has been separated from the protected material; and that, save as to any other power applying which permits retention, where it is assessed that protected material within an article or copy cannot be separated from non-protected material the article must be returned to the person from whom it was taken, and any copies of the article must be destroyed.
  It is a rule for the examining officer. As quoted, it does not give the person a right to refuse any Schedule 7 duty.
  Source: Schedule 7 (Terrorism Act 2000) Code of Practice (Oct 2025), para 71 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68e7b52b187483de54d766d2/Schedule+7+Code+of+Practice.pdf
- The Schedule 7 Code says an examining officer may only retain an article, or make and retain a copy of an article, which the officer has reasonable grounds for believing it consists of or includes protected material if the officer considers it necessary and proportionate to do so in accordance with paragraphs 11(2)(a)-(c) or 11A(3)(a)-(c) and a sifting and independent review process, or any other process designed to prevent the examining officer or any other officer involved in an examination under Schedule 7 examining the protected material, is possible.
  It is a rule for the examining officer. As quoted, it does not give the person a right to refuse any Schedule 7 duty.
  Source: Schedule 7 (Terrorism Act 2000) Code of Practice (Oct 2025), para 75 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68e7b52b187483de54d766d2/Schedule+7+Code+of+Practice.pdf
- The Schedule 7 Code says the examining officer should consider whether it is reasonably practicable for the protected material to be separated at the time and place of the Schedule 7 examination (which, it says, can be done either using the sifting and independent review process described below, or in any other manner designed to prevent the examining officer or any other officer involved in an examination under Schedule 7 from accessing the protected material), and that, if this is not reasonably practicable at the time and place of the Schedule 7 examination, the officer may retain the article or copy in accordance with paragraph 11 or 11A, as applicable, and during the retention period the sifting and independent review process in relation to an article or copy must be carried out. It says the process requires steps to be taken, one of which (the only step quoted here) is that, in cases where the material on the article or copy is electronic, voluminous and capable of being searched electronically, the person from whom the article has been taken (or from whose article a copy has been taken), or that person’s legal representative, must be given the opportunity to provide search terms to be applied to identify potential protected material; the ultimate decision as to which search terms are applied shall be for the relevant police force; those search terms must be applied by a member of the police digital forensic unit, who is independent of the Schedule 7 examination; the result of the search terms applied must be confined in a separate folder to which the examining officer and any other officer involved in the Schedule 7 examination do not have access; and any data which is not covered by the search terms can be provided to the examining officer for their review.
  These are rules for the examining officer and the police. As quoted, they do not give the person a right to refuse any Schedule 7 duty.
  Source: Schedule 7 (Terrorism Act 2000) Code of Practice (Oct 2025), para 72 (separation at the time and place of the examination, sifting and independent review process: retention trigger and step (d)) — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68e7b52b187483de54d766d2/Schedule+7+Code+of+Practice.pdf

### What the sources say
- The Schedule 7 Code says an examining officer may retain anything (including electronic devices) which is given to the officer in accordance with paragraph 5(d) of Schedule 7, which is searched or found during a search under paragraph 8, or which is examined under paragraph 9, and may retain the thing under paragraph 11(2) for the purpose of examining the detained thing, for a period not exceeding 7 days beginning with the day on which the retention commences; while the examining officer believes that it may be needed for use as evidence in criminal proceedings; or while the officer believes that it may be needed in connection with a decision of the Secretary of State whether to make a deportation order under the Immigration Act 1971. It says the powers to retain property must be exercised in a manner which is proportionate to the legitimate aim; that the thing may be retained for as long as the examining officer believes it is needed for these purposes (although not beyond 7 days if the thing is retained only under paragraph 11(2)(a)); and that if the examining officer retains anything beyond the conclusion of the examination of that person, he or she must inform the person of the power under which their property is being retained, and should ask the person how they would prefer to be contacted regarding the status or return of their property.
  Source: Schedule 7 (Terrorism Act 2000) Code of Practice (Oct 2025), paras 66 and 67 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68e7b52b187483de54d766d2/Schedule+7+Code+of+Practice.pdf
- Paragraph 67 of the Schedule 7 Code says the thing may be retained for as long as the examining officer believes it is needed for these purposes (although not beyond 7 days if the thing is retained only under paragraph 11(2)(a)). A footnote to that paragraph says it is important to note that where an examining officer has retained a thing under 11(2)(b) or (c), examination of the thing is permitted in order to fulfil the purpose of the retention.
  Source: Schedule 7 (Terrorism Act 2000) Code of Practice (Oct 2025), para 67 and footnote 17 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68e7b52b187483de54d766d2/Schedule+7+Code+of+Practice.pdf
- Section 130(1) of the Terrorism Act 2000 says that, subject to subsections (2) to (6) of that section, the Act extends to the whole of the United Kingdom.
  Source: Terrorism Act 2000, s.130(1) (extent) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/section/130

## What a 'full file system' extraction actually contains
URL: https://phoneseized.com/on-your-phone/what-a-full-extraction-contains
Jurisdictions: England & Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland, Australia, United States
Last reviewed: 2026-10-04

### Four states, one vocabulary
This site uses the same terms for a phone’s state on every page in this section and in Protect (https://phoneseized.com/protect): Off / before first unlock (BFU) — the phone is switched off, or has been switched on but not yet unlocked once since it booted. After first unlock (AFU) — the phone has been unlocked at least once since it booted, and is now locked again. Unlocked — the phone is currently unlocked, in someone’s hand or on a desk. Cloud / carrier — data that is not on the phone at all, held instead by the phone maker, an app maker, or the mobile network operator. See Cloud and carrier (https://phoneseized.com/on-your-phone/cloud-and-carrier). The rest of this section reports what vendors and researchers say about devices, in the words they use — never as a blanket “police can” or “police cannot” statement.

### What extraction vendors say their own tools do
Cellebrite and Magnet Forensics are two forensic vendors. Each describes a product, in its own marketing, in these words: Cellebrite’s Inseyets product page, in an FAQ answer on what Inseyets includes, describes Cellebrite Inseyets.UFED with the words “Access devices and data previously unreachable and extract the Full File System data including containerized applications and encrypted data.” Magnet Forensics markets its Graykey product as offering “same-day access to the latest iOS and Android devices.” Neither statement says which specific models or OS versions it covers. See Passcode and updates (https://phoneseized.com/protect/passcode-and-updates) for what AppleInsider reported about a model/iOS matrix.

### What independent reports say about extraction tools and who has bought them
Two reports describe mobile extraction tools from outside the vendors: Privacy International’s 2018 report on UK police extraction says that MSAB’s XRY Physical allows access to “system and deleted data and can use extra functionality to help overcome security and encryption challenges.” Upturn’s 2020 “Mass Extraction” report says: “Based on 110 public records requests to state and local law enforcement agencies across the country, our research documents more than 2,000 agencies that have purchased these tools, in all 50 states and the District of Columbia.” The tools it means are mobile device forensic tools. The Information Commissioner’s Office’s June 2020 report on police forces in England and Wales says that police data extraction practices vary across the country, “with excessive amounts of personal data often being extracted, stored, and made available to others, without an appropriate basis in existing data protection law.”

### How device state changes what a tool can reach
Apple’s and Android’s documentation each describe more than one class of storage. Apple’s Platform Security Guide says that for the Complete Protection class, shortly after the user locks a device (10 seconds, if the Require Password setting is Immediately) the decrypted class key is discarded, “rendering all data in this class inaccessible until the user enters the passcode again or unlocks (logs in to) the device using Optic ID, Face ID, or Touch ID.” The same guide describes a default class for all third-party app data not otherwise assigned to a Data Protection class. Android’s file-based encryption documentation describes Credential Encrypted (CE) storage as “the default storage location and only available after the user has unlocked the device,” and says that on an FBE-enabled device each user of the device has two storage locations available to apps, one of which is Device Encrypted (DE) storage, “a storage location available both during Direct Boot mode and after the user has unlocked the device.” The BFU/AFU/unlocked vocabulary above is this site’s own shorthand; the quotations here are Apple’s and Android’s own descriptions of their storage classes. See Deleted is not gone (https://phoneseized.com/on-your-phone/deleted-is-not-gone) for what its sources say about data the user has already deleted, and the cross-country comparison (https://phoneseized.com/compare/what-they-can-extract) for how the legal power to demand a passcode differs from the technical question this page covers.

### What the sources say
- Cellebrite's Inseyets product page, in an FAQ answer on what Inseyets includes, describes Cellebrite Inseyets.UFED with the words “Access devices and data previously unreachable and extract the Full File System data including containerized applications and encrypted data.”
  Source: Cellebrite, "Cellebrite Inseyets" product page, FAQ "What does Cellebrite Inseyets include?" (cellebrite.com), as fetched 2026-10-04 — https://cellebrite.com/en/products/cellebrite-inseyets/
- Magnet Forensics markets its Graykey product as offering same-day access to the latest iOS and Android devices.
  Source: Magnet Forensics, Magnet Graykey product page (magnetforensics.com), as fetched 2026-09-08 — https://www.magnetforensics.com/products/magnet-graykey/
- A 2018 Privacy International report on UK police extraction says that MSAB's XRY Physical allows access to “system and deleted data and can use extra functionality to help overcome security and encryption challenges”.
  Source: Privacy International, "Digital stop and search: how the UK police can secretly download everything from your mobile phone", 27 Mar 2018 (archived copy of the report PDF) — https://web.archive.org/web/20260323171448id_/https://privacyinternational.org/sites/default/files/2018-03/Digital%20Stop%20and%20Search%20Report.pdf
- A 2020 Upturn report on mobile device forensic tools says: “Based on 110 public records requests to state and local law enforcement agencies across the country, our research documents more than 2,000 agencies that have purchased these tools, in all 50 states and the District of Columbia.”
  Source: Upturn, "Mass Extraction", October 2020 — https://www.upturn.org/work/mass-extraction/
- The UK Information Commissioner's Office's June 2020 report on police forces in England and Wales says that police data extraction practices vary across the country, with excessive amounts of personal data often being extracted, stored, and made available to others, without an appropriate basis in existing data protection law.
  Source: ICO, Mobile phone data extraction by police forces in England and Wales (June 2020) — https://ico.org.uk/media2/migrated/2617838/ico-report-on-mpe-in-england-and-wales-v1_1.pdf
- Apple's Platform Security Guide says that for the Complete Protection class, shortly after the user locks a device (10 seconds, if the Require Password setting is Immediately) the decrypted class key is discarded, rendering all data in this class inaccessible until the user enters the passcode again or unlocks (logs in to) the device using Optic ID, Face ID, or Touch ID.
  Source: Apple Platform Security Guide — "Data Protection classes", published 19 Dec 2024, Apple — https://support.apple.com/guide/security/data-protection-classes-secb010e978a/web
- Apple's Platform Security Guide describes a default class for all third-party app data not otherwise assigned to a Data Protection class.
  Source: Apple Platform Security Guide — "Data Protection classes", published 19 Dec 2024, Apple — https://support.apple.com/guide/security/data-protection-classes-secb010e978a/web
- Android's file-based encryption documentation states that Credential Encrypted (CE) storage, which is the default storage location, is only available after the user has unlocked the device.
  Source: Android Open Source Project, "File-based encryption" (source.android.com), as fetched 2026-09-08 — https://source.android.com/docs/security/features/encryption/file-based
- Android's file-based encryption documentation states that on an FBE-enabled device, each user of the device has two storage locations available to apps, one of which is Device Encrypted (DE) storage, which is a storage location available both during Direct Boot mode and after the user has unlocked the device.
  Source: Android Open Source Project, "File-based encryption" (source.android.com), as fetched 2026-10-04 — https://source.android.com/docs/security/features/encryption/file-based

## Deleted is not gone — but it is not all recoverable either
URL: https://phoneseized.com/on-your-phone/deleted-is-not-gone
Jurisdictions: England & Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland, Australia, United States
Last reviewed: 2026-10-04

### What SQLite’s documentation says about Write-Ahead Logging and secure_delete
SQLite’s own documentation on Write-Ahead Logging states that “The original content is preserved in the database file and the changes are appended into a separate WAL file.” SQLite’s own documentation for the secure_delete pragma states: “When secure_delete is on, SQLite overwrites deleted content with zeros.” This page does not say which apps have that setting on, and it is not a claim that every deleted message survives.

### What one report says a tool allows access to
Privacy International’s 2018 report on UK police extraction says that MSAB’s XRY Physical allows access to “system and deleted data and can use extra functionality to help overcome security and encryption challenges.” That is one report’s statement about a specific product — not a statement that any tool recovers everything a phone has ever held. The device states used on this site are described in What a full extraction contains (https://phoneseized.com/on-your-phone/what-a-full-extraction-contains) — off/BFU, AFU, or unlocked. None of the sources quoted on this page says whether a given tool can reach a given piece of already-deleted content on a given phone.

### What Apple says about iCloud and Advanced Data Protection
Separately from anything on the phone itself, Apple’s “iCloud data security overview” states that “With Advanced Data Protection, the number of data categories that use end-to-end encryption rises to 25 and includes your iCloud Backup, Photos, Notes and more.” The same page states that you “can choose to enable Advanced Data Protection to protect the vast majority of your iCloud data” and that “If you enable Advanced Data Protection and then lose access to your account, Apple will not have the encryption keys to help you recover it.” See Cloud and carrier (https://phoneseized.com/on-your-phone/cloud-and-carrier) for what Apple separately says about iCloud content and legal process.

### What this page does not claim
None of the above adds up to “everything is recoverable.” It adds up to narrower, sourced statements: SQLite’s Write-Ahead Logging documentation says the original content is preserved in the database file and the changes are appended into a separate WAL file; SQLite’s documentation says that when secure_delete is on, SQLite overwrites deleted content with zeros; and Apple’s page lists iCloud Backup among the data categories that use end-to-end encryption with Advanced Data Protection. Whether any specific message on any specific phone is actually still retrievable is not something this page, or any general-purpose page, can answer.

### What the sources say
- SQLite's own documentation on Write-Ahead Logging states that the original content is preserved in the database file and the changes are appended into a separate WAL file.
  Source: SQLite, "Write-Ahead Logging" (sqlite.org/wal.html), as fetched 2026-09-08 — https://www.sqlite.org/wal.html
- SQLite's own documentation states that when secure_delete is on, SQLite overwrites deleted content with zeros.
  Source: SQLite, "PRAGMA secure_delete" (sqlite.org/pragma.html), as fetched 2026-09-08 — https://www.sqlite.org/pragma.html#pragma_secure_delete
- A 2018 Privacy International report says that MSAB's XRY Physical allows access to “system and deleted data and can use extra functionality to help overcome security and encryption challenges”.
  Source: Privacy International, "Digital stop and search: how the UK police can secretly download everything from your mobile phone", 27 Mar 2018 (archived copy of the report PDF) — https://web.archive.org/web/20260323171448id_/https://privacyinternational.org/sites/default/files/2018-03/Digital%20Stop%20and%20Search%20Report.pdf
- With Apple's Advanced Data Protection enabled, the number of iCloud data categories using end-to-end encryption rises to 25, including iCloud Backup, Photos and Notes.
  Source: Apple, "iCloud data security overview" (support.apple.com/en-gb/102651), as fetched 2026-09-08 — https://support.apple.com/en-gb/102651
- Apple states that you can choose to enable Advanced Data Protection to protect the vast majority of your iCloud data, and that if you enable it and then lose access to your account, Apple will not have the encryption keys to help you recover it.
  Source: Apple, "iCloud data security overview" (support.apple.com/en-gb/102651), as fetched 2026-10-01 — https://support.apple.com/en-gb/102651
- Cellebrite's Inseyets product page, in an FAQ answer on what Inseyets includes, describes Cellebrite Inseyets.UFED with the words “Access devices and data previously unreachable and extract the Full File System data including containerized applications and encrypted data.”
  Source: Cellebrite, "Cellebrite Inseyets" product page, FAQ "What does Cellebrite Inseyets include?" (cellebrite.com), as fetched 2026-10-04 — https://cellebrite.com/en/products/cellebrite-inseyets/

## What lives in the cloud and with your carrier, not the phone
URL: https://phoneseized.com/on-your-phone/cloud-and-carrier
Jurisdictions: England & Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland, Australia, United States
Last reviewed: 2026-10-02

### What Apple says it can and cannot hand over
The cloud state described in What a full extraction contains (https://phoneseized.com/on-your-phone/what-a-full-extraction-contains) covers data held by the maker or the carrier rather than on the phone. Apple’s own legal-process guidelines to US law enforcement state: “For all devices running iOS 8.0 and later versions, Apple is unable to perform an iOS device data extraction as the data typically sought by law enforcement is encrypted, and Apple does not possess the encryption key.” That sentence is about the device. Apple’s account-held iCloud content is a separate question, and the same guidelines state: “iCloud content, as it exists in the customer’s account, may be provided in response to a search warrant issued upon a showing of probable cause, or customer consent.”

### What Apple says about standard and Advanced Data Protection
Apple’s “iCloud data security overview” describes two settings. Under standard data protection, which it calls “the default setting for your account,” it states: “Apple doesn’t have the encryption keys for these categories, and we can’t help you recover this data if you lose access to your account” — “these categories” being the ones it says are end-to-end encrypted under that setting. For Advanced Data Protection, which the same page says you “can choose to enable,” it states that “the number of data categories that use end-to-end encryption rises to 25 and includes your iCloud Backup, Photos, Notes and more,” and that “If you enable Advanced Data Protection and then lose access to your account, Apple will not have the encryption keys to help you recover it.” This site does not combine those statements with the legal-process guidelines quoted above into a claim about what Apple can or cannot hand over under a warrant.

### Cell-site location information: a US example
In the United States, the Supreme Court said in a footnote (n.3) to Carpenter v. United States: “It is sufficient for our purposes today to hold that accessing seven days of CSLI constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.” The opinion also says: “Our decision today is a narrow one. We do not express a view on matters not before us: real-time CSLI or ‘tower dumps’ (a download of information on all the devices that connected to a particular cell site during a particular interval).” That is a US constitutional holding, not a technical fact about the phone itself; this site has not sourced an equivalent holding for the other jurisdictions it covers.

### The US border adds a boundary of its own
US Customs and Border Protection’s own directive says of passcodes and other means of access obtained during a border inspection: “Passcodes or other means of access obtained during a border inspection will only be utilized to facilitate the inspection of devices and information subject to border search. Passcodes or other means of access may not be utilized to access information that is only stored remotely.” See Passcode vs biometrics (https://phoneseized.com/usa/passcode-vs-biometrics) and Before a border (https://phoneseized.com/protect/before-a-border) for what else that directive covers.

### Limits on them
- In the United States, the Supreme Court said in a footnote (n.3) to Carpenter v. United States: “It is sufficient for our purposes today to hold that accessing seven days of CSLI constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.” The opinion also says: “Our decision today is a narrow one. We do not express a view on matters not before us: real-time CSLI or ‘tower dumps’ (a download of information on all the devices that connected to a particular cell site during a particular interval).”
  Source: Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296 (2018), slip op. (majority) and n.3 — https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/16-402
- US Customs and Border Protection's directive states that passcodes or other means of access obtained during a border inspection will only be utilized to facilitate the inspection of devices and information subject to border search, and may not be utilized to access information that is only stored remotely.
  Source: CBP Directive No. 3340-049B §5.3.2 (eff. 1 Jan 2026) — https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/2026-01/cbp_directive_3340-049b_jan_2026_508.pdf

### What the sources say
- Apple's own law enforcement guidelines state that for iOS 8.0 and later, Apple is unable to perform an iOS device data extraction because the data typically sought is encrypted and Apple does not hold the encryption key.
  Source: Apple, "Legal Process Guidelines — Government & Law Enforcement within the United States", published October 2025, Apple — https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/law-enforcement-guidelines-us.pdf
- Apple's own law enforcement guidelines state that content in a customer's iCloud account, as it exists there, may be provided in response to a search warrant issued on probable cause, or the customer's consent.
  Source: Apple, "Legal Process Guidelines — Government & Law Enforcement within the United States", published October 2025, Apple — https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/law-enforcement-guidelines-us.pdf
- With Advanced Data Protection enabled, the number of iCloud data categories using end-to-end encryption rises to 25, including iCloud Backup, Photos and Notes.
  Source: Apple, "iCloud data security overview" (support.apple.com/en-gb/102651), as fetched 2026-09-08 — https://support.apple.com/en-gb/102651
- Apple states that if you enable Advanced Data Protection and then lose access to your account, Apple will not have the encryption keys to help you recover it.
  Source: Apple, "iCloud data security overview" (support.apple.com/en-gb/102651), as fetched 2026-10-01 — https://support.apple.com/en-gb/102651
- Apple states that standard data protection is the default setting for an account, that some data categories are end-to-end encrypted under it, and that Apple doesn't have the encryption keys for these categories and can't help you recover this data if you lose access to your account.
  Source: Apple, "iCloud data security overview" (support.apple.com/en-gb/102651), "Standard data protection" paragraph, as fetched 2026-10-01 — https://support.apple.com/en-gb/102651

## Passcode strength and delay: what vendors document
URL: https://phoneseized.com/protect/passcode-and-updates
Jurisdictions: England & Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland, Australia, United States
Last reviewed: 2026-10-02

### Passcode strength and delay, in Apple's own words
Apple’s Platform Security Guide says two things on this. First, on delay: “On iPad, iPhone, Mac, and Apple Vision Pro, to further discourage brute-force passcode attacks, there are escalating time delays after the entry of an invalid passcode, password, or PIN (depending on the device and the state the device is in).” Second, on passcode length and character set: Apple states “it would take more than five and one-half years to try all combinations of a six-character alphanumeric passcode with lowercase letters and numbers.” That figure is stated for a six-character alphanumeric passcode with lowercase letters and numbers; this page does not extend it to any other kind of passcode.

### The same idea implemented differently: GrapheneOS and Android
GrapheneOS’s Features page says of one feature that it “allows users to make use of diceware passwords if they don’t want to depend on the security of the secure element which provides very aggressive throttling and offers a high level of security even for a random 6 digit PIN.” Separately, Android’s file-based encryption documentation says that “all devices launching with Android 10 and higher are required to use file-based encryption.” See What a full extraction contains (https://phoneseized.com/on-your-phone/what-a-full-extraction-contains) for the Credential Encrypted and Device Encrypted storage locations.

### What happens if a locked phone sits untouched
Apple’s Platform Security Guide says that for the Complete Protection class, shortly after the user locks a device the decrypted class key is discarded, “rendering all data in this class inaccessible until the user enters the passcode again or unlocks (logs in to) the device using Optic ID, Face ID, or Touch ID.” See What a full extraction contains (https://phoneseized.com/on-your-phone/what-a-full-extraction-contains) for the device states used on this site. Separately, Magnet Forensics’ blog post of 13 Nov 2024, “Understanding the security impacts of iOS 18’s inactivity reboot”, said “once a device has entered a locked state and has not been unlocked within 72 hours, it will reboot”; it also said that the timer is 72 hours (3 days) in iOS 18.1 and was originally 7 days in iOS 18.0, and that the reboot ensures that data that is at rest for longer than three days gets rebooted so that it gets returned to its most secure state. Those are statements in a Magnet Forensics blog post, not Apple support-page statements.

### What AppleInsider reported about a model/iOS matrix
AppleInsider reported on 18 Jul 2024 that an April 2024 document listing which iPhones Cellebrite can unlock had been leaked, that two documents were obtained from a Cellebrite customer, according to 404 Media, and that “significant sections of the model/iOS matrix” in the documents “are listed as either ‘Coming Soon,’ or ‘in Research.’” That is a news report of what the leaked documents were reported to list, not a statement by any vendor and not a guarantee about any other date.

### What the sources say
- Apple’s Platform Security Guide says that on iPad, iPhone, Mac, and Apple Vision Pro, to further discourage brute-force passcode attacks, there are escalating time delays after the entry of an invalid passcode, password, or PIN (depending on the device and the state the device is in).
  Source: Apple Platform Security Guide — "Passcodes and passwords", published 19 Dec 2024, Apple — https://support.apple.com/guide/security/passcodes-and-passwords-sec20230a10d/web
- Apple states it would take more than five and one-half years to try all combinations of a six-character alphanumeric passcode with lowercase letters and numbers.
  Source: Apple Platform Security Guide — "Passcodes and passwords", published 19 Dec 2024, Apple — https://support.apple.com/guide/security/passcodes-and-passwords-sec20230a10d/web
- GrapheneOS’s Features page says of one feature that it allows users to make use of diceware passwords if they don't want to depend on the security of the secure element which provides very aggressive throttling and offers a high level of security even for a random 6 digit PIN.
  Source: GrapheneOS, "Features" (grapheneos.org/features), as fetched 2026-09-08 — https://grapheneos.org/features
- Android’s file-based encryption documentation says that all devices launching with Android 10 and higher are required to use file-based encryption.
  Source: Android Open Source Project, "File-based encryption" (source.android.com), as fetched 2026-09-08 — https://source.android.com/docs/security/features/encryption/file-based
- Apple’s Platform Security Guide says that for the Complete Protection class, shortly after the user locks a device the decrypted class key is discarded, rendering all data in this class inaccessible until the user enters the passcode again or unlocks (logs in to) the device using Optic ID, Face ID, or Touch ID.
  Source: Apple Platform Security Guide — "Data Protection classes", published 19 Dec 2024, Apple — https://support.apple.com/guide/security/data-protection-classes-secb010e978a/web
- In a blog post of 13 Nov 2024 titled “Understanding the security impacts of iOS 18’s inactivity reboot”, Magnet Forensics said that once a device has entered a locked state and has not been unlocked within 72 hours, it will reboot; it also said that the timer is 72 hours (3 days) in iOS 18.1 and was originally 7 days in iOS 18.0, and that the reboot ensures that data that is at rest for longer than three days gets rebooted so that it gets returned to its most secure state.
  Source: Magnet Forensics blog, "Understanding the security impacts of iOS 18's inactivity reboot", 13 Nov 2024 — https://www.magnetforensics.com/blog/understanding-the-security-impacts-of-ios-18s-inactivity-reboot/
- AppleInsider reported on 18 Jul 2024 that an April 2024 document listing which iPhones Cellebrite can unlock had been leaked, that two documents were obtained from a Cellebrite customer, according to 404 Media, and that significant sections of the model/iOS matrix in the documents are listed as either “Coming Soon,” or “in Research.”
  Source: AppleInsider, "Cellebrite can't crack iPhones running iOS 17.4 or later", William Gallagher, 18 Jul 2024 — https://appleinsider.com/articles/24/07/18/cellebrite-cant-crack-iphones-running-ios-174-or-later

## Lock state, Lockdown Mode and GrapheneOS: what each changes
URL: https://phoneseized.com/protect/bfu-lockdown-grapheneos
Jurisdictions: England & Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland, Australia, United States
Last reviewed: 2026-10-14

### Locked-device storage, in Apple’s and Android’s own documentation
The off/BFU, AFU and unlocked states used on this site are defined in What a full extraction contains (https://phoneseized.com/on-your-phone/what-a-full-extraction-contains). Apple’s Platform Security Guide says that for the Complete Protection class, shortly after the user locks a device the decrypted class key is discarded, “rendering all data in this class inaccessible until the user enters the passcode again or unlocks (logs in to) the device using Optic ID, Face ID, or Touch ID.” The same guide describes a default class for all third-party app data not otherwise assigned to a Data Protection class. Android’s file-based encryption documentation describes Credential Encrypted (CE) storage as “the default storage location and only available after the user has unlocked the device.”

### Reboot after a period locked, and ending a profile session: what each source says
GrapheneOS’s Features page says it “provides an auto-reboot feature which reboots locked devices after a set period of time to put data at rest.” It also says “A countdown timer is started each time the device is locked, and the device will reboot if a successful unlock doesn’t occur before the timer reaches zero. Unlocking any profile cancels the timer, not just the Owner profile.” It says the feature “doesn’t apply when the device is in ‘Before First Unlock’ state, meaning that it will not lead to the device continuously rebooting, as data is already at rest”, and that “The feature is implemented in the init process, preventing it from being bypassed through system process crashes since an init crash causes a kernel panic which leads to a reboot.” Google’s Advanced Protection help page lists, among the protections offered by Advanced Protection, Inactivity Reboot: “Automatically reboot your phone if it remains locked for 72 hours. The process of rebooting will make user data unreadable until a fresh unlock takes place.” Magnet Forensics’ blog said, on 13 Nov 2024, in a post titled “Understanding the security impacts of iOS 18’s inactivity reboot”, that “once a device has entered a locked state and has not been unlocked within 72 hours, it will reboot”, and that “while the timer is 72 hours (3 days) in iOS 18.1, it was originally for 7 days in iOS 18.0.” That is a statement in a Magnet Forensics blog post, not an Apple support-page statement. On secondary user profiles, GrapheneOS’s FAQ says “GrapheneOS enables support for ending secondary user profile sessions after logging into them.” It also says “This fully purges the encryption keys and puts the profiles back at rest. This can’t be done for the owner profile without rebooting due to it encrypting the sensitive system-wide operating system data.”

### USB connections while a phone is locked: what each source says
In its “USB-C port and pogo pins control” section, GrapheneOS’s Features page says “Our USB-C port and pogo pins setting protects against attacks through USB-C or pogo pins while the OS is booted.” and “The feature has five modes”, and lists them as: Off Charging-only Charging-only when locked Charging-only when locked, except before first unlock On The same section says “Our USB-C port and pogo pins setting protects against attacks through USB-C or pogo pins while the OS is booted.”, that the default is Charging-only when locked, which “significantly reduces attack surface when the device is locked”, and that “After locking, it blocks any new USB connections immediately through either USB-C and pogo pins at both the hardware level via configuring the USB controller and also at the OS level in the kernel to provide a second layer of defense.” Google’s Advanced Protection help page lists, among the protections offered by Advanced Protection, USB Protection: “Secure your Android device with USB Protection. When your screen is locked, it protects your device from unauthorized access through a USB connection.”

### Lockdown Mode: what Apple’s page says
Apple’s “About Lockdown Mode” page says that when Lockdown Mode is enabled, some apps and features function differently, including “Device connections: to connect your iPhone or iPad to an accessory or another computer, the device needs to be unlocked.” That is a statement about connecting the device to an accessory or another computer; it is not a statement about Wi-Fi, cellular or cloud sync. See Cloud and carrier (https://phoneseized.com/on-your-phone/cloud-and-carrier) for cloud and carrier copies. The same page says “Lockdown Mode is an optional, extreme protection that’s designed for the very few individuals who, because of who they are or what they do, might be personally targeted by some of the most sophisticated digital threats. Most people will never be targeted by attacks of this nature.”

### Failed attempts: what each source says
GrapheneOS’s FAQ, on how disk encryption is implemented, says “A secure internal timer is used to implement hardware-based delays for each attempt at key derivation. Only a total of 20 attempts is permitted.” Its “Standard delays for encryption key derivation enforced by the secure element” include the entry “20 No more attempts allowed”. Google’s theft-protection help page says “These features aren’t supported on Android Go devices, tablets, and wearables. Support may also vary based on your smartphone device model.”, and that “If Failed Authentication Lock is on, your device will automatically lock when authentication attempts fail repeatedly.” Apple’s Platform Security Guide, in its “Passcodes and passwords” article, says “If the Erase Data option is turned on for iPad, iPhone, or Apple Vision Pro”, “after 10 consecutive incorrect attempts to enter the passcode, all content and settings are removed from storage.” It also says “Consecutive attempts of the same incorrect passcode don’t count toward the limit”, and that the setting is also available as an administrative policy through a device management service that supports this feature and through Microsoft Exchange ActiveSync, and “can be set to a lower threshold”. The same article says “The delays are enforced by the Secure Enclave. If the device is restarted during a timed delay, the delay is still enforced, with the timer starting over for the current period.” See Passcode strength and delay: what vendors document (https://phoneseized.com/protect/passcode-and-updates) for Apple’s statement on escalating time delays.

### Memory tagging and the app sandbox: what each source says
GrapheneOS’s FAQ says “8th generation and later Pixels also have support for the incredibly powerful hardware memory tagging security feature as part of moving to new ARMv9 CPU cores. GrapheneOS uses hardware memory tagging by default to protect the base OS and known compatible user installed apps against exploitation, with the option to use it for all apps and opt-out on a case-by-case basis for the few incompatible with it.” Google’s Advanced Protection help page lists, among the protections offered by Advanced Protection, Memory Tagging Extension (MTE): “For supported apps, MTE will help prevent apps from corrupting memory. When MTE is on, you may experience slower device performance.” GrapheneOS’s Features page says “GrapheneOS has a compatibility layer providing the option to install and use the official releases of Google Play in the standard app sandbox. Google Play receives absolutely no special access or privileges on GrapheneOS as opposed to bypassing the app sandbox and receiving a massive amount of highly privileged access.”

### What GrapheneOS’s Features page says
GrapheneOS’s Features page says it “provides an auto-reboot feature which reboots locked devices after a set period of time to put data at rest”; that “The timer is set to 18 hours by default, but can be set to values between 10 minutes and 72 hours, or turned off”; and that “This feature doesn’t apply when the device is in ‘Before First Unlock’ state.” It also says it “provides users with the ability to set a duress PIN/Password that will irreversibly wipe the device (along with any installed eSIMs) once entered anywhere where the device credentials are requested (on the lockscreen, along with any such prompt in the OS)”; that “The wipe does not require a reboot and cannot be interrupted”; and that “if the duress PIN/Password is the same as the actual unlock method, the actual unlock method always takes precedence, and therefore no wipe will occur.” Statutes and prosecution guidance on destroying, concealing or obstructing, and a United States indictment, are set out in Duress wipes, auto-reboot and the law (https://phoneseized.com/protect/duress-wipe-auto-reboot-and-the-law); this page sets out the feature in GrapheneOS’s words and does not advise for or against using it. GrapheneOS’s Features page also says its USB-C port and pogo pins setting “protects against attacks through USB-C or pogo pins while the OS is booted” and that “The default is Charging-only when locked, which significantly reduces attack surface when the device is locked.”

### What Osservatorio Nessuno reported about GrapheneOS
Osservatorio Nessuno’s analysis “A deep dive into Cellebrite: Android support as of February 2025”, published 16 Mar 2025, said, in the paragraph under its figure captioned “Support matrix, older Pixel devices up to the 5/5a.”, “Pixel devices remain quite a solid choice if kept updated. While it seems that for the standard Google ROM there are working exploits available to perform the FFS extraction in AFU state, on the contrary GrapheneOS additional hardening and protections are effective, and have been so since 2022. Brute force is generally not available, because the user credentials are stored in the secure element, and thus cannot be extracted and active attempts are heavily throttled.” That is a reported assessment as of the date given — not a permanent guarantee, and not this site’s own technical claim.

### Apple's own statement on iOS device data extraction
Apple’s Legal Process Guidelines for government and law enforcement within the United States state: “For all devices running iOS 8.0 and later versions, Apple is unable to perform an iOS device data extraction as the data typically sought by law enforcement is encrypted, and Apple does not possess the encryption key.”

### What the sources say
- Apple’s Platform Security Guide says that for the Complete Protection class, shortly after the user locks a device the decrypted class key is discarded, rendering all data in this class inaccessible until the user enters the passcode again or unlocks (logs in to) the device using Optic ID, Face ID, or Touch ID.
  Source: Apple Platform Security Guide — "Data Protection classes", published 19 Dec 2024, Apple — https://support.apple.com/guide/security/data-protection-classes-secb010e978a/web
- Apple’s Platform Security Guide describes a default class for all third-party app data not otherwise assigned to a Data Protection class.
  Source: Apple Platform Security Guide — "Data Protection classes", published 19 Dec 2024, Apple — https://support.apple.com/guide/security/data-protection-classes-secb010e978a/web
- Android's file-based encryption documentation states that Credential Encrypted (CE) storage, which is the default storage location, is only available after the user has unlocked the device.
  Source: Android Open Source Project, "File-based encryption" (source.android.com), as fetched 2026-09-08 — https://source.android.com/docs/security/features/encryption/file-based
- Apple’s “About Lockdown Mode” page says that when Lockdown Mode is enabled some apps and features function differently, including “Device connections: to connect your iPhone or iPad to an accessory or another computer, the device needs to be unlocked.”
  Source: Apple, "About Lockdown Mode" (support.apple.com/en-gb/105120), as fetched 2026-09-08 — https://support.apple.com/en-gb/105120
- Apple’s “About Lockdown Mode” page says “Lockdown Mode is an optional, extreme protection that’s designed for the very few individuals who, because of who they are or what they do, might be personally targeted by some of the most sophisticated digital threats. Most people will never be targeted by attacks of this nature.”
  Source: Apple, "About Lockdown Mode" (support.apple.com/en-gb/105120), as fetched 2026-10-14 — https://support.apple.com/en-gb/105120
- GrapheneOS’s Features page says it provides an auto-reboot feature which reboots locked devices after a set period of time to put data at rest; that the timer is set to 18 hours by default, but can be set to values between 10 minutes and 72 hours, or turned off; and that the feature doesn't apply when the device is in “Before First Unlock” state.
  Source: GrapheneOS, "Features" (grapheneos.org/features), "Auto reboot" paragraph, as fetched 2026-10-01 — https://grapheneos.org/features
- GrapheneOS’s Features page says it provides users with the ability to set a duress PIN/Password that will irreversibly wipe the device (along with any installed eSIMs) once entered anywhere where the device credentials are requested (on the lockscreen, along with any such prompt in the OS).
  Source: GrapheneOS, "Features" (grapheneos.org/features), as fetched 2026-09-08 — https://grapheneos.org/features
- GrapheneOS’s Features page says its USB-C port and pogo pins setting protects against attacks through USB-C or pogo pins while the OS is booted, and that the default is Charging-only when locked, which significantly reduces attack surface when the device is locked.
  Source: GrapheneOS, "Features" (grapheneos.org/features), "USB-C port and pogo pins control" paragraph, as fetched 2026-10-01 — https://grapheneos.org/features
- GrapheneOS’s Features page says that its auto-reboot feature reboots locked devices after a set period of time to put data at rest; that a countdown timer is started each time the device is locked, and the device will reboot if a successful unlock doesn't occur before the timer reaches zero; that unlocking any profile cancels the timer, not just the Owner profile; that the feature doesn't apply when the device is in “Before First Unlock” state, meaning that it will not lead to the device continuously rebooting, as data is already at rest; and that the feature is implemented in the init process, preventing it from being bypassed through system process crashes since an init crash causes a kernel panic which leads to a reboot.
  Source: GrapheneOS, "Features" (grapheneos.org/features), "Auto reboot" paragraph, as fetched 2026-10-14 — https://grapheneos.org/features
- Google’s Advanced Protection help page lists, among the protections offered by Advanced Protection, Inactivity Reboot: “Automatically reboot your phone if it remains locked for 72 hours. The process of rebooting will make user data unreadable until a fresh unlock takes place.”
  Source: Google, Android Help, "Improve device security with Advanced Protection for Android" (support.google.com/android/answer/16339980), as fetched 2026-10-14 — https://support.google.com/android/answer/16339980?hl=en
- Magnet Forensics’ blog said, on 13 Nov 2024, in a post titled “Understanding the security impacts of iOS 18’s inactivity reboot”, that once a device has entered a locked state and has not been unlocked within 72 hours, it will reboot, and that while the timer is 72 hours (3 days) in iOS 18.1, it was originally for 7 days in iOS 18.0.
  Source: Magnet Forensics blog, "Understanding the security impacts of iOS 18's inactivity reboot", 13 Nov 2024 — https://www.magnetforensics.com/blog/understanding-the-security-impacts-of-ios-18s-inactivity-reboot/
- GrapheneOS’s FAQ says that it enables support for ending secondary user profile sessions after logging into them; that this fully purges the encryption keys and puts the profiles back at rest; and that this can't be done for the owner profile without rebooting due to it encrypting the sensitive system-wide operating system data.
  Source: GrapheneOS, "Frequently Asked Questions" (grapheneos.org/faq), "How is disk encryption implemented?" paragraph, as fetched 2026-10-14 — https://grapheneos.org/faq
- GrapheneOS’s Features page, in its “USB-C port and pogo pins control” section, says “Our USB-C port and pogo pins setting protects against attacks through USB-C or pogo pins while the OS is booted.” and “The feature has five modes”, and lists them as Off; Charging-only; Charging-only when locked; Charging-only when locked, except before first unlock; and On.
  Source: GrapheneOS, "Features" (grapheneos.org/features), "USB-C port and pogo pins control" paragraph, as fetched 2026-10-14 — https://grapheneos.org/features
- GrapheneOS’s Features page, in its “USB-C port and pogo pins control” section, says “Our USB-C port and pogo pins setting protects against attacks through USB-C or pogo pins while the OS is booted.”, that the default is Charging-only when locked, which significantly reduces attack surface when the device is locked, and that after locking, it blocks any new USB connections immediately through either USB-C and pogo pins at both the hardware level via configuring the USB controller and also at the OS level in the kernel to provide a second layer of defense.
  Source: GrapheneOS, "Features" (grapheneos.org/features), "USB-C port and pogo pins control" paragraph, as fetched 2026-10-14 — https://grapheneos.org/features
- Google’s Advanced Protection help page lists, among the protections offered by Advanced Protection, USB Protection: “Secure your Android device with USB Protection. When your screen is locked, it protects your device from unauthorized access through a USB connection.”
  Source: Google, Android Help, "Improve device security with Advanced Protection for Android" (support.google.com/android/answer/16339980), as fetched 2026-10-14 — https://support.google.com/android/answer/16339980?hl=en
- GrapheneOS’s FAQ says “A secure internal timer is used to implement hardware-based delays for each attempt at key derivation. Only a total of 20 attempts is permitted.” and that its “Standard delays for encryption key derivation enforced by the secure element” include the entry “20 No more attempts allowed”.
  Source: GrapheneOS, "Frequently Asked Questions" (grapheneos.org/faq), "How is disk encryption implemented?" paragraph, as fetched 2026-10-14 — https://grapheneos.org/faq
- Google’s theft-protection help page says “These features aren’t supported on Android Go devices, tablets, and wearables. Support may also vary based on your smartphone device model.”, and that “If Failed Authentication Lock is on, your device will automatically lock when authentication attempts fail repeatedly.”
  Source: Google, Android Help, "Protect your personal data against theft" (support.google.com/android/answer/15146908), as fetched 2026-10-14 — https://support.google.com/android/answer/15146908
- Apple’s Platform Security Guide says “If the Erase Data option is turned on for iPad, iPhone, or Apple Vision Pro”, “after 10 consecutive incorrect attempts to enter the passcode, all content and settings are removed from storage.” It also says “Consecutive attempts of the same incorrect passcode don’t count toward the limit”, and that the setting is also available as an administrative policy through a device management service that supports this feature and through Microsoft Exchange ActiveSync, and “can be set to a lower threshold”.
  Source: Apple Platform Security Guide — "Passcodes and passwords", published 19 Dec 2024, Apple — https://support.apple.com/guide/security/passcodes-and-passwords-sec20230a10d/web
- Apple’s Platform Security Guide, in its “Passcodes and passwords” article, says “The delays are enforced by the Secure Enclave. If the device is restarted during a timed delay, the delay is still enforced, with the timer starting over for the current period.”
  Source: Apple Platform Security Guide — "Passcodes and passwords", published 19 Dec 2024, Apple — https://support.apple.com/guide/security/passcodes-and-passwords-sec20230a10d/web
- GrapheneOS’s FAQ says “8th generation and later Pixels also have support for the incredibly powerful hardware memory tagging security feature as part of moving to new ARMv9 CPU cores. GrapheneOS uses hardware memory tagging by default to protect the base OS and known compatible user installed apps against exploitation, with the option to use it for all apps and opt-out on a case-by-case basis for the few incompatible with it.”
  Source: GrapheneOS, "Frequently Asked Questions" (grapheneos.org/faq), "Which devices are recommended?" paragraph, as fetched 2026-10-14 — https://grapheneos.org/faq
- Google’s Advanced Protection help page lists, among the protections offered by Advanced Protection, Memory Tagging Extension (MTE): “For supported apps, MTE will help prevent apps from corrupting memory. When MTE is on, you may experience slower device performance.”
  Source: Google, Android Help, "Improve device security with Advanced Protection for Android" (support.google.com/android/answer/16339980), as fetched 2026-10-14 — https://support.google.com/android/answer/16339980?hl=en
- GrapheneOS’s Features page says “GrapheneOS has a compatibility layer providing the option to install and use the official releases of Google Play in the standard app sandbox. Google Play receives absolutely no special access or privileges on GrapheneOS as opposed to bypassing the app sandbox and receiving a massive amount of highly privileged access.”
  Source: GrapheneOS, "Features" (grapheneos.org/features), "Sandboxed Google Play" paragraph, as fetched 2026-10-14 — https://grapheneos.org/features
- GrapheneOS’s Features page says, of its duress PIN/Password, that the wipe does not require a reboot and cannot be interrupted, and that if the duress PIN/Password is the same as the actual unlock method, the actual unlock method always takes precedence, and therefore no wipe will occur.
  Source: GrapheneOS, "Features" (grapheneos.org/features), "Duress PIN/Password" paragraph, as fetched 2026-10-14 — https://grapheneos.org/features
- Osservatorio Nessuno’s analysis “A deep dive into Cellebrite: Android support as of February 2025”, published 16 Mar 2025, said, in the paragraph under its figure captioned “Support matrix, older Pixel devices up to the 5/5a.”, that “Pixel devices remain quite a solid choice if kept updated”; that while it seems that for the standard Google ROM there are working exploits available to perform the FFS extraction in AFU state, on the contrary GrapheneOS additional hardening and protections are effective, and have been so since 2022; and that “Brute force is generally not available, because the user credentials are stored in the secure element, and thus cannot be extracted and active attempts are heavily throttled.”
  Source: Osservatorio Nessuno, "A deep dive into Cellebrite: Android support as of February 2025", 16 Mar 2025 — https://osservatorionessuno.org/blog/2025/03/a-deep-dive-into-cellebrite-android-support-as-of-february-2025/
- Apple’s Legal Process Guidelines for government and law enforcement within the United States state that for all devices running iOS 8.0 and later versions, Apple is unable to perform an iOS device data extraction as the data typically sought by law enforcement is encrypted, and Apple does not possess the encryption key.
  Source: Apple, "Legal Process Guidelines — Government & Law Enforcement within the United States", published October 2025, Apple — https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/law-enforcement-guidelines-us.pdf

## Preparing a phone before a border crossing
URL: https://phoneseized.com/protect/before-a-border
Jurisdictions: England & Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland, Australia, United States
Last reviewed: 2026-10-14

### Read this before you read anything else on this page
This page does not advise refusing a lawful demand at a border. Under Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000, a person commits an offence if he wilfully fails to comply with a duty imposed under or by virtue of the Schedule, wilfully contravenes a prohibition imposed under or by virtue of the Schedule, or wilfully obstructs, or seeks to frustrate, a search or examination under or by virtue of the Schedule, and the Code of Practice says the person must provide access to any electronic device to allow for a search to be undertaken. Customs and Border Protection’s directive says that if an officer is unable to complete an inspection of an electronic device because it is protected by a passcode or encryption, the officer may detain the device pending a determination as to its admissibility, exclusion, or other disposition. The Australian Border Force told a Senate committee that there is no legal compulsion for a traveller to provide a password/passcode or provide assistance to an electronic device at the border, and also that if an individual refuses to comply with a request or provide a password for an examination of their electronic device, and an ABF officer considers there to be a risk to the border, the ABF officer is authorised to seize that device for further examination prior to being returned. What follows gives the words of each, and then turns to device behaviour that the vendors document, none of which involves refusing anything.

### What the UK Schedule 7 Code says about passwords and access to a device
Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000 says a person who is questioned under paragraph 2 or 3 “must—give the examining officer any information in his possession which the officer requests.” The Schedule 7 Code of Practice says information requested under paragraph 5(a) “may include passwords to electronic devices.” The same paragraph says an examining officer may not, however, compel a person to disclose or confirm the identity of a source of journalistic information or disclose information subject to legal privilege. That is a rule for the examining officer. As quoted, it does not give the person a right to refuse any Schedule 7 duty. The Code also says “The person must provide access to any electronic device to allow for a search to be undertaken, including where access to a device requires the person to unlock a device through application of their thumb or finger, or any other form of access control.” Under paragraph 18, a person commits an offence if he wilfully fails to comply with a duty imposed under or by virtue of the Schedule, wilfully contravenes a prohibition imposed under or by virtue of the Schedule, or wilfully obstructs, or seeks to frustrate, a search or examination under or by virtue of the Schedule. See Extraction after seizure (https://phoneseized.com/uk/extraction-after-seizure) for what happens to a device once it has been examined.

### What Australian Border Force says
In answer AE22-050 to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee’s Additional Estimates, the ABF said: “There is no legal compulsion for a traveller to provide a password/passcode or provide assistance to an electronic device at the border.” In the same answer it said: “If an individual refuses to comply with a request or provide a password for an examination of their electronic device, and an ABF officer considers there to be a risk to the border, the ABF officer is authorised to seize that device for further examination prior to being returned.” See Border: ABF (https://phoneseized.com/australia/border-abf) for the rest of that policy, including retention timeframes.

### What the US CBP directive says
CBP’s directive states: “Travelers are obligated to present electronic devices and the information contained therein in a condition that allows inspection of the device and its contents.” It also states: “If an officer is unable to complete an inspection of an electronic device because it is protected by a passcode or encryption, the officer may…detain the device pending a determination as to its admissibility, exclusion, or other disposition.” See CBP and your phone at the U.S. border (https://phoneseized.com/usa/border-cbp) for the rest of that directive. Statutes and prosecution guidance on destroying, concealing or obstructing, and a United States indictment, are set out in Duress wipes, auto-reboot and the law (https://phoneseized.com/protect/duress-wipe-auto-reboot-and-the-law).

### Device behaviour, as each vendor’s own documentation says
None of the following is advice to refuse a lawful demand. Each item below is what a vendor’s documentation says: Apple’s description of the Complete Protection class. Apple’s Platform Security Guide says that for the Complete Protection class, shortly after the user locks a device the decrypted class key is discarded, rendering all data in this class inaccessible until the user enters the passcode again or unlocks (logs in to) the device using Optic ID, Face ID, or Touch ID. Android’s description of CE storage before first unlock. Android’s file-based encryption documentation says testers can verify that CE storage is locked before the device has been unlocked for the first time since boot. Apple on Advanced Data Protection. Apple says you can choose to enable Advanced Data Protection to protect the vast majority of your iCloud data, and states: “If you enable Advanced Data Protection and then lose access to your account, Apple will not have the encryption keys to help you recover it” — see Cloud and carrier (https://phoneseized.com/on-your-phone/cloud-and-carrier) for the rest of what Apple says on this. See the border-prep tool (https://phoneseized.com/tools/border-prep) for what the law and the agencies’ own documents say at a border, and what the sources say happens to a device afterward, and the rights card (https://phoneseized.com/tools/rights-card) for the position in your jurisdiction, each line with its quoted source.

### You must
- Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000 says a person who is questioned under paragraph 2 or 3 must give the examining officer any information in his possession which the officer requests.
  Source: Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 5(a) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/schedule/7
- The Schedule 7 Code of Practice says the person must provide access to any electronic device to allow for a search to be undertaken, including where access to a device requires the person to unlock a device through application of their thumb or finger, or any other form of access control.
  Source: Schedule 7 (Terrorism Act 2000) Code of Practice (Oct 2025), para 61 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68e7b52b187483de54d766d2/Schedule+7+Code+of+Practice.pdf
- Under paragraph 18 of Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000, a person commits an offence if he wilfully fails to comply with a duty imposed under or by virtue of the Schedule, wilfully contravenes a prohibition imposed under or by virtue of the Schedule, or wilfully obstructs, or seeks to frustrate, a search or examination under or by virtue of the Schedule.
  Source: Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 18(1) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/schedule/7/paragraph/18

### What they can do
- CBP’s directive states that if an officer is unable to complete an inspection of an electronic device because it is protected by a passcode or encryption, the officer may, in accordance with section 5.4, detain the device pending a determination as to its admissibility, exclusion, or other disposition.
  Source: CBP Directive No. 3340-049B §5.3.3 (eff. 1 Jan 2026) — https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/2026-01/cbp_directive_3340-049b_jan_2026_508.pdf

### What the sources say
- In a written answer to a question on notice taken at Senate Additional Budget Estimates (AE22-050), the Australian Border Force said: “There is no legal compulsion for a traveller to provide a password/passcode or provide assistance to an electronic device at the border.”
  Source: Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Additional Budget Estimates, ABF written answer AE22-050 (document headed 14 Feb 2022) — no legal compulsion — https://www.aph.gov.au/api/qon/downloadattachment?attachmentId=bd0902f9-1209-49d9-9c86-b6858c22020d
- The same answer said that if an individual refuses to comply with a request or provide a password for an examination of their electronic device, and an ABF officer considers there to be a risk to the border, the ABF officer is authorised to seize that device for further examination prior to being returned.
  Source: Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Additional Budget Estimates, ABF written answer AE22-050 (document headed 14 Feb 2022) — consequence of refusal — https://www.aph.gov.au/api/qon/downloadattachment?attachmentId=bd0902f9-1209-49d9-9c86-b6858c22020d
- CBP’s directive states that travelers are obligated to present electronic devices and the information contained therein in a condition that allows inspection of the device and its contents.
  Source: CBP Directive No. 3340-049B §5.3.1 (eff. 1 Jan 2026) — https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/2026-01/cbp_directive_3340-049b_jan_2026_508.pdf
- Apple’s Platform Security Guide says that for the Complete Protection class, shortly after the user locks a device the decrypted class key is discarded, rendering all data in this class inaccessible until the user enters the passcode again or unlocks (logs in to) the device using Optic ID, Face ID, or Touch ID.
  Source: Apple Platform Security Guide — "Data Protection classes", published 19 Dec 2024, Apple — https://support.apple.com/guide/security/data-protection-classes-secb010e978a/web
- Android’s file-based encryption documentation says testers can verify that CE storage is locked before the device has been unlocked for the first time since boot.
  Source: Android Open Source Project, "File-based encryption" (source.android.com), as fetched 2026-10-01 — https://source.android.com/docs/security/features/encryption/file-based
- Apple states that you can choose to enable Advanced Data Protection, and that if you enable it and then lose access to your account, Apple will not have the encryption keys to help you recover it.
  Source: Apple, "iCloud data security overview" (support.apple.com/en-gb/102651), as fetched 2026-10-01 — https://support.apple.com/en-gb/102651

## Duress wipes, auto-reboot and the law: what a wipe can cost once a phone is sought
URL: https://phoneseized.com/protect/duress-wipe-auto-reboot-and-the-law
Jurisdictions: England & Wales, Scotland, Australia, United States
Last reviewed: 2026-10-14

### Read this first
This page describes; it does not advise. It sets out what vendors say their features do, in the vendors’ own words, and what statutes, prosecution guidance and court documents say, set out in the words of each source; the full quotation is under each item. Nothing on this page is advice to use any feature. Nothing on this page is advice to wipe, lock, restart or withhold a phone at any time. It is not legal advice. None of the statutes or the Crown Prosecution Service guidance quoted here mentions a phone, a duress PIN or a wipe by name, and this page does not say how any court would apply them. A United States indictment quoted below does mention a phone; it is an allegation and is set out separately. This page is not a list of every offence in any jurisdiction; that is a limit of this page, not a statement that no other offence applies. Apart from the lines that open “Across the United Kingdom”, this page makes no statement about Northern Ireland. For the border-specific position, see Preparing a phone before a border crossing (https://phoneseized.com/protect/before-a-border).

### What the vendors say the features do, in their own words
GrapheneOS’s Features page (https://grapheneos.org/features) says it “provides users with the ability to set a duress PIN/Password that will irreversibly wipe the device (along with any installed eSIMs) once entered anywhere where the device credentials are requested (on the lockscreen, along with any such prompt in the OS).” The same page says “The wipe does not require a reboot and cannot be interrupted”, that “Duress PIN will also wipe the device when entered as the two-factor fingerprint unlock PIN but not currently when entered as the SIM PIN” and, in a separate sentence, “if the duress PIN/Password is the same as the actual unlock method, the actual unlock method always takes precedence, and therefore no wipe will occur.” On auto-reboot, GrapheneOS’s Features page (https://grapheneos.org/features) says it “provides an auto-reboot feature which reboots locked devices after a set period of time to put data at rest.” It says “A countdown timer is started each time the device is locked, and the device will reboot if a successful unlock doesn’t occur before the timer reaches zero.” and “Unlocking any profile cancels the timer, not just the Owner profile.” It also says “The timer is set to 18 hours by default, but can be set to values between 10 minutes and 72 hours, or turned off.” and “This feature doesn’t apply when the device is in ‘Before First Unlock’ state, meaning that it will not lead to the device continuously rebooting, as data is already at rest.” See Lock state, Lockdown Mode and GrapheneOS: what each changes (https://phoneseized.com/protect/bfu-lockdown-grapheneos) for what that page quotes from the same Features page. Apple’s Platform Security Guide (https://support.apple.com/guide/security/passcodes-and-passwords-sec20230a10d/web) describes a different setting, one that is tied to incorrect passcode attempts. It says “If the Erase Data option is turned on for iPad, iPhone, or Apple Vision Pro…after 10 consecutive incorrect attempts to enter the passcode, all content and settings are removed from storage.” It adds “Consecutive attempts of the same incorrect passcode don’t count toward the limit”, and that the setting is also available as an administrative policy through a device management service that supports this feature and through Microsoft Exchange ActiveSync, and “can be set to a lower threshold”. Google’s Android Help page “Protect your personal data against theft” (https://support.google.com/android/answer/15146908) says “These features aren’t supported on Android Go devices, tablets, and wearables. Support may also vary based on your smartphone device model.” and, later on the page, “If Failed Authentication Lock is on, your device will automatically lock when authentication attempts fail repeatedly.” That last sentence describes a lock. Google’s Advanced Protection help page (https://support.google.com/android/answer/16339980?hl=en) lists, among the protections offered by Advanced Protection, Inactivity Reboot: “Automatically reboot your phone if it remains locked for 72 hours. The process of rebooting will make user data unreadable until a fresh unlock takes place.”

### England and Wales: prosecution guidance and statutes
In England and Wales, the Crown Prosecution Service’s guidance “Public Justice Offences” (https://www.cps.gov.uk/prosecution-guidance/public-justice-offences) says the offence of perverting the course of justice is committed when an accused “does an act or series of acts; which has or have a tendency to pervert; and which is or are intended to pervert; the course of public justice.” It says “The course of justice must be in existence at the time of the act(s).” and that “The course of justice starts when: an event has occurred, from which it can reasonably be expected that an investigation will follow; or investigations which could/might bring proceedings have actually started; or proceedings have started or are about to start.” In England and Wales, the same guidance lists “false alibis and interference with evidence or exhibits” and “concealing or destroying evidence or providing a false alibi” among its “examples of what may amount to a charge of perverting the course of justice” (https://www.cps.gov.uk/prosecution-guidance/public-justice-offences). In England and Wales, on maximum sentences, the guidance says that perverting the course of justice, preventing lawful burial, obstructing a coroner, escape from lawful custody and breaching prison “have a maximum sentence of life imprisonment and which are triable only on indictment” (https://www.cps.gov.uk/prosecution-guidance/public-justice-offences), and that “The offences carrying a maximum life sentence are all common law offences.” The guidance goes on, in the same passage, to address prosecuting a statutory offence in preference to these common law offences; that part is not quoted on this page. This is a prosecutor’s guidance, not a statute, and the excerpts quoted here do not mention a phone. In England and Wales, section 89(2) of the Police Act 1996 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/16/section/89) provides that “Any person who resists or wilfully obstructs a constable in the execution of his duty, or a person assisting a constable in the execution of his duty, shall be guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one month or to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale, or to both.” Across the United Kingdom, section 49(1)(a) of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/section/49) (RIPA) lists cases in which the section applies; the case at paragraph (a), which is the case quoted on this page, is where any protected information has come into the possession of any person by means of the exercise of a statutory power to seize, detain, inspect, search or otherwise to interfere with documents or other property, or is likely to do so. Across the United Kingdom, section 49(2) sets out the conditions under which a person with the appropriate permission under Schedule 2 may, by notice, impose a disclosure requirement; those conditions are set out in full in the “What they can do” item below. Across the United Kingdom, section 53(1) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/section/53) provides that a person to whom a section 49 notice has been given is guilty of an offence if he knowingly fails, in accordance with the notice, to make the disclosure required by virtue of the giving of the notice. Across the United Kingdom, section 53(2) to (4) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/section/53) of that Act provides that in proceedings against any person for an offence under that section, if it is shown that that person was in possession of a key to any protected information at any time before the time of the giving of the section 49 notice, that person shall be taken for the purposes of those proceedings to have continued to be in possession of that key at all subsequent times, unless it is shown that the key was not in his possession after the giving of the notice and before the time by which he was required to disclose it; that a person shall be taken to have shown that he was not in possession of a key to protected information at a particular time if sufficient evidence of that fact is adduced to raise an issue with respect to it and the contrary is not proved beyond a reasonable doubt; and that it shall be a defence for that person to show that it was not reasonably practicable for him to make the disclosure required by virtue of the giving of the section 49 notice before the time by which he was required, in accordance with that notice, to make it, but that he did make that disclosure as soon after that time as it was reasonably practicable for him to do so. Across the United Kingdom, section 53(5) and (5A) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/section/53) set out the penalties, which are listed in the items below. See The RIPA s.49 notice: when failing to disclose is an offence (https://phoneseized.com/uk/ripa-notice). Across the United Kingdom, paragraph 18(1) of Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/schedule/7/paragraph/18) provides that a person commits an offence if he wilfully fails to comply with a duty imposed under or by virtue of the Schedule, wilfully contravenes a prohibition imposed under or by virtue of the Schedule, or wilfully obstructs, or seeks to frustrate, a search or examination under or by virtue of the Schedule. Across the United Kingdom, paragraph 18(2) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/schedule/7/paragraph/18) sets the penalty on summary conviction at imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months, a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale, or both. See Schedule 7 at ports (https://phoneseized.com/uk/ports-schedule-7).

### Scotland
In Scotland, section 90 of the Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/asp/2012/8/section/90) provides that it is an offence for a person to resist, obstruct or hinder a person acting in a capacity mentioned in subsection (3), or a person assisting that person while acting in such capacity. In Scotland, subsection (3) lists the capacity of a constable among the capacities. In Scotland, the penalty provision quoted says that a person who is guilty of an offence under subsection (1) or (2) is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 12 months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to both; subsection (1) is not quoted on this page. Across the United Kingdom, section 53(1) of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/section/53) provides that a person to whom a section 49 notice has been given is guilty of an offence if he knowingly fails, in accordance with the notice, to make the disclosure required by virtue of the giving of the notice. Across the United Kingdom, section 53(2) to (4) (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/section/53) of that Act provides that in proceedings against any person for an offence under that section, if it is shown that that person was in possession of a key to any protected information at any time before the time of the giving of the section 49 notice, that person shall be taken for the purposes of those proceedings to have continued to be in possession of that key at all subsequent times, unless it is shown that the key was not in his possession after the giving of the notice and before the time by which he was required to disclose it; that a person shall be taken to have shown that he was not in possession of a key to protected information at a particular time if sufficient evidence of that fact is adduced to raise an issue with respect to it and the contrary is not proved beyond a reasonable doubt; and that it shall be a defence for that person to show that it was not reasonably practicable for him to make the disclosure required by virtue of the giving of the section 49 notice before the time by which he was required, in accordance with that notice, to make it, but that he did make that disclosure as soon after that time as it was reasonably practicable for him to do so. Across the United Kingdom, paragraph 18(1) of Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/schedule/7/paragraph/18) provides that a person commits an offence if he wilfully fails to comply with a duty imposed under or by virtue of the Schedule, wilfully contravenes a prohibition imposed under or by virtue of the Schedule, or wilfully obstructs, or seeks to frustrate, a search or examination under or by virtue of the Schedule. The penalties for these provisions are quoted in the England and Wales section above and in the items below. See Schedule 7 at ports (https://phoneseized.com/uk/ports-schedule-7). Scots common-law offences about destroying evidence are not quoted on this page because no official text was found to quote; that is a gap in this page, not a statement that no such offence exists.

### Australia
In Victoria, section 254 of the Crimes Act 1958 (https://content.legislation.vic.gov.au/sites/default/files/2026-10/58-6231aa323-authorised.pdf) provides that a person who (a) knows that a document or other thing of any kind is, or is reasonably likely to be, required in evidence in a legal proceeding; and (b) either destroys or conceals it or renders it illegible, undecipherable or incapable of identification, or expressly, tacitly or impliedly authorises or permits another person to destroy or conceal it or render it illegible, undecipherable or incapable of identification and that other person does so; and (c) acts as described in paragraph (b) with the intention of preventing it from being used in evidence in a legal proceeding, is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to level 6 imprisonment (5 years maximum) or a level 6 fine or both. In Victoria, subsection (2) provides that the section applies with respect to a legal proceeding, whether the proceeding is one that is in progress or is to be, or may be, commenced in the future. The full section is at the link. In Queensland, section 129 of the Criminal Code (https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/view/pdf/inforce/current/act-1899-009) provides that a person who, knowing something is or may be needed in evidence in a judicial proceeding, damages it with intent to stop it being used in evidence commits a misdemeanour, with a maximum penalty of 7 years imprisonment. In New South Wales, section 317 of the Crimes Act 1900 (https://legislation.nsw.gov.au/view/whole/html/inforce/current/act-1900-040) provides that a person who, with intent to mislead any judicial tribunal in any judicial proceeding, suppresses, conceals, destroys, alters or falsifies anything knowing that it is or may be required as evidence in any judicial proceeding is liable to imprisonment for 10 years. Under Commonwealth law in Australia, section 39(1) of the Crimes Act 1914 (https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/3) provides that a person commits an offence if the person knows that a book, document or thing of any kind is, or may be, required in evidence in a judicial proceeding; and destroys the book, document or thing, or renders it illegible, undecipherable or incapable of identification; and does so with the intention of preventing it from being used in evidence; and the judicial proceeding is a federal judicial proceeding. The penalty stated is imprisonment for 5 years. Under Commonwealth law in Australia, section 3LA(1) of the Crimes Act 1914 (https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1) provides that a constable may apply to a magistrate for an order requiring a specified person to provide any information or assistance that is reasonable and necessary to allow a constable to do one or more of the following, including to access data held in, or accessible from, a computer or data storage device in the circumstances listed in the “What they can do” item below. Under Commonwealth law in Australia, section 3LA(5) (https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1) provides that a person commits an offence if the person is subject to an order under that section, is capable of complying with a requirement in the order, omits to do an act, and the omission contravenes the requirement. Under Commonwealth law in Australia, section 3LA(6) (https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1) provides that a person commits an offence if the person is subject to an order under that section, is capable of complying with a requirement in the order, omits to do an act, the omission contravenes the requirement, and the offence to which the relevant warrant relates is a serious offence or a serious terrorism offence. The penalty stated in section 3LA(5) is imprisonment for 5 years or 300 penalty units, or both; the penalty stated in section 3LA(6) is imprisonment for 10 years or 600 penalty units, or both. The Australian Border Force’s written answer AE22-050 to a Senate committee (the document is headed 14 February 2022) said that if an individual refuses to comply with a request or provide a password for an examination of their electronic device, and an ABF officer considers there to be a risk to the border, the ABF officer is authorised to seize that device for further examination prior to being returned. See Border: ABF (https://phoneseized.com/australia/border-abf) for the rest of that answer. The words “legal proceeding”, “judicial proceeding” and “federal judicial proceeding” are used in the Australian provisions quoted above, as are “serious offence”, “serious terrorism offence” and “relevant warrant” in section 3LA(6); this page quotes no definition of them. The other Australian states and territories are not covered on this page. Other offences in the Australian jurisdictions named above are not quoted on this page either; that is a limit of this page, not a statement that none applies.

### United States federal law and the border directive
Under United States federal law, 18 U.S.C. §2232(a) (https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2024-title18/html/USCODE-2024-title18-partI-chap109-sec2232.htm) provides that whoever, “before, during, or after any search for or seizure of property by any person authorized to make such search or seizure”, knowingly destroys, damages, wastes, disposes of, transfers, or otherwise takes any action, or knowingly attempts to destroy, damage, waste, dispose of, transfer, or otherwise take any action, “for the purpose of preventing or impairing the Government’s lawful authority to take such property into its custody or control or to continue holding such property under its lawful custody and control”, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both. The words quoted are about a search for or seizure of property. Under United States federal law, 18 U.S.C. §1519 (https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2024-title18/html/USCODE-2024-title18-partI-chap73-sec1519.htm) provides that whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper administration of any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States or any case filed under title 11, or in relation to or contemplation of any such matter or case, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. Under United States federal law, 18 U.S.C. §1512(c)(1) (https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2024-title18/html/USCODE-2024-title18-partI-chap73-sec1512.htm) provides that whoever corruptly alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document, or other object, or attempts to do so, with the intent to impair the object’s integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. The words “official proceeding” are used in the quoted provision; this page quotes no definition of that term. CBP’s directive (https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/2026-01/cbp_directive_3340-049b_jan_2026_508.pdf) states that travelers are obligated to present electronic devices and the information contained therein in a condition that allows inspection of the device and its contents. See CBP and your phone at the U.S. border (https://phoneseized.com/usa/border-cbp) for the rest of that directive.

### United States v. Tunick: what the indictment and docket say
This section gives the indictment in, and docket entries for, United States v. Tunick, No. 1:25-cr-00499 (N.D. Ga.); the next section gives reports about it. The indictment (https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.gand.351975/gov.uscourts.gand.351975.1.0.pdf) (Doc. 1, filed 13 November 2025) alleges that, on or about January 24, 2025, in the Northern District of Georgia, the defendant, Samuel Tunick, “before and during the search for and seizure of property by Customs and Border Patrol Tactical Terrorism Response Team…did knowingly destroy, damage, waste, dispose of, and otherwise take any action to delete the digital contents of a Google Pixel cellular phone, for the purpose of preventing and impairing the Government’s lawful authority to take said property into its custody and control”, and it cites Section 2232(a) of Title 18. The paragraph quoted here cites that section and no other provision. That is an allegation, not a finding. The indictment paragraph quoted here does not mention GrapheneOS, a duress password or a wipe. CourtListener’s copy of the docket (https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/71998357/united-states-v-tunick/) records a plea of not guilty entered as to Count 1. CourtListener’s copy of the docket (https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/71998357/united-states-v-tunick/), as fetched on 14 October 2026, records at entry 8 (3 December 2025): “INITIAL APPEARANCE and ARRAIGNMENT held as to Samuel Tunick. A PLEA of NOT GUILTY was entered as to Count 1.” CourtListener’s copy of the docket records (https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/71998357/united-states-v-tunick/) at entry 21 (17 March 2026): “MOTION to Suppress Evidence and Statements by Samuel Tunick.” It records at entry 31 (20 July 2026): “The Court held an evidentiary hearing regarding Defendant’s 21 motion to suppress evidence and statements.” Entry 31 continues beyond the sentence quoted here. CourtListener’s copy of the docket records (https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/71998357/united-states-v-tunick/) at entry 38 (18 September 2026) an order granting a motion for continuance of the post-hearing briefing schedule, and that “Defendant’s opening brief shall be due October 19, 2026, the Government’s response shall be due November 9, 2026, and Defendant’s reply shall be due November 23, 2026.” As of CourtListener’s copy of the docket as fetched on 14 October 2026, this page quotes no ruling on that motion. That is a statement about what this page quotes, not about the court.

### United States v. Tunick: what outlets reported
The paragraphs below give reports about United States v. Tunick; each supports only that the outlet reported it. On 24 July 2026, TechCrunch reported (https://techcrunch.com/2026/07/24/us-accuses-american-of-allegedly-wiping-his-phone-using-a-duress-password-during-border-search/) that “The U.S. Justice Department is prosecuting an American for allegedly providing U.S. border authorities with a passcode that wiped the contents of his phone, according to an indictment and media reports.” It also reported “Prosecutors later charged Tunick under a federal statute that makes it unlawful to knowingly destroy or damage property to prevent authorities from seizing it. Tunick has pleaded not guilty.” On 27 July 2026, MediaNama reported (https://www.medianama.com/2026/07/223-us-grapheneos-duress-password-case/) that “The U.S. Department of Justice is prosecuting Samuel Tunick of Atlanta for allegedly providing border officers with a passcode that erased his phone’s data during a search.” It also reported that “Legal and security experts say this is the first known U.S. case involving the alleged use of a ‘duress’ password”. On 9 August 2026, Fox News reported (https://www.foxnews.com/tech/self-destructing-phone-code-sparks-federal-case) that “Tunick pleaded not guilty. The charge remains an allegation, and the court has not decided whether the government’s seizure was lawful.” It also reported “Installing GrapheneOS or setting up a duress passcode is not the crime alleged in this case.” That is the outlet’s description of what is alleged; this page makes no statement on whether any setting is lawful. On 30 July 2026, Decrypt reported (https://decrypt.co/374705/completely-legal-grapheneos-pushes-back-as-duress-password-case-proceeds) that GrapheneOS had said its smartphone operating system is “completely legal” and constitutionally protected, and that the project tweeted on July 27, “We have no obligation to weaken any of the security protections it provides,” adding that laws requiring it to do so “would be unconstitutional.” Decrypt reported that “The statement came in a thread about the prosecution, after a user asked whether the project was refusing to cooperate with Homeland Security. GrapheneOS said it could not.” and wrote “Once key material is wiped, ‘there’s nothing we can do to assist with it,’ it wrote”. This page does not assess those statements. The outlets’ descriptions of a passcode, a duress password or GrapheneOS are what the outlets reported; the indictment paragraph quoted in the previous section does not mention them.

### What reports say about police attention to GrapheneOS
The first reports below concern France and Catalonia (Spain). Those places are outside the jurisdictions this site covers, and the items are reports. On 21 November 2025, Privacy Guides reported (https://www.privacyguides.org/news/2025/11/22/grapheneos-migrates-server-infrastructure-from-france-amid-police-intimidation-claims/) that the GrapheneOS project “has announced on X that they are ceasing all operations in France”; that “While the operating system will still be available to French users, all website and discussion servers are being relocated to countries and providers outside France’s jurisdiction”; that, according to GrapheneOS, “law enforcement in France has repeatedly made media statements with ‘inaccurate and unsubstantiated claims’ about GrapheneOS”; and that “This decision was publicly initiated after negative press coverage from two articles published by Le Parisien”. On 3 July 2025, Notebookcheck reported (https://www.notebookcheck.net/Catalan-cops-link-Google-Pixel-phones-to-organized-crime.1050210.0.html) that “Cops in Catalonia, Spain, reportedly stay alert when they spot someone using a Google Pixel phone.” It also reported “Per the authorities in the region, Google’s smartphones are apparently go-to devices for organized crime groups, especially with GrapheneOS installed.” On 30 October 2025, Android Authority reported (https://www.androidauthority.com/cellebrite-leak-google-pixel-grapheneos-security-3611794/) of GrapheneOS that it is “also the same software that’s occasionally drawn attention from police agencies who associate it with criminal use, even though its biggest audience is privacy-minded users who simply want more control over their devices.” The sources cited on this page include no equivalent report for England and Wales, Scotland or Australia. That is a statement about the sources used for this page, not about whether any such report exists.

### What the vendor pages say about defaults
GrapheneOS’s Features page (https://grapheneos.org/features) says, of its auto-reboot, “The timer is set to 18 hours by default, but can be set to values between 10 minutes and 72 hours, or turned off.” Of its USB-C port and pogo pins setting, the Features page (https://grapheneos.org/features) says “The default is Charging-only when locked, which significantly reduces attack surface when the device is locked.” These are the vendor’s statements; this page gives no steps for any of them.

### What GrapheneOS’s FAQ says about ending a secondary profile session
On ending a secondary user profile session, GrapheneOS’s FAQ (https://grapheneos.org/faq) says that ending such a session “fully purges the encryption keys and puts the profiles back at rest” and that “This can’t be done for the owner profile without rebooting due to it encrypting the sensitive system-wide operating system data.” This is the vendor’s statement; this page gives no steps for it.

### What they can do
- Across the United Kingdom, section 49(2) of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 provides that if a person with the appropriate permission under Schedule 2 believes, on reasonable grounds, that a key to the protected information is in the possession of any person, that a disclosure requirement is necessary on grounds falling within subsection (3) or for the purpose of securing the effective exercise or proper performance by any public authority of any statutory power or statutory duty, that imposing it is proportionate to what is sought to be achieved, and that it is not reasonably practicable for the person with the appropriate permission to obtain possession of the protected information in an intelligible form without the giving of a notice under that section, that person may by notice to the person he believes to have possession of the key impose a disclosure requirement in respect of the protected information; the words quoted say “the protected information” without saying which information, and section 49(1), which is quoted in part in the “What the sources say” items, is not quoted in this item.
  Source: Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, s.49(2) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/section/49
- Under Commonwealth law in Australia, section 3LA(1) of the Crimes Act 1914 provides that a constable may apply to a magistrate for an order requiring a specified person to provide any information or assistance that is reasonable and necessary to allow a constable to do one or more of the following, including to access data held in, or accessible from, a computer or data storage device that is on warrant premises, is found in the course of an ordinary search of a person, or a frisk search of a person, authorised by a warrant under section 3E, has been moved under subsection 3K(2) and is at a place for examination or processing, or has been seized under this Division.
  Source: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3LA(1) — order power (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026) — https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1

### What the sources say
- GrapheneOS’s Features page says it provides users with the ability to set a duress PIN/Password that will irreversibly wipe the device (along with any installed eSIMs) once entered anywhere where the device credentials are requested (on the lockscreen, along with any such prompt in the OS).
  Source: GrapheneOS, "Features" (grapheneos.org/features), as fetched 2026-09-08 — https://grapheneos.org/features
- GrapheneOS’s Features page says that the wipe does not require a reboot and cannot be interrupted, that the duress PIN will also wipe the device when entered as the two-factor fingerprint unlock PIN but not currently when entered as the SIM PIN, and that if the duress PIN/Password is the same as the actual unlock method, the actual unlock method always takes precedence, and therefore no wipe will occur.
  Source: GrapheneOS, "Features" (grapheneos.org/features), "Duress PIN/Password" paragraph, as fetched 2026-10-14 — https://grapheneos.org/features
- GrapheneOS’s Features page says it provides an auto-reboot feature which reboots locked devices after a set period of time to put data at rest; that a countdown timer is started each time the device is locked, and the device will reboot if a successful unlock doesn’t occur before the timer reaches zero; that unlocking any profile cancels the timer, not just the Owner profile; that the timer is set to 18 hours by default, but can be set to values between 10 minutes and 72 hours, or turned off; and that the feature doesn’t apply when the device is in “Before First Unlock” state, meaning that it will not lead to the device continuously rebooting, as data is already at rest.
  Source: GrapheneOS, "Features" (grapheneos.org/features), "Auto reboot" paragraph, as fetched 2026-10-14 — https://grapheneos.org/features
- Apple’s Platform Security Guide says that if the Erase Data option is turned on for iPad, iPhone, or Apple Vision Pro, after 10 consecutive incorrect attempts to enter the passcode, all content and settings are removed from storage, and that consecutive attempts of the same incorrect passcode don’t count toward the limit, and that the setting is also available as an administrative policy through a device management service that supports this feature and through Microsoft Exchange ActiveSync, and “can be set to a lower threshold”.
  Source: Apple Platform Security Guide — "Passcodes and passwords", published 19 Dec 2024, Apple — https://support.apple.com/guide/security/passcodes-and-passwords-sec20230a10d/web
- Google’s Android Help page “Protect your personal data against theft” says “These features aren’t supported on Android Go devices, tablets, and wearables. Support may also vary based on your smartphone device model.” and, later on the page, that if Failed Authentication Lock is on, your device will automatically lock when authentication attempts fail repeatedly.
  Source: Google, Android Help, "Protect your personal data against theft" (support.google.com/android/answer/15146908), as fetched 2026-10-14 — https://support.google.com/android/answer/15146908
- Google’s Advanced Protection help page lists, among the protections offered by Advanced Protection, Inactivity Reboot: “Automatically reboot your phone if it remains locked for 72 hours. The process of rebooting will make user data unreadable until a fresh unlock takes place.”
  Source: Google, Android Help, "Improve device security with Advanced Protection for Android" (support.google.com/android/answer/16339980), as fetched 2026-10-14 — https://support.google.com/android/answer/16339980?hl=en
- GrapheneOS’s Features page says that for its USB-C port and pogo pins setting the default is Charging-only when locked, which significantly reduces attack surface when the device is locked.
  Source: GrapheneOS, "Features" (grapheneos.org/features), "USB-C port and pogo pins control" paragraph, as fetched 2026-10-01 — https://grapheneos.org/features
- GrapheneOS’s FAQ says it enables support for ending secondary user profile sessions after logging into them, that this fully purges the encryption keys and puts the profiles back at rest, and that this can’t be done for the owner profile without rebooting due to it encrypting the sensitive system-wide operating system data.
  Source: GrapheneOS, "Frequently Asked Questions" (grapheneos.org/faq), "How is disk encryption implemented?" paragraph, as fetched 2026-10-14 — https://grapheneos.org/faq
- In England and Wales, the Crown Prosecution Service’s guidance says that the offence of perverting the course of justice is committed when an accused does an act or series of acts which has or have a tendency to pervert, and which is or are intended to pervert, the course of public justice; that the course of justice must be in existence at the time of the act(s); and that the course of justice starts when an event has occurred, from which it can reasonably be expected that an investigation will follow, or investigations which could/might bring proceedings have actually started, or proceedings have started or are about to start.
  Source: Crown Prosecution Service, "Public Justice Offences" prosecution guidance (cps.gov.uk) — "Perverting the Course of Justice", the elements of the offence and when the course of justice starts (page printed "updated 1 July 2019; revised 18 September 2024"), as fetched 2026-10-14 — https://www.cps.gov.uk/prosecution-guidance/public-justice-offences
- In England and Wales, the Crown Prosecution Service’s guidance lists “false alibis and interference with evidence or exhibits” and “concealing or destroying evidence or providing a false alibi” among its examples of “what may amount to a charge of perverting the course of justice”.
  Source: Crown Prosecution Service, "Public Justice Offences" prosecution guidance (cps.gov.uk) — "Perverting the Course of Justice", examples of what may amount to a charge (page printed "updated 1 July 2019; revised 18 September 2024"), as fetched 2026-10-14 — https://www.cps.gov.uk/prosecution-guidance/public-justice-offences
- In England and Wales, the Crown Prosecution Service’s guidance says that perverting the course of justice, preventing lawful burial, obstructing a coroner, escape from lawful custody and breaching prison “have a maximum sentence of life imprisonment and which are triable only on indictment”, and that “The offences carrying a maximum life sentence are all common law offences.”
  Source: Crown Prosecution Service, "Public Justice Offences" prosecution guidance (cps.gov.uk) — "Selection of charges", maximum sentences and prosecuting common law offences (page printed "updated 1 July 2019; revised 18 September 2024"), as fetched 2026-10-14 — https://www.cps.gov.uk/prosecution-guidance/public-justice-offences
- In England and Wales, section 89(2) of the Police Act 1996 provides that any person who resists or wilfully obstructs a constable in the execution of his duty, or a person assisting a constable in the execution of his duty, shall be guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one month or to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale, or to both.
  Source: Police Act 1996, s.89(2) — resisting or wilfully obstructing a constable — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/16/section/89
- Across the United Kingdom, section 49(1) of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 lists cases in which the section applies; the case at paragraph (a), which is the case quoted here, is where any protected information has come into the possession of any person by means of the exercise of a statutory power to seize, detain, inspect, search or otherwise to interfere with documents or other property, or is likely to do so.
  Source: Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, s.49(1)(a) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/section/49
- Across the United Kingdom, section 53(1) of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 provides that a person to whom a section 49 notice has been given is guilty of an offence if he knowingly fails, in accordance with the notice, to make the disclosure required by virtue of the giving of the notice.
  Source: Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, s.53(1) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/section/53
- Across the United Kingdom, section 53(2) of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 provides that in proceedings against any person for an offence under that section, if it is shown that that person was in possession of a key to any protected information at any time before the time of the giving of the section 49 notice, that person shall be taken for the purposes of those proceedings to have continued to be in possession of that key at all subsequent times, unless it is shown that the key was not in his possession after the giving of the notice and before the time by which he was required to disclose it; section 53(3) provides that for the purposes of that section a person shall be taken to have shown that he was not in possession of a key to protected information at a particular time if sufficient evidence of that fact is adduced to raise an issue with respect to it and the contrary is not proved beyond a reasonable doubt; and section 53(4) provides that in proceedings against any person for an offence under that section it shall be a defence for that person to show that it was not reasonably practicable for him to make the disclosure required by virtue of the giving of the section 49 notice before the time by which he was required, in accordance with that notice, to make it, but that he did make that disclosure as soon after that time as it was reasonably practicable for him to do so.
  Source: Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, s.53(2)–(4) — presumption of continued possession of a key, and defence — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/section/53
- Across the United Kingdom, a person guilty of an offence under section 53 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding "the appropriate maximum term" or to a fine, or to both, where s.53(5A) defines "the appropriate maximum term" as five years in a national security case or a child indecency case and two years in any other case; on summary conviction the person is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to both.
  Source: Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, s.53(5) and (5A) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/section/53
- Across the United Kingdom, paragraph 18(1) of Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 provides that a person commits an offence if he wilfully fails to comply with a duty imposed under or by virtue of the Schedule, wilfully contravenes a prohibition imposed under or by virtue of the Schedule, or wilfully obstructs, or seeks to frustrate, a search or examination under or by virtue of the Schedule.
  Source: Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 18(1) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/schedule/7/paragraph/18
- Across the United Kingdom, a person guilty of an offence under paragraph 18 of Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months, a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale, or both.
  Source: Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 18(2) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/schedule/7/paragraph/18
- In Scotland, section 90 of the Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012 provides that it is an offence for a person to resist, obstruct or hinder a person acting in a capacity mentioned in subsection (3), or a person assisting that person while acting in such capacity; that the capacities listed in subsection (3) include that of a constable; and that a person who is guilty of an offence under subsection (1) or (2) is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 12 months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to both; subsection (1) is not quoted here.
  Source: Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012, s.90(2), (3)(a) and (4) — resisting, obstructing or hindering a constable — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/asp/2012/8/section/90
- In Victoria, section 254(1) of the Crimes Act 1958 provides that a person who (a) knows that a document or other thing of any kind is, or is reasonably likely to be, required in evidence in a legal proceeding; and (b) either destroys or conceals it or renders it illegible, undecipherable or incapable of identification, or expressly, tacitly or impliedly authorises or permits another person to destroy or conceal it or render it illegible, undecipherable or incapable of identification and that other person does so; and (c) acts as described in paragraph (b) with the intention of preventing it from being used in evidence in a legal proceeding, is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to level 6 imprisonment (5 years maximum) or a level 6 fine or both; and section 254(2) provides that the section applies with respect to a legal proceeding, whether the proceeding is one that is in progress or is to be, or may be, commenced in the future.
  Source: Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), s.254(1)–(2) — destruction of evidence: offence, penalty and application to a proceeding that may be commenced in the future, Authorised Version No. 323 — https://content.legislation.vic.gov.au/sites/default/files/2026-10/58-6231aa323-authorised.pdf
- In Queensland, section 129 of the Criminal Code provides that a person who, knowing something is or may be needed in evidence in a judicial proceeding, damages it with intent to stop it being used in evidence commits a misdemeanour, with a maximum penalty of 7 years imprisonment.
  Source: Criminal Code (Qld), s.129 — damaging evidence with intent, offence and maximum penalty (current as at 1 June 2026) — https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/view/pdf/inforce/current/act-1899-009
- In New South Wales, section 317 of the Crimes Act 1900 provides that a person who, with intent to mislead any judicial tribunal in any judicial proceeding, suppresses, conceals, destroys, alters or falsifies anything knowing that it is or may be required as evidence in any judicial proceeding is liable to imprisonment for 10 years.
  Source: Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s.317 — tampering etc with evidence: suppressing, concealing, destroying, altering or falsifying with intent to mislead a judicial tribunal; penalty — https://legislation.nsw.gov.au/view/whole/html/inforce/current/act-1900-040
- Under Commonwealth law in Australia, section 39(1) of the Crimes Act 1914 provides that a person commits an offence if the person knows that a book, document or thing of any kind is, or may be, required in evidence in a judicial proceeding; and destroys the book, document or thing, or renders the book, document or thing illegible, undecipherable or incapable of identification; and does so with the intention of preventing the book, document or thing from being used in evidence; and the judicial proceeding is a federal judicial proceeding; the penalty stated is imprisonment for 5 years.
  Source: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.39(1) — destroying evidence: offence, elements and penalty (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026) — https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/3
- Under Commonwealth law in Australia, section 3LA(5) of the Crimes Act 1914 provides that a person commits an offence if the person is subject to an order under that section, the person is capable of complying with a requirement in the order, the person omits to do an act, and the omission contravenes the requirement; the penalty stated in that subsection is imprisonment for 5 years or 300 penalty units, or both.
  Source: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3LA(5) — penalty tier one (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026) — https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1
- Under Commonwealth law in Australia, section 3LA(6) of the Crimes Act 1914 provides that a person commits an offence if the person is subject to an order under that section, the person is capable of complying with a requirement in the order, the person omits to do an act, the omission contravenes the requirement, and the offence to which the relevant warrant relates is a serious offence or a serious terrorism offence; the penalty stated in that subsection is imprisonment for 10 years or 600 penalty units, or both.
  Source: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3LA(6) — offence elements and penalty tier two (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026) — https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1
- In a written answer to a question on notice taken at Senate Additional Budget Estimates (AE22-050; the document is headed 14 February 2022), the Australian Border Force said that if an individual refuses to comply with a request or provide a password for an examination of their electronic device, and an ABF officer considers there to be a risk to the border, the ABF officer is authorised to seize that device for further examination prior to being returned.
  Source: Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Additional Budget Estimates, ABF written answer AE22-050 (document headed 14 Feb 2022) — consequence of refusal — https://www.aph.gov.au/api/qon/downloadattachment?attachmentId=bd0902f9-1209-49d9-9c86-b6858c22020d
- Under United States federal law, 18 U.S.C. §2232(a) provides that whoever, “before, during, or after any search for or seizure of property by any person authorized to make such search or seizure”, knowingly destroys, damages, wastes, disposes of, transfers, or otherwise takes any action, or knowingly attempts to destroy, damage, waste, dispose of, transfer, or otherwise take any action, “for the purpose of preventing or impairing the Government’s lawful authority to take such property into its custody or control or to continue holding such property under its lawful custody and control”, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.
  Source: 18 U.S.C. §2232(a), Destruction or removal of property to prevent seizure (U.S. Code, 2024 edition) — https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2024-title18/html/USCODE-2024-title18-partI-chap109-sec2232.htm
- Under United States federal law, 18 U.S.C. §1519 provides that whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper administration of any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States or any case filed under title 11, or in relation to or contemplation of any such matter or case, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.
  Source: 18 U.S.C. §1519, Destruction, alteration, or falsification of records in Federal investigations and bankruptcy (U.S. Code, 2024 edition) — https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2024-title18/html/USCODE-2024-title18-partI-chap73-sec1519.htm
- Under United States federal law, 18 U.S.C. §1512(c)(1) provides that whoever corruptly alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document, or other object, or attempts to do so, with the intent to impair the object’s integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.
  Source: 18 U.S.C. §1512(c)(1) and the penalty clause that follows (c)(2), Tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant (U.S. Code, 2024 edition) — https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2024-title18/html/USCODE-2024-title18-partI-chap73-sec1512.htm
- CBP’s directive states that travelers are obligated to present electronic devices and the information contained therein in a condition that allows inspection of the device and its contents.
  Source: CBP Directive No. 3340-049B §5.3.1 (eff. 1 Jan 2026) — https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/2026-01/cbp_directive_3340-049b_jan_2026_508.pdf
- In United States v. Tunick, No. 1:25-cr-00499 (N.D. Ga.), the indictment (Doc. 1, filed 13 November 2025) alleges that, on or about January 24, 2025, in the Northern District of Georgia, the defendant, Samuel Tunick, “before and during the search for and seizure of property by Customs and Border Patrol Tactical Terrorism Response Team … did knowingly destroy, damage, waste, dispose of, and otherwise take any action to delete the digital contents of a Google Pixel cellular phone, for the purpose of preventing and impairing the Government’s lawful authority to take said property into its custody and control”, and cites Section 2232(a) of Title 18, the paragraph quoted citing no other provision; the indictment is an allegation, not a finding.
  Source: United States v. Tunick, No. 1:25-cr-00499 (N.D. Ga.), Doc. 1, INDICTMENT filed 13 Nov 2025, Count 1 (an allegation, not a finding; the quote keeps the document’s own spelling "Untied") — https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.gand.351975/gov.uscourts.gand.351975.1.0.pdf
- The CourtListener docket in United States v. Tunick, No. 1:25-cr-00499 (N.D. Ga.), as fetched on 14 October 2026, records at entry 8, dated 3 December 2025, that an initial appearance and arraignment were held as to Samuel Tunick and that a plea of not guilty was entered as to Count 1.
  Source: United States v. Tunick, No. 1:25-cr-00499 (N.D. Ga.), docket entry 8, 3 Dec 2025 (minute entry: arraignment; plea of not guilty entered as to Count 1), CourtListener docket as fetched 2026-10-14 — https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/71998357/united-states-v-tunick/
- The CourtListener docket in United States v. Tunick, No. 1:25-cr-00499 (N.D. Ga.), as fetched on 14 October 2026, records at entry 21, dated 17 March 2026, “MOTION to Suppress Evidence and Statements by Samuel Tunick.”, and at entry 31, dated 20 July 2026, that “The Court held an evidentiary hearing regarding Defendant’s 21 motion to suppress evidence and statements.”; entry 31 continues beyond the sentence quoted.
  Source: United States v. Tunick, No. 1:25-cr-00499 (N.D. Ga.), docket entries 21 (17 Mar 2026) and 31 (20 Jul 2026; the entry continues beyond the quoted sentence: hearing left open, briefing schedule later changed by entry 38), CourtListener docket as fetched 2026-10-14 — https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/71998357/united-states-v-tunick/
- The CourtListener docket in United States v. Tunick, No. 1:25-cr-00499 (N.D. Ga.), as fetched on 14 October 2026, records at entry 38, dated 18 September 2026, an order granting a motion for continuance of the post-hearing briefing schedule, and that the defendant’s opening brief shall be due October 19, 2026, the Government’s response shall be due November 9, 2026, and the defendant’s reply shall be due November 23, 2026.
  Source: United States v. Tunick, No. 1:25-cr-00499 (N.D. Ga.), docket entry 38, 18 Sep 2026 (order granting a continuance of the post-hearing briefing schedule), CourtListener docket as fetched 2026-10-14 — https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/71998357/united-states-v-tunick/
- On 24 July 2026, TechCrunch reported that the U.S. Justice Department is prosecuting an American for allegedly providing U.S. border authorities with a passcode that wiped the contents of his phone, according to an indictment and media reports; that prosecutors later charged Tunick under a federal statute that makes it unlawful to knowingly destroy or damage property to prevent authorities from seizing it; and that Tunick has pleaded not guilty.
  Source: TechCrunch, "US accuses American of allegedly wiping his phone using a ‘duress’ password during border search", 24 Jul 2026 — https://techcrunch.com/2026/07/24/us-accuses-american-of-allegedly-wiping-his-phone-using-a-duress-password-during-border-search/
- On 27 July 2026, MediaNama reported that the U.S. Department of Justice is prosecuting Samuel Tunick of Atlanta for allegedly providing border officers with a passcode that erased his phone’s data during a search, and that legal and security experts say this is the first known U.S. case involving the alleged use of a “duress” password.
  Source: MediaNama, "U.S. man prosecuted over alleged use of phone’s Duress password at border", 27 Jul 2026 (updated 30 Jul 2026) — https://www.medianama.com/2026/07/223-us-grapheneos-duress-password-case/
- On 9 August 2026, Fox News reported that Tunick pleaded not guilty; that the charge remains an allegation, and the court has not decided whether the government’s seizure was lawful; and that “Installing GrapheneOS or setting up a duress passcode is not the crime alleged in this case.”
  Source: Fox News, "Self-destructing phone code sparks federal case", 9 Aug 2026 — https://www.foxnews.com/tech/self-destructing-phone-code-sparks-federal-case
- On 30 July 2026, Decrypt reported that “Privacy software firm GrapheneOS has said its smartphone operating system is ‘completely legal’ and constitutionally protected, as the first U.S. prosecution involving one of its features moves through the courts”; that the project tweeted on July 27, “We have no obligation to weaken any of the security protections it provides,” adding that laws requiring it to do so “would be unconstitutional”; that “The statement came in a thread about the prosecution, after a user asked whether the project was refusing to cooperate with Homeland Security. GrapheneOS said it could not.”; and, in Decrypt’s words, “Once key material is wiped, ‘there’s nothing we can do to assist with it,’ it wrote”.
  Source: Decrypt, "'Completely Legal': GrapheneOS Pushes Back as Duress Password Case Proceeds", 30 Jul 2026 — https://decrypt.co/374705/completely-legal-grapheneos-pushes-back-as-duress-password-case-proceeds
- On 21 November 2025, Privacy Guides reported, in a report about France (outside the jurisdictions this site covers), that the GrapheneOS project “has announced on X that they are ceasing all operations in France”; that “While the operating system will still be available to French users, all website and discussion servers are being relocated to countries and providers outside France’s jurisdiction”; that, according to GrapheneOS, “law enforcement in France has repeatedly made media statements with ‘inaccurate and unsubstantiated claims’ about GrapheneOS”; and that “This decision was publicly initiated after negative press coverage from two articles published by Le Parisien”.
  Source: Privacy Guides, "GrapheneOS migrates server infrastructure from France amid police intimidation claims", 21 Nov 2025 (editor's note 28 Nov 2025) — https://www.privacyguides.org/news/2025/11/22/grapheneos-migrates-server-infrastructure-from-france-amid-police-intimidation-claims/
- On 3 July 2025, Notebookcheck reported, in a report about Catalonia, Spain (outside the jurisdictions this site covers), that “Cops in Catalonia, Spain, reportedly stay alert when they spot someone using a Google Pixel phone” and that, “Per the authorities in the region, Google’s smartphones are apparently go-to devices for organized crime groups, especially with GrapheneOS installed.”
  Source: Notebookcheck, "Catalan cops link Google Pixel phones to organized crime", 3 Jul 2025 — https://www.notebookcheck.net/Catalan-cops-link-Google-Pixel-phones-to-organized-crime.1050210.0.html
- On 30 October 2025, Android Authority reported of GrapheneOS that it is “also the same software that’s occasionally drawn attention from police agencies who associate it with criminal use, even though its biggest audience is privacy-minded users who simply want more control over their devices.”
  Source: Android Authority, "Cellebrite leak highlights how much more secure Pixel phones are with GrapheneOS", 30 Oct 2025 — https://www.androidauthority.com/cellebrite-leak-google-pixel-grapheneos-security-3611794/

## Compare: Can they take my phone?
England & Wales — They can: In England and Wales, under s.19 of PACE a constable who is lawfully on any premises may seize anything which is on the premises if he has reasonable grounds for believing that it is evidence in relation to an offence which he is investigating or any other offence, and that it is necessary to seize it in order to prevent the evidence being concealed, lost, altered or destroyed. — Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.19(3) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/19
  After an arrest at a place other than a police station, a constable also has power to search the arrested person for anything which might be evidence relating to an offence, subject to subsections (3) to (5) of s.32 — among them that he may not search under that power unless he has reasonable grounds for believing that the person to be searched may have concealed on him anything for which a search is permitted under that paragraph. Under s.32(9), a constable searching a person in the exercise of the power conferred by subsection (2)(a) may seize and retain anything he finds, other than an item subject to legal privilege, if he has reasonable grounds for believing that it is evidence of an offence or has been obtained in consequence of the commission of an offence.
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.32(1), (2)(a)(ii), (5) and (9) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/32
  The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, subject to the other provisions of its s.120, extends to England and Wales only.
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.120(1) (extent) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/120
Scotland — They can: In Scotland, s.47(1) of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2016 says that nothing in Part 1 affects any rule of law by virtue of which a constable may exercise a power of the type described in subsection (2) — a power exercised in relation to a person by reason of the person’s having been arrested and charged with an offence by a constable — and s.47(3) says powers of that type include the power to seize any item in the person’s possession. — Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2016, s.47(1), (2) and (3)(b) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/asp/2016/1/section/47
  The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, subject to the other provisions of its s.120, extends to England and Wales only.
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.120(1) (extent) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/120
Australia — They can: In Australia, under s.3F(1)(c)–(e) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), a warrant that is in force in relation to premises authorises the executing officer or a constable assisting to search the premises for the kinds of evidential material specified in the warrant, and to seize things of that kind found at the premises; to seize other things found at the premises in the course of the search that the executing officer or a constable assisting believes on reasonable grounds to be evidential material in relation to an offence to which the warrant relates, evidential material in relation to another offence that is an indictable offence, or evidential material (within the meaning of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002) or tainted property (within the meaning of that Act), if the executing officer or a constable assisting believes on reasonable grounds that seizure of the things is necessary to prevent their concealment, loss or destruction or their use in committing an offence; and to seize other things found at the premises in the course of the search that the executing officer or a constable assisting believes on reasonable grounds to be seizable items. — Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3F(1)(c)–(e) — search and seizure under a warrant in relation to premises (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026) — https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1
  Under s.3K(2) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), a thing found at warrant premises, or a thing found during a search under a warrant that is in force in relation to a person, may be moved to another place for examination or processing in order to determine whether the thing may be seized under a warrant, or the thing suggests the existence of a digital asset that may be seized under a warrant, if: both of the following apply — it is significantly more practicable to do so having regard to the timeliness and cost of examining or processing the thing at another place and the availability of expert assistance, and the executing officer or constable assisting suspects on reasonable grounds that the thing contains or constitutes evidential material or the thing suggests the existence of a digital asset that may be seized under a warrant; or, for a thing found at warrant premises, the occupier of the premises consents in writing; or, for a thing found during a search under a warrant that is in force in relation to a person, the person consents in writing.
  Source: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3K(2) — power to move a thing to another place for examination or processing (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026) — https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1
  Under s.3K(3A) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), the thing may be moved to another place for examination or processing for no longer than whichever of the following is applicable: if the thing is a computer or data storage device, 30 days; otherwise, 14 days.
  Source: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3K(3A) — time limit on moving a thing for examination or processing (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026) — https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1
  Under s.3K(3B)–(3D) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), an executing officer may apply to an issuing officer for one or more extensions of that time if the executing officer believes on reasonable grounds that the thing cannot be examined or processed within the time applicable under subsection (3A) or that time as previously extended; the executing officer must give notice of the application to the person referred to in paragraph (2)(b) or (c) (as the case requires), and that person is entitled to be heard in relation to the application; and a single extension cannot exceed whichever of the following is applicable: if the thing is a computer or data storage device, 14 days; otherwise, 7 days.
  Source: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3K(3B)–(3D) — extensions of the examination time limit (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026) — https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1
United States — They can: In the United States, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(e)(2)(B) says that a warrant under Rule 41(e)(2)(A) may authorize the seizure of electronic storage media or the seizure or copying of electronically stored information, and that unless otherwise specified the warrant authorizes a later review of the media or information consistent with the warrant. — Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e)(2)(B) — https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcrmp/rule_41
  In Riley v. California, the Supreme Court’s answer to the question of what police must do before searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest was “accordingly simple—get a warrant.”
  Source: Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014) — https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/13-132

## Compare: Must I give them the passcode?
England & Wales — Must — refusing is an offence: In England and Wales, a person to whom a section 49 notice under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 has been given is guilty of an offence under s.53(1) if they knowingly fail, in accordance with the notice, to make the disclosure required by virtue of the giving of the notice. — Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, s.53(1) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/section/53
  Schedule 2 to the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 says that, subject to the other provisions of that Schedule, a person has the appropriate permission in relation to any protected information if, and only if, written permission for the giving of section 49 notices in relation to that information has been granted — in England and Wales, by a Circuit judge.
  Source: Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, Sch.2 para 1(1) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/schedule/2
  Paragraph 4 of that Schedule applies to protected information falling within section 49(1)(a), (b) or (c) which is not information in the case of which paragraph 2 or 3 applies; paragraph 4(2) says that, subject to paragraph 6, where the statutory power was exercised, or is likely to be exercised, by the police, the police have the appropriate permission in relation to the protected information, without any grant of permission under paragraph 1.
  Source: Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, Sch.2 para 4(1)(a) and (2) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/schedule/2
  Paragraph 2 of that Schedule applies in the case of protected information falling within section 49(1)(a), (b) or (c) where the statutory power in question is one exercised, or to be exercised, in accordance with a warrant issued by the Secretary of State or a person holding judicial office, an authorisation under Part III of the Police Act 1997 (authorisation of otherwise unlawful action in respect of property), or a targeted equipment interference warrant issued under section 106 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (powers of law enforcement chiefs to issue warrants to law enforcement officers); and, subject to sub-paragraphs (3) to (5) and paragraph 6(1), a person has the appropriate permission in relation to that protected information (without any grant of permission under paragraph 1) if the warrant or, as the case may be, the authorisation contained the relevant authority’s permission for the giving of section 49 notices in relation to protected information to be obtained under the warrant or authorisation, or, since the issue of the warrant or authorisation, written permission has been granted by the relevant authority for the giving of such notices in relation to protected information obtained under the warrant or authorisation. Paragraph 2(9) says that protected information that comes into a person’s possession by means of the exercise of any statutory power which is exercisable without a warrant, but is so exercisable in the course of, or in connection with, the exercise of another statutory power for which a warrant is required, shall not be taken, by reason only of the warrant required for the exercise of that other statutory power, to be information in the case of which paragraph 2 applies.
  Source: Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, Sch.2 para 2(1), (2) and (9) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/schedule/2
  Paragraph 6(2) of that Schedule says that, subject to sub-paragraph (3), a constable does not by virtue of paragraph 1, 4 or 5 have the appropriate permission in relation to any protected information unless he is of or above the rank of superintendent, or permission to give a section 49 notice in relation to that information has been granted by a person holding the rank of superintendent, or any higher rank.
  Source: Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, Sch.2 para 6(2) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/schedule/2
  A notice under s.49 imposing a disclosure requirement in respect of any protected information must be given in writing or (if not in writing) must be given in a manner that produces a record of its having been given.
  Source: Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, s.49(4)(a) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/section/49
Scotland — Must — refusing is an offence: In Scotland, a person to whom a section 49 notice under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 has been given is guilty of an offence under s.53(1) if they knowingly fail, in accordance with the notice, to make the disclosure required by virtue of the giving of the notice. — Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, s.53(1) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/section/53
  Schedule 2 to the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 says that, subject to the other provisions of that Schedule, a person has the appropriate permission in relation to any protected information if, and only if, written permission for the giving of section 49 notices in relation to that information has been granted — in Scotland, by a sheriff.
  Source: Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, Sch.2 para 1(1) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/schedule/2
  Paragraph 4 of that Schedule applies to protected information falling within section 49(1)(a), (b) or (c) which is not information in the case of which paragraph 2 or 3 applies; paragraph 4(2) says that, subject to paragraph 6, where the statutory power was exercised, or is likely to be exercised, by the police, the police have the appropriate permission in relation to the protected information, without any grant of permission under paragraph 1.
  Source: Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, Sch.2 para 4(1)(a) and (2) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/schedule/2
  Paragraph 2 of that Schedule applies in the case of protected information falling within section 49(1)(a), (b) or (c) where the statutory power in question is one exercised, or to be exercised, in accordance with a warrant issued by the Secretary of State or a person holding judicial office, an authorisation under Part III of the Police Act 1997 (authorisation of otherwise unlawful action in respect of property), or a targeted equipment interference warrant issued under section 106 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (powers of law enforcement chiefs to issue warrants to law enforcement officers); and, subject to sub-paragraphs (3) to (5) and paragraph 6(1), a person has the appropriate permission in relation to that protected information (without any grant of permission under paragraph 1) if the warrant or, as the case may be, the authorisation contained the relevant authority’s permission for the giving of section 49 notices in relation to protected information to be obtained under the warrant or authorisation, or, since the issue of the warrant or authorisation, written permission has been granted by the relevant authority for the giving of such notices in relation to protected information obtained under the warrant or authorisation. Paragraph 2(9) says that protected information that comes into a person’s possession by means of the exercise of any statutory power which is exercisable without a warrant, but is so exercisable in the course of, or in connection with, the exercise of another statutory power for which a warrant is required, shall not be taken, by reason only of the warrant required for the exercise of that other statutory power, to be information in the case of which paragraph 2 applies.
  Source: Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, Sch.2 para 2(1), (2) and (9) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/schedule/2
  Paragraph 6(2) of that Schedule says that, subject to sub-paragraph (3), a constable does not by virtue of paragraph 1, 4 or 5 have the appropriate permission in relation to any protected information unless he is of or above the rank of superintendent, or permission to give a section 49 notice in relation to that information has been granted by a person holding the rank of superintendent, or any higher rank.
  Source: Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, Sch.2 para 6(2) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/schedule/2
  A notice under s.49 imposing a disclosure requirement in respect of any protected information must be given in writing or (if not in writing) must be given in a manner that produces a record of its having been given.
  Source: Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, s.49(4)(a) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/section/49
Australia — Must — refusing is an offence: In Australia, under s.3LA(5) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), a person commits an offence if the person is subject to an order under that section, is capable of complying with a requirement in the order, and omits to do an act, and the omission contravenes the requirement; the penalty stated is imprisonment for 5 years or 300 penalty units, or both. — Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3LA(5) — penalty tier one (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026) — https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1
  Under s.3LA(6) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), a person commits an offence if the person is subject to an order under that section, is capable of complying with a requirement in the order, and omits to do an act, and the omission contravenes the requirement, and the offence to which the relevant warrant relates is a serious offence or a serious terrorism offence; the penalty stated is imprisonment for 10 years or 600 penalty units, or both.
  Source: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3LA(6) — offence elements and penalty tier two (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026) — https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1
  Under s.3LA(1) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), a constable may apply to a magistrate for an order requiring a specified person to provide any information or assistance that is reasonable and necessary to allow a constable to do one or more of a listed set of things, which include accessing data held in, or accessible from, a computer or data storage device, provided the computer or storage device is on warrant premises, was found in the course of an ordinary search or a frisk search authorised by a warrant under s.3E, has been moved under s.3K(2) and is at a place for examination or processing, or has been seized under that Division.
  Source: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3LA(1) — order power (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026) — https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1
  In New South Wales, a specified person for a digital evidence access order must not, without reasonable excuse, fail to comply with a direction given, in accordance with the order, by the executing officer for the order; the maximum penalty is 100 penalty units or imprisonment for 5 years, or both.
  Source: Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW), s.76AO(1) — failure to comply, offence and maximum penalty — https://legislation.nsw.gov.au/view/whole/html/inforce/current/act-2002-103
  In New South Wales, s.76AO(2) says that, without limiting subsection (1), it is not a reasonable excuse for a specified person for a digital evidence access order to fail to comply with the order or a requirement made in accordance with the order on the ground that complying with the order or the requirement would tend to incriminate the person or otherwise expose the person to a penalty.
  Source: Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW), s.76AO(1)–(2) — failure to comply, and self-incrimination is not a reasonable excuse — https://legislation.nsw.gov.au/view/whole/html/inforce/current/act-2002-103
  In Queensland, s.205A(1) of the Criminal Code says that a person who, without reasonable excuse, contravenes an order made under the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000, section 154(1) or (2), 154A(2) or 178A(1), or an order made under the Crime and Corruption Act 2001, section 88A(1) or (2) or 88B(2), commits a crime, with a maximum penalty of 5 years imprisonment.
  Source: Criminal Code (Qld), s.205A(1) — contravening a device information order, offence and penalty (current as at 1 June 2026) — https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/view/pdf/inforce/current/act-1899-009
  In Queensland, s.205A(2) of the Criminal Code says that it is not a reasonable excuse to contravene an order made under the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000, section 154(1) or (2), 154A(2) or 178A(1), or an order made under the Crime and Corruption Act 2001, section 88A(1) or (2) or 88B(2), on the basis that complying with the order might tend to incriminate the person or expose the person to a penalty.
  Source: Criminal Code (Qld), s.205A(1)–(2) — the offence, and self-incrimination as no reasonable excuse (current as at 1 June 2026) — https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/view/pdf/inforce/current/act-1899-009
  In Victoria, under s.465AA(9) of the Crimes Act 1958, a person commits an offence if the person has relevant knowledge of the computer or data storage device or a computer network of which it forms or formed a part, or of measures applied to protect data held in, or accessible from, it; the person is informed by a police officer of the order and its terms and that it is an indictable offence punishable by imprisonment to fail to comply with the order; and the person fails to comply with the order without reasonable excuse.
  Source: Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), s.465AA(9) — offence, Authorised Version No. 323 — https://content.legislation.vic.gov.au/sites/default/files/2026-10/58-6231aa323-authorised.pdf
  In Victoria, s.465AA(6) of the Crimes Act 1958 says a person is not excused from complying with an order on the ground that complying with it may result in information being provided that might incriminate the person.
  Source: Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), s.465AA(6) and (9)(c) — self-incrimination is no ground for non-compliance; the offence, Authorised Version No. 323 — https://content.legislation.vic.gov.au/sites/default/files/2026-10/58-6231aa323-authorised.pdf
United States — Unsettled: In the United States, in State v. Andrews (2020) the Supreme Court of New Jersey said that, although the United States Supreme Court had considered the application of the foregone conclusion exception only in the context of document production, courts in other jurisdictions had grappled with the applicability of the exception beyond that context, and many had considered whether the exception applies to compelled decryption or to the compelled production of passcodes and passwords, reaching divergent results; among other causes for that divergence, it said, was a dispute over how to adapt the foregone conclusion analysis from the document-production context, which involves the act of producing the document and the contents of the document, to the context of passcode production, which involves the act of producing the passcode that protects the contents of the electronic device. — State v. Andrews, 234 A.3d 1254 (N.J. Aug. 10, 2020), opinion of the Court (Solomon, J.), Part III.B.3 (the court's description of other courts' decisions, not its holding) — https://www.njcourts.gov/system/files/court-opinions/2020/a_72_18.pdf
  In Utah, in State v. Valdez (2023), the Supreme Court of Utah held that verbally providing a cell phone passcode to law enforcement is testimonial for Fifth Amendment purposes, that because the disclosure of a passcode involves traditional oral testimony the act-of-production analysis urged by the State does not apply, and that for the same reasons the foregone conclusion exception is inapplicable.
  Source: State v. Valdez, 2023 UT 26, 552 P.3d 159 (Utah Dec. 14, 2023), ¶ 73, opinion of the Court (holding) — http://www.utcourts.gov/opinions/supopin/State%20v.%20Valdez20231214.pdf
  In Utah, in Valdez, the court said that the questions about how the Fifth Amendment extends to law enforcement’s efforts to unlock seized devices and decrypt their contents had proven to be especially complex where law enforcement attempts to access the contents of a seized device by means that do not require the suspect to disclose the actual passcode, such as obtaining an order to compel the suspect to provide an unlocked device; it said that was not the situation before it, because law enforcement asked Valdez to verbally provide his passcode.
  Source: State v. Valdez, 2023 UT 26 (Utah Dec. 14, 2023), ¶¶ 7–8, opinion of the Court (the court's description of what the case did not involve) — http://www.utcourts.gov/opinions/supopin/State%20v.%20Valdez20231214.pdf
  In Indiana, in Seo v. State (2020), the Supreme Court of Indiana held that the compelled production of an unlocked smartphone is testimonial and entitled to Fifth Amendment protection unless the State demonstrates that the foregone conclusion exception applies, and that in that case the State had failed to make that showing.
  Source: Seo v. State, 148 N.E.3d 952 (Ind. June 23, 2020), slip op. at 5, opinion of the Court (holding) (CourtListener copy of the court's opinion) — https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2020/06/23/katelin_eunjoo_seo_v._state_of_indiana.pdf
  In Pennsylvania, in Commonwealth v. Davis (2019), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania considered whether a defendant may be compelled to disclose a password to allow the Commonwealth access to the defendant’s lawfully-seized, but encrypted, computer; it found that such compulsion is violative of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution’s prohibition against self-incrimination, and held that the compelled recollection of the appellant’s password is testimonial in nature and, consequently, privileged under the Fifth Amendment.
  Source: Commonwealth v. Davis, 220 A.3d 534 (Pa. Nov. 20, 2019), opinion of the Court (Todd, J.), slip op. at 1 and 24 (holding; the password to a computer) — https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Supreme/out/J-42-2019mo%20-%2010422940787775633.pdf
  In New Jersey, in Andrews, the Supreme Court of New Jersey considered whether a court order requiring a criminal defendant to disclose the passcodes to his passcode-protected cellphones violates the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution or New Jersey’s common law or statutory protections against self-incrimination; it concluded that it does not and affirmed the Appellate Division’s judgment.
  Source: State v. Andrews, 234 A.3d 1254 (N.J. Aug. 10, 2020), opinion of the Court (Solomon, J.), opening paragraph (holding) — https://www.njcourts.gov/system/files/court-opinions/2020/a_72_18.pdf
  In Illinois, in People v. Sneed (2023), the Supreme Court of Illinois concluded that compelling the act of producing the passcode to a cell phone by entering it into the phone is testimonial to the extent that performing the act of entering the passcode implicitly asserts that the person entering it has the ability to unlock the phone; that the foregone conclusion test is applicable in the context of the compelled production of cell phone passcodes; that in applying the test in this context the proper focus is on the passcode itself rather than on the contents of the phone; and that the foregone conclusion doctrine applies as an exception to the fifth amendment privilege in that case. It said that because the State’s motion to compel sought an order for the defendant to either enter the passcode or provide it to officers, compliance with the order would not require the defendant to disclose the passcode, and that it need not consider whether disclosing the passcode is sufficiently testimonial to be privileged where entering the passcode would not be.
  Source: People v. Sneed, 2023 IL 127968, 230 N.E.3d 97 (Ill. June 15, 2023), ¶ 3, ¶ 115 and n.7 (attached to ¶ 113), opinion of the Court (holding) — https://www.illinoiscourts.gov/resources/eeff3005-c65c-4cc5-a95f-5cf2a201175f/file
  In Massachusetts, in Commonwealth v. Jones (2019), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts concluded that when the Commonwealth seeks an order pursuant to its decision in Gelfgatt compelling a defendant to decrypt an electronic device by entering a password, art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights requires the Commonwealth to prove that the defendant knows the password beyond a reasonable doubt for the foregone conclusion exception to apply, and that the Commonwealth met its burden in that case.
  Source: Commonwealth v. Jones, 481 Mass. 540, 117 N.E.3d 702 (Mass. Mar. 6, 2019), slip op. at 2-4, opinion of the Court (Kafker, J.) (holding under art. 12) (archived copy of the court’s slip opinion) — https://web.archive.org/web/20190315055659id_/https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2019/03/06/12564.pdf
  In Oregon, in State v. Pittman (2021), the Supreme Court of Oregon, “faced with the circumstances and law as they presently exist,” construed Article I, section 12 of the Oregon Constitution to permit an order compelling a defendant to unlock a cell phone so long as the state (1) has a valid warrant authorizing it to seize and search the phone; (2) already knows the information that the act of unlocking the phone, by itself, would communicate; and (3) is prohibited from using the defendant’s act against the defendant, except to obtain access to the contents of the phone; it said those circumstances were not present in that case, and reversed.
  Source: State v. Pittman, 367 Or. 498, 479 P.3d 1028 (Or. Jan. 28, 2021), opinion of the Court (Walters, C.J.), 367 Or. at 525 and 534 (the requirements and the disposition) — https://ojd.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/api/collection/p17027coll3/id/9369/download
  In Oregon, in Pittman, the court said that, because it concluded that the trial court’s order violated Article I, section 12 of the Oregon Constitution, it did not reach the defendant’s Fifth Amendment argument.
  Source: State v. Pittman, 367 Or. 498, 479 P.3d 1028 (Or. Jan. 28, 2021), opinion of the Court (Walters, C.J.), 367 Or. at 508 (the constitutional ground) — https://ojd.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/api/collection/p17027coll3/id/9369/download
  In Utah, in Valdez (14 December 2023), the Supreme Court of Utah said that the United States Supreme Court had not yet addressed this specific question — whether an accused has a Fifth Amendment right not to disclose a passcode to an electronic device when law enforcement has a valid warrant to search the device, which it called a question of first impression for that court — so it analyzed existing Fifth Amendment precedent to determine how it should extend to this new factual context.
  Source: State v. Valdez, 2023 UT 26 (Utah Dec. 14, 2023), ¶ 6, opinion of the Court (the court's statement as of its decision date) — http://www.utcourts.gov/opinions/supopin/State%20v.%20Valdez20231214.pdf
  In the D.C. Circuit, in United States v. Brown (17 January 2025), the court said that if Schwartz had instead been compelled to disclose whether he could open the phone, and made to say yes or to verbally disclose the password, those answers unquestionably would be testimonial communications; this is a statement about a situation that case did not involve.
  Source: United States v. Brown, No. 23-3074 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 17, 2025), slip op. 25–26 — https://media.cadc.uscourts.gov/opinions/docs/2025/01/23-3074-2094718.pdf

## Compare: Can they use my face or fingerprint?
England & Wales — Must — refusing is an offence: Under Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000, a person commits an offence if they wilfully fail to comply with a duty imposed under or by virtue of that Schedule, wilfully contravene a prohibition imposed under or by virtue of that Schedule, or wilfully obstruct, or seek to frustrate, a search or examination under or by virtue of that Schedule. — Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 18(1) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/schedule/7/paragraph/18
  The Schedule 7 Code of Practice (October 2025), at para 61, says the person must provide access to any electronic device to allow for a search to be undertaken, including where access to a device requires the person to unlock a device through application of their thumb or finger, or any other form of access control.
  Source: Schedule 7 (Terrorism Act 2000) Code of Practice (Oct 2025), para 61 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68e7b52b187483de54d766d2/Schedule+7+Code+of+Practice.pdf
Scotland — Must — refusing is an offence: Under Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000, a person commits an offence if they wilfully fail to comply with a duty imposed under or by virtue of that Schedule, wilfully contravene a prohibition imposed under or by virtue of that Schedule, or wilfully obstruct, or seek to frustrate, a search or examination under or by virtue of that Schedule. — Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 18(1) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/schedule/7/paragraph/18
  Section 130(1) of the Terrorism Act 2000 says that, subject to subsections (2) to (6) of that section, the Act extends to the whole of the United Kingdom.
  Source: Terrorism Act 2000, s.130(1) (extent) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/section/130
  The Schedule 7 Code of Practice (October 2025), at para 61, says the person must provide access to any electronic device to allow for a search to be undertaken, including where access to a device requires the person to unlock a device through application of their thumb or finger, or any other form of access control.
  Source: Schedule 7 (Terrorism Act 2000) Code of Practice (Oct 2025), para 61 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68e7b52b187483de54d766d2/Schedule+7+Code+of+Practice.pdf
Australia — They can: In New South Wales, s.76AM(1) of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 says the executing officer for a digital evidence access order may direct the specified person to give the officer any information or assistance reasonable and necessary to enable the officer to access data held in or accessible from a computer specified in, or within the scope of, the order; s.76AM(2) says that, without limiting subsection (1), the executing officer may require the specified person to provide reasonable and necessary assistance in accessing data on a computer that is secured by biometric means, including, for example, fingerprints or retina scans. — Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW), s.76AM(1) and (2) — direction to give information or assistance, including in accessing data secured by biometric means — https://legislation.nsw.gov.au/view/whole/html/inforce/current/act-2002-103
  In New South Wales, s.76AM(2B) says that the executing officer must not direct a specified person who is less than 18 years of age unless reasonable steps are taken to have a suitable person present to represent the interests of the specified person while the specified person is directed.
  Source: Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW), s.76AM(2B) — direction to a specified person under 18 years of age — https://legislation.nsw.gov.au/view/whole/html/inforce/current/act-2002-103
  In New South Wales, s.76AM(3) says that, to avoid doubt, information provided by a specified person under subsection (1) to access data held in or accessible from a computer may be used only for that purpose and no other purpose, and that the section is subject to any other provision of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 or another Act that provides for how a police officer may take particulars that are necessary to identify a person.
  Source: Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW), s.76AM(3) — information used only for access; section subject to identification-particulars provisions — https://legislation.nsw.gov.au/view/whole/html/inforce/current/act-2002-103
  In New South Wales, s.76AO(1) says that a specified person for a digital evidence access order must not, without reasonable excuse, fail to comply with a direction given, in accordance with the order, by the executing officer for the order; the maximum penalty is 100 penalty units or imprisonment for 5 years, or both.
  Source: Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW), s.76AO(1) — failure to comply, offence and maximum penalty — https://legislation.nsw.gov.au/view/whole/html/inforce/current/act-2002-103
  In New South Wales, s.76AO(2) says that, without limiting subsection (1), it is not a reasonable excuse for a specified person for a digital evidence access order to fail to comply with the order or a requirement made in accordance with the order on the ground that complying with the order or the requirement would tend to incriminate the person or otherwise expose the person to a penalty.
  Source: Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW), s.76AO(1)–(2) — failure to comply, and self-incrimination is not a reasonable excuse — https://legislation.nsw.gov.au/view/whole/html/inforce/current/act-2002-103
United States — Unsettled: In the United States, in United States v. Payne (2024) the Ninth Circuit held that the compelled use of Payne’s thumb to unlock his phone (which he had already identified for the officers) required no cognitive exertion, placing it firmly in the same category as a blood draw or fingerprint taken at booking, and that the use of his thumb was not a testimonial act and the Fifth Amendment did not apply; the court added that its opinion should not be read to extend to all instances where a biometric is used to unlock an electronic device. — United States v. Payne, 99 F.4th 495 (9th Cir. 2024) — https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2024/04/17/22-50262.pdf
  In Payne the Ninth Circuit said that district courts applying Doe and Hubbell have arrived at different conclusions on the biometric unlock question.
  Source: United States v. Payne, 99 F.4th 495 (9th Cir. 2024) — https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2024/04/17/22-50262.pdf
  In Payne, the opinion says Officer Coddington forcibly grabbed Payne’s thumb and used it to unlock the phone via a built-in biometric unlocking feature.
  Source: United States v. Payne, 99 F.4th 495 (9th Cir. 2024) — https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2024/04/17/22-50262.pdf
  A footnote in Payne says that whether the officer forcibly used Payne’s thumb to unlock the phone or Payne “reluctantly unlocked the cell phone using his thumb print” was disputed before the district court, and that for the purposes of the appeal the government accepted the defendant’s version of the facts, “that defendant’s thumbprint was compelled.”
  Source: United States v. Payne, 99 F.4th 495 (9th Cir. 2024), n.2 — https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2024/04/17/22-50262.pdf
  In United States v. Brown (D.C. Cir., 17 January 2025), the court held that, in compelling Schwartz to unlock his cellphone, law enforcement violated the Fifth Amendment.
  Source: United States v. Brown, No. 23-3074 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 17, 2025) — https://media.cadc.uscourts.gov/opinions/docs/2025/01/23-3074-2094718.pdf
  In Brown, the court said the record reveals that an FBI agent ordered Schwartz to open the cellphone, and Schwartz complied by placing his thumb on the cellphone.
  Source: United States v. Brown, No. 23-3074 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 17, 2025) — https://media.cadc.uscourts.gov/opinions/docs/2025/01/23-3074-2094718.pdf
  A footnote in Brown says: “This holding is consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Payne.” It explains: “In that case, instead of instructing the defendant to open his phone, as the FBI instructed Schwartz to do, the police ‘forcibly grabbed Payne’s thumb and used it to unlock the phone.’” It quotes Payne’s statement that “the outcome on the testimonial prong may have been different” had the officer “required Payne to independently select the finger that he placed on the phone,” and adds: “That is this case.”
  Source: United States v. Brown, No. 23-3074 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 17, 2025), n.2 — https://media.cadc.uscourts.gov/opinions/docs/2025/01/23-3074-2094718.pdf
  Payne says it mentions such possibilities “not to opine on the right result.”
  Source: United States v. Payne, 99 F.4th 495 (9th Cir. 2024) — https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2024/04/17/22-50262.pdf

## Compare: Do they need a warrant?
England & Wales — A limit applies: In England and Wales, under s.8(1) of PACE, if on an application made by a constable a justice of the peace is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that an indictable offence has been committed, that there is material on premises mentioned in subsection (1A) which is likely to be of substantial value to the investigation of the offence, that the material is likely to be relevant evidence, that it does not consist of or include items subject to legal privilege, excluded material or special procedure material, and that any of the conditions specified in subsection (3) applies, he may issue a warrant authorising a constable to enter and search the premises. — Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.8(1) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/8
  Section 113(3)(b) of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 says that, in s.8(1) of the 1984 Act, in paragraph (e), at the end, the words “in relation to each set of premises specified in the application” are added.
  Source: Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005, s.113(1), (2) and (3)(b) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2005/15/section/113
  Under s.16(3) of PACE, entry and search under a warrant must be within three months from the date of its issue.
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.16(3) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/16
  PACE Code B, para 7.6, says that if an officer considers information stored in any electronic form and accessible from the premises could be used in evidence, they may require the information to be produced in a form which can be taken away and in which it is visible and legible, or from which it can readily be produced in a visible and legible form.
  Source: PACE Code B (2023), para 7.6 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/65804a3a83ba380013e1b769/PACE+Code+B+2023.pdf
  The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, subject to the other provisions of its s.120, extends to England and Wales only.
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.120(1) (extent) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/120
Australia — A limit applies: In Australia, under s.3E(1) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), an issuing officer may issue a warrant to search premises if the officer is satisfied, by information on oath or affirmation, that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that there is, or there will be within the next 72 hours, any evidential material at the premises. — Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3E(1) — when a search warrant can be issued (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026) — https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1
United States — A limit applies: In the United States, in Riley v. California the Supreme Court’s answer to the question of what police must do before searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest was “accordingly simple—get a warrant.” — Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014) — https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/13-132
  In the same opinion the Court said that other case-specific exceptions may still justify a warrantless search of a particular phone, and that the exigent circumstances exception requires a court to examine whether an emergency justified a warrantless search in each particular case.
  Source: Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014) — https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/13-132

## Compare: What can they actually get?
England & Wales — A report says: In England and Wales, the Information Commissioner’s Office’s June 2020 report on mobile phone data extraction by police forces said that police data extraction practices vary across the country, with excessive amounts of personal data often being extracted, stored, and made available to others, without an appropriate basis in existing data protection law. — ICO, Mobile phone data extraction by police forces in England and Wales (June 2020) — https://ico.org.uk/media2/migrated/2617838/ico-report-on-mpe-in-england-and-wales-v1_1.pdf
Scotland — Agency says: a limit applies: In Scotland, Police Scotland’s cyber kiosks page says it will only examine a digital device where there is a legal basis and where it is necessary, justified and proportionate to the incident or crime under investigation. — Police Scotland, "Cyber kiosks" — legal basis — https://www.scotland.police.uk/about-us/what-we-do/specialist-crime-division/cybercrime-investigations-and-digital-forensics/cyber-kiosks/
Australia — They can: In Australia, s.186A(1) of the Customs Act 1901 (Cth) says that if a document is examined under section 186 or 186AA and, as a result of that examination, an officer of Customs is satisfied that the document or part of the document may contain information relevant to an importation or exportation, or a proposed importation or exportation, of prohibited goods, the commission or attempted commission of any other offence against that Act or of any offence against a prescribed Act, the performance of functions under section 17 of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 or section 6 of the Intelligence Services Act 2001, or security (within the meaning of section 4 of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979), the officer of Customs may make a copy of, or take an extract from, the document, or arrange for another officer of Customs or other person having the necessary experience to make such a copy or take such an extract. — Customs Act 1901 (Cth), s.186A(1) — power to copy documents and data (Compilation No. 193, 19 Sep 2026) — https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1901A00006/2026-09-19/2026-09-19/text/original/pdf/3
United States — A report says: In the United States, Upturn’s October 2020 report “Mass Extraction” says that law enforcement agencies use mobile device forensic tools (MDFTs), a powerful technology that allows police to extract a full copy of data from a cellphone, and that, based on 110 public records requests to state and local law enforcement agencies across the country, its research documents more than 2,000 agencies that have purchased these tools, in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. — Upturn, "Mass Extraction", October 2020 — https://www.upturn.org/work/mass-extraction/

## Compare: How long can they keep it — or the data?
England & Wales — They can: In England and Wales, under s.22(1) of PACE, subject to subsection (4), anything which has been seized by a constable, or taken away by a constable following a requirement made by virtue of section 19 or 20, may be retained so long as is necessary in all the circumstances. — Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.22(1) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/22
  Under s.22(4) of PACE, nothing may be retained for either of the purposes mentioned in subsection (2)(a) if a photograph or copy would be sufficient for that purpose.
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.22(4) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/22
  Under the Data Protection Act 2018, personal data processed for any of the law enforcement purposes must be kept for no longer than is necessary for the purpose for which it is processed.
  Source: Data Protection Act 2018, s.39(1) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2018/12/section/39
  The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, subject to the other provisions of its s.120, extends to England and Wales only.
  Source: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.120(1) (extent) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/120
Scotland — Agency says: a limit applies: In Scotland, Police Scotland’s cyber kiosks page says that all information is securely deleted from the cyber kiosk at the end of each examination. — Police Scotland, "Cyber kiosks" — no persistent storage — https://www.scotland.police.uk/about-us/what-we-do/specialist-crime-division/cybercrime-investigations-and-digital-forensics/cyber-kiosks/
Australia — Agency says: a limit applies: In Australia, the Australian Border Force’s written answer AE22-050 to a question taken on notice at the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs’ Additional Budget Estimates hearing of 14 February 2022 said that current ABF policy was to retain electronic devices held for examination for no longer than 14 days, unless it was reasonable that the examination would take longer or content was located on the device that rendered the device subject to seizure. — Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Additional Budget Estimates, ABF written answer AE22-050 (document headed 14 Feb 2022) — retention policy — https://www.aph.gov.au/api/qon/downloadattachment?attachmentId=bd0902f9-1209-49d9-9c86-b6858c22020d
  In the same answer, the Australian Border Force said that it has powers under the Customs Act 1901 (Customs Act), the Migration Act 1958 (Migration Act) and the Maritime Powers Act 2013 (Maritime Powers Act) to examine and copy electronic devices which includes mobile phones, computers and removable storage devices such as USB drives, and that “None of the aforementioned legislation provide a time limit for the retention of goods subject to examination.”
  Source: Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Additional Budget Estimates, ABF written answer AE22-050 (document headed 14 Feb 2022) — no statutory time limit on retention — https://www.aph.gov.au/api/qon/downloadattachment?attachmentId=bd0902f9-1209-49d9-9c86-b6858c22020d
  Separately from the ABF’s policy, under a Commonwealth search warrant (Crimes Act 1914), s.3K(3A) says that a thing may be moved to another place for examination or processing for no longer than whichever of the following is applicable: if the thing is a computer or data storage device, 30 days; otherwise, 14 days. That period is stated for a thing moved under s.3K(2); the provision quoted does not state a period for a thing seized.
  Source: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3K(3A) — time limit on moving a thing for examination or processing (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026) — https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1
  Separately from the ABF’s policy, under a Commonwealth search warrant (Crimes Act 1914), s.3K(3B)–(3D) says that an executing officer may apply to an issuing officer for one or more extensions of that time if the executing officer believes on reasonable grounds that the thing cannot be examined or processed within the time applicable under subsection (3A) or that time as previously extended; the executing officer must give notice of the application to the person referred to in paragraph (2)(b) or (c) (as the case requires), and that person is entitled to be heard in relation to the application; and a single extension cannot exceed whichever of the following is applicable: if the thing is a computer or data storage device, 14 days; otherwise, 7 days.
  Source: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3K(3B)–(3D) — extensions of the examination time limit (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026) — https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1
United States — Agency says: a limit applies: In the United States, CBP Directive 3340-049B says that, following the completion of the border search, CBP will retain no copies of the information from an electronic device beyond twenty-one (21) calendar days following the conclusion of the border search unless retention is permissible or required consistent with sections 5.6.1, 5.6.2, or 5.6.3. Section 5.6.1 says that CBP may retain copies of information from an electronic device when, based on a review of the information encountered or on other facts and circumstances, they determine there is probable cause to believe the information contains digital contraband or evidence of a violation of law that CBP is authorized to enforce or administer, subject to the requirements and limitations provided in the directive and applicable law. Section 5.6.2 says that, without probable cause, CBP may retain only information from the border search of an electronic device relating to immigration, customs, and other enforcement matters if such retention is consistent with the applicable system of records notice and subject to the requirements and limitations provided in the directive and applicable law. — CBP Directive No. 3340-049B §§5.6.1, 5.6.2, 5.6.4 (eff. 1 Jan 2026) — https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/2026-01/cbp_directive_3340-049b_jan_2026_508.pdf
  The same directive says it is an internal policy statement of CBP and does not create or confer any rights, privileges, or benefits on any person or party.
  Source: CBP Directive No. 3340-049B §8.1 (eff. 1 Jan 2026) — https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/2026-01/cbp_directive_3340-049b_jan_2026_508.pdf

## Compare: Can I get it back, or get the data deleted?
England & Wales — A limit applies: The Code of Practice on extraction of information from electronic devices says it only applies as regards the powers in Chapter 3 of Part 2 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 (‘the Act’), and that information which is extracted and deemed not relevant must be deleted unless there is a lawful basis to retain it. — Extraction of Information from Electronic Devices: Code of Practice (Oct 2022), paras 1, 4 and 138 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/634810a38fa8f53463dcb957/E02802691_Electronic_Devices_Code_of_Practice_WEB.pdf
  The same Code says it “only applies as regards the powers in Chapter 3 of Part 2 of the Act” (the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022) and that “If another power is being used as the basis for extracting information from an electronic device, the guidance/code for that power will apply.”
  Source: Extraction of Information from Electronic Devices: Code of Practice (Oct 2022), para 4 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/634810a38fa8f53463dcb957/E02802691_Electronic_Devices_Code_of_Practice_WEB.pdf
  Under s.59(2) of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, any person with a relevant interest in the seized property may apply to the appropriate judicial authority, on one or more of the grounds mentioned in subsection (3), for the return of the whole or a part of the seized property.
  Source: Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.59(2) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/16/section/59
Scotland — A limit applies: The Code of Practice on extraction of information from electronic devices says it only applies as regards the powers in Chapter 3 of Part 2 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 (‘the Act’), and that information which is extracted and deemed not relevant must be deleted unless there is a lawful basis to retain it. — Extraction of Information from Electronic Devices: Code of Practice (Oct 2022), paras 1, 4 and 138 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/634810a38fa8f53463dcb957/E02802691_Electronic_Devices_Code_of_Practice_WEB.pdf
  The same Code says it “only applies as regards the powers in Chapter 3 of Part 2 of the Act” (the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022) and that “If another power is being used as the basis for extracting information from an electronic device, the guidance/code for that power will apply.”
  Source: Extraction of Information from Electronic Devices: Code of Practice (Oct 2022), para 4 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/634810a38fa8f53463dcb957/E02802691_Electronic_Devices_Code_of_Practice_WEB.pdf
Australia — A limit applies: In Australia, under s.3ZQX(1) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), if the Commissioner is satisfied that a thing seized under Division 2 or 4 is not required (or is no longer required) for a purpose mentioned in section 3ZQU or for other judicial or administrative review proceedings, the Commissioner must take reasonable steps to return the thing to the person from whom it was seized or to the owner if that person is not entitled to possess it; under s.3ZQX(2), the Commissioner does not have to take those steps if the thing may be retained because of an order under subsection 3ZQZB(3), or any other order under that subsection has been made in relation to the thing; or the Commissioner has applied for such an order and the application has not been determined; or the thing may otherwise be retained, destroyed or disposed of under a law, or an order of a court or tribunal, of the Commonwealth or of a State or a Territory; or the thing is forfeited or forfeitable to the Commonwealth or is the subject of a dispute as to ownership. — Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3ZQX(1)–(2) — return of a thing seized under Division 2 or 4, and when return is not required (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026) — https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1
  Under s.3ZQZB(1) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), a magistrate may, on application by the Commissioner, make an order under subsection (2) or (3) in relation to a thing seized or a document produced under this Part.
  Source: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3ZQZB(1) — orders a magistrate may make on application by the Commissioner (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026) — https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1
  Under s.3ZQZB(3) and (4) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), the magistrate may make any of the orders in subsection (4) if satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that, if a thing seized or document produced under this Part is returned to the owner of the thing or document, to the person from whom the thing was seized, or to the person who produced the document, it is likely to be used by that person or another person in the commission of a terrorist act, a terrorism offence or a serious offence. The orders are: that the thing or document may be retained for the period specified in the order; that it is forfeited to the Commonwealth; for a thing that is not a document, that the thing be sold and the proceeds given to the owner, or sold in some other way; or that the thing or document is to be destroyed or otherwise disposed of.
  Source: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3ZQZB(3)–(4) — magistrate may order a thing seized to be retained, forfeited, sold or destroyed (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026) — https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1
  Under s.3ZQZB(5) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), the magistrate must order that a thing or document be returned to the following person if the magistrate is not satisfied as mentioned in subsection (2) or (3): in the case of a thing, the person from whom the thing was seized; in the case of a document, the person who produced the document; if the person referred to in paragraph (a) or (b) is not entitled to possess the thing or document, the owner of the thing or document.
  Source: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3ZQZB(5) — magistrate must order return if not satisfied as to retention (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026) — https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1
  Under s.3ZQZB(6) and (7) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), before making an application the Commissioner must take reasonable steps to discover who has an interest in the thing or document and, if it is practicable to do so, notify each person who the Commissioner believes to have such an interest of the proposed application; the magistrate must allow a person who has an interest in the thing or document to appear and be heard in determining the application.
  Source: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3ZQZB(6)–(7) — notice to persons with an interest, and the right to appear and be heard (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026) — https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1
  Section 3(1) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) says that in that Act, unless the contrary intention appears, “Commissioner means the Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police.”
  Source: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3(1) — definition of “Commissioner” (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026) — https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1914A00012/2026-08-27/2026-08-27/text/original/pdf/1
United States — A limit applies: In the United States, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g) says that a person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure of property or by the deprivation of property may move for the property’s return, and that the motion must be filed in the district where the property was seized. — Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g) — https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcrmp/rule_41

## Compare: At the border?
England & Wales — Must — refusing is an offence: Under Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000, a person commits an offence if they wilfully fail to comply with a duty imposed under or by virtue of that Schedule, wilfully contravene a prohibition imposed under or by virtue of that Schedule, or wilfully obstruct, or seek to frustrate, a search or examination under or by virtue of that Schedule. — Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 18(1) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/schedule/7/paragraph/18
  Under Schedule 7, a person who is questioned under paragraph 2 or 3 must give the examining officer any information in his possession which the officer requests.
  Source: Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 5(a) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/schedule/7
  The Schedule 7 Code of Practice (October 2025), at para 55, says that information requested by an examining officer under paragraph 5(a) may include passwords to electronic devices; the same paragraph says an examining officer may not, however, compel a person to disclose or confirm the identity of a source of journalistic information or disclose information subject to legal privilege. That is a rule for the examining officer. As quoted, it does not give the person a right to refuse any Schedule 7 duty.
  Source: Schedule 7 (Terrorism Act 2000) Code of Practice (Oct 2025), para 55 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68e7b52b187483de54d766d2/Schedule+7+Code+of+Practice.pdf
  Once in force, s.178 of the Crime and Policing Act 2026 will insert into Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 (port and border controls) a paragraph that will apply where an electronic device is detained under paragraph 11 after having been searched or found on a search under paragraph 8, or examined under paragraph 9; under it a relevant senior officer will be able to authorise a constable to extract information accessible by means of one or more online accounts which were accessed by means of the device before the search or examination began; the power will be exercisable only to extract information which was accessible by means of the online accounts at the time the search or examination began, and the powers under the paragraph will be exercisable only for so long as the electronic device continues to be detained under paragraph 11.
  Source: Crime and Policing Act 2026, s.178 — Terrorism Act 2000 Sch.7 para 11B(1)-(3) and (6) (inserted) — NOT YET IN FORCE — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2026/20/section/178
Scotland — Must — refusing is an offence: Under Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000, a person commits an offence if they wilfully fail to comply with a duty imposed under or by virtue of that Schedule, wilfully contravene a prohibition imposed under or by virtue of that Schedule, or wilfully obstruct, or seek to frustrate, a search or examination under or by virtue of that Schedule. — Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 18(1) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/schedule/7/paragraph/18
  Section 130(1) of the Terrorism Act 2000 says that, subject to subsections (2) to (6) of that section, the Act extends to the whole of the United Kingdom.
  Source: Terrorism Act 2000, s.130(1) (extent) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/section/130
  Under Schedule 7, a person who is questioned under paragraph 2 or 3 must give the examining officer any information in his possession which the officer requests.
  Source: Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 5(a) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/schedule/7
  The Schedule 7 Code of Practice (October 2025), at para 55, says that information requested by an examining officer under paragraph 5(a) may include passwords to electronic devices; the same paragraph says an examining officer may not, however, compel a person to disclose or confirm the identity of a source of journalistic information or disclose information subject to legal privilege. That is a rule for the examining officer. As quoted, it does not give the person a right to refuse any Schedule 7 duty.
  Source: Schedule 7 (Terrorism Act 2000) Code of Practice (Oct 2025), para 55 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68e7b52b187483de54d766d2/Schedule+7+Code+of+Practice.pdf
  Once in force, s.178 of the Crime and Policing Act 2026 will insert into Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 (port and border controls) a paragraph that will apply where an electronic device is detained under paragraph 11 after having been searched or found on a search under paragraph 8, or examined under paragraph 9; under it a relevant senior officer will be able to authorise a constable to extract information accessible by means of one or more online accounts which were accessed by means of the device before the search or examination began; the power will be exercisable only to extract information which was accessible by means of the online accounts at the time the search or examination began, and the powers under the paragraph will be exercisable only for so long as the electronic device continues to be detained under paragraph 11.
  Source: Crime and Policing Act 2026, s.178 — Terrorism Act 2000 Sch.7 para 11B(1)-(3) and (6) (inserted) — NOT YET IN FORCE — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2026/20/section/178
Australia — Agency says: may refuse: In Australia, the Australian Border Force’s written answer AE22-050 to a question taken on notice at the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs’ Additional Budget Estimates hearing of 14 February 2022 said there was no legal compulsion for a traveller to provide a password/passcode or provide assistance to an electronic device at the border. — Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Additional Budget Estimates, ABF written answer AE22-050 (document headed 14 Feb 2022) — no legal compulsion — https://www.aph.gov.au/api/qon/downloadattachment?attachmentId=bd0902f9-1209-49d9-9c86-b6858c22020d
  In the same answer, the Australian Border Force said that if an individual refused to comply with a request or provide a password for an examination of their electronic device, and an ABF officer considered there to be a risk to the border, the ABF officer was authorised to seize that device for further examination prior to being returned.
  Source: Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Additional Budget Estimates, ABF written answer AE22-050 (document headed 14 Feb 2022) — consequence of refusal — https://www.aph.gov.au/api/qon/downloadattachment?attachmentId=bd0902f9-1209-49d9-9c86-b6858c22020d
United States — Agency says: must: In the United States, CBP Directive 3340-049B says that travelers are obligated to present electronic devices and the information contained therein in a condition that allows inspection of the device and its contents. — CBP Directive No. 3340-049B §5.3.1 (eff. 1 Jan 2026) — https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/2026-01/cbp_directive_3340-049b_jan_2026_508.pdf
  The same directive says that if an officer is unable to complete an inspection of an electronic device because it is protected by a passcode or encryption, the officer may, in accordance with section 5.4 of the directive, detain the device pending a determination as to its admissibility, exclusion, or other disposition.
  Source: CBP Directive No. 3340-049B §5.3.3 (eff. 1 Jan 2026) — https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/2026-01/cbp_directive_3340-049b_jan_2026_508.pdf
  The same directive says that passcodes or other means of access obtained during a border inspection will only be utilized to facilitate the inspection of devices and information subject to border search, and that passcodes or other means of access may not be utilized to access information that is only stored remotely.
  Source: CBP Directive No. 3340-049B §5.3.2 (eff. 1 Jan 2026) — https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/2026-01/cbp_directive_3340-049b_jan_2026_508.pdf

## Tools

### Rights card
URL: https://phoneseized.com/tools/rights-card
A compact, print-friendly card with the key facts for your jurisdiction, sourced the same way as every guide page.

### The next 60 seconds
URL: https://phoneseized.com/tools/next-60-seconds
Things to ask and check in the first minute of an encounter, each with a quoted source behind it.

### Border prep
URL: https://phoneseized.com/tools/border-prep
What the law and the agencies’ own documents say at a border, and what the sources say happens to a device afterward.

### What's on your phone
URL: https://phoneseized.com/tools/whats-on-your-phone
A walkthrough of what a modern phone actually stores, so "they have my phone" has a concrete answer.

### Could they get in?
URL: https://phoneseized.com/tools/could-they-get-in
What stands between your device’s data and someone who has it.